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Preface
For much time, the general impression has been that Europe is doing little to nothing
in responding to developments that threaten checks and balances in the European
legal space. Today that is not true anymore, so the discussion should move on. This
book brings together insight from two conferences on this topic. One conference was
held at the University of Warsaw in September 2017, the topic being “Protecting
European Union Values: Breaches of Article 2 TUE and their Consequences.” The
other conference, held in Berlin at the Wissenschaftskolleg in January 2019, focused
under the title of “Constitutional Courts and Political Change” on the role of
domestic constitutional courts in this respect. The common thread is to better
understand how checks and balances are threatened in some Member States and to
assess what Europe is doing about it.
At the time when the first conference took place, few could expect that the whole
situation develops so dynamically. A few months later, in December 2017, the
European Commission triggered Article 7 (1) TEU for the first time in relation to
Polish judicial reforms. There have been three infringement proceedings started
against Poland by the Commission under Article 258 of the Treaty on the function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU). One of them concerning the regime of disci-
plinary liability of Polish judges is still pending (C-791/19). Two of them concerning
aspects of judicial independence of Polish Common Courts (C-192/18) and the
Polish Supreme Court (C-619/18) have been already brought to the end.
Worth mentioning is especially the latter case, which in fact saved the substance
and independence of the Polish Supreme Court. The Court of Justice imposed on
Poland a groundbreaking interim order (C-619/18 R), consisting not only of the
suspension of the application of the regulations lowering the retirement age but also
in reinstating the judges of the Supreme Court dismissed. The Court pointed out that
ordering interim measures has the effect of directly and immediately suspending the
application of the challenged national regulations, including those that led to
repealing or replacement of the regulations formerly fixing the retirement age of
Supreme Court judges, in view of which those former regulations shall apply until
v
delivery of final judgment in the case. Consequently, the Court “brought back to life”
the former law that had been repealed by the national legislature.
In the final judgment, the Court held in strong words that doubts may be raised as
to whether the reform of the retirement age was made by the Polish government in
pursuance of standardizing the retirement age of judges and all other employees and
not “with the aim of side-lining a certain group of Supreme Court judges.” By the
same, it rejected Poland’s explanation that the introduced changes had an important,
justified purpose and were proportionate.
It should also be stated that since 2018, Polish courts, including but not limited to
the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court, referred to the Court of
Justice for numerous preliminary references concerning the independence of judi-
ciary treating EU law as a shield against governmental measures undermining the
judiciary. A variety of these references are still pending before the Court of Justice.
One of the last notable events in Poland was the judgment issued by the Court of
Justice on 19 November 2019 in Joined Cases A.K. v. Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa
(C-585/18) and CP (C-624/18), DO (C-625/18) v. Sąd Najwyższy. This judgment
made it clear that judicial independence must be guaranteed also in the context of
procedures of appointing judges which must exclude any reasonable doubt as to the
court’s independence of any external factors as well as its neutrality with respect to
the overlapping interests on which it rules. It opened the door to questioning panels
in courts that include individuals appointed with the recommendation of the Polish
National Council of Judiciary and judgments issued by them.
Following the Court’s Judgment, the Chamber of Labour and Social Security of
the SC issued three rulings in which it has been stated that the Disciplinary Chamber
of the SC is not a court within the meaning of EU law due to its lack of independence
according to the criteria established by the ECJ. Worth mentioning is also the
resolution adopted by three “old” chambers of the Polish Supreme Court on
23 January 2020, which adopts binding criteria of the Court’s November ruling to
Polish judicial procedures and national courts. That resolution states i.a. that two
“new” chambers of the Polish Supreme Court (Chamber for Disciplinary matters and
the Chamber of Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs), appointed by the current
governmental majority, are not independent Courts in the meaning of EU Law and
according to the Polish legal system.
As courts across Poland started to apply those criteria, the ruling majority started
a counter-attack: massive disciplinary proceedings against judges (even with crim-
inal charges) are being initiated under the supervision of the Prosecutor General who
is at the same time the Minister of Justice. The government and the “new” part of the
Supreme Court simply ignore the binding resolution of the “old” Supreme Court. A
special “muzzle” law has been prepared in order to silence those judges who try to
apply the ECJ’s judgment. According to that law actions challenging the existence of
a service relationship of a judge, the effectiveness of a judge’s appointment or the
legitimacy of a constitutional authority of the Republic of Poland constitutes a
disciplinary offense for which the judge may be punished with dismissal from office.
In January 2020, few days before we finished this foreword, the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal, which has already been subordinated to the will of the executive
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power and does not guarantee impartial and effective constitutional control, issued
an interim measure suspending the judgment of the Supreme Court which followed
the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Justice. That suspension is without
precedent and according to the majority of constitutional scholars also without any
legal grounds. One of the contributions in this book emphasizes the importance of
the “red lines”. Is it a moment in which these lines are just crossed?
Finally, one should not lose sight of numerous proceedings which are still
pending before Polish courts, aimed at the verification of legislative solutions
adopted by the ruling majority in Poland from the perspective of judicial indepen-
dence. Those cases include preliminary referrals i.a. on suspending a national law on
the basis of the principle of effective judicial protection (C-522/18), on the scope of
application of Art. 19 (1) TEU in judicial proceedings that have no EU element at all
(C-558/18 and C-563/18), on whether two chambers of the SC are “established by
law” due to a flagrant infringement of national law during the appointing process of
judges sitting on those benches (C-508/19 and C-487/19), or on the right to judicial
control of the appointment process of judges to the SC from the perspective of
candidates for judicial positions (C-824/18). There is no doubt that after those
questions have been answered by the Court, a huge step in developing the standard
of judicial independence in EU law will be made.
We wish to thank the Leibniz Program of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
for generous support as well as the rector of the Wissenschaftskolleg, Barbara
Stollberg-Rilinger, for her generous welcome, as well as Giacomo Rugge, Dimitri
Spieker, and the MPIL’s Editorial Department for bringing the volume to publica-
tion.
Heidelberg, Germany Armin von Bogdandy
Warsaw, Poland Piotr Bogdanowicz
Tel Aviv, Israel Iris Canor
Vienna, Austria Christoph Grabenwarter
Warsaw, Poland Maciej Taborowski
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Abstract Polarization in today’s politics, pre- and post COVID, transcends nations,
states regions and continents. It’s a feature of politics which, in and on itself, when
played to extremes by demonizing one’s opponents, it threatens democracy itself—
since it frays the demos some cohesion of which is necessary for the legitimacy of
majoritarianism, one of the pillars of national democracies. Its lexical manifestation
is to be found with expressions such as ‘traitors’ or ‘not real’ Americans, Italians,
Israelis—take your pick and fill in the gap.
It has, lamentably in my view, a spillover effect also into the academic world of
scholarship. A word of criticism of, say, the European Court of Justice instantly
brands you a ‘Eurosceptic’ and one of ‘them’. To speak of Universal Values, casts
you as an enemy of this or that national cause. This is not to say, not at all, that one
cannot bring to one’s scholarship a fully engaged normative and ethical commit-
ment, especially in the field of law which has, or should have, at its roots a
commitment to justice. But it militates against careful listening, complex reasoning
and understanding and more fine grained normative judgments. Justice is oftentimes
not black and white.
It is particularly so when it comes to dealing with the phenomenon of Populism
which has moved from the fringe to the center of politics. Trying to understand
Populism is not akin to justifying it.
J. H. H. Weiler (*)
New York University, New York, NY, USA
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I despise the word Populism. When you like them, (Tzipras in Greece or Podemos in
Spain perhaps?) they are Popular. When you dislike them, they are Populist. But this
is just the beginning. In a political circumstance which requires discernment and
careful judgment in arriving at moral and political conclusions, ‘Populism’ is a broad
and lazy paintbrush which colors everyone with the same damning color and allows
one to feel virtuous, basking in one’s own self-righteousness. Salvini, Hungary,
Marine Le Pen, Poland, Brexiteers, AfD etc? They are all the same, are they not?
Well, they are not, far from it. It is as wrong as it is unhelpful.
‘Populism’ is a proxy for two judgmental sentiments: ‘They’ are either fascists, or
at best crypto-fascists, whom you can thus just write off and consign to the beyond-
the-pale waste bin, (which is appropriate for those who are truly so!) And/or, they are
(resorting to that odious Marxist trope of False Consciousness) simply dumb. ‘They’
do not get it, if only they understood. . .Yes, there are among them quite a few which
are both, but I refuse to accept that millions of Europeans, in Member States from
East to West, from North to South, are either dumb or have become in short order
fascists.
Be that as it may, there is a deep self-exculpatory streak in the simplistic narrative
concerning those ‘awful populists’. It exculpates us, the bien pensants of the Post
WWII political and moral comfort zone which extends between Christian Democ-
racy and Social Democracy and an ironclad commitment to European integration. It
obviates the necessity of some serious soul searching of what in the established
political order has led to this major, non-peripheral rupture in the European consen-
sus and to examine, what if anything is our responsibility for such.
The two principal sins of the ‘populists’ is a growing Euroskepticism and a
disillusionment with the fundamentals of the liberal democratic order.
I hope my credentials are such that my lifelong commitment to the European
construct will not be called into question nor, my old fashioned liberal commitment.
When it comes to Europe, this enduring commitment is rooted not only or even
principally in the material and utilitarian benefits of such, but in the deep moral and
even spiritual dimensions of the construct—aimed at forging a different kind of
human relations among peoples divided by borders: Nous ne coalisons pas des Etats
nous unissons des hommes. And the commitment to liberal democracy (which in
Europe can cover the gamut from Socialism, through social democracy, through
liberalism, Christian Democracy including democratic social conservatives) is to be
considered as the oxygen of our shared political life.
But we cannot turn a blind eye to some major fault lines in the construct which
contradict its most cherished values. Despite the full empowerment of the European
Parliament European democracy remains deeply flawed. The two most primitive
features of democracy, which cut across the rich variety of specific arrangements in
our Member States, are the ability of the electorate, through parliamentary elections
(in this case elections to the European Parliament) to determine, or have a decisive
weight in deciding, by whom we will be governed, and, at least in a broad way, what
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will be the ideological and policy direction by which we will be governed. It is not
comfortable to admit, but European democracy fails on both grounds. The first point
was painfully visible in relation to electing the current incumbent heading the
Commission (like her predecessor I think she is an impressive incumbent, but this
is beside the point); and over the years we have come to realize that voter preference
in the outcome of such elections has had a tenuous connection to the policies of the
Union. Our system does not allow European citizens to feel, even in relation to these
two primitive parameters, that they have any appreciable impact on the governance
of the polity.
It should surprise no one that the slogan, iterated in different forms by
Eurosceptics, Taking back Control, had and has so much resonance. The resulting
alienation is not simply understandable but in no small measure justified.
These defects of the political process give added weight to the importance of the
European Court of Justice and the European legal order. It is not perfect, far from it; I
have published from time to time trenchant critiques of some of its judgments and
certain aspects of its modus operandi.1 But it is fiercely independent in its spirit and
self-understanding, does not kowtow to Member State government interests and has
placed the individual and his or her rights squarely in the center of its juridical
sensibilities. It is not only the de facto constitutional court of the Union, but more
than Brussels, Luxembourg epitomizes the meaning that may be given to European
citizenship. The Court might infuriate us from time to time. If the motto of the EU is
United in Diversity, in its jurisprudence it might have, in the eyes of some, given
more weight to United than to Diversity. One could argue that it would be well
advised to foster a veritably more dialogical process with its Statal judicial interloc-
utors. But the way to change, if change is needed, is through constitutional channels.
If the authority of and the loyalty to the European Court of Justice were to be
seriously undermined, it would not only be a blow to the rule of law in the
transnational arena for which Europe is the world leader, the very European con-
struct as a space of justice would be threatened.
2 What of the Disillusionment with Liberal Democracy?
The ‘Holy Trinity’ of the liberal order are Democracy (free elections and majoritar-
ian rule), Human Rights and the Rule of Law. I use the term ‘Holy Trinity’ only with
limited irony. Since, like the real Holy Trinity, the three are one: Majority gover-
nance without the constraints of human rights and the rule of law is but a tyranny of
the majority. Human rights without effective rule of law are but slogans. The rule of
law, outside a democracy is simply the most effective instrument of authoritarianism
and worse. That is why so called ‘illiberal democracy’ is an oxymoron. It is no
democracy at all.
1See for example https://www.ejiltalk.org/je-suis-achbita/.
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There is a second sense in which I use the metaphor of ‘Holy Trinity’. These three
values represent the bedrock of our civil faith, the reason we fought to overturn both
fascism and Communism in the twentieth Century.
But whence, then, the disillusionment with these noble values?
It is oft forgotten that these are peculiar values in the sense that they are mostly
but conditions for the Good Life (in the ancient Greek and Biblical sense). Democ-
racy is a ‘technology’ of governance, flawed but the best we have. But it gives no
instruction as to the content that has to be put in place in the act of governance. A
democracy of evil people will be an evil democracy even if enjoying majoritarian
support, does not violate human rights and respects the rule of law. Human Rights
guarantee our liberties but give no instruction as to how one should exercise such
liberties. One can use freedom of expression, for example, to be vile. One can be
mean spirited, egoistic, hard hearted and lacking in charity and mercy and yet not
violate anyone’s human rights. And provided our laws do not violate fundamental
human rights, they too, can be uncaring, socially unjust, draconian and yet the rule of
law would still be observed.
In this sense, then, the ‘Holy Trinity’ are but a framework to be filled. They are
like the oxygen of physical life. You need it to live, but it does not determine how
your life will be lived.
What has been, generally speaking, the governance policy content that has been
put into this framework in the Post WWII decades by the European political
consensus, and what has been left out?
It has been primarily material: Prosperity. The Treaty of Rome expresses this
enduring concern very well: The [European] Community shall have as its task, by
establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic
policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer
relations between the States belonging to it.
The Treaty of Nice further elaborated this concern by stating: The Community
shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an economic and
monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred to in
Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and
sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of
social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and
non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of
economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality
of the environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and
economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.2
2Treaty establishing the European Community (Nice consolidated version), Article 2, Official
Journal C 325, 24/12/2002 P. 0033—0184, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0173—Consol-
idated version.
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The magic square of development of economic activities, expansion (growth),
increased stability (low inflation) and raising standard of living—the Canon of Ordo-
Liberalism—has been the bedrock of European politics for decades. This is mainly
what the main parties argue about—the best way to achieve such: Fiscal austerity or
otherwise and how much? And what policies of redistribution are the best to ensure
prosperity with social justice. There are some notable theorists of democracy who
claim that the essence of democratic governance is but the issue of redistributive
politics. Christian democracy and social democracy, until recently occupying the
central space of European politics shared this same bed.
Our record in this sphere is both spectacular and dismal. These politics, the
different political divisions between the center left and center right notwithstanding,
has resulted in remarkable overall growth in prosperity and the European construct
has played a critical role in such. But these politics, the different political divisions
between the center left and center right notwithstanding, has also seen a remarkable
growth in the uneven distribution of the deserts of this political project and of, more
recently economic globalization. It is a common place that as a result of this gap, a
growing segment of the population has felt left out of this success story.
A blind spot of Ordo-liberalism which under different guises and labels has so
dominated our political landscape is that it regards the human person, in as much as
politics is concerned, as Homo Economicus. But Not on Bread Alone doth Man
Liveth. When one, explicitly and implicitly, places Prosperity at the center of your
politics, one is transmitting a value, a measurement of ‘worth’ and of Respect. Just
think of the respect that is accorded those States that ‘make it’ in these terms: The
Germanys and Americas and Switzerlands of this world. And the same becomes true
at the social and individual human level. The gap thus produces not only a resent-
ment at the material unequal distribution of prosperity, but a deep sense of ‘not
making it’ in a society which values ‘making it’ above all, an attendant sense of
disrespect.
One cannot overstate the centrality of respect (and the lack of it) to human
wellbeing. If we consider how, in Europe, in our various constitutions and charters
of rights we have placed the inviolability of dignity as our primary human right, one
can understand how potent will this disrespect be, real and perceived, in the political
arena. The sense of material inequality pales in comparison to the sense of
dignitarian inequality and deprivation. It is no answer to say that personally one
does not disrespect persons because of their economic condition, if the system, as a
whole, privileges so much material well-being and prosperity.
Our centrist politics are characterized not only by what has been placed at the
center but by what has been removed.
In the critique of liberalism by such as Michael Sandel and Michael Walzer to
name but two, a central argument concerns the very focus of liberalism on the
individual and his or her liberties. Yet, the human person is always ‘situated’,
sociality is integral to the sense of self. And I would add I would postulate—that
as part of the very human condition there is a quest to give ‘meaning’ to one’s life in
the sense that the sum of one’s existence not be limited to self-betterment—the
engine of the free market—but will have some meaning that transcends such. And
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indeed it is the social condition that often provides this because it is only in sociality
that altruism may be practiced and experienced. Moreover, the social situates the
individual within a collective identity; it is commonplace that it is the collective
identity which contributes to the sense of meaning that goes beyond the self.
In the pre-War era the two institutions which were most prevalent in this respect
were national patriotism and religious faith. People found deep meaning in both. It is
important to state, immediately, that the understanding of both is not exhausted, not
even remotely so, by the meaning that was given to them in that era.
For reasons that are quite understandable, the very word ‘patriotism’ became
‘unprintable’ after the War notably in Western Europe. Fascist regimes (among
others), by abusing the word and the concept, had ‘burned’ it from our collective
consciousness. And in many ways this has been a positive thing. But we also pay a
high price for having banished this word—and the sentiment it expresses—from our
psycho-political vocabulary. Since patriotism also has a noble side: the discipline of
love, the duty to take care of one’s homeland and people, of one’s neighbour; of
accepting our civic responsibility toward the community in which we live. In reality,
true patriotism is the opposite of Fascism: ‘We do not belong to the State as fascism
claims; it’s the State that belongs to us’ and we are responsible for it and what
happens to it which is the essence of democratic republicanism.
But the baby—a liberal and enlightened sense of national belongingness and
pride—was thrown out with the bathwater of pre-War odious atavistic nationalism.
For reasons which I will not elaborate here, Europe, with probably the exception
of Poland and a handful of others, underwent in the post war politics a rapid process
of secularization. Not only did Laicite become prevalent and normative, but with
time it has, as I argue in my book A Christian Europe,3 been accompanied by distinct
Christophobic manifestations.
This is obviously not a call for evangelization. I never judge a person by their
faith or lack of it. I know religious persons who are awful human beings and atheists
who are noble. But as a society we have paid two heavy prices for this process. First,
we have lost a voice which was at one time universal and ubiquitous. A voice in
which the emphasis was on duty and responsibility and not only rights, on personal
responsibility in the face of what happens to us, our neighbours and our society. It
has been replaced by an instinctive appeal to public institutions as both the source of
all ills and as the remedy. In Church you do not hear about your entitlements from
the State and others but on your duty towards society and others. No politician today
in Europe could or would repeat the famous Kennedy Inauguration speech of
1960—Don’t ask what your country can do for you but what you can do . . . . Etc.
The Citizenship chapter of the European Treaties are a poignant example. They
speak of rights and duties which the citizen enjoys and owes—but then no duties are
ever mentioned.
Duty and responsibility—towards others and not only ourselves and our fami-
lies—are empowering as citizens and human beings. They, like identity, are meaning
3Weiler (2004).
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giving. And, of course, with a laique culture which consigns religions to the private
sphere at best, and disdains it at worst, those to whom religion is an important point
of reference feel marginalized, at times disrespected and under (non physical) threat.
Our commitment to rights, as has been pointed out by many is not, too, without
ambiguities. We’ve accepted, both at the national and international levels, a serious
and irreversible obligation rooted in our Constitutions to protect the fundamental
rights of individuals, even against the political tyranny of the majority. At a more
general level, our political-juridical vocabulary has become a discussion of legal
rights. The rights of, say, a German citizen are protected by our Courts, and, above
all, by the Constitutional Court. But also by the Court of Justice of the EU in
Luxembourg, and—again—by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
It’s enough to make your head spin. And this is true for the other Member States.
Just think about how common it has become, in the political discourse of today, to
speak more and more about ‘rights.’ To try and turn any political action into a legal
action about rights, and entitlements. And using the courts, again and again, to
achieve our political objectives. It’s enormously important. I would never want to
live in a country in which fundamental rights are not effectively defended. But here
too—as with the banishment of patriotism—we pay a dear price. Actually, we pay
two prices.
First and foremost, the noble culture of rights does put the individual at the center,
but little by little, almost without realizing it, it turns him or her into a self-centered
individual. It not only atomizes the individual since most fundamental right battles
poses an individual and his or her liberties against the collective good but it also
‘objectifies’ him or her—as an object of someone else’s power. The (justified)
concern with human rights at the European level gives some cover to the loss of
power resulting from our flawed democratic process.
And the second effect of this ‘culture of rights’—which is a framework all
Europeans have in common—is a kind of flattening of political and cultural speci-
ficity, of one’s own unique national identity.
For the most part ‘Identity’ politics are considered an evil. And when
identitarianism turns into atavism and worse, it is an evil. But Identity, individual
and collective, like patriotism, have, too, a noble dimension. The notion of human
dignity—(in the secular version it is part of human ontology; in the religion version it
flows from the fact that we have been created in the image of God) contains, at one
and the same time, two facets. On the one hand, it means that we are all equal in our
fundamental human dignity: rich and poor, Italians and Germans, men and women,
Gentile and Jew. To assign more worth to the life of one individual over another, is
an assault on our dignity. On the other hand, recognizing human dignity means
accepting that each of us is an entire universe, distinct and different from any other
person. To treat any of us as fungible with others is an equal assault. And the same is
true for each of our societies. To deracinate the cultural specificity of each of our
nations and societies is, in this sense, to compromise an essential element of our
dignity. When this element of diversity is diminished or derided, we rebel.
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And since with only small differences of nuance our supreme value as Europeans
are our belief in the Holy Trinity of Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law (and
thankfully this is the case) the specificities of our identities are seen to be devalued.
The ‘Holy Trinity’ remain indispensable, a ‘sacred’ dimension of our civil life.
But I have argued that they are accompanied by a vacuum as regards the politics of
meaning which I had ostulated as indispensable to the human condition.
The vacuum thus created has not been filled by mainstream politics, and the
‘populist’ turn at least in some appreciable measure has been a response to such. Of
course it is tragic if the vacuum is filled by a return to pre-War versions of atavistic
identity but the pretense that all is well if only the material needs of the human
person are satisfied—as in Clinton’s famous adage ‘It’s the Economy, Stupid’ is
terribly reductionist and as wrong in America as it has proven to be in Europe.
Mussolini understood this perfectly and his Family, Church, Nation slogan had
immense mobilizing power for just this reason—it catered to the politics of meaning.
But it has to be emphasized again and again—different imaginaries exist. There can
be, if we are to fasten on those three social institutions—and they are not the only
ones—a concept of Patria and patriotism which is neither fascist nor atavistic but
inclusive and celebrating diversity richness; there can be family which is not
patriarchal but progressive and egalitarian and there are forms of our classical
religions which are non-hierarchical but communitarian. This is not the place to
elaborate on these but simply to remind us that a politics which and a social telos
which reduces men and women to homo economicus are bound to produce the
backlash we are experiencing today.
3 Poland
I turn now to Poland. The Polish narrative leaves few indifferent. Decades of
oppression by both fascism and then Communism followed by liberation and
impressive rejuvenation is a success story widely shared. Poland enjoys both high
prestige and affection. It was Poland and the Polish who rocked the foundations of
the Soviet empire and toppled the first domino which ended with the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Who cannot feel deep solidarity, admiration and, yes, gratitude for
Solidarnosc, for Tischner, for Wałęsa, for father Jerzy Popiełuszko and all the rest?
And the story of Poland in WWII—the heroism of Warsaw 44 is unique among
those countries occupied by Germany. It was neither Paris or Rome or Amsterdam
which rose in quite the same way and with quite the same cost.
And in more recent times, once liberated, who cannot but exclaim at the creativity
and industriousness resulting in such rapid economic and political transformation,
second to none?
I am not ignorant or oblivious to the shadows—we do not live in a society of
saints and Poland is no exception; I am aware of the current critique of Polish
democracy, both from within and without, some fully justified, some exaggerated,
some outright fanciful. But Polish democracy endures. No one can fault the integrity
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of Polish elections themselves; the 2019 elections with power in the Senate changing
hands is just one testimony to such. No one is afraid of a knock on the door in the
middle of the night. There are no political prisoners languishing in camps or prisons.
There is still a robust free media, traditional and social, as some counterweight to a
government dominated public media, and the pro- and anti-government demonstra-
tions are proof of an engaged citizenship, the life of a vibrant democracy. Yes, I
detest the use of criminal sanctions in cases of alleged or real defamation, especially
in the political arena. But I detest it as much in France as I do in Poland.
Can Polish democracy be better? Of course it can. Are there dangers and threats?
There are. Should one be vigilant and engaged? One should. But this should not
cloud one’s overall judgment—which is far from black and white.
Do I agree with the policies of the current government? With some I do. I have,
for example, sympathy for their concern for those segments of the population which
suffered the unequal distribution of the deserts of the ‘Polish economic miracle.’ I
also have sympathy for the legitimate concern to cherish that which is unique and
special in Polish identity, including its Catholic heritage (though naturally I recoil
when for some this legitimate and even essential value provides cover for vulgar
expressions of xenophobia, homophobia and anti-Semitism). I do think the World
needs educating on the suffering and heroism of Poland in WWII. The outrageous
comments of Mr. Putin are particularly revolting in this context.
With other policies I do not. For example, government use of public media in the
political arena is, against the American and British practice to which I am accus-
tomed, alien to me and mars Polish democracy.
But I am always mindful that it is the democratically elected government of
Poland, and it is well to remember that the discipline of democracy is such that one
has to accept the discipline of democracy.
In my view the gravest threat to democracy in Poland and some other Western
countries (the USA, Italy, Spain, Israel and others) is, as noted above, a polarization
of society which goes beyond the normal divisions between strongly held views of,
say, Left and Right. A polarization which entirely delegitimizes one’s political
adversaries, considers them as betraying the patria and worse. This not only stifles
civic discourse it also fractures the demos; a sense of shared destiny, beyond political
divisions is essential to democracy. The word Demos in democracy is not a lexical
artifact. It is an ontological necessity for a functioning democracy. This imposes a
duty, easier to preach than to practice, to moderate the tones of contentious political
discourse for both sides and to realize that once a certain line has been crossed it is
extremely difficult to pull back. Lack of restraint on one side feeds the same on the
other and the vicious spiral just deepens.
But when it comes to the Rule of Law one cannot but lament some of the
measures recently introduced. One should not get the impression that the functioning
of the Polish judicial system pre 2015 was a bed of roses. Voices both of the left and
right of the political spectrum identified serious flaws which called for reform. But
the manner in which this reform has been taken has been, in my view, impatient,
short sighted and damaging in the long term to one of the foundations of democracy.
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There is no need to list these measures, the principal ones of which have been the
subject of litigation and already condemnation by the European Court of Justice.
I say this for several reasons.
Politics have some role in the appointment of the judiciary, and different coun-
tries manage such in different ways. In the United States some State judges are
selected by a popular vote on election day. A terrible system. And appointments to
the Supreme Court have become a highly charged political battle, an example for no
one. One better look to, say, Italy or Germany for more thoughtful and politically
balanced systems. Be that as it may, once appointed, the independence of the
judiciary becomes, for obvious reasons, the bedrock of the Rule of Law. Judicial
misconduct such as bribe taking has of course to be dealt with, including eventually
by criminal sanctions. But objectionable judicial decision making is to be dealt with
through the judicial appeal process. Disciplinary proceedings affect directly the kind
of judicial independence in deciding a case essential to the judicial function. A threat
is no different from a bribe. I think this point has been made sufficiently and I do not
need to add. But there is one dimension which troubles me beyond the intrinsic
point. Poland is a democracy which means that sooner or later, as in all our European
democracies, a new party and a new government will come into power. It would be a
disaster, if the practice were established, that each new government would feel it had
a license to reshape the judiciary to fit its own sensibility. The damage, thus, is not
simply to the immediate independence of the judiciary but to the long term culture of
judicial independence. Democrats in the USAmight be furious with judicial appoint-
ments made during a Republican administration and no less so with decisions of
judges so appointed. And vice versa, of course. But both sides would consider it
anathema to seek to touch those sitting judges precisely for realizing that the
principle of judicial independence in the political culture of the nation is in the
long term more important than a short terms gain in, say, the manner of appointing or
disciplining judges. Self restraint and patience are the only viable approach to this
dilemma if the essential balance between democracy, human rights and the rule of
law is compromised. The rule of law and the independence of the judiciary is what
stands between democracy and the tyranny of the majority.
There has also been enough discussion on the ill will towards Poland which the
various judicial reform plans have generated, even among firm friends of Poland.
Seen from the outside, Poland is paying an increasingly heavy reputational price for
a project which is intrinsically flawed.
But here, too, I want to add, with humility, a point which has received somewhat
less attention. I have already expressed, in word and deed, my sympathy for a
country such as Poland which wants to hold on to its Christian identity respecting
at the same time, in the European tradition, full freedom of religion and freedom
from religion. In some ways it is one of the few remaining countries in Europe which
is serious about such and certainly the most important. It is the embodiment of JPIIs
encyclical Centesimus Annus, a foundational document of the twentieth Century,
which argued persuasively the manner in which Christianity and democracy are not
antagonists. This is not only important for Poland but for Europe as a whole. This
places a special responsibility on the State. There are certain lines which Poland
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crosses not only compromise the reputation of Poland but the perception of the
viability of the Centesimus Annus proposition to the detriment of European
civilization.
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Abstract This chapter concerns the constitutional crisis in Poland that began in
2015. It was triggered by appointing judges of the Constitutional Tribunal, by the
outgoing Parliament, and then by re-appointing new judges for the same vacancies.
Thus, the status of three judges elected by the previous Parliament and three judges
elected by the current Parliament remains disputable.
One of the crucial elements of the rule of law is the principle of legality. There are
two aspects of this principle: the presumption of legality that covers all acts of state
bodies; the revoking of this presumption may be performed only within procedures
prescribed by the law. The law should indicate a state body competent to revoke the
presumption of legality and define the legal effects of such revoking. If the law is
incomplete, incoherent or imprecise in that scope—that may lead to legal and
political crisis. Polish legislation and Constitution fail to comply with the said
standard. This is one of the causes of the constitutional crisis in Poland.
In a state governed by the rule of law state bodies should mutually respect their
acts. State bodies should not treat acts or decisions issued by other state bodies as
invalid or non-existent, unless it is declared within a procedure prescribed by the
law. Otherwise, a legal chaos may occur. Courts are not empowered to evaluate the
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lawfulness of the Tribunal’s judgments. One of the crucial elements of the rule of
law principle is the certainty of law.
1 Introduction
This contribution concerns the crisis that was caused by the election of five judges of
the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT) in October and December 2015. The events
that took place at that time led to the greatest constitutional dispute in the modern
history of Poland and to the so-called ‘rule of law crisis’ in Poland that was subject to
numerous procedures, in particular, before the organs of the European Union and the
Council of Europe.1 The principal aim of this contribution is to explain and evaluate
sine studio et ira the sequence of actions that led to the crisis and to identify its root
causes from the perspective of the rule of law principle.
It should be emphasised that the precise analysis of the aforementioned question
is crucial, since the whole rule of law crisis in Poland began with the Constitutional
Tribunal-related problem.2
2 Facts and Law
The constitutional crisis in Poland began in October 2015. It was triggered by
appointing, by the outgoing Parliament (elected for the 2011–2015 term of office),
five new judges of the CT. Subsequently, in December 2015, after parliamentary
elections, the newly-elected Sejm re-appointed constitutional judges for the same
vacancies.3
According to Art. 194 para. 1 of the Polish Constitution:4 ‘The Constitutional
Tribunal shall be composed of 15 judges chosen individually by the Sejm for a term
1See, in particular, Opinion no. 833/2015 of the Venice Commission on Amendments to the Act of
25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland; Opinion no. 860/2016 of the Venice
Commission on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal; Commission Recommendation
(EU) 2016/1374 of 27 July 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland; Commission Recommendation
(EU) 2017/146 of 21 December 2016 regarding the rule of law in Poland complementary to
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374.
2Cf. Sadurski (2019), pp. 15–16.
3Detailed information, concerning subsequent stages of the constitutional crisis in Poland
2015–2016, is presented, in particular, in the following publications: Kustra (2016), Szuleka
et al. (2016), Krzywoń (2018) and Sadurski (2019).
4Constitution of the Republic of Poland, adopted by the National Assembly on 2 April 1997
(English translation: www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm [accessed 19 August
2019]).
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of office of 9 years from amongst persons distinguished by their knowledge of the
law. No person may be chosen for more than one term of office.’5 On the basis of this
constitutional provision, in 2006, five constitutional judges were appointed. Their
terms of office began on 6 November (three judges), on 2 December (one judge) and
on 8 December 2006 (one judge). Thus, five vacancies opened 9 years later,
accordingly, on 7 November, on 3 December and on 9 December 2015.
On 25 June 2015, a few months prior to parliamentary elections, the Parliament
adopted the new CT Act (2015 Act) which repealed the hitherto binding CT Act
1997.6 The principal aim of the new Act was to simplify the procedure for the
constitutional review, to accelerate this procedure and to explain certain procedural
doubts that had arisen in the past.
The Sejm decided, however, that the 2015 Act should comprise also some
transitional provisions which would concern the election procedure for the vacancies
that would open on November and December 2015. According to Art. 137 of the
2015 Act: ‘With regard to judges of the Tribunal whose terms of office end in 2015,
the time-limit for submitting the proposal referred to in Art. 19 para. 2 shall be
30 days from the date of entry into force of the Act.’7
On 21 July 2015, the then Polish President signed the new CT Act. On 30 July
2015 it was published in the Journal of Laws and it entered into force after the expiry
of a 1-month vacatio legis period.8 In the meantime, i.e. on 17 July 2015, the
President summoned the parliamentary elections. The day of elections was set for
25 October 2015.
During the last session of the outgoing Sejm, the Deputies decided to elect five
new constitutional judges. Five Sejm’s resolutions on appointing judges were
adopted on 8 October 2015, i.e. 17 days before the parliamentary elections. Each
resolution indicated the exact date when the term of office of a newly-elected judge
would commence. Three of them indicated 7 November (R. Hauser, A. Jakubecki,
K. Ślebzak), one—3 December (B. Sitek) and one—9 December 2015 (A. Sokala).
According to Art. 21 para. 1 of the 2015 Act, a person elected by the Sejm to
assume the office of a constitutional judge was subsequently obliged to take the oath
of office in the presence of the Polish President.9 As regards persons elected on
8 October 2015, the President did not, however, organize the swearing-in ceremony.
5Sejm is the first chamber of the Polish Parliament.
6English translations of the 1997 Act and the 2015 Act: www.trybunal.gov.pl/en/about-the-tribunal/
legal-basis/the-constitutional-tribunal-act/archive/ (accessed 19 August 2019).
7Art. 19 para. 2 of the 2015 Act: ‘A proposal of a candidate for the judgeship at the Tribunal shall be
lodged with the Marshal of the Sejm no later than 3 months prior to the end of the term of office of a
judge of the Tribunal.’
8See Art. 139 of the 2015 Act.
9According to Art. 21 para. 2 of the 2015 Act: ‘Refusal to take the oath of office shall be tantamount
to resignation from the office of a judge of the Tribunal.’
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Parliamentary elections were held on 25 October 2015. The term of office of the
newly-elected Sejm began on 12 November 2015, according to the order of the
Polish President, issued on 5 November 2015.10
Immediately after the inauguration of the new Sejm’s term of office, on
17 November 2015, a group of Sejm Deputies lodged with the CT a motion to
review the constitutionality of Art. 137 and some other provisions of the 2015 Act, in
particular provisions concerning the swearing-in stage of a constitutional judge
nomination procedure. Two days after having received the motion, the CT
announced that the hearing of the case would be carried out 2 weeks later, i.e. on
3 December 2015.
A few days before the hearing, on 25 November 2015, the Sejm adopted five
resolutions declaring that the elections of constitutional judges, performed by the
previous Sejm on 8 October 2015, had been null and void due to procedural
irregularities. In the reasoning for these resolutions their authors (a group of Sejm
Deputies) acknowledged that the Sejm was not empowered to dismiss a constitu-
tional judge from office, once he/she had been lawfully elected. The Sejm was,
however, authorized to proclaim—merely in the form of a declaration, as opposed to
a law-making decision—that a resolution on appointing a constitutional judge had
been adopted in breach of law and thus it had been invalid from the very beginning.
The authors of the November 2015 resolutions argued that, notwithstanding the
transitional provisions of the 2015 Act, the resolutions of 8 October 2015 had
contravened the Sejm’s Rules of Procedure (Standing Orders).11 For that reason,
the majority of the Deputies expressed the opinion that the said resolutions had not
brought about any legal effects and, consequently, there were still five judicial
vacancies opened at the CT.
Three days before hearing the case, on 30 November 2015, the CT issued a
decision on temporary (interim) injunction. The Tribunal called upon the Sejm not to
appoint new judges until pronouncing a judgment on constitutionality of the 2015
Act (i.e. until 3 December 2015). It should be pointed out that the temporary
injunction was not directly based on the 2015 Act, since this Act did not explicitly
empower the Tribunal to issue such injunctions, unless the procedure was initiated
by an individual’s constitutional complaint (referred to in Art. 79 of the Constitu-
tion). The Tribunal explained, however, that legal bases for the injunction have been
10According to Art. 98 para. 1 of the Constitution: ‘The Sejm and the Senate shall be chosen each
for a 4-year term of office. The term of office of the Sejm and Senate shall begin on the day on which
the Sejm assembles for its first sitting and shall continue until the day preceding the assembly of the
Sejm of the succeeding term of office.’ According to Art. 109 para. 2 of the Constitution: ‘The first
sitting of the Sejm and Senate shall be summoned by the President of the Republic to be held on a
day within 30 days following the day of the elections (. . .).’
11The Deputies argued that, on the day of the elections of constitutional judges by the previous
Sejm, Art. 137 of the 2015 Act had been contrary to Art. 30 para. 3(1) of the Sejm’s Rules of
Procedure according to which a candidature for the office of a constitutional judge shall be
presented to the Marshall of the Sejm 30 days before the expiry of a constitutional judge mandate.
That lack of coherence between Art. 137 of the 2015 Act and Art. 30 para. 3 subpara. 1 of the
Sejm’s Rules of Procedure led to the invalidity of the resolutions of 8 October 2015.
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found in the Civil Procedure Code 1964 which was applicable, mutatis mutandis, to
the procedure before the Tribunal in matters not regulated within the 2015 Act.12
The Sejm decided not to follow the temporary injunction. On 2 December 2015
(a day before the CT judgment) the Sejm elected five persons for the offices of
constitutional judges (H. Cioch, L. Morawski, M. Muszyński, J. Przyłębska,
P. Pszczółkowski). They have been forthwith sworn by the Polish President.13
Next day, on 3 December 2015, the Tribunal issued the judgment (ref. no. K
34/15).14 In the operative part of the judgment the Tribunal ruled, inter alia, that Art.
137 of the 2015 Act, insofar as it concerned three judges whose terms of office ended
on 6 November 2015, was consistent with the Constitution and, insofar as it
concerned two judges whose terms of office either ended on 2 December 2015 or
would end on 8 December 2015, violated the Constitution. Furthermore, the Tribu-
nal ruled that the Polish President was, in general, devoid of the power to deny
giving the oath of office to a person elected by the Sejm for the office of a
constitutional judge. In the reasoning part of its judgment, the CT expressed the
viewpoint that three judges had been lawfully elected by the previous Sejm and,
therefore, the President was still under obligation to give them the oath of office. The
Tribunal was of the opinion that the appointment of two other judges lay within the
scope of competence of the newly-elected Sejm and, therefore, the previous Sejm
had not been constitutionally empowered to fill in these two vacancies ‘in
advance.’15
One day after the Tribunal had delivered the aforementioned judgment, a group of
Sejm Deputies lodged with the Tribunal a motion to review five Sejm’s resolutions
of 25 November 2015 (declaring that the appointments performed by the previous
Sejm had been invalid) and five resolutions of 2 December 2015 (on appointing new
constitutional judges). These motions were not, however, adjudicated to their merits.
On 7 January 2016, the CT discontinued proceedings (ref. no. U 8/15), since
according to the majority of judges the Tribunal was not constitutionally authorized
to review the aforementioned resolutions.
Subsequently, the then CT President A. Rzepliński expressed an opinion that, as a
result of the K 34/15 judgment, three judges elected by the previous Sejm for the
12See Art. 74 of the 2015 Act. In its hitherto jurisprudence the CT had always rejected motions to
issue temporary injunctions in proceedings initiated by a group of Sejm Deputies, due to the lack of
legal basis to issue such injunctions (see e.g. the decision of 11 May 2004, ref. no. K 15/04; English
summary: www.trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_15_04_pp_GB.pdf [accessed
19 August 2019]).
13Four judges were sworn on 3 December 2015, prior to the opening of the hearing before the
CT. Judge J. Przyłębska was sworn on 9 December 2015, since she had been appointed for the term
of office which would inaugurate on this day.
14English translation: www.trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/judgments/art/8748-ustawa-o-trybunale-
konstytucyjnym (accessed 19 August 2019).
15See also the similar judgment of 9 December 2015, ref. no. K 35/15 (English translation: www.
trybunal.gov.pl/en/hearings/judgments/art/8792-nowelizacja-ustawy-o-trybunale-konstytucyjnym
[accessed 19 August 2019]).
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terms of office beginning on 7 November 2015 (R. Hauser, A. Jakubecki,
K. Ślebzak) were still expecting to be sworn by the Polish President. In consequence,
the CT President allowed only two judges, from amongst five persons elected by the
new Sejm and sworn by the Polish President, to perform their judicial duties,
i.e. judges elected for the terms of office beginning on 3 December and 9 December
2015 (P. Pszczółkowski, J. Przyłębska). The CT President denied assigning cases to
three other judges elected by the new Sejm (H. Cioch, L. Morawski, M. Muszyński).
The CT President did, however, make it possible for these persons to work at the
Tribunal, as its employees. They obtained their own office rooms and their judicial
salary has been paid every month.
As a result of the aforementioned facts, the CT was composed of 12 judges
allowed by the CT President to perform their judicial duties. Three remaining
judgeships have become disputable, since, on one hand, the Polish President did
not give the oath of office to three persons elected by the previous Sejm and, on the
other hand, the CT President did not allow three persons elected by the new Sejm to
perform their judicial duties.
In the meantime, on 22 December 2015, the Parliament adopted the Amendment
Act, modifying the 2015 Act (Amendment Act). It envisaged, inter alia, that the CT
should have adjudicated most of the cases sitting in a plenary session composed of at
least 13 judges. It also imposed upon the CT the obligation to adjudicate cases in
accordance with the order in which the motions were received by the Tribunal.
Furthermore, the Tribunal’s judgments, issued by the full bench, were to be adopted
by the qualified majority of 2/3 votes. The Amendment Act entered into force upon
the day of its publication (on 28 November 2015), without any vacatio legis period.
After its entry into force, the Amendment Act was immediately challenged before
the Tribunal by two groups of Sejm Deputies, the First President of the Supreme
Court, the National Council of the Judiciary and by the Ombudsman. The Tribunal
decided to bypass some of the Amendment Act’s provisions and to rule upon its
conformity with the Constitution sitting in a panel composed of 12 judges, i.e. ten
judges appointed prior to parliamentary elections and two judges appointed by the
new Sejm, who had been allowed to perform their judicial duties by the CT
President. The judgment was issued on 9 March 2016 (ref. no. K 47/15).16 The
Tribunal ruled that the whole Amendment Act was unconstitutional and the Act
failed to bring about any legal consequences, in particular it did not effectively
modify the original version of the 2015 Act. The majority of judges decided to
proceed the case directly on the basis of the Constitution. These judges were of the
opinion that Art. 8 para. 2 and Art. 195 para. 1 of the Constitution17 empowered the
Tribunal to deny applying provisions of the Act of Parliament. Hence, the CT
16English translation: www.konstytucja.wpia.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Judgment-
of-the-Polish-Constitutional-Tribunal_ref.-no.-K_47_15_en.pdf (accessed 19 August 2019).
17Art. 8 para. 2 of the Constitution: ‘The provisions of the Constitution shall apply directly, unless
the Constitution provides otherwise.’ Art. 195 para. 1 of the Constitution: ‘Judges of the Consti-
tutional Tribunal, in the exercise of their office, shall be independent and subject only to the
Constitution.’
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disregarded, inter alia, the provision pursuant to which the full bench of the CT
should have been composed of at least 13 judges.
On 9 March 2016, the K 47/15 judgment was verbally announced in the court-
room and, subsequently, its operative part, signed by 12 judges,18 was delivered to
the Chancellery of the Prime Minister for official publication in the Journal of Laws.
It should be pointed out that according to Art. 190 para. 2 of the Constitution:
‘Judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal (. . .) shall be required to be immediately
published in the official publication in which the original normative act was pro-
mulgated (. . .).’ Art. 190 para. 3 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘A judgment of
the Constitutional Tribunal shall take effect from the day of its publication (. . .).’
The duty to publish the Journal of Laws is vested in the Chancellery of the Prime
Minister.
The Prime Minister’s Chancellery expressed the opinion that the K 47/15 judg-
ment was null and void, since it had been delivered by the 12-judge panel, as
opposed to the panel composed of at least 13 judges, as it had been required by
the Amendment Act which, during the Tribunal’s session, had been in force and had
enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, the judgment was not
perceived by the Prime Minister as a CT’s decision, but rather as a non-binding
opinion of the majority of constitutional judges. For this reason, the PrimeMinister’s
Chancellery denied publishing the judgment. However, according to the majority of
the constitutional judges, the act delivered on 9 March 2016 was indeed the CT’s
judgment, its verbal announcement resulted in the revoking of the Amendment Act’s
presumption of constitutionality and, therefore, this Act may not be applied in the
future.
From that moment, the Tribunal continued its routine adjudicating work, but the
Prime Minister’s Chancellery refused to publish its judgments in the Journal of
Laws. It stemmed from the fact that the Tribunal respected the K 47/15 judgment and
went on proceeding on the basis of the 2015 Act in its original wording. The Prime
Minister’s Chancellery was of the opinion that the K 47/15 judgment had not
brought about any legal effects. Therefore, in the Chancellery’s opinion, the Amend-
ment Act was still in force and decisions issued in breach thereof may not be treated
as CT’s judgments.
On 22 July 2016, the Parliament adopted the new CT Act, repealing the 2015 Act.
The new Act obliged the Prime Minister to publish all CT’s judgments issued ‘in
breach of the 2015 Act,’ except for the K 47/15 judgment. The situation became
more complex after the Tribunal, several days before the Act of 22 July 2016 entered
into force, had ruled that some of this Act’s provisions had been unconstitutional
(judgment of 11 August 2016, ref. no. K 39/16). That judgment has not been
published either, since the procedure within which it was issued ignored the
18Two newly-elected judges (J. Przyłębska, P. Pszczółkowski) presented dissenting opinions. They
expressed the viewpoint that the CT was not empowered to bypass the Amendment Act, even when
reviewing its conformity with the Constitution, and that three remaining persons, who had been
elected to be the CT judges in December 2015 (H. Cioch, L. Morawski, M. Muszyński), should
have been allowed by the CT President to participate in the adjudication of the K 47/15 case.
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Amendment Act of 22 December 2015. Therefore, not only the K 39/16 judgment,
but also other CT’s decisions pronounced after that judgment were denied being
published.19
On 30 November and 13 December 2016, three new Acts concerning the CT, the
status of its judges and transitional provisions were issued by the Parliament, signed
by the President and entered into force.20 On 19 December 2016, the term of office of
the hitherto CT President expired. Two days later the Polish President nominated a
new CT President (judge J. Przyłębska).21
The newly-appointed CT President allowed the three judges elected on
2 December 2015, who had not been hitherto assigned cases by the previous
Tribunal’s President (H. Cioch, L. Morawski, M. Muszyński), to perform their
judicial duties. Furthermore, the CT President ordered the publication of the hitherto
unpublished judgments (except for the K 47/15, K 39/16 and K 44/16 judgments).22
These CT President’s orders were based on transitional provisions contained within
the Act of 13 December 2016.23 The aforementioned three judgments were also
removed from the official collection of the CT’s rulings.24 Eventually, the afore-
mentioned three judgments were officially published in 2018.25
19For more details, see Sadurski (2019), pp. 75 et seq.
20English translations: www.trybunal.gov.pl/en/about-the-tribunal/legal-basis/the-constitutional-
tribunal-act (accessed 1 March 2018).
21According to Art. 194 para. 2 of the Constitution: ‘The President and Vice-President of the
Constitutional Tribunal shall be appointed by the President of the Republic from amongst candi-
dates proposed by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.’ The
procedure of proposing candidates for the position of new CT President provoked certain legal
doubts as to whether the General Assembly lawfully presented candidatures to the President. These
doubts stemmed from the fact that, on 20 December 2016, during the sitting of the General
Assembly, only six judges did cast their votes, eight judges denied voting and one judge was on
leave. The procedure was based on a special transitional provision (Art. 21 of the Act of
13 December 2016). On one hand, this provision envisaged that candidatures should have been
presented ‘by resolution’ of the General Assembly. On the other hand, it did not require any
particular quorum that should have been reached in order to adopt resolutions. That problem has
been presented before the Supreme Court by the Warsaw Court of Appeal’s referral. The Supreme
Court, however, refused to rule the case to its merits (decision of 12 September 2017, ref. no. III
SZP 2/17).
22The judgment K 44/16, issued on 7 November 2016, concerned the procedure for electing
candidates for the positions of the President and the Vice-President of the Tribunal.
23According to Art. 18 para. 2 of the Act of 13 December 2016 (containing the transitional
provisions), a person performing the duties of the CT President ‘shall (. . .) assign cases to the
judges of the Tribunal who have taken the oath of office before the President of the Republic of
Poland and create conditions that make it possible for the judges of the Tribunal to perform their
judicial duties.’ The special basis for publishing judgments which had been issued ‘in breach of’ CT
Acts of 2015 or 2016 had been created in Art. 19 of the said Act.
24It is published in the electronic form by the CT (see Art. 115 of the Act of 30 November 2016 on
the Organization of the CT and the Mode of Proceedings before the CT).
25The specific legal basis for these publications was created by the Amendment Act of 12 April
2018. For more details, see Sadurski (2019), p. 78.
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3 Controversies Concerning Three Constitutional Judges
From the moment when the new CT President assumed her office, the Tribunal
started to continue its routine adjudicating work being composed of 15 judges.
However, some constitutional judges, participants to procedures, scholars and pub-
licists express the opinion that the Tribunal’s composition is contrary to law, since
three mandates at the Tribunal are not exercised by legally-appointed persons.
Judges holding these mandates are sometimes even called ‘anti-judges’ or ‘body
doubles’.
Some argue that judgments issued with the participation of at least one of the
aforementioned three persons are illegal and invalid. For instance, in his dissenting
opinion attached to the CT judgment of 4 April 2017 (ref. no. P 56/14), judge
S. Rymar stated that one of judges of the adjudicating panel (H. Cioch) was not a
constitutional judge, since he had been elected by the Sejm for the judgeship that had
been already occupied by a person appointed by the previous Sejm. Therefore, in
judge Rymar’s opinion, the P 56/14 judgment has been invalid, since it was
delivered with the participation of a person who was not legally capable to perform
his judicial duties.26
On the other hand, arguments are being raised that, currently, the Tribunal is
lawfully-composed, since due to the law violations committed by the previous
Parliament, the new Sejm was empowered to fill in all five vacancies at the Tribunal.
For instance, in the reasoning for one of its latest decisions, i.e. the judgment of
24 October 2017, ref. no. K 10/17, the CT, sitting as a 5-judge panel, expressed the
opinion that it was a misunderstanding to argue that the legal status of three
constitutional judges had been determined by hitherto-delivered CT’s judgments.
In particular, the K 34/15 judgment concerned merely the constitutionality of Art.
137 of the 2015 Act which regulated nothing more than time-limits for submitting
candidatures for the offices of a constitutional judge. As regards the Sejm’s resolu-
tions on appointing constitutional judges, the Tribunal declared, in the U 8/15
decision, that it was not constitutionally authorized to perform the review of such
acts. In conclusion of the K 10/17 judgment, the Tribunal stated that the K 34/15
judgment’s entry into force did not affect the legality of any of five appointments
performed by the new Sejm on 2 December 2015.27 The detailed analysis of this
complicated constitutional problem will be performed hereinafter (in point 6 below).
26See also dissenting opinions attached to the following CT’s decisions: judgment of 16 March
2017, ref. no. Kp 1/17 (judges L. Kieres, M. Pyziak-Szafnicka, S. Wronkowska-Jaśkiewicz);
procedural decisions of 20 April 2017, ref. no. K 23/15, of 16 May 2017, ref. no. P 115/15, and
of 11 October 2017, ref. no. K 14/16 (judge P. Tuleja); judgment of 24 October 2017, ref. no. K
1/17 (judge L. Kieres).
27See also: CT’s procedural decisions of 15 February 2017, ref. no. K 2/15, and of 19 April 2017,
ref. no. K 10/15; Muszyński (2017), pp. 127 et seq.
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4 The Rule of Law and the Principle of Legality
The rule of law principle, enshrined in Art. 2 of the Constitution and in Art. 2 of the
Treaty on the European Union, is a very broad concept and the source of several
detailed principles.28 One of the crucial elements of the rule of law is the principle of
legality which, in general, means that all state bodies should act on the basis and
within the limits of the law (see also Art. 7 of the Constitution). The discussion on
the constitutional crisis in Poland should take into account the fact that there are two
specific aspects of the principle of legality:
Firstly, it is the presumption of legality that covers all acts of public power,
namely Acts of Parliament, courts judgments, administrative decisions, acts of the
President etc. In general, all acts of public powers should be presumed legal and
valid.29
Secondly, the presumption of legality may be challenged and then revoked. It is
obvious that, on one hand, the violation of law by state bodies, or the abuse of
powers, should not take place, but, on the other hand, it is not per se anything
unusual in a state governed by the rule of law that such situations may occur. In the
light of the rule of law principle, the revoking of the presumption of legality may,
however, be performed only within procedures prescribed by the law. The law
should, in particular, precisely indicate a state body competent to revoke the
presumption of legality and define the legal effects of such revoking. Should the
law be incomplete, incoherent or imprecise in that scope—that may lead to legal and
political crisis.
Against that background, I express an opinion that Polish legislation and Consti-
tution fail to comply with the aforementioned standard. The legality of state bodies’
activity, which is the element of the rule of law principle, is not sufficiently
safeguarded by appropriate procedural provisions of Polish law. That is one of the
root causes of the crisis concerning the Polish CT. The Constitution and legislation
fail to provide for exhaustive and sufficiently precise procedures within which
certain essential legal disputes might be resolved. Therefore, as regards certain
legal acts (e.g. constitutional judges’ appointments, judgments of the CT), there is
no procedural way to finally revoke or confirm their presumption of legality in case
of a dispute.
28See, on the conceptual vagueness of the rule of law principle, e.g. Bárd (2016), pp. 190 et seq. See
also Taborowski (2019), pp. 59 et seq.
29The concept of the presumption of legality may be found, in particular, in the ECJ case-law,
cf. ECJ, Case 101/78 ECR 1979, 38 paras. 4–5; see also General Court Case T 471/11 ECLI EU T
2014, 739 para 117.
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5 Constitutional Tribunal’s Scope of Competence
The main source of the constitutional crisis were controversies concerning the
legality of the Sejm’s resolutions, issued on 8 October 2015, on electing new
constitutional judges. They have not been sworn by the President, and, after the
parliamentary elections, the Sejm declared aforementioned resolutions to be legally-
ineffective (resolutions of 25 November 2015) and, consequently, appointed five
new constitutional judges (resolutions of 2 December 2015).
One may pose a question whether there is an independent state body which would
be legally capable to review the legality and constitutionality of the aforementioned
Sejm’s resolutions. The answer is ‘no’, since the Polish Constitution empowers
neither the CT, nor any other judicial body, with the competence to examine the
legality of the Sejm’s individual resolutions, i.e. resolutions on personal nomina-
tions. In general, the CT may examine only statutes (Acts of Parliament), interna-
tional agreements and legal provisions issued by central state bodies.30 In
consequence, certain Sejm’s resolutions are reviewable in the proceedings before
the Tribunal, but that refers only to so-called ‘normative’ resolutions, i.e. resolutions
that are the source of general and abstract legal norms.31 For that reason, in the
aforementioned procedural decision of 7 January 2016 (ref. no. U 8/15), the Tribunal
ruled that it was deprived of the power to review the Sejm’s resolutions on
appointing constitutional judges.
The Polish Constitution failed to introduce any systemic mechanism enabling
constitutional review of state bodies’ acts of applying the law, in particular acts
issued by the Parliamentary Chambers.32 Perhaps the situation would be different,
should the Polish Constitution expressly empower the Tribunal to review all acts
enacted by the Parliament, notwithstanding their contents, like it is, for instance, in
Lithuania.33 In particular, in 2005 the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruled that the
parliamentary resolution on the appointment of a constitutional judge was consistent
with the Constitution.34 Another good example is Spain. The Spanish Constitutional
Court is explicitly authorized to control the appointments of constitutional judges.35
Possibly, should the Polish CT have a similar scope of competence, the
30See Art. 188 para. 1–3 of the Constitution.
31E.g. the CT found itself to be authorized to examine some provisions of the Sejm’s resolution on
appointing an investigative committee (see the judgment of 22 September 2006, ref. no. U 4/06;
English translation: www.trybunal.gov.pl/en/case-list/judicial-decisions/art/5888-zakres-dzialania-
tzw-bankowej-komisji-sledczej [accessed 19 August 2019]; see also Wiącek (2007), pp. 193 et seq.
32Cf. Brzozowski (2017), p. 20.
33See Art. 102 of the Lithuanian Constitution 1992.
34Judgment of 2 June 2005, ref. no. 10/05 (English translation: www.lrkt.lt/en/court-acts/search/
170/ta924/content [accessed 19 August 2019]).
35See Art. 2 para. 1 lit. (g) of the Organic Law 2/1979 on the Constitutional Court of 3 October 1979
(English translation: www.tribunalconstitucional.es/es/tribunal/normativa/Normativa/LOTC-en.
pdf [accessed 19 August 2019]).
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constitutional crisis could have been avoided or, at least, it would not have so
escalated as it proved to be.
6 Legal Effects of the K 34/15 Judgment
During the debate on the constitutional crisis in Poland the argument was frequently
raised that, as a result of the CT judgment of 3 December 2015 (ref. no. K 34/15), the
Polish President became obliged to give the oath of office to three judges appointed
by the previous Sejm. This judgment was also referred to as the justification of the
CT President’s refusal to assign cases to three judges elected by the new Parliament.
In general, the aforementioned judgment is often understood as declaring the
lawfulness of elections of three judges appointed by the previous Sejm.36 Some
important questions should be, however, explained in a more detailed manner.
First of all, it should be explained that the K 34/15 judgment was announced
already after the new Sejm had appointed five constitutional judges and the President
had sworn four of them. Furthermore, the judgment concerned merely some legal
provisions of the CT Act 2015. The Tribunal did not directly examine the Sejm’s
resolutions adopted within the constitutional judges’ appointment procedure, since
(as it was explained herein before) it was not constitutionally authorized to review
such resolutions. Nonetheless, in the reasoning of the K 34/15 judgment, the
Tribunal expressed a viewpoint that the previous Sejm had been empowered to
elect, and actually had effectively elected, three judges who should have been sworn
by the President, despite the fact that, a few hours before, the President had sworn
judges elected by the new Parliament.37
It is undisputable that, under the rule of law principle, all state bodies should
respect and implement the CT’s judgments. Simultaneously, there are many doubts
concerning the legal effects of these judgments. Pursuant to the Constitution, the
CT’s judgments are, in general, prospective and they do not automatically exert
influence upon acts or decisions issued before a judgment’s entry into force.38 For
36Cf., inter alia, the Venice Commission’s Opinion no. 833/2015 (referred to in footnote 1), margin
numbers 26, 124; the Commission Recommendation (EU) 2016/1374 (referred to in footnote 1), 8.
37In the Tribunal’s opinion: ‘In the case of the two judges of the Tribunal whose terms of office
either ended on 2.12 or will end on 8.12.2015, the legal basis of the significant stage of the judicial
election process was challenged by the Tribunal as unconstitutional. (. . .) the derogation of the
relevant scope of Art. 137 of the CT Act should result in the discontinuance and closure of the
procedure (. . .). The completion of the aforementioned procedure is inadmissible (. . .). (. . .) what
does not raise constitutional doubts is the legal basis of the election of the three judges of the
Tribunal who were to take office after the judges whose terms of office had ended on 6.11.2015. The
derogation of Art. 137 of the CT Act within the indicated scope does not affect the election of those
judges. (. . .) the judicial election carried out on that basis was valid and there are no obstacles to
complete the procedure by the oath of office taken, before the President of Poland, by the persons
elected to the judicial offices in the Tribunal.’
38See Art. 190 para. 2–4 of the Constitution.
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that reason, it is debatable whether, and in what manner, the K 34/15 judgment
affected the Sejm’s resolutions of 8 October and 2 December 2015 on electing
constitutional judges. It would be an oversimplification to argue that the said
judgment nullified three out of five resolutions of the new Sejm (adopted on
2 December 2015) and definitively confirmed the legality of three out of five
resolutions of the previous Sejm (adopted on 8 October 2015). The constitutional
judges have been appointed directly on the basis of Art. 194 para. 1 of the Consti-
tution, as opposed to the 2015 Act which only provided for certain procedural
components of the appointment process.
According to the legal doctrine and courts’ jurisprudence, including the jurispru-
dence of the CT, only the operative part of a CT judgment is legally binding within
the meaning of Art. 190 para. 1 of the Constitution.39 Arguments or opinions
expressed by the CT in the reasoning parts of its judgments are, on one hand,
frequently respected and applied by courts and other state bodies but, on the other
hand, they are not universally binding since the Constitution did not introduce such
an obligation. Consequently, state bodies are not legally compelled to obey such
directives in their activity.40 It is not unusual that a state body, e.g. a court, refuses to
follow the CT’s instructions contained within the reasoning part of a CT’s judgment,
in particular the instructions concerning the legal effects produced by the judgment.
Therefore, ignoring certain considerations contained in the reasoning of a CT’s
judgment, including considerations concerning the legal effects of a judgment,
may not be, in general, tantamount to the law violation.
It should also be noted that, as regards the participation of the Polish President in
the appointment procedure (the swearing-in stage), the Tribunal issued a so-called
interpretative judgment.41 Yet, the Tribunal’s power to issue such judgments
remains disputable and, for many years, it has been questioned in some courts’
jurisprudence. In particular, in 2009, the Polish Supreme Court adopted a resolution
in which it expressed an opinion that the Tribunal was not constitutionally
empowered to declare, in a universally binding manner, which interpretation of a
legal provision is constitutional and which violates the Constitution.42
The legal problem concerning the swearing-in stage is pivotal, since the Consti-
tution fails to envisage any form of the Polish President’s participation in the
procedure of appointing constitutional judges. One may, therefore, pose a question
why the Tribunal decided to resolve the aforementioned problem in the controversial
form of an interpretative judgment. Should the Tribunal have quashed the whole
39‘Judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal shall be of universally binding application and shall be
final.’
40See, in particular, the resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court of 10 January 2011, ref.
no. I OPS 3/10.
41See point 5 of the K 34/15 judgment’s operative part: ‘Art. 21 para. 1 of the Act (. . .), interpreted
other than that the President of the Republic of Poland is obliged to give the oath of office forthwith
to a judge of the CT who has been elected by the Sejm, is inconsistent with Art. 194 para. 1 of the
Constitution.’
42See the resolution of the Supreme Court of 17 December 2009, ref. no. III PZP 2/09.
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provision concerning the swearing-in procedure, the legal effects of its judgment
would have been, to that extent, less ambiguous.43
In consequence, the legal effects of the K 34/15 judgment remain vague. Perhaps
the situation would have been different, should the law have expressly empowered
the Tribunal to define the legal effects produced by its judgments and the way they
should be implemented, like it is, for instance, in Germany.44 Maybe it would be also
worthy of searching for some ideas in the Amendment of the Spanish Constitutional
Court Act, concerning the enforcement of the Court’s judgments.45
7 May the Constitutional Tribunal Bypass an Act
of Parliament?
One of the most important stages of the constitutional crisis occurred when, on
9 March 2016, the majority of the Tribunal’s judges decided to bypass some
provisions of the Amendment Act of 22 December 2015, which entered into force
on the day of its official publication, and to declare this Act’s unconstitutionality (the
K 47/15 judgment). As it was explained herein before, the judgment was passed by
the 12-judge panel, despite the fact that, according to the Amendment Act which had
already been in force, the plenary session of the Tribunal should have been com-
posed of at least 13 judges. For that reason, the Prime Minister’s Chancellery denied
the official publishing of the judgment.
Some arguments that justified the constitutional judges’ decision to bypass certain
provisions of the binding Act of Parliament might have been found in Art. 195 para.
1 of the Constitution, according to which constitutional judges are subject only to the
Constitution.46 A similar provision is contained in Article 178 para. 1 of the
Constitution which stipulates that ‘regular’ judges (in particular, judges of common
and administrative courts) are subject only to the Constitution and statutes (Acts of
Parliament). The aforementioned provision is commonly understood in Polish legal
doctrine and jurisprudence as empowering judges to bypass sub-statutory acts (inter
alia, governmental regulations, referred to in Article 92 of the Constitution) which
are, in a court’s opinion, inconsistent with an Act of Parliament or with the
Constitution. Accordingly, Article 195 para. 1 of the Constitution may be interpreted
as granting judges of the CT the power to deny applying a sub-constitutional act, in
43See Wiącek (2016), pp. 125 et seq.
44See Art. 35 of the Act on the Federal Constitutional Court 1951.
45See Organic Law 15/2015 of 16 October 2015 on the reform of Organic Law 2/1979 of the
Constitutional Court concerning the execution of decisions of the Constitutional Court as a
guarantee of the rule of law (English translation: www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/
default.aspx?pdffile¼CDL-REF(2016)035-e [accessed 19 August 2019]).
46Cf. Radziewicz (2017), pp. 23 et seq.; Safjan (2016), pp. 35 et seq.
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particular an Act of Parliament, in the situation where according to the CT an act in
question is unconstitutional.
There are, however, scholars and constitutional judges who express the opinion
that the Tribunal should obey even constitutionally questionable procedural norms,
since—until ruling upon their inconformity with the Constitution—these norms
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. Furthermore, on one hand, pursuant to
Article 195 para. 1 of the Constitution, constitutional judges are bound only by the
Constitution but, on the other hand, the Constitution itself, in Art. 197, stipulates that
the mode of proceedings before the Tribunal shall be regulated by the Act of
Parliament.47
Perhaps the situation would be different, if acts concerning the mode of pro-
ceedings before the Tribunal were under obligatory constitutional review prior to
their entry into force, like it is, for instance, in France.48 Such a provision would
make it possible to avoid the paradox situation where the Tribunal would be obliged
to proceed on the basis of an Act which already came into force and, at the same
time, is under constitutional review.
Furthermore, the constitutional crisis in Poland could have proved to be less
escalated, if the law explicitly stated that the Tribunal may refuse to apply provisions
that it deems unconstitutional, like it is in Lithuania. Art. 17 sentence 2 of the
Lithuanian Constitutional Court Act 1993 stipulates that the Constitutional Court
shall obey the Constitution and only such laws that are not inconsistent with the
Constitution.
8 Presumption of Legality of Acts Issued by State Bodies
In the debate concerning the constitutional crisis in Poland, another fundamental
question arose, namely whether a Tribunal’s judgment may be found, by another
organ of public power—e.g. by the Prime Minister (whose duty is to officially
publish the Tribunal’s judgments) or by a court (whose duty is to apply the Tri-
bunal’s judgments in individual cases)—illegal and non-existent due to controver-
sies concerning the composition of a Tribunal’s panel that adjudicated a
particular case.
In my opinion, the answer to that question is ‘no’. Neither the Constitution nor the
legislation vest any state body with the power to evaluate the lawfulness of the
Tribunal’s judgments—in particular, with the power to declare that a judgment was
delivered by the unlawfully-composed panel and thus was illegal or non-existent.
From the moment when a judgment is ordered to be published by the CT President
and referred to the Prime Minister’s Chancellery, it should be presumed legal, then
47See, in particular, the dissenting opinions of judges J. Przyłębska and P. Pszczółkowski attached
to the K 47/15 judgment (referred to in footnote 18). Cf. Zubik (2011), p. 116.
48It stems from Art. 61, read in conjunction with Art. 63, of the French Constitution 1958.
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officially published and respected by individuals and all state bodies, in particular
courts. It is the CT President’s legal responsibility that an act sent for publication is
indeed a legally-delivered Tribunal’s judgment. That act enjoys the presumption of
legality.
Nonetheless, I am of the opinion that the Parliament would be empowered to
introduce a procedure under which, in certain exceptional circumstances, the Tri-
bunal’s judgments might be challenged. In particular, the current Polish legislation
makes it possible to nullify a final court judgment issued by the wrongfully-
composed judicial panel.49 There are no constitutional obstacles against introducing
such an extraordinary procedure when it comes to the Tribunal’s judgments. Not
only a final court decision but also a judgment delivered by the CT may be,
hypothetically, burdened with such procedural defects that may justify the nullifica-
tion of a judgment and re-considering a particular case.50 It should be emphasized
that there are some states in Europe where the proceedings before constitutional
courts may be, in certain circumstances, re-opened what, in consequence, may lead
to the re-examination of a case which was already settled by a final judgment.51
9 Closing Remarks. The Crisis of Procedures
The constitutional crisis in Poland is, to some extent, the crisis of procedures. There
are some crucial constitutional issues which are not reviewable and, therefore, some
pivotal constitutional disputes may remain unsettled by the judiciary. In particular,
the authors of the Constitution failed to anticipate that the appointment of a consti-
tutional judge may be subject to legal controversies and they failed to provide for
procedures that could lead to the definite resolving of such controversies by an
impartial organ of the judiciary. A constitution of a state governed by the rule of law
should provide for, one may call it, ‘fail-safe procedures’, guaranteeing the respect
for the principle of legality. The constitutional crisis proved that the Polish Consti-
tution is not sufficiently consistent with this standard. As it turned out, the political
will of the majority of Parliament was capable to break the hitherto established
49See, in particular, Art. 401 para. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code 1964; Art. 542 para. 3, read in
conjunction with Art. 439 para. 1 subpara. 1–2, of the Criminal Procedure Code 1997; Art.
271 para. 1 of the Act on the Proceedings before Administrative Courts 2002.
50For instance, one of the judges sitting in the Tribunal’s panel which pronounced the judgment of
2 April 2003 (ref. no. K 13/02) had been previously a Senator and had voted on the provision that
was under review in this case. The Tribunal, however, decided that there was no basis for the
re-opening of procedure (see the decision of 17 July 2003, ref. no. K 13/02, English summary:
www.trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_13_02_GB.pdf [accessed 19 August 2019];
see also Tuleja (2014), pp. 62 et seq.
51See, in particular, Art. 119–119b of the Czech Republic Constitutional Court Act 1993; Art.
75–75b of the Slovakian Constitutional Court Act 1993; Art. 62 of the Lithuanian Constitutional
Court Act 1993.
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practice in electing the CT judges and there was no legal remedy to be filed directly
against these decisions.
In particular, the question of legality of electing three judges by the previous Sejm
remains controversial and debatable, since no organ of judicial power is vested with
the power to finally adjudicate upon that question in a binding manner. As it was
explained herein before, the legal effects of the K 34/15 judgment are unclear.
Simultaneously, the Sejm’s resolutions on electing judges may not be reviewed by
the Tribunal, what was confirmed by the Tribunal in the U 8/15 decision. Hence, on
one hand, one may raise arguments, based on the CT’s stance, expressed in the
reasoning parts of judgments delivered in 2015 and 2016, that the previous Sejm was
empowered to appoint three constitutional judges who, subsequently, should have
been sworn by the Polish President. On the other hand, it should be noticed that
the thesis that the previous Sejm was authorized to elect three judges is founded on
the assumption that three vacancies at the CT undoubtedly opened in the course of
the previous Sejm’s term of office (i.e. on 7 November 2015). Such an assumption
has basis in facts, the calendar of these facts was, however, unknown on the day
when the previous Sejm appointed judges. In other words, on 8 October 2015 it was
uncertain whether the previous Sejm’s term of office would encompass the day when
three vacancies at the Tribunal would open.52 A question whether this argument,
overlooked in the CT’s judgments, influenced—in the light of the tempus regit
actum principle—upon the legality of elections, performed by the previous Sejm,
remains open.
Under the rule of law principle, all state bodies should mutually respect their acts
and decisions. It means that, except for certain extraordinary and evident situations, a
state body should not treat acts or decisions issued by another state body as invalid or
non-existent, unless it is declared within a procedure prescribed by the law. Other-
wise, a legal chaos may occur, what would be per se contrary to the rule of law
principle. In particular, in the current system of law the Prime Minister’s Chancellery
is not vested with the power to deny publishing a CT’s judgment in the situation
where it was properly sent for publication on the basis of the CT President’s order.
For the same reasons, Polish courts are not empowered to evaluate the lawfulness of
CT’s judgments, including the situation where a court raises doubts as regards the
composition of a particular Tribunal’s adjudicating panel. Such a conclusion flows
from the fact that one of the crucial elements of the rule of law principle is the
certainty of law. Notwithstanding the legal controversies concerning the current
composition of the Tribunal, its judgments should be published, respected and
52In the light of Art. 98 para. 1 and Art. 109 para. 2 of the Constitution (see footnote 10) the Sejm’s
term of office is, to some extent, flexible. The exact date of the inauguration of new Sejm’s term of
office had been unknown until 5 November 2015, when the President summoned the first sitting of
the new Sejm and set its date for 12 November 2015. Theoretically, the new Sejm could have
inaugurated its term of office even one day after parliamentary elections, on 26 October 2015. It
was, therefore, conditional upon the decision of the Polish President. Cf. Brzozowski
(2016), p. 149.
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applied by courts and other state bodies. The protection of the principle of legality
may not lead to the negation of the principle of law certainty.
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Abstract This contribution will concentrate on the Hungarian situation by analysing
the generalised practice of targeted legislation and the different causes for legal
uncertainty on the constitutional level. The European Parliament initiated an Article
7 TEU sanctioning procedure against Hungary in September 2018 and several infringe-
ment proceedings have been launched by the Commission. Unfortunately, these EU
responses were not able to grasp the gist of the Hungarian developments. Even the so
called Sargentini report of the European Parliament—intended to be a comprehensive
analysis of the rule of law deficiencies in Hungary—could not identify the most
significant patterns of the Hungarian rule of law decline. This reveals a central
shortcoming of EU sanctioning mechanisms employed against ‘backsliding’Member
States: the need for ‘informed’ sanctions. Some recent legislative proposals for mea-
suring the rule of law illustrate, that the need for such informed sanctions has been
realised by EU institutions. However, the question of ‘how’ is still unanswered. Taking
the case of Hungary as an example, I will finally recommend some aspects to be
considered in order to grasp the patterns of ‘systemic’ rule of law decline.
Polak, Węgier, dwa bratanki / I do szabli, i do szklanki
Lengyel, magyar, két jó barát / együtt harcol, s issza borát1
1 Introduction
Today, this proverb of Polish-Hungarian friendship has developed a new meaning,
as Hungary and Poland ‘fight together’ against the EU and its founding values as
listed (but not defined) in Article 2 TEU. Both countries are shifting towards an
extreme version of what Richard Bellamy termed ‘political constitutionalism’.2
Against ‘legal constitutionalism’ and judicial review as one of its key features,
Richard Bellamy argues that the democratic mechanisms and decision-making by
majority rule offer superior and sufficient methods for upholding rights and the rule
of law. The absence of popular accountability renders judicial review a form of
arbitrary rule which lacks the incentive structure democracy provides to ensure rulers
treat the ruled with equal concern and respect. According to Bellamy, one of the key
legal constitutionalist methods is establishing boundaries for the political sphere by
‘designating certain values . . . as beyond the realm of politics.’3
Applying Bellamy’s words to the current debates revolving around the ‘Copen-
hagen dilemma’, it is hard to decide whether the current events should be framed in
political or legal terms. Indeed, it seems that Article 2 TEU is at the interface of the
1‘Polish and Hungarian are two brothers [Polish]/two good friends [Hungarian]; they fight and
drink together.’
2About constitutionalism as understood in the EU legal order see e.g. Glencross (2014),
pp. 1165–1167; Walker (2007), pp. 254–267.
3Bellamy (2007), p. 147.
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political and legal realm. While the EU’s founding values are clearly beyond the
realm of day-to-day politics, the contours of their exact meaning and their enforce-
ment could hardly be more politicised: Article 7 TEU is commonly labelled as a
‘nuclear option’.4 Just like nuclear weapons, pressing the button is exclusively up to
politicians. In this light, the defence of the Union’s common values faces a twofold
risk: first, the risk of becoming a highly politicised question, and second, the risk of
losing the bigger picture in narrow and particularized judicial proceedings.
On one hand, politicians usually do not decide in line with constitutional concepts
and ideas but rather in line with their interests. An important interest that concerns all
EU Member States is to maintain peaceful relations and not to give reason for any
kind of ‘revenge’ or ‘retaliation’. The recent procedures against Poland and Hungary
are testimony to this: After Poland,5 a second Article 7 TEU procedure was launched
against Hungary.6 Yet, nothing moved forward in the Council. Indeed, the risk of
‘mutual indulgence’7 has increased especially after the Polish and the Hungarian
governments enormously contributed to the nomination of the surprise candidate for
the presidency of the Commission.
On the other hand, the infringement procedures brought by the Commission were
unable to sufficiently address the gist of the illiberal developments in the respective
Member States. They were instead, focused on particularized, individual details
while leaving the systemic patterns aside.
The Hungarian example perfectly illustrates these shortcomings. Taking Hungary
as a case study, this paper will reveal that systemic patterns might be complex and
not always visible in the Member States. First, this contribution systematizes the
developments in Hungary and reveals two crucial threats to the rule of law: on one
hand, the Hungarian government established a skilfully designed, complex and
nuanced system of legislation targeting specifically its ‘enemies’ and ‘friends’. On
the other hand, there are serious malfunctions on the constitutional level like the
questionable use of constitutional amendments as an instrument of every-day politics
and the declining role of the Constitutional Court (see Sect. 2). This analysis
demonstrates how difficult it is for EU institutions to grasp these developments—
especially in a highly politicised (Art. 7 TEU) or particularized legal procedure (Art.
258 TFEU). Seen in this light, it becomes clear that the developments in Hungary
were only partially addressed by the Commission’s infringement procedures (see
Sect. 3) and the Article 7 TEU procedure initiated by the European Parliament (see
Sect. 4). These procedures concentrate on specific laws without having the bigger
picture in mind. What could be responses to these shortcomings? I argue that there
4Critically on the ‘nuclear myth’, see Kochenov (2017).
5Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (2017/0360(APP), 20. December 2017.
6European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of
a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)),
P8_TA(2018)0340.
7von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 497.
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should be no procedures against ‘backsliding’ Member States without a profound
legal assessment involving independent experts beforehand—in a nutshell: there is a
need for more ‘informed’ EU sanctions. Some recent legislative proposals reflect the
need for ‘measuring’ the rule of law. However, it is important that any system of
indicators should follow a comprehensive approach (see Sect. 5).
2 The Big Picture: Targeted Legislation and Constitutional
Malfunctions
2.1 Lex Friends and Lex Enemies
Targeted legislation can take different forms and shapes. In the first years after
setting up the new constitutional system in January 2012, several independent state
institutions were affected by organisational changes and this was a proper occasion
to dispense with independent officials, like the data protection ombudsman (see Sect.
2.1.1), the president of the Supreme Court and ‘communist judges’ in general (see
Sect. 2.1.2). As the years passed and the new constitutional system was consolidated,
targeted legislation has diverged from constitutional institutions to everyday sub-
jects: some of them were also useful in the political communication of the governing
parties (see Sects. 2.1.3–6).
2.1.1 Turning the Data Protection Ombudsman into an Authority
Influenced by the Government
As the new Hungarian Fundamental Law entered into force in January 2012, the
office, and together with that, the term of the former data protection ombudsman was
terminated and a new Data Protection Authority was established.8 Contrary to the
ombudsman who had been elected by the parliament, the president of the National
Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority (NAIH) is nominated by the
President of the Republic on the proposal of the Prime Minister. He may be
reappointed for a second term which only strengthens his political dependency.9
8§ 38 of Act CXII. of 2011 on the Right to Informational Self-determination and Freedom of
Information.
9In details see also Polyák and Szőke (2011), pp. 164–165.
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2.1.2 Sending Judges into Retirement
Similar reorganisational measures have been adopted in the judiciary: new admin-
istrative organs have been established10 and the Supreme Court has been renamed
‘Curia’.11 At the same time, the president of the Supreme Court was released and the
Curia started its work with a new president.12 The new constitution further pre-
scribed that ‘with the exception of the President of the Curia, no judge may serve
who is older than the general retirement age.’13
The law on the status of judges prescribed that judges had to retire at the age of
62 instead of the former 70. The new rule affected about 10% of the judges.14
Prosecutors and notaries had to meet the same age-requirements too. The law would
have entered into force with a tight vacatio legis: half a year before the affected
judges would have had to retire.
2.1.3 Labelling Foreign Funded NGOs
Unlike in 2012 and 2013, when the institutional reforms concerned state institutions,
the Hungarian government found quite different targets by 2017. These were
nongovernmental institutions: civil society organisations on one hand, and a univer-
sity, on the other—moreover, only a few particular players within these specific
categories were affected.
After the government started to systematically undermine the rule of law, to limit
the powers of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) and to amend the consti-
tution routinely in line with its political interests, it had received harsh criticism from
civil society, particularly from different NGOs like the Hungarian Civil Liberties
10The National Judicial Office (NJO) has been established by the new Fundamental Law. It is led by
its president who is elected by the parliament: accidentally, she is the wife of a Fidesz-politician and
an old friend of the Prime Minister. Her most criticised competence was the transfer of cases
between different courts but later this was abrogated by the fifth amendment of the constitution in
autumn 2013. For details about the judiciary reform see e.g. Sonnevend et al. (2015), pp. 102–103.
Since the beginning of 2017, a conflict has developed between the NJO and the self-administration
body of the judiciary, the National Judiciary Council (NJC). Namely, the president of the NJO often
declared applications to judicial positions as void in order to avoid the control of the NJC. The
controversies in details are discussed by Vadász (2018).
11Originally: Art. 25 (1) of the Fundamental Law, due to amendments now Art. 25 (2).
12The former Supreme Court president, András Baka made a complaint before the European Court
of Human Rights on the issue. The Strasbourg court dismissed Hungary on the grounds of the right
to access to court and the freedom of expression. Concerning the latter, the Court found that the
reason of ‘the early termination of his mandate as President of the Supreme Court was not the result
of a justified restructuring of the supreme judicial authority in Hungary, but in fact was set up on
account of the views and criticisms that he had publicly expressed in his professional capacity on
the legislative reforms concerned’. (ECHR decision no. 20261/12, Baka v. Hungary, paras. 75, 96.).
13Art. 26 (2) of the Fundamental Law.
14Szente (2017), p. 466.
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Union (TASZ), the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, or, the Hungarian division of
Amnesty International.
Their activity must have been a thorn in the government’s eye for a couple of
years but the first concrete legislative step against them was linked to the migration
crisis—at least on the rhetorical level. According to the government’s narrative, the
Hungarian-American billionaire George Soros planned to smuggle millions of
migrants into Europe and is financing NGOs to fulfil this plan.15
The new law on the transparency of foreign funded NGOs was adopted in June
2017. According to the new rules, NGOs receiving more than 7.2 million HUF
(approximately 24,000 Euros) from abroad per year must register themselves as
‘organisations supported from abroad’. This label must be used on their website and
on their materials. They were also obliged to provide detailed information to the
authorities about the funding they receive.16
Some affected NGOs declared civil disobedience and refused to register them-
selves as being financed from abroad, emphasizing at the same time, that their
financial background was already transparent.17 Several NGOs made constitutional
complaints before the Constitutional Court based on personality and privacy rights
and the freedom of expression.18 Additionally, opposition MPs issued a norm
control procedure before the Constitutional Court, arguing that the law violated
the principles of legal certainty and the rule of law and threatened the freedom of
association.19 For now, all cases are pending before the Court.
2.1.4 Targeting the ‘Soros University’
The other problematic law applies to an even narrower circle of addressees and has
an important overlap with the NGO law: George Soros. The amendment of the
Higher Education Law adopted in April 2017 clearly targets the Central European
University (CEU) founded by the Hungarian-American billionaire. The amendment
has set up new requirements for universities operating from a third country
(non-EEA) to continue their activities in Hungary.
The most significant change is that an international agreement between Hungary
and the third state is needed. If this is a federal state, a prior agreement with the
15The story contains truth in small and fragmented pieces in so far as the abovementioned NGOs get
funding from the Soros founded Open Society Foundations and some of them offer legal aid to
asylum seekers. However, it is not the only and main focus of their activity and the financing
sources (including the OSF) had been published in their financial reports at their website already
earlier.
16Act LXXVI of 2017 on the transparency of civil organisations financed from abroad.
17The boycott declared by HCLU/TASZ, Amnesty International and Hungarian Helsinki Commit-
tee was joined later by four further NGOs. By doing so, they are risking a fine between 10,000 and
900,000 HUF (30-3,000 Euros). For now, they have not announced being fined because of that.
18AB cases no. IV/01830/2017, IV/01685/2017 and IV/01857/2017.
19AB case no. II/01460/2017.
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federal government is required. The amendment further prescribes that the affected
foreign universities must perform educational activity in their country of origin
too.20 There are 27 third country universities operating in Hungary but most of
them have only a few study programs together with other Hungarian universities.
Conversely, the entirety of CEU’s educational program has been threatened by this
law. Further, this is the only university among the addressees having no campus and
educational activity in its country of origin (the U.S.) at all. The sum of these special
requirements has made one thing clear: the exclusive target was the ‘Soros Univer-
sity’, the CEU.
The amendment has set a tight vacatio legis: originally, the deadline for compli-
ance with the new rules was the 1st of January 2018. However, in October 2017—
after an infringement procedure and several constitutional reviews had been initi-
ated21—the government suddenly realised that this was not realistic and extended
the deadline for one more year.22 In December 2018 the CEU announced it would
move to Vienna because the Hungarian government rejected to sign or ratify the
required international agreement.23
The decision on the constitutionality of the law still has not been made by the
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court suspended the procedures of the lex
CEU and the NGO law in June 2018 with a very strange reasoning. Namely,
referring to the European constitutional dialogue and the obligation of cooperation
within the European Union, the Court found it necessary to wait for the closing of the
parallel cases pending before the European Court of Justice.24 The decision illus-
trates that the HCC did not (want to) acknowledge that the CJEU will decide on
grounds of EU law, which is a totally different yardstick than the Hungarian
constitution.25
20§ 2 of Act XXV of 2017 on the amendment of Act CCIV of 2011 on the national higher education.
21The university issued a constitutional complaint and opposition politicians initiated norm control
before the Constitutional Court. Both cases are still pending under case numbers II/01036/2017 and
IV/01810/2017. Details about the infringement procedures in Sect. 3 below.
22Act CXXVII on the amendment of Act CCIV of 2011 on the national higher education and of Act
XXV of 2017 supra note 20.
23The development that started with the lex CEU, continued in the Summer of 2019 the law on the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences was amended. The most important point of the amendment is that
the Academy would be deprived of its research network (Act. LXVIII of 2019). Opposition MPs
initiated a norm control before the Constitutional Court (pending case no. II/01214/2019). The
president of the Academy also announced to file a constitutional complaint in the matter. Since the
Academy is a public institution and a part of the central budget, the reform itself does not
necessarily mean that it was a lex enemy. However, such motivations cannot be excluded either,
especially taking into account that the government has no visible and constructive plans for a
reasonable restructuration of the Academy.
24AB orders no. 3198/2018 (VI. 21), 3200/2018 (VI. 21) and 3199/2018 (VI. 21) (ABH 2018, 1050,
1057, 1064, respectively).
25This point is however addressed in some parallel reasonings and dissenting opinions. See e.g. the
dissenting opinion of István Stumpf and the parallel reasoning of Balázs Schanda and Ildikó
Hörcherné Marosi to AB order no. 3200/2018, supra note 24.
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2.1.5 ‘Stopping Soros’ (and Migration)
The latest package amending several laws related to immigration has been named
‘Stop Soros’26 by the government in order to link the fight against immigration and
Soros stronger in their political rhetoric. However, contrary to the name, this is not a
typical piece of targeted legislation (unlike the ‘lex CEU’ that was officially labelled
the amendment of the Higher Education Law).
The package was adopted in Summer 2018, after Fidesz won a third two thirds
majority in the parliament in the aftermath of the elections held in Spring 2018. The
most striking point of the law is the introduction of a new criminal offense called
‘facilitating illegal migration.’ The offence refers to any ‘organisational activity’
aimed at enabling a person to file an asylum application in the event that the latter is
ineligible for asylum.27 The police is also empowered to issue injunctions against
persons suspected (not even accused or condemned) to facilitate illegal migration or
other immigration-related offences from approaching the border closer than 8 km.28
Therefore, it seems that the ultimate objective is not to condemn but rather to keep
away any persona non grata from the border.
2.1.6 The System of Lex Friends and Lex Enemies: The Fundamental
Challenge to the Rule of Law in Hungary
The above listed pieces of targeted legislation are by far not unique examples, but
they are the ones that have been noticed in Brussels. However, many other targeted
legislations have not triggered the EU’s attention yet. One of the most striking
examples of lex enemies is strongly related to the EU-values, especially to the
principle of democracy. It is most commonly known as the ‘billboard law’ and
was adopted with a procedural trick. In the summer of 2017—ahead of the 2018
elections—the parliamentary majority adopted an amendment of Act LXXIV of
2016 on the protection of the landscape.29 On its face, the law has nothing to do with
political campaigns. Yet its new § 11/G prohibits parties (‘organisations supported
from the central budget’) to advertise under a certain listed price beyond the period
of election campaigns.
The new provisions clearly target opposition parties, especially Jobbik, which
was supported at the 2018 elections by an investor owning several billboards. The
26Officially: Act VI. of 2018 on the amendment of certain law related to the measures against illegal
immigration.
27§ 353/A of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code. It must be noted that according to the general
rules of Hungarian criminal law, intentional crimes can only be committed deliberately: See Blaskó
(2016). Therefore, it is not that easy to condemn someone according to this provision: it has to be
proven before the court that the accused person exactly knew that the migrant he helped was safe in
his home country or during his journey.
28New § 46/F of Act XXXIV of 1994 on the police.
29Act CIV of 2017.
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governing Fidesz, however, can easily avoid the scope of this law by labelling its
advertising as ‘government information’ instead of party campaigning.30 The reason
why this provision had to be implemented through the law on landscape protection
was the fact that at that time Fidesz did not have the two-thirds majority in
parliament. Both the election procedure—including the rules of campaigning—and
party financing must be regulated through cardinal laws that require the support of
the two-thirds majority of attending MPs.31 So Fidesz bypassed its ‘own’ Basic Law
by hiding the rules in a piece of ordinary legislation that could be adopted with
simple majority.
Besides these examples, several laws have been made to favour ‘friends’, to make
them eligible to certain positions32 or to benefit them otherwise. The content of such
lex friends may change according to who the friend is, and which position he holds.
For example, the company called MAHIR was owned by an oligarch who had been
an old friend of the Prime Minister: MAHIR owned several billboards in the country.
A concurrent company, the ESMA owned smaller advertisements on electricity
poles along the roads. In order to influence the competition between both companies,
the government amended the law on road traffic and prohibited advertising on
electricity poles and similar objects.33 However, the Prime Minister broke with
said friend and competition was immediately restored. After another government-
friendly oligarch purchased the ESMA, the law was changed again allowing to
advertise on objects along the roads with permission.34 Further, a lex friend has
been introduced, that may be applied flexibly to any friendly businesses if needed. A
specific exception was added to the law on the prohibition of unfair commercial
practices and of restriction of competition in 2013. The general rule prescribed that
corporate mergers concerning companies whose annual turnover exceeded 15 billion
HUF (47–48 million EUR) in total, were bound to take permission from the
Competition Authority. The new exception rule made it possible for the government
30See e.g. decision no. 647/2018 of the National Election Office. The Office argued that basically,
the ‘information campaign of the government’ should not be able to be confused with the campaign
of the ruling party. However, in the concrete case, the massive anti-immigration ‘government
information’ was not found to be such intervention to the election campaign—even if it happened
only 8 days before the day of the election. The law was challenged before the Constitutional Court
by opposition parties but the Court found no violation of the constitution. The Constitutional Court
argued that the law in question did not regulate a cardinal subject because in fact, it did not change
the normative content of the law on the functioning and management of parties. That law (Act
XXXIII of 1989) is also cardinal and it sets up the elements of the asset of a party (§ 4). See AB
decision no. 3001/2019. (I. 7.), ABH 2019, 35, especially para. 68 et seq.
31Art. VIII of the Basic Law, § 354 of Act XXXVI of 2014 on the election procedure.
32The news portal Index collected many of them: https://index.hu/belfold/2012/06/04/lexek/.
Beyond these examples, the so called ‘lex Mocsai’ is worth to be added. Namely Act XXXVI. of
2014 on the amendment of certain education laws prescribed (in its § 39) that Olympic medals count
to be equal to an academic PhD in the higher education of sport: a month later, ex-trainer of the
national water polo team, Lajos Mocsai became the rector of the University of Physical Education.
33§ 7 (3b) of Act CXIX of 2012 on amending certain laws related to the traffic.
34§ 1 of LXXXVII of 2015 on amending certain laws related to the traffic.
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to qualify certain mergers to be of strategical importance: such mergers do not have
to be reviewed by the Competition Authority.35 Since then, this exception has been
used several times: for the first time, in the same year, through a two-step
privatisation of the biggest savings bank Takarékbank.36
In light of these examples, one thing becomes clear: these laws are targeted. Some
have a wider, some have a narrower scope but the intention behind them is always
the same: to punish the enemies or favour the friends of the government. Legislation
designed to target individuals is not a new feature in the Hungarian legal system.37 A
good example for this is the CEU itself which was recognised by a distinct law in
2004 by the then socialist government.38
Yet, individually designed legislation is always problematic because the rule of
law requires laws to be general, applying to subjects in an undifferentiated manner.39
Therefore, it is questionable whether laws that genuinely apply only to a distinct
scope of individuals, institutions or companies fulfil these essential requirements.
Even more dangerous are laws, which pretend to have general effect but are designed
in a way that they de facto apply only to a circumscribed circle of people. This is the
common feature of the recent lex friends and lex enemies which became everyday
practice of Hungarian politics. They became the ‘silver bullets’ for resolving almost
any problem. This is one of the most important systemic rule of law problems in
Hungary now—even if it has not been acknowledged by the EU institutions as a
general pattern.
2.2 Unrestrained Constitutional Amendments
Even more alarming, however, are the developments at the constitutional level. The
amendment of the constitution is relatively easy in the Hungarian unicameral
parliamentary system: it simply requires the two-thirds majority of all MPs.40 With
regard to the Hungarian mixed election system,41 however, it was not expected that
one single party could obtain such an overwhelming majority. In this sense, the two
thirds majority requirement seemed to be a proper guarantee for political
35§ 24/A of Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair commercial practices and of restriction of
competition.
36The case was especially delicate because smaller savings banks were forced by law (Act
no. CXXXV of 2013) to integrate into that Takarékbank, but their constitutional complaint against
that law remained unsuccessful for the most part: see AB decision no. 20/2014 (VII. 3).
37In details Erdős (2013), pp. 47–56.
38Act LXI. of 2004 on the recognition of the Central European University.
39Similarly Erdős (2013), p. 55.
40Art. S of the Fundamental Law. The majority requirement has not changed with the new
constitution, see § 24 (3) of Act XX of 1949 on the constitution of the Republic of Hungary
(in effect until 31. December 2011).
41About the half of MPs are elected in constituencies, and the other half from party lists.
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compromises. The situation changed in 2010 when—due to the scandalous gover-
nance of the socialists—the right-conservative Fidesz gained a two-thirds majority
alone. After this victory, the Fidesz party did not feel obliged to prescribe stricter
rules for amendments of the constitution.
To the contrary: the governing party used its overwhelming power for amending
the constitution with controversial provisions several times. Some of these new
provisions had even been annulled by the Constitutional Court previously.42 The
probably most notorious of these amendments, was the Fourth Amendment to the
Fundamental Law in April 2013. As a result of this amendment, the government
implemented significant parts of the so called ‘transitional provisions’ to the Fun-
damental Law. These provisions had formerly been annulled by the Constitutional
Court because they would have introduced some ‘actually not transitional’ pro-
visions into the constitution. The Court had also pointed out that the ‘transitional
provisions’ were neither parts of the constitution nor constitutional amendments:
they were in the ‘no men’s land of public law’.43
Further, the Fourth Amendment concerned topics like the possibility of levying
taxes to finance obligations stemming from judgments of the Constitutional Court or
of international courts, the National Judicial Office’s president’s right to reallocate
cases,44 the introduction of the concept of ‘dignity of communities’ as a special limit
to the freedom of speech,45 and the possibility of local governments to penalize
homeless people if they live on the streets.46 Some of these laws had earlier—as
ordinary legislation—been declared void by the Constitutional Court47 or were
pending before the Court at that time.48 Further, point 5 of the closing provisions
to the Fourth Amendment states: ‘the decisions of the Constitutional Court taken
prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law are repealed’. The reason for
42The first over constitutionalisation of the Fidesz government happened under the old constitution
yet. After the Constitutional Court annulled the introduced 98% special tax on redundancy
payments in the public sector, the Fidesz-majority amended the old constitution and explicitly
allowed that and also limited the competences of the Constitutional Court in financial matters. See
AB decision no 184/2010 (X. 28) (ABH 2010, 1161) and §§ 1-2 of Act CXIX of 2010 on the
amendment of Act XX of 1949 on the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary. The rate of the tax
was decreased to 75% at the end of 2013, and after the third election victory resulting in two third
majority, the Fidesz-majority of the parliament silently terminated this extra tax (§§ 41-42 of Act
XLI of 2018 on the amendment of certain laws about taxation and on the immigration tax).
43AB decision no. 45/2012 (XII. 29.), (Magyar Közlöny [Official Journal] 184/2012, p. 38979).
44These two provisions have been later abolished by the Fifth Amendment of the Fundamental Law
in September 2013.
45Art. IX (5) of the Fundamental Law. Since then, the seventh amendment codified an explicit
prohibition.
46Art. XXII (3) of the Fundamental Law.
47See e.g. AB decision no. 38/2012 (XI. 14.) (ABH 2012, 185) on the unconstitutionality of
criminalising homelessness, AB decision no. 6/2013 (III. 1.) (ABH 2013, 194) on the unconstitu-
tionality of the regulation of churches.
48See e.g. AB decision no. 36/2013 (XII. 5.) (ABH, 2013, 1045) on the ‘case transfer’ within the
judiciary.
Hungary’s Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for ‘Informed’ EU. . . 45
this provision was that the Court often followed its former case law even after the
Fundamental Law entered into force, at least in cases when the affected provision of
the Fundamental Law and of the old constitution were the same or very similar.49
However the Court interpreted the newly amended closing provisions very crea-
tively: it pointed out that point 5 of the closing provisions only gave the Court the
opportunity, not to refer to its former decisions even if the affected rules and the
context are the same.50
In order to overcome any restrictions and constitutional checks placed upon the
government by the Constitutional Court, the Fidesz government established a
strategy of ‘over-constitutionalisation’. Namely, after the Court declared ordinary
laws to be unconstitutional, the two-thirds majority simply ‘solved the problem’ by
amending the respective provision of the constitution. Since the Constitutional Court
cannot review the substance of constitutional amendments,51 constitutional checks
and balances are in fact disabled. Further these constitutional amendments concern
topics, which would normally be considered to be a matter of ordinary law. As such
they lead to an inflated, trivialized constitutional law—to an ‘over-
constitutionalisation’. The consequences of this development for the Hungarian
constitutional architecture are difficult to foresee.
Recently, this practice can be further illustrated with the seventh constitutional
amendment. The Hungarian government has been a strict opponent of the EU
migration policy and especially of the Council decision no. 2015/1601 on the
relocation of 120,000 asylum applicants. While the government challenged this
decision before the CJEU, the Hungarian Commissioner for Fundamental Rights
initiated proceedings before the Hungarian Constitutional Court, practically
requesting an ultra vires- and fundamental rights review. The motion was pending
before the HCC when the Hungarian government decided to hold a referendum on
the ‘EU migrant quota system’ (without an explicit legal basis).52 Since the turnout
remained under 50%, the referendum was legally invalid.53 In order to make it
‘valid’, the prime minister initiated a constitutional amendment in the autumn of
2016. Alongside the prohibition of settling ‘foreign population’ in Hungary, the
amendment would have introduced an obligation for all state bodies to respect the
constitutional identity of Hungary—without, however, defining this concept. This
explicit reference to constitutional identity was obviously aimed at challenging the
authority of EU law. Further, the constitution’s EU-clause was intended to be
49See primarily AB decision no. 22/2012 (V. 11) (Magyar Közlöny [Official Journal, 52/2012,
p. 9737), para. 40.
50AB decision no. 13/2013 (VI. 17) (Magyar Közlöny [Official Journal], 98/2013, p. 54958),
para. 31.
51See on this under Sect. 2.3.2.
52It makes no sense to hold a national referendum on an issue ruled by EU law: neither it is foreseen
by the Hungarian constitution as it allows referendums only in questions which belong to the
competence of the Hungarian National Assembly. See Art. 8 of the Hungarian Fundamental Law.
53According to Art. 8 (4) of the Fundamental Law, a referendum is valid if the number of valid votes
exceed 50% of all citizens eligible to vote.
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amended so as to make the ‘joint exercise of competences’ subject to the fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Hungarian Fundamental Law and without
limiting Hungary’s sovereign right to command its population, territory and state
order.54 Yet, this amendment failed because by that time the governing party did not
hold the needed two-thirds majority anymore. After Fidesz regained a two-thirds
majority in spring 2018, the seventh constitutional amendment55 was placed on the
agenda again—this time with success. The amendment did not only provide for the
constitutionality of the aforementioned ‘Stop Soros’ package on facilitating ‘illegal
migration’.56 It further concerned the law on the administrative courts,57 the new law
on the freedom of assembly58 and the criminalisation of homelessness. Concerning
the latter it not only established the possibility to ban habitual residence at public
spaces by local governments’ decrees59 but generally prohibits it at the constitutional
level.60 In addition, the rules on the EU-clause and the reference to the obligation of
all state bodies to respect constitutional identity have been codified at the
54Draft legislation no. T/12458. The text is available in Hungarian at the website of the National
Assembly: www.parlament.hu/irom40/12458/12458.pdf.
55The consolidated version of the Fundamental Law after the seventh amendment is available in
official English translation at: www.njt.hu/translated/doc/TheFundamentalLawofHungary_
20181015_FIN.pdf.
56The new Art. XIV of the Fundamental Law now stipulates that foreign population cannot be
settled in Hungary and the basic rules of granting asylum and asylum procedure must be defined by
cardinal law. That means that an eventual future easing on the asylum rules will require a two thirds
majority in the parliament. Further, it has been codified on the constitutional level that those who
arrived through a safe third country, are not eligible to get asylum (this last point is codified also in
the German Basic Law anyway: see Article 16a (2) GG). The ‘Stop Soros’ anti migration package
was published in the official journal on the same day than the seventh constitutional amendment.
See Act VI. of 2018 on the amendment of certain laws related to measures against illegal
immigration.
57The constitutional amendment established the constitutional basis of a distinct system of admin-
istrative courts with the Administrative High Court on the top of it (new Article 25 of the
Fundamental Law). See also Act CXXX of 2018 on the administrative courts. After the European
elections of 2019, the government decided to delay the entering into force of this law for an
indefinite period. The reason behind is most probably political: Fidesz still wants to stay in the
European People’s Party—where its membership has been suspended because of concerns over the
rule-of-law-conformity of their governance—and therefore they made a gesture to show some
willingness for a compromise.
58Art. VI of the Fundamental Law has been amended with a sentence with regard to the collision of
privacy rights and of the freedom of expression and assembly. Namely, ‘exercising the right to
freedom of expression and assembly shall not impair the private and family life and home of others.’
less than a month later, on the 20th of July 2018, the parliament adopted the new law on the freedom
of assembly. The new law makes it possible to ban an assembly if it is likely to violate others’ right
to privacy and family, or to human dignity. (§ 13 (4) of Act LV of 2018 on the freedom of
assembly.).
59As it had been the case since the fourth amendment which overruled AB decision no. 38/2012
(XI. 14.) (MK 2012/25417).
60Art. XXII (3) of the Fundamental Law as amended through the seventh amendment. In effect
since 15. October 2018.
Hungary’s Latest Experiences with Article 2 TEU: The Need for ‘Informed’ EU. . . 47
constitutional level.61 This latter part of the amendment is especially interesting
because it perfectly illustrates how the role and significance of the Constitutional
Court has changed. Namely, through implementing these provisions into the consti-
tution, an earlier decision of the Constitutional Court has not been overruled, but on
the contrary, confirmed.
2.3 The Constitutional Court: Still a Counterbalance or,
Already an Ally of the Government?
The significant event between the first attempt for the seventh constitutional amend-
ment and its adoption in its final form was a judgment of the Constitutional Court. A
few weeks after the planned constitutional amendment introducing the notion of
constitutional identity in the constitution failed in autumn 2016, the Constitutional
Court delivered a decision on the aforementioned motion of the Commissioner for
Fundamental Rights concerning the Council decision on refugee-quotas.62 In that
judgment, the Court established the possibility of an identity review of EU law
(without being asked on such a review competence). Until then, the concept of
constitutional identity had no significance in the case law of the Constitutional
Court.63 The Court recycled the German case law on the matter, however in a rather
selective way without clearly defining the content of this constitutional identity.64
The decision perfectly shows how the attitude of the Constitutional Court towards
the government has changed in the last couple of years. Indeed, the case illustrates
how the initial relationship between the Court and the government has been
reversed: initially, the government tried to circumvent decisions of the court striking
down ordinary laws through constitutional amendments. After the governing party
lost its constitution-amending majority in the parliament, the Court presented itself
as an institution compensating the government’s lack of majority by constitutional
interpretation. The Court substituted the requirement of two thirds majority through
constitutional interpretation.
61New Art. E and the Preamble of the Fundamental Law as amended.
62AB decision no. 22/2016 (XII. 5.) (ABH 2016, 1418).
63The concept occurred only once, in the parallel reasoning of (then constitutional judge, now
justice minister) László Trócsányi to the Lisbon-decision (AB decision no. 143/2010 (VII. 14.),
(ABH 2010, 872). Since then, the concept has only been referred by Fidesz-appointed constitutional
judges at the Fide Congress in the spring of 2016—when the motion of the ombudsman was already
pending before the Court. See the speeches of András Zs. Varga and Tamás Sulyok at the XXVII.
FIDE Congress. See Varga Zs (2016), pp. 9–10; Sulyok (2016), p. 40.
64There is only an illustrative list of the elements of constitutional identity in the decision with
e.g. rights and freedoms, separation of powers, republican state form, parliamentarism, equality,
protection of ethnic minorities. The rule of law is lacking from the list. AB decision no. 22/2016
supra note 62, para. 65. For a detailed critical analysis of the judgment see Bakó (2018),
pp. 863–902.
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The push for the seventh amendment of the Fundamental Law shows, however,
that the government still does not regard the Court as a ‘trustworthy’ ally. A portion
of the seventh amendment secured the constitutionality of some reforms in the event
that the Court’s helpful attitude should change. On the other hand, the amendment,
concerning the EU clause and the question of constitutional identity, illustrates the
misgivings that the government still harbours regarding the Constitutional Court.
Safe is only what is codified in the constitution—that is the general strategy of the
Fidesz-government.
The changed relationship between the parliamentary majority and the Constitu-
tional Court is easier to understand by analysing the changed composition and
competences of the Court and the new strategies applied by the Court in its everyday
practice.
2.3.1 Filling the Court with Fidesz-Loyalist Judges
Constitutional judges are elected with two thirds majority of the parliament. This has
not changed since 1990. However, prior to 2010, candidates used to be proposed by
a parity-based committee comprising of all parliamentary groups. Therefore, even if
a government had a supermajority in the parliament, a compromise with the oppo-
sition would have been required concerning the candidates.
In July 2010, Fidesz with their supermajority amended the old constitution to
ensure that the composition of the committee represents the power relations in
the parliament.65 Since then, no compromise has been needed—at least as long as
the governing parties had a supermajority. In September 2011, the number of the
constitutional judges was raised from eleven to fifteen and their mandate was
extended from 9 to 12 years.66 Between 2010 and 2013, eight constitutional judges
had been appointed exclusively with the votes of the Fidesz. By spring 2013, Fidesz-
appointed judges had a majority in the Court. In autumn 2014, three further judges
were elected by the Fidesz-MPs.67 While Fidesz temporarily lost its two-third
majority in February 2015, the term of some judges expired. In order to not
jeopardize the Court’s pro-Fidesz attitude by electing judges of a different political
orientation, the Court was left to operate with 11 judges instead of 15 for months and
the election of new constitutional judges was not even put on the agenda of
parliament for some time. Finally, in autumn 2016, the parliament elected four
65§ 32/A (5) of the old constitution as amended on the 5th of July 2010.
66Act LXI of 2011 on the amendment to the (old) constitution, § 3; Act LXII. of 2011 on the
amendment to the (old) Act on the Constitutional Court (Act XXXII. of 1989), § 1 (2). New
Fundamental Law Art. 24 (8) and the new Act on the Constitutional Court (Act CLI of 2011), §
6 (3)—both have been in force since 1. January 2012.
67In his empirical analysis focusing on the period between 2010 and 2014, Zoltán Szente pointed
out that the level of political adaptation of the majority of the constitutional judges was surprisingly
high. In details see Szente (2016), p. 66.
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new judges with the support of the green party. However, this could not significantly
change the balance and the attitude of the Court.
2.3.2 Limiting Constitutional Review in Important Cases
Concerning the powers of the Court, two problematic points must be emphasized.
First, substantive review of constitutional amendments has been explicitly
excluded.68 Neither the old constitution nor the original version of the new Funda-
mental Law contained any reference to the substantive review of constitutional
amendments. Yet the Constitutional Court generally considered itself not competent
for such a review.69 From 2011 on, it has happened several times that constitutional
amendments have been introduced to incorporate provisions that had been formerly
invalidated by the Constitutional Court. As described above,70 the government
acting through parliamentary supermajority amended the constitution incorporating
several provisions that were previously declared invalid. While the Constitutional
Court theoretically had the chance to take an activist step by changing its former case
law and review constitutional amendments on their substance, the Fourth Amend-
ment erased the Court’s discretion in this regard. The Fourth Amendment of the
Fundamental Law explicitly prohibits the Constitutional Court to substantially
review constitutional amendments by limiting judicial review of constitutional
amendments to procedural aspects alone.71 Absent any other constitutional guaran-
tees limiting the amending power of the parliament, these constraints placed on the
Constitutional Court raise substantial concerns. Since constitutional amendments are
also excluded subjects for referendums,72 neither the Constitutional Court nor the
people have any direct control over how the two thirds majority in parliament
amends the constitution.
Second the new Fundamental Law restricted the competence of the Constitutional
Court regarding the review of acts concerning public revenue and expenditure. Until
the state debt exceeds 50% of the GDP, the Constitutional Court may review the Act
68Art. 24 (5) of the constitution stipulates: ‘The Constitutional Court may review the Fundamental
Law or the amendment of the Fundamental Law only in relation to the procedural requirements laid
down in the Fundamental Law for making and promulgating it.’ (My italics).
69For details see e.g. Jakab and Szente (2009), para 117; Bakó (2017), pp. 105–108.
70See Sect. 2.2.
71See the present Art. 24 (5) of the Fundamental Law. The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights
made a motion against the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the amendment caused inner contra-
dictions within the constitution. However, the Court declared its lacking competence for the review
of the constitutional amendment, referring to the terms of the constitution as amended through the
amendment subject to that review, see AB decision no. 12/2013 (V. 24.) (ABH 2013, 390).
72Holding a referendum about constitutional questions is now explicitly excluded by Art. 8 of the
Fundamental Law: under the old constitution, it was an unwritten taboo, established and conse-
quently reaffirmed by the Constitutional Court. See primarily AB decisions no. 2/1993 (I. 22.) and
25/1999 (VII. 7.).
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on State Budget and other acts related to public finances only if they violate human
dignity or other enumerated fundamental rights.73 Some authors consider this rule to
be a ‘dishearteningly materialistic reading of constitutionalism’ as it practically
means the suspension of the rule of law until a certain debt is reached74 implying
that the constitution is not necessarily the highest law anymore.75 On a theoretical
level, such criticism is right and well founded, especially taking into account the
circumstances. The taboo of reviewing financial laws has been a part of the strategy
of ‘over-constitutionalisation’, described above. After the Constitutional Court
struck down a law that levied a 98% tax on certain severance payments in the public
service,76 the old constitution was amended in order to allow levying special taxes
on remunerations ‘received against the good morals’ retroactively.77 Further, the
aforementioned limitation of the Constitutional Court’s competences concerning
laws related to the central budget, was introduced.78 Following this new restriction,
constitutional complaints in financial and economic matters have mostly been
rejected in their entirety or to a large extent.79 However, these complaints were not
necessarily rejected on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction but because the respective
limitations of fundamental rights were not unnecessary and disproportional.80
2.3.3 New Strategies of the Constitutional Court: Shifting Away from
the Control of the Legislative
In light of the changes to the competences and composition of the Court, a crucial
question relates to if and how the attitude of the institution has evolved. Although
73Art. 37 (4) of the Fundamental Law. The state debt was 77.6% of the GDP at the beginning of
2012—as the Fundamental law entered into force. According to the last data of the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office, the debt was 73.3% in 2017 (http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/stattukor/
edp/edp181024.pdf). So, this restriction probably will remain in place for a while.
74Vincze and Varju (2012), p. 451.
75Halmai (2012), p. 1082.
76AB decision no. 184/2010. (X. 28), ABH 2010, 1161.
77§ 70/I (2) of the old constitution as amended. At the same time it must be seen, especially in the
EU-context, that national constitutional courts and the effectiveness of national constitutional
principles are often limited by EU-law and by measures of EU institutions in the field of financial
legislation. See theOMT case (BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13, OMT and CJEU, Case C-62/14 Gauweiler,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:400) and the PSPP case (BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, PSPP and CJEU, Case C-493/
17 Weiss, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000).
78In details see e.g. Sonnevend et al. (2015), pp. 94–95.
79Gárdos-Orosz (2016), p. 444.
80See e.g. AB decision no. 20/2014 (VII. 3.) (MK 91/2014, 10918) regarding the integration of
cooperative banks and AB decision no. 3194/2014 (VII. 15.) (ABH 20/2014, 991) regarding the
commerce of tobacco products. For an overview of the Constitutional Court’s case law on
budgetary matters see Tilk (2014).
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there are some positive examples in the Court’s latest case law related to fundamen-
tal rights81 and the rule of law,82 two relevant tendencies can be identified.
First, the Court has distanced itself from politically relevant questions. As the
abstract norm control has been subsequently displaced by concrete forms of judicial
review, primarily by the newly established constitutional complaint, the focus has
shifted from the constitutional review of legislation towards the constitutional
review of the application of the law.83 Thus, the role of the Constitutional Court
in the system of checks and balances has changed profoundly.84 The Court is no real
counterweight to the parliament anymore. A recent example is the judgment on the
penalisation of homelessness, established by the seventh amendment to the consti-
tution. Finding first that the newly introduced offence was constitutionally valid, the
Court established a constitutional requirement for the practical application of the
relevant paragraph. In order to comply with the aim of this constitutional prohibition,
respectively the integration of homeless people into the social care system, § 178/B
of the Act on Offences may only be applied if the affected person can be provided
with accommodation at the time the offence was committed.85 However, the Court
did not even discuss the question of whether the penalisation itself was a propor-
tional tool for the implementation of the constitutional prohibition. The Court
decided to avoid any conflict with parliament by annulling the law. Instead, it left
the law in force and only modified its interpretation in light of constitutional
requirements.
Second, even when the Court adjudicates on the validly of a piece of legislation
and finds it to be contrary to the constitution, it has been cautious to strike it down
and applied a more lenient approach.86 Instead of annulling a law, it often prescribes
constitutional requirements for the law’s interpretation by ordinary courts. This
happens even in politically significant matters or cases concerning fundamental
rights.87 Further, the timing of the decisions (in relation to politically important
events, like referendums or elections) might also have significant impact (see e.g. the
constitutional identity decision discussed above).
81In December 2017, the Court ruled that it is an obligation for the parliament to decide on the status
on churches within a reasonable time and ordered the legislator to establish proper guarantees in
order to keep the 60 days deadline. See decision no 36/2017. (XII. 29.), ABH 2018, 2. Another
recent case concerned media freedom: a CC judgment delivered at the end of 2017 made clear that a
medium is not liable for the violation of personality rights if it was covering a press conference. AB
decision no. 34/2017. (XII. 11.), ABH 2017, 2058.
82The Constitutional Court annulled some parts of an order of the president of the National Judicial
Office because it foresaw unconstitutional sanctions against judges, moreover, without the right of
appeal. AB decision no. 33/2017. (XII. 6.), ABH 2017, 2031.
83For empirical data see Gárdos-Orosz (2016), pp. 448–452.
84Orbán (2016), pp. 7–9.
85AB decision no. 19/2019 (VI. 18.), ABH 2019, 1052, paras. 105–110.
86Gárdos-Orosz (2016), p. 449.
87Id. See also Halmai (2015), p. 146.
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Finally, many sensitive cases are still pending before the Court—like the NGO
law and the ‘lex CEU’, which are both subject to an infringement procedure and
therefore (questionably) suspended by the Constitutional Court with the probable
motivation of avoiding any conflict with the government.88
3 Why Infringement Procedures Are Ineffective in the Case
of Hungary
Currently, the only judicial tool of enforcing EU values compliance is the infringe-
ment action. However, this procedure is intended to enforce compliance with EU law
concerning rather specific matters, instead of addressing systemic rule of law
deficiencies. This problem is also illustrated by the infringement actions launched
against Hungary in the past few years related to EU values. Although Hungary did de
facto not comply with the CJEU’s decisions in some of the cases, the respective
issues were regarded as solved. In this section, I will briefly discuss the infringement
proceedings regarding some of the above-mentioned targeted laws. It is important to
recall that ‘rule of law’ deficiencies in Hungary arise from the whole gamut of
constitutional malfunctions on one hand and the system of targeted legislation on the
other. Therefore, individual infringement procedures against some selected pieces of
targeted legislation cannot solve the problem, even if the Hungarian government
fully complies with the decisions of the CJEU.
3.1 CJEU Judgments Being Fully or Partly Ignored
In the case concerning the premature termination of the data protection
ombudsman’s term of office, the European Commission initiated an infringement
procedure based on a violation of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). The
Hungarian government argued that the directive required independence in an oper-
ational sense89 which had not been violated by the personal and institutional
changes.
The CJEU delivered its decision in April 2014 dismissing Hungary’s plea.
According to the Court, the threat of a premature termination of the term of office
‘could lead it to enter into a form of prior compliance with the political authority,
which is incompatible with the requirement of independence’.90 It stated that merely
preserving the operational independence of the president of the new Data Protection
88See Sect. 2.1.4 above.
8995/46/EC directive, Art. 28 (1).
90CJEU, Case C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237, para. 54.
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Authority was not enough91 and the reorganisation of the institutional framework
was not sufficient ground for the termination of the ombudsman’s term without
applying proper transitional measures.92 The status of the Data Protection Authority
has not been changed since the judgment.
Regarding the new retirement rules applying to judges, the government has
shown some readiness for compromise and recommended raising the retirement
age to 65 from the originally intended 62. The Commission did not accept that and
initiated an accelerated infringement procedure.
Simultaneously, the Hungarian Constitutional Court also examined the question
and ruled in July 2012 that the regulation was violative of judicial independence and
thus unconstitutional. The Hungarian Constitutional Court knew that a parallel
infringement procedure was in progress. As such, the Constitutional Court could
challenge the government without taking any risk93 and voided the law
retroactively.94
The decision of the CJEU in the infringement procedure, delivered 4 months later
examined the case as pertaining to a question of discrimination under Directive
2000/78. The CJEU ruled that the Hungarian regulation violated the directive95
without, however, basing its decision on the requirement of judicial independence.96
Following these rulings, the laws on the status of judges (and of prosecutors and
notaries too) have been amended: affected judges had to choose whether they wanted
to retire or continue assuming their office. Such decisions were also motivated by a
legal amendment according to which those judges who do not want to return to
service were eligible to compensation in the amount of 12 months remuneration.97
91Id., para. 51.
92Id., para. 61.
93For a comparative analysis of the judgments of the CJEU and of the Hungarian Constitutional
Court, see Vincze (2013), pp. 330–333. Of course, normally, a constitutional court would not have
to take any risk in cases like that but in Hungary, the government’s recent practice shows that it is
likely to amend the constitution with the content of laws which has been just annulled by the
Constitutional Court.
94AB decision no. 33/2012. (VII. 17) (MK [official journal] 2012, 13918). The meanwhile retired
judges did not get back to office automatically, but they had to claim an action before the Labour
Court—many of them decided rather not to do that.
95CJEU, Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687. The Court did not take
into account that the Hungarian Constitutional Court meanwhile annulled the provisions in question
because that happened after the start of the infringement procedure.
96Interestingly, the case law of the CJEU had changed significantly within a couple of years. In the
very similar case of sending Polish Supreme Court judges into retirement, the CJEU’s dismissing
judgment, delivered in June 2019, was primarily based on the principle of judicial independence
and to Art. 19 (1) TEU. CJEU, C-619/18 Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paras.
96, 124.
97§ 323/I (6) of Act XX of 2013 on certain legal amendments related to the age limit in certain
positions in the justice system.
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Thus, many judges were not reinstated into their former, leading positions.98 Further,
they must still retire by reaching the general retirement age of 65 years.99 To sum up,
the initial situation has not fully been restored. Further, other threats to judicial
independence, like the controversial appointment practice of the president of the
National Judicial Office,100 have not even been addressed by infringement
procedures.101
3.2 Infringement Cases Regarding the NGO Law and the Lex
CEU
In parallel to the procedure before the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the European
Commission launched an infringement procedure concerning the NGO law. The
ECJ ruled in June 2020 that the law represented unjustified restrictions to the free
movement of capital and to the right to privacy, data protection and the freedom of
association as guaranteed by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.102
Further, the ‘Stop Soros package’ has been subject to an infringement procedure
since July 2018. The procedure is based on a twofold argument. First, the Commis-
sion criticises the non-compliance with the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Asy-
lum Qualifications Directive and the Reception Conditions Directive by
criminalising the support for asylum applications and by introducing a new
non-admissibility ground.103 Second, the Commission challenges the injunction to
stay away from the border, arguing that the respective legal provision is contrary to
the TFEU, the Charter and the Free Movement Directive because it ‘unduly restricts
the exercise of free movement rights of EU citizens without due regard for proce-
dural guarantees.’ In September 2018, the Hungarian government refused to make
any changes to the package.104
98This was also the subject of a complaint of more than 150 judges before the ECtHR. The
Strasbourg Court finally dismissed the complaints. In the appendix of the judgment it is apparent
that the majority of the applicants accepted the lump-sum compensation for not being reinstated.
See J. B. and others v. Hungary, ECtHR case no. 45434/12.
99See the new § 91 of Act CLXII of 2011 on the Legal Status and Remuneration of Judges
(following Act XX of 2013 on amendments regarding the retirement age in certain jurisdictional
position).
100See Vadász (2018). Meanwhile, the practice of the NJO president has been subject to a
preliminary reference, see CJEU, Case C-564/19, IS.
101The problem, that systemic deficiencies of the independence of the judiciary, are not holistically
handled by the CJEU, occurred more clearly in the case of Poland. See e.g. opinion of AG Tanchev
in Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K., para. 147.
102Judgment in case no. C-78/18, para 143. ECLI:EU:C:2020:476
103See press release no. IP/18/4522.
104A kormány válasza az Európai Bizottságnak: marad a Stop Soros [The government’s answer to
the European Commission: Stop Soros remains] http://www.kormany.hu/hu/igazsagugyi-
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Concurrently, affected NGOs launched constitutional complaints before the
Hungarian Constitutional Court arguing that the introduction of the new offence of
‘facilitating illegal migration’ unconstitutionally restricted the freedom of associa-
tion and the freedom of expression. One of these complaints has already been
rejected. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to have a rather open attitude towards the
case. First, the complaint was not submitted by an affected person (but by an
organisation with a more abstract relationship to the contested provision) and
without exhausting the ordinary remedies beforehand.105 Instead of dismissing the
case as inadmissible, however, the Court referred to an exceptional rule of the Act on
the Constitutional Court106 and to the HCC’s function as a protector of fundamental
rights107 and examined (and eventually rejected the case) on the merits.
Finally, the ‘lex CEU’ is by far the most problematic case. Generally, education
is a Member States’ competence. The Commission based its charges on the
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services with reference to
universities from third countries. The applicability of EU law, however, is highly
questionable in this case considering that only universities with links to third
countries are affected.108 Due to the lack of any intra-EU cross-border element,
this argument presupposes an extensive interpretation of the freedom of establish-
ment clause: an understanding similar to that adopted in Ruiz Zambrano.109
However, unlike the applicants in the Zambrano case, the CEU is a legal person
and thus could not rely on the ‘substance’ of Union citizenship under Article
20 TEU. Therefore, the Commission’s reference to academic freedom, freedom
of education and freedom to conduct a business as guaranteed by the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights raises the question: how can the scope of EU law in the sense
of Article 51 (1) of the Charter be triggered? A way to circumvent these problems
happened to be WTO law. The CJEU, contrary to its former case law, applied
WTO law directly in the case and ruled that Hungary failed to comply with its
commitments under the GATS convention and this equals to the failing to fulfil its
obligations under EU law. The fact that this convention was an integral part of EU
law was found to be enough reason also for the application of the Charter.110
miniszterium/parlamenti-allamtitkarsag/hirek/a-kormany-valasza-az-europai-bizottsagnak-marad-
a-stop-soros.
105See §§ 26-27 of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court about the requirements of
submitting a constitutional complaint.
106§ 26 (2) of Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court regulates the exceptional requirements
when constitutional complaints are acceptable also beyond the general conditions. These include
cases when the threat of fundamental rights violation is direct and does not require a judicial
decision and cases when no remedies are provided. In the case of the amendment of the Criminal
Code, neither requirement is fulfilled, so by accepting the complaint, the Constitutional Court
obviously made an activist step in the field of individual fundamental rights protection.
107AB decision no. 3/2019 (III. 7.), Magyar Közlöny [official journal] 2019, 912, paras. 32–42.
108See press release no. IP/17/1952 and MEMO/17/3494.
109See e.g. the Zambrano judgment: C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124.
110Judgment in case no. C-66/18, especially paras 86–93. and 212–215. ECLI:EU:C:2020:792.
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The amendment of the Higher Education Law—or, the ‘lex CEU’ as it is often
referred to—is much easier to be challenged under Hungarian constitutional law
than under EU law. Unlike the Charter provisions, the academic freedom and
freedom of education as guaranteed by the Hungarian constitution undoubtedly
apply to the act in question. Further, the legislation arguably violates the principle
of the rule of law as guaranteed in Article B) (1) of the Fundamental Law: not only
through the tight—although later extended—vacatio legis, but also by posing a
threat to legal certainty and legitimate expectations. Further, by requiring prior
consent of the federal government for agreements with federal states, the law
demands the legally impossible.111 Additionally, if an international agreement is
a prerequisite for the further functioning of an accredited university, it practically
means that the exercise of academic freedom ‘depends on the political discretion of
two sovereigns’.112 This is very problematic regarding both fundamental rights and
the rule of law.
Yet the Hungarian Constitutional Court suspended the review of the lex CEU
with reference to the pending cases before the CJEU. The strategy of the HCC was
probably the following: waiting for the decision of the CJEU and hoping that the lex
CEU will get the green light under EU law. That would have been a win-win
situation for the HCC: it would have been able to reaffirm the constitutionality of
the law and avoid any conflict with the CJEU or the government. The strategy did
not work, the CJEU dismissed Hungary. The aforementioned infringement pro-
ceedings were directed against specific pieces of targeted legislation, without embed-
ding them in the broader context and evaluating the general practice of personalised
legislation. The fact, that ‘ordinary’ infringement procedures are not suitable to
address systemic patterns, has been pointed out by legal scholarship long ago.113
Yet, the respective proposals have not been implemented in EU legislation or
practice.
111In detail see the amicus curiae brief of András Jakab, Miklós Lévay, László Sólyom and Zoltán
Szente to the Constitutional Court (case no. II/01036/2017). It has to be added that this impossible
requirement has already been ignored by the Hungarian Government itself by closing such an
agreement with the state of Maryland. See the Agreement between the government of Hungary and
the state of Maryland and on cooperation in the field of higher education as promulgated by Act
CXIV. of 2017. The agreement provides the further functioning of the McDaniel College in
Budapest under the new legal framework. In the agreement, there is no reference to any prior
consent of the US federal government.
112Uitz (2017).
113Scheppele (2013a) and Bárd and Śledzińska-Simon (2019).
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4 Making a Try with Article 7: The Sargentini Report
on Hungary
As seen above, the infringement procedure as currently operated by the Commission
is insufficient for addressing the systemic key issues in Hungary. The following
section will analyse whether procedures in the political realm are more apt to
challenge the Hungarian rule of law deficiencies.
The first comprehensive political document on the new Hungarian constitutional
system and its compatibility with EU values was adopted as early as June 2013: this
was the non-binding EP resolution named after its rapporteur Tavares.114 The report
criticised the media situation,115 the legislation concerning the judiciary and
the Constitutional Court,116 some fundamental rights issues, especially the rules of
the recognition of churches,117 the reform of the election system118 and not least, the
practice of amending the Fundamental Law systematically along political interests,
with special regard to its Fourth Amendment.119 As a reaction to the Tavares report,
the Fundamental Law has been amended for the fifth time in September 2013. Some
points of criticism have been slightly modified or suspended (like the case transfer
within the judiciary or, the possibility of levying special taxes to finance obligations
stemming from decisions of the HCC or of international courts). Yet, the main
114EP report no. P7_TA(2013)0315.
115The most criticised point was the independence of the Media Authority. However, it has been
proven in the last years that the media problem is not of an institutional kind. It is rather about the
fact that government friendly investors purchase even more formerly independent media platforms
and turn them to be loyal to the government or even propagandistic (or they just simply close them,
as it happened to the biggest daily newspaper called Népszabadság in October 2016). In detail, see
e.g. Bátorfy (2017), pp. 12–13.
116See Sects. 2.1.2 and 2.3.2 above on these matters.
117The Constitutional Court annulled some earlier versions of the law on churches: AB decisions no
164/2011 (XII. 20) (ABH 2011, 1263) and 6/2013 (II. 26.) (ABH 2013, 334). In its later decisions, it
called the government more times for amending the relevant laws, see AB decisions no. 23/2015
(VII. 7.) (ABH 2015, 1043), 36/2017 (XII. 29) (ABH 2018, 2). The ECtHR also dismissed Hungary
upon the issue (Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház and others v. Hungary, Application Nos.
70945/11 23611/12, 26998/12 et al.). The rules have been changed quite often meanwhile, most
recently in November 2018. The basic idea is however the same: there are different categories of
churches, and they are recognised by the parliament. Pursuant to the latest amendment, the
recognition by the parliament only applies to ’settled churches’ while other religious communities
will be registered by courts (see Act CXXXII of 2018 on the amendment of Act CCVI of 2011 on
the freedom of religion and on the status of churches and other religious communities, especially the
new §§ 9/A-9/G).
118The new election law (Act CCIII of 2011 on the election of the members of parliament) basically
upholds the former mixed system but it has been complemented with a tricky gerrymandering and
some unfair rules for the campaign (Section VIII of Act. XXXVI. of 2013 on the election
procedure).
119More details in Sect. 2.2 above.
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problematic points remained in place and the rule of law in Hungary has not
improved through this amendment.120
4.1 Getting Lost in Details, Missing the Bigger Picture
Unfortunately, very little of the deficiencies discussed above were addressed by the
Sargentini report adopted in September 2018. This second comprehensive EP
resolution on the situation in Hungary triggered an Article 7 TEU procedure121
and concentrated on 12 issues related mainly to fundamental rights protection122 and
the rule of law.123 Although the report mentions many relevant deficiencies, it gets
lost in irrelevant details and misses the bigger picture.
To name just but a few examples: concerning the Constitutional Court, the Data
Protection Authority and judicial independence, mostly the findings of the Tavares
report remain repetitive without analysing the recent developments in these fields
(points 8–9, 12–18). Related to fundamental rights, the report echoes some partly
unfounded criticism concerning the alleged oppression of Roma, Jewish minorities
or women (points 59-61, 46).124 Further issues included in the report relate to media
freedom (points 27-30), the secret surveillance for national security purposes without
sufficient legal guarantees (points 25–26), the penalization of homelessness (point
73), and violations of the academic freedom, the freedom of assembly and the
freedom of expression (points 33–36, 41–45). Furthermore, a new topic took centre
stage: corruption. On the one hand, the report correctly mentions cases where OLAF
found serious irregularities and possible fraudulent activities related to the spending
of EU funds, some of them share links to the family of the prime minister (point
23).125 On the other hand, the report also discusses irrelevant technical details like
MPs asset declarations or the system of campaign financing (points 20–21).
120Similarly, Szente (2017), p. 470.
121European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of
a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)).
122Freedom of expression, freedom of association, academic freedom, freedom of religion, privacy
and data protection, the right to equal treatment, social rights, rights of asylum seekers.
123Functioning of the constitutional system, the independence of the judiciary, corruption.
124The most striking false statement is that the Criminal Code does not fully protect women who
have been victims of domestic violence (point 46). Actually, a new offense has been introduced
already during the governance of the Fidesz, exactly in order to address this problem. See 212/A. §
of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code.
125The company of the son-in-law of the prime minister won public procurement procedures in
several towns and villages for the modernisation of street lightings. Many of the procurement
tenders were directly designed exactly and exclusively for his company. The Hungarian authorities
started an investigation but it was finally cancelled in November 2018. (Hungarian investigative
portal Átlátszó wrote about the story in details: https://atlatszo.hu/category/cikkek/eliosaktak/.) It is
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Eventually, the report does the Hungarian government a huge favour when
dealing exhaustively with Fidesz’s old-time campaign topic—migration. Yet even
here the report misses the crucial point: the introduction and emphasis by the
government on the ‘crisis situation caused by mass migration’. This new state of
emergency enables the government to apply less guarantees during the asylum
application procedures in order to significantly accelerate them.126 The crisis situa-
tion has constantly been prolonged since 2015, even if the legal requirements are
clearly not fulfilled.127 Instead of identifying this obvious and systemic rule of law
deficiency, the report rather concentrates on recording statistical data on the deten-
tion circumstances and the frequent refusal of appeals (points 62–72). Moreover, by
criticising a judgment in a specific criminal case, the report makes the impression of
intervening into that case,128 which is highly questionable with regard to the rule of
law itself.
In sum, proper grounds could be found for launching an Article 7 procedure
against Hungary, but only a few of them have been identified. And even those
elements that have been identified, are not convincingly placed within the system of
constitutional malfunctions. The report failed to realise the patterns: neither the
tendency of targeted legislation, nor the logic of “over-constitutionalisation” behind
some constitutional amendments were identified. Further, relevant arguments are
diluted with rather strange and minor, sometimes unfounded allegations:129 this
feeds such counterarguments that portray the report as a purely politically motivated
attack. Based on such an ill-founded report, Article 7 will surely remain a tool of
political cherry picking, failing to play a serious role in safeguarding the rule of law.
4.2 Limited Political Relevance
Despite several shortcomings of the Sargentini report, the Hungarian government
decided not to go into a substantial debate on the rule of law or fundamental rights.
Instead, the government challenged the report on formal grounds arguing that the
worth to recall at this point that the Prosecutor General was elected by the two thirds majority of the
parliament and actually, he is an ex-Fidesz member and an old friend of the Prime Minister.
126§§ 80/I-J-K of Act LXXX of 2007 on asylum.
127Such crisis situation may be announced basically if more than 500 applicants arrive daily in the
average of at least a month. This is not the case for a long time according to the statistics, but there is
a more flexible rule too- namely, the threatening of the public order in any Hungarian municipality
(not necessarily closed to the border). The interpretation and application of this flexible provision
belongs to the discretion of the government. See 80/A § of Act LXXX of 2007 on asylum.
128That is the case Ahmed H, who has been condemned for 5 years imprisonment because of an ‘act
of terror’ by the Hungarian courts following a riot at the boarder to Serbia. See Article 67 of the
report. In January, 2019 he was ordered to be expelled from Hungary.
129For example the oppression of LGBT, Jewish or Roma minorities and the lacking protection of
women from domestic violence etc.
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two thirds majority requirement for the EP voting was not fulfilled because absten-
tions were not counted as votes cast.130 After referring to these procedural defects
and declaring the Sargentini report as void, there seems to be no place for stepping
back and finding compromises. As such, the Sargentini report was an ideal target for
the Hungarian government in the campaign before the EP-election of 2019. Fidesz
called the Hungarian voters to resist pro-migration EU bureaucrats ‘punishing their
own border guards’: 52.56% of them did so by voting for the Fidesz.
More than two years have passed since the EP adopted the Sargentini report, but
the Council still has not made any decision. Only some hearings took place over
2019. This is not a surprise as a similar inertia can be observed with regard to Poland.
Nevertheless, rapporteur Sargentini has been eager to keep the issue of Hungary on
the agenda of the LIBE committee and to pressure the Romanian Council presidency
to table the case during the first half of 2019. In light of the fact that serious concerns
have been raised concerning the rule of law in Romania,131 it is no surprise that the
Romanian Council presidency did not hurry up with the Article 7 processes either
against Hungary or Poland. It is worth recalling that the Hungarian and Polish
governments promised to veto any steps against each-other in the Article
7 procedure.
5 How to Take ‘Informed’ Measures in Defence
of the Union’s Values?
Until here, I have tried to illustrate the complexity of the Hungarian developments
and also show how insufficient the different processes launched by EU institutions
have been. If values are codified normatively—as they are in Article 2 TEU—and
rule of law is to be taken seriously, there should be an objective and transparent tool
to “measure the unmeasurable”.132 As such, it comes as no surprise that the idea of
measuring the rule of law is a matter of increasing importance within the EU
institutions nowadays. In this last section, I will briefly outline some recent proposals
and point out the difficulties of using indicators to detect systemic rule of law
problems.
130CJEU, Case C-650/18, Hungary v. Parliament (pending). The legal situation is not obvious at
this point. The Rules of Procedure reads that ‘in calculating whether a text has been adopted or
rejected, account shall be taken only of votes cast for and against, except in those cases for which
the Treaties lay down a specific majority’ (Rule 178 (3) RoP). So the question is whether the two
thirds majority required by Article 354 (4) TFEU counts as a ’specific majority’.
131See EP resolution no. P8_TA(2018)0446.
132Cf. Schmitt (1996), p. 3.
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5.1 Measuring, Buying or Monitoring the Rule of Law?
In October 2016 the European Parliament made a proposal to the Commission133 to
introduce an Interinstitutional Agreement—the European Union Pact on Democ-
racy, the Rule of Law, and Fundamental Rights (DRF Pact). It seemed to be inspired
by an earlier academic debate on the ‘Copenhagen dilemma’ and especially by
Jan-Werner Müller’s idea of a ‘Copenhagen Commission’.134 The proposal concen-
trated primarily on two shortcomings of the present system: first, the EP intended to
define the Article 2 TEU values by setting up a framework of indicators. Second, it
would have provided for the Member States to be assessed regularly by an expert
group according to a ‘DRF Scoreboard’. A ‘DRF policy cycle’ was also foreseen to
assess the EU institutions.
The draft of the DRF Scoreboard outlined some rather general indicators to
measure democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights in the Member States,
involving existing expert bodies, civil organisations, EU institutions and not least,
national parliaments (Articles 6–8). Depending on the scores of the Member States,
the draft proposed initiating different proceedings under the Rule of Law Frame-
work, Article 7 (1) or even 7 (2) TEU. Further, the EP suggested that the Commis-
sion launch systemic infringement procedures by bundling several infringement
cases together.135
Of course there are difficulties: In light of the considerable differences between
the systems of the Member States with regard to democracy and rule of law, a
comprehensive and detailed list of indicators, which claims validity for all Member
States, would have been difficult to establish.136 Further, the proposal mentioned the
Charter as the only indicator for fundamental rights: however, that would have meant
an extension of the Charter’s scope beyond the limits of Article 51 (1).
Yet the proposal had some obvious advantages. Monitoring all Member States
(and the EU institutions as well) would certainly be more just and balanced than
criticising only some selected ‘suspicious’Member States. The DRF proposal would
not have changed the current system of EU values enforcement fundamentally in so
far as Article 7 TEU would have remained the main and final tool of sanctioning
non-compliance with EU values. However, the political process would have been
preceded by an exhaustive legal analysis: this way, expertise and political consid-
erations could have been better balanced. Unfortunately, the Commission has opted
for the usual course and refused to initiate any legislative proposal following the
133European Parliament resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission
on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
(2015/2254(INL)), 8_TA(2016)0409.[DRF Proposal].
134Müller (2016), pp. 206–224.
135The systemic infringement action was first advised by Scheppele (2013a).
136For details about the methodological questions see e.g. Jakab and Lőrincz (2017).
62 B. Bakó
EP’s DRF-proposal.137 The Commission argued that it had ‘serious doubts about the
need and feasibility’ of setting up such annual reports. Further, the involvement of an
expert panel raised ‘serious questions of legality, institutional legitimacy and
accountability,’ and rather, ‘best possible use should be made of existing instruments
while avoiding duplication’, the Commission argued.138
These arguments are hypocritical for several reasons. First, the Commission
presumes that its own Rule of Law Framework does not pose legality and legitimacy
concerns.139 Second, the Commission is clearly aware of the fact that the existing
instruments are not very effective to solve the EU’s value crisis, as illustrated by the
case of Poland140 and Hungary.141 The legality and legitimacy concerns could be
allayed exactly if Article 7 would result in informed sanctions: and the best way to
inform politicians about the legal system of other Member States is a thorough and
holistic legal assessment. Further, the judicial dialogue through preliminary pro-
ceedings also raised great hopes. Yet, after the LM judgment,142 it seems that simply
triggering an Article 7 procedure against the affected Member State is not enough to
generally overcome the present ‘horizontal Solange’model143 operating with excep-
tions from the mutual trust.
By rejecting the DRF proposal, it seemed that the Commission waived the legal
assessment in order to keep inappropriate tools of political threat. This raised the
question of whether the Commission’s position corresponds to its function as
guardian of the Treaties.144 The proposals on the protection of EU values developed
since then, still reflect the need for a thorough legal assessment.
An example for that is the Commission’s proposal from 2018 for a regulation to
protect ‘the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of
law in the Member States’.145 The proposal aims to withhold payments from EU
sources in the case of generalised rule of law deficiencies, trying to find the balance
137Follow up to the European Parliament resolution on with recommendations to the Commission
on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights,
adopted by the Commission on 17 January 2017, Ref. no. A8-0283/2016/P8_TA-PROV(2016)
0409.
138See the follow up document no. A8-0283/2016, point 6.
139See e.g. Skouris (2015), p. 14.
140In its third Rule of Law recommendation, the Commission admitted that the situation of a
systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland has ‘seriously deteriorated’ since the start of the process.
(Commission recommendation no. C(2017) 5320, point 45). This impression definitely was
strengthened after triggering Article 7 TEU against Poland—following that efforts made in the
frames of the Rule of Law Framework were useless. (Proposal for a Council decision on the
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (2017/
0360(APP, especially para. 175).
141See Sect. 3.1 above.
142Case no. C-216/18 PPU (ECLI:EU:C:2018:586).
143Canor (2013), pp. 383–421.
144Petra Bárd and Sergio Carrera answer this question obviously for the disadvantage of the
Commission. See Bárd and Carrera (2017), pp. 9–10.
145A8-0469/2018, procedure no. 2018/0136 (COD).
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between the general and systemic rule of law violations and the concrete individual
cases of fraud or corruption regarding EU sources. In fact, the proposal of the
Commission basically foresees a somewhat similar but much simpler political
process than that of the Article 7, to be applied to a narrower circle of problems.
The main practical differences are that this process has only one stage, the European
Council would not be involved and the required majority in the Council would be
much lower. In the first reading of the legislative procedure, the European Parliament
suggested that both the consent of the Parliament and of the Council should be
needed to approve a transfer proposal for a budgetary reserve.146
The problem is that the proposal of the Commission explains only very briefly,
what is meant under the ‘rule of law’ or ‘generalised deficiency’ of the rule of law,
which gives ground to restrict the use of EU funds by the affected Member State.
Different aspects of the proper functioning of the judiciary system are set out in the
proposal: judicial independence, legal remedies, effective investigation and the
implementation of judgments, legal certainty, pluralistic and transparent legislative
process, lack of arbitrariness and so on. The proposal defines not only legal acts and
measures but also ‘widespread and recurrent practices and omissions’ as possible
sources of a generalised rule of law deficiency (Article 2 b).
However, it was not clear from the original proposal, how the Commission and
the Council would find out whether such a practice takes places in a Member State.
The European Parliament made an important amendment at this point and suggested
setting up an advisory panel composed of independent experts in constitutional law
and financial and budgetary matters, appointed by each of the national parliaments
and by the European Parliament (new Article 3 a as proposed). The suggestion
clearly reflects the idea of the failed DRF proposal147 but applied only to a narrower
field, related to rule of law deficiencies affecting the financial interests of the EU.
Regardless of this ongoing legislative process, the Commission seems to realise
that it was a mistake to dismiss the Parliament’s DRF Scoreboard. It is hard to find
any other reason, why the Commission returned to the basic idea of that scoreboard.
Namely, in July 2019, the Commission announced the introduction of a ‘Rule of
Law Review Cycle’ and the publication of an ‘Annual rule of law report’ in order to
prevent ‘negative developments’ regarding the rule of law in the Member States.148
Similar to the DRF Scoreboard, all Member States will be subject to this monitoring
mechanism, but unlike that scoreboard without a distinct expert panel. Further, the
Commission aims at collecting data from existing bodies, also beyond the EU, like
the OSCE, the Council of Europe or the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. The
reason for that are the Commission’s legitimacy and accountability concerns
again. In its communication, however, the Commission made clear that ‘external
expertise cannot take the place of an assessment made by the Commission itself,
146New Art. 5, paras. 6a-6c as proposed and Art. 5 paras. 7–8 as proposed to be deleted.
147See Sect. 5.1 above.
148COM(2019) 343 final.
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particularly when the Commission’s conclusions could be the basis for acts that
come with legal and financial consequences’.
The question occurs, why extra-EU expert bodies count automatically as account-
able and legitimate in the matter of EU values, and how is it guaranteed that the
Commission will make an informed assessment concerning the rule of law in the
Member States. The first annual rule of law reports, published in September 2020,
unfortunately verified these concerns. In the country report on Hungary, the Com-
mission correctly raised criticism concerning a number of issues, but it failed to point
out to the big picture: how the criticised elements will affect the constitutional reality
in context.
5.2 How to Indicate Overlapping Systemic Rule of Law
Deficiencies?
To ‘measure’ the rule of law, it is clearly not enough to ‘simply take the Copenhagen
criteria off the legal shelf’.149 Simple governance checklists do not work either.150
However, that is not a reason for giving up any attempts to ‘measure’ the rule of law.
Yet, complex indicators should be used instead of checklists. Aggregating the
presence or absence of certain institutional structures does not make much sense
without taking into account the wider context and the interrelatedness of different
aspects within (and beyond) the rule of law.151
Several international rule of law indicators exist, which are based on different
factors of the rule of law: still, their results usually are almost identical.152 If the EU
wants to set up a rule of law indicator, that will be a ground for sanctions, this must
be more than a mere checklist. Such a rule of law indicator could only work if it
follows a truly holistic approach. The Hungarian example illustrates very well, how
many levels of rule of law problems could occur. Particular rule of law problems
may affect each other in a way that is extremely difficult to translate into scores and
numbers if we work with strictly distinct factors of the rule of law.
For example, targeted legislation seems to be a problem that is relatively easy to
detect by assessing to whom a certain law actually applies. Still, the issue becomes
more difficult, once the options for constitutional remedies are taken into account.
The constitutionality of that targeted law will be reviewed by a Constitutional Court
that is composed of judges loyal to the government. Moreover, if the law regulates a
financial subject or is part of an ‘over-constitutionalisation’, it might not be consti-
tutionally reviewed at all. Of course, a weakened Constitutional Court will get lower
scores in any system of indicators—but it is questionable whether this lower score
149Müller (2017), p. 241.
150Scheppele (2013b), p. 562 et seq.
151Similarly, Ginsburg (2011), p. 272.
152See the empirical analysis of Versteeg and Ginsburg (2017), p. 102 et seq.
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properly describes its actual effects on the legal system. Such complex outcomes can
hardly be expressed in a score-system based on separate factors.
But there is another side of the coin too: if once a constitutional court gets a lower
score because of its restricted competences, to what extent does it make sense to
complain further about the method of selecting judges? Namely: if the Court could
not decide about anything important, why does it matter that it is composed of
government-friendly judges? Of course, the question is simplified in so far that some
important decisions could surely be made by any constitutional court. Still, if the
factors of competence and composition are put in proportion, the final score of a
constitutional court will be better balanced.
The correlation and interrelatedness of different factors should not only be
measured within the elements of the rule of law (e.g. generality of laws, indepen-
dence of judges, constitutionalism), but also in the broader context of the state order.
For example, it might sound good that two thirds parliamentary majority is needed
for appointments for the most important positions and for the amendment of the
constitution. But it should also be measured, how easy or how difficult it is to win
such a majority in the given election system. By asking this question, we are already
beyond the realm of the rule of law, and within the principle of democracy, which is
another founding value of the EU. A founding value that seems to be overlooked in
the current rule of law debates. And that is a pity for an important reason.
The above-analysed legislative changes are protected by the government always
with the same argumentation: they are legitimised by the people to make such
reforms and this legitimation does not only establish an opportunity for them, but
also an obligation. They must fulfil the people’s will by implementing these legis-
lative changes, and anyone who doubts that these reforms comply with the rule of
law, actually questions the democratically expressed will of the Hungarian people.
As such, they are echoing the idea of ‘political constitutionalism’ under the slogan of
‘illiberal democracy’. However, not only the rule of law, but also the functioning of
democracy could convincingly be criticised in Hungary.153 The difference between
the paradigms of legal and political constitutionalism, between the ideas of ‘liberal’
and ‘majoritarian’ democracy was perfectly illustrated through the debates on the
Hungarian rule of law. EU institutions could be much more successful in these
debates if they distanced themselves from the idea of legal constitutionalism and
tried to set a trap for Orbán in his own territory by pointing out to some problems of
democratic legitimacy beyond (but related to) the strictly understood rule of law
concerns.
Such arguments are more effective if they are not echoed (only) by politicians, but
they have a solid background. A background that is more than a report made by a
MEP who was bound to party bargains, and more than a mere checklist based on
scores of separate factors. A complex EU-indicator of the rule of law (or more
153E.g. the rules of the election procedure and campaigning (see Sect. 2.1.6 and supra note 113),
restrictions regarding direct democracy (supra note 78) and the media situation (supra note 110).
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broadly, of EU values) can only be set out if it is sensitive to correlations and it is
based on legal reality instead of abstract legal possibilities.
Of course, such an indicator will not be a solution for every problem either. It
would also be necessary that the Commission repeatedly launches infringement
actions if judgments of the CJEU in rule of law related matters are not respected,
and it would further be useful if the CJEU would be more eager to systemically
scrutinise the rule of law breaches in those processes.154
6 Conclusion
As seen above, the Hungarian government works primarily with the instrument of
personalised, targeted legislation—this tendency has not been acknowledged in
Brussels as one of the main pillars of Hungary’s rule of law-deficit. Only some
individual pieces of the targeted legal regime reach the thresholds of EU criticism
from time to time. The reason for limiting the powers of the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court was mainly to ensure that the Court does not prevent the introduction of
some targeted and politically important laws and constitutional amendments. Ulti-
mately, Hungary has been made subject to an Article 7 procedure. Yet from the
Sargentini report it is clear that the rule of law problems of Hungary are only partly
captured by the EP: the ‘lex CEU’ and the ‘lex NGO’ were the obvious red lines in
the eyes of many politicians but they are by far not the most problematic points in the
whole constitutional pattern. That pattern could have been identified if EU values
would be considered at least worth to be defined—at best, along factors of a
scoreboard that takes systemic correlations into account. For Hungary and Poland
the purely political Article 7 procedure still awaits—without a minimum of legal
certainty provided by clear concepts but with guaranteed political motivations
behind the decision. If a final decision comes at all. . .
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Abstract This contribution develops the framework of European reactions to the
undermining of checks and balances in EU Member States. It surveys the normative
setting with its various institutional options and contrasting constitutional principles
and then applies these principles to the panoply of relevant instruments. The building
blocks of this framework are competence, procedure, standards, and control. This
should help Europe to speak with a principled voice. The contribution shows how
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red lines can be drawn that respect constitutional pluralism, and how any action’s
legitimacy is enhanced if many institutions undertake it jointly.
1 What Is at Stake
In some EU Member States, governing majorities are modifying controlling institu-
tions. These attempts go far beyond the traditional three branches and affect political
parties, ombudspersons, the media, NGOs and academia. As such, they critically
weaken the domestic checks and balances in a larger sense.1 Most consider the value
of the rule of law to be endangered, but the values of democracy and of respect for
human dignity are no less at stake.2 Indeed, political science sees such measures as
symptomatic for illiberal democracies, i.e. for authoritarian tendencies.3
This book has been triggered by the remodelling of the Polish Judiciary since
2015.4 However, the Polish developments are not isolated. Similar tendencies
manifest in a series of EU Member States, especially in Hungary.5 European
constitutionalism is perhaps facing a ‘constitutional moment’:6 the decision whether
it comprises illiberal democracies or whether it fights them. The first case would
herald the end of the European Union’s current self-understanding, as ‘illiberal
democracies’ would co-inform the common values of Article 2 TEU in the future.
The alternative path requires the Union to counter threats to domestic checks and
balances. To achieve this, European constitutionalism must draw and defend ‘red
lines’, which would also imply a considerable constitutional development: European
1See Ackerman et al. (2011), p. 264.
2On the interrelatedness of these values, see already Habermas (1992), p. 109 et seq.; similarly,
Möllers and Schneider (2018), p. 97 et seq. Similarly Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of
generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018) 324 final),
recital (3).
3Lauth and Sehring (2009), p. 165; Kailitz and Köllner (2012), p. 11; Merkel (2013), p. 223 et seq.
4For an enumeration of particularly problematic measures, see Proposal for a Council Decision on
the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law
(COM(2017) 835 final), para. 6 et seq.; on the context, Bachmann (2018), p. 9 et seq.;
Sadurski (2019).
5Halmai (2018a), p. 85; European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling
on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence
of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/
2131(INL)). On Romania, see Venice Commission, Romania—Opinion on draft amendments to
Law No. 303/2004 on the Statute of Judges and Prosecutors, Law No. 304/2004 on Judicial
Organisation, and Law No. 317/2004 on the Superior Council for Magistracy (Oct. 22, 2018),
CDL-AD(2018)017; European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2018 on the rule of law in
Romania (2018/2844(RSP)).
6The concept was coined by Ackerman (1991), p. 6, though with a different thrust.
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constitutionalism would gain in profile and develop elements of a militant
democracy.
This chapter explores the latter path, which leads into unchartered waters. The
legality and the legitimacy of the European actions are disputed. Even the Council of
the European Union considers one of the European Commission’s instruments
inadmissible.7 Some voices, not least the European Parliament, regard European
actions as too one-sided.8 Others accuse the Union of double standards, as it
allegedly fails the same values which it demands its Members to respect.9 Some
hold the European Commission as generally ‘unsuited’ as a guardian of liberal
democracy.10
Some even detect in these unchartered waters what Carl Schmitt branded as the
‘tyranny of values’: a defence of values that destroys the very values it aims to
protect.11 In April 2017, the Polish ambassador in Berlin announced that Poland
respects all European values and that there merely was ‘a problem of interpretation.
Brussels is far too strongly informed by liberal left-wing ideology.’12 In similar
terms, Viktor Orbán explained his rejection of Frans Timmermans’ nomination as
President of the Commission by calling him ‘an ideological warrior who accepts no
diversity, who tolerates no views which diverge from his own and from liberal
democracy, and who wants to force his own conception on all EUMember States’.13
Such positioning is symptomatic. As Uwe Volkmann observes, in today’s European
society there are ‘different worlds of values which only rotate around themselves and
hardly ever intersect’.14 The predominance of one of these worlds is then quickly
considered tyranny by the other.
In the first step, I will explore the constitutional horizon of the question of
whether one should intervene in a case such as the Polish one (2). Factors militating
against such action are national democracy, the risk of failure, but also the possibility
of an unwanted European state (Sect. 2.1), while considerations of the current
constitutional self-understanding, Union citizenship and mutual trust speak in favour
of such action (Sect. 2.2). The second step develops a legal frame for pertinent
instruments of European law, Member States’ law and international law (Sect. 3.1),
7Council Legal Service, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the
rule of law: – compatibility with the Treaties (10296/14).
8Mendelski (2016), p. 390; Franzius (2018), p. 382 and 386; Resolution on the need for a
comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental
rights (2018/2886(RSP)), recital (K).
9Weiler (2016), p. 326.
10Schorkopf (2016), p. 159; Janse (2019), p. 43.
11Schmitt (2011), p. 48 et seq. The expression ‘tyranny of values’ was first used by Hartmann
(1926), p. 524 et seq.
12Quoted after Voßkuhle (2018), p. 17.
13Press Release, ‘They want to make Soros’s man the President of the Commission’ (2 July 2019),
www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/they-want-to-make-soros-s-man-the-president-of-
the-commission.
14Volkmann (2018), p. 14.
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consisting of the building blocks legal basis (Sect. 3.2), procedure (Sect. 3.3),
standards (Sect. 3.4), and control (Sect. 3.5).
2 The Principles in Abstract
2.1 Options
The European legal space requires that all institutions exercising public authority
within its scope respect its fundamental values. Its legal orders have mutually
committed themselves to a constitutional core.15 This is expressed most clearly in
Articles 2, 7, and 49 TEU, but national constitutional law sets out similar require-
ments.16 These requirements are complemented by international law, especially
Article 3 Statute of the Council of Europe as well as the ECHR.17 These require-
ments may not be identical, given European constitutional pluralism, but they
certainly rest on largely overlapping core values.18
At the same time, it is not clear whether and how public institutions are to defend
these fundamental values. Article 7 TEU, which stipulates specific mechanisms,
provides much discretion: The Union ‘may’, but is not bound to defend the European
values against its Member States.19 All the other instruments, too, leave ample
scope.20 There is legal room for considering various options.
From the perspective of Union law, a first option is to avoid any conflict, to do
nothing, and—with liberal optimism—to trust into the self-healing powers of liberal
constitutionalism. A second option would be to primarily address authoritarian
tendencies in the Council of Europe, thus acknowledging the Council’s special
role regarding questions of Member State constitutional law.21 This would relieve
cooperation within the Union from this conflict. A third option for the Union is to
adhere to the established scope of Union law und thus avoid the highly conflictual
discussion about values. The Commission acted against Hungary in this sense: it
brought the disempowerment of the judiciary to the CJEU as an inadmissible
15For an overview see von Bogdandy (2014), p. 980.
16BVerfGE 140, 317 – Identitätskontrolle; The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmer, [2018]
IEHC 119 (2018).
17In detail Uerpmann-Wittzack (2009), p. 131.
18Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in CJEU, Case C-62/14Gauweiler and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:7,
para. 61.
19Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on Article 7 of
the Treaty on European Union. Respect for and promotion of the values on which the EU is based
(COM(2003) 606 final) p. 6; Ruffert (2016), para. 8.
20However, there may also be constellations in which there is a duty to take action, Huber
(2017), p. 389.
21Tuori (2016), p. 237. On the procedure under Art. 20 (c) Statute of the European Council, see
Wittinger (2005), p. 130 et seq.
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discrimination of elderly judges under the Anti-Discrimination Directive 2000/78.22
As a fourth option, the Union could leave the issue to its Member States. The
Member States in turn could act collectively, as in case of the sanctions against
Austria,23 or individually, e.g., by denying the Member State in question judicial
cooperation or by utilising Article 259 TFEU.24
Exercising such discretion must be based on valid grounds. The structuring of
such grounds is a task of legal doctrine. While such a doctrine cannot recommend
any specific outcome, it can rationalise matters. As is the case with most difficult
decisions, there are valid reasons both for and against defending the Union’s values.
2.2 Grounds Against Defending the Union’s Values
Powerful arguments suggest caution. One of these, much deployed by the Polish
government, refers to the pair of democracy and national identity. Article 2 TEU
states democracy as a fundamental value; Article 4 (2) TEU protects the Member
States’ ‘national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and
constitutional’. If a democratically elected governing majority modifies these fun-
damental political and constitutional structures—this most ‘sacred’ area of national
sovereignty—there is strong reason to assume that neither the Union nor other
Member States should intervene. From a comparative view, the situation in Poland
or in Hungary is far less critical than the one in Russia or Turkey.25 Furthermore,
understanding the Union’s values in an exacting manner would create the need to
intervene in many Member States. This can hardly be the intention of the TEU.
Another valid argument is the consideration not to damage the Union. Articles
1 and 3 TEU task the Union to develop policies for the good of its citizens. Any
attempt to force an elected government under a common constitution can easily
result in explosive conflicts. They may even endanger the constitution itself.26 One
need only think of the escalation caused by the actions of the Spanish central state
against the governing majority of Catalonia.27 And European actions against the
current governing majority in Poland lack important resources which supported the
Spanish central state against the Catalonian government: a clear democratic man-
date, a developed national consciousness, and the hard instrument of federal execu-
tion. Polish representatives have already declared that they consider European
22CJEU, Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687, para. 24 et seq.; critically
Halmai (2017), p. 471.
23On this Ahtisaari et al. (2000), para. 116; Schorkopf (2002), Lachmayer (2017).
24BVerfGE 140, 317 – Identitätskontrolle; Hirsch Ballin (2016), p. 133; Kochenov (2015), p. 153.
25Weiler (2016), p. 314.
26Dyzenhaus (2012); comparative Federalism is instructive in this respect, Möllers and Schneider
(2018), p. 5 et seq.
27García Morales (2018), p. 791 et seq.
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actions against their remodelling of the judiciary as illegitimate.28 It appears possible
that a European defence of values may fail, which might inflict lasting damage on the
Union’s authority and demonstrate the frailty of the foundations of the common
European house. The Union is not built for such conflict: since its ‘constitutional
moment’ of overcoming the French ‘empty seat’, the search for consensus is key to
its operation.29
But success, too, might plunge the Union into serious trouble. If the Union
prevails over the combative Polish government, this would imply an enormous
proof of power. The Union would significantly gain in stature vis-à-vis its Member
States should it succeed in transforming its instruments, so far widely considered as
rather ineffective, into a kind of effective federal execution.30 This could be regarded
as a huge step towards the EU’s becoming a federal state, since what the Union
primarily lacks in this regard is precisely such power. Such a prospect of
Staatswerdung could cause a backlash from many Member States, which might
equally endanger the Union. For all these reasons, the Union’s hesitations should not
be misconceived as mere opportunism.31
2.3 Grounds in Favour of Defending the Union’s Values
At the same time, there are substantial legal grounds for the Union to defend
European values. Three of them appear particularly pertinent: the European self-
understanding as a community of values, Union citizenship and the principle of
mutual trust.32
A first reason for the Union to defend its values results from its self-
understanding, stipulated in the Treaties, as a liberal-democratic peace project.
According to Article 2 TEU, the Union has been ‘founded’ on the respect for
these values. This applies not only to the Union’s supranational institutions, but
also to its Member States. Article 2 TEU expresses standards for any public action in
the European legal space.33 Respecting and promoting these values is the key
requirement for membership, as stipulated in Article 49 TEU. The term ‘value’
underlines the character of these principles as ‘supreme and final normative
28See the statement by Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, quoted after Steinbeis (2018);
the Vice President of the Polish Constitutional Court has announced that he would consider any
judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union against Poland as illegitimate, see
Muszyński (2018).
29van Middelaar (2016), pp. 107 et seq., 120.
30The Polish compliance with the interim measures ordered by the CJEU in Case C-619/18,
Commission v. Poland, with regard to the Supreme Court might be an indication.
31Cf., e.g., Kochenov and Pech (2016), p. 1062.
32On the legal grounds for intervention Closa et al. (2014), pp. 5–7; Hillion (2016), pp. 60–64.
33In detail von Bogdandy (2010), p. 13 et seq.
78 A. von Bogdandy
grounds’.34 In Article 2 TEU, all Member States declare who they are and what they
stand for; they articulate the deep logic of their institutional practice and the moral
convictions of their citizens. In short: Article 2 TEU positivises the Union’s self-
understanding as a community of values.
In the light of substantiated evidence that Polish measures violate European
values, a European silence would speak volumes. It would question this very
community: the common axiological basis would appear either as an unfounded
illusion or as a foundation that includes developments such as the Polish ones. In
both cases, the self-understanding cultivated so far would hardly prove sustainable.
The distance to Trump’s USA would diminish. The Union would face a severe
identity crisis.
Another legal ground results from the Union’s mandate to protect all individuals
in the European legal space, which includes protecting Polish citizens against their
own government.35 The CJEU says that ‘Article 20 TFEU precludes national
measures which have the effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine
enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens
of the Union’.36 This includes the ‘essence’ of EU fundamental rights, which is
protected by Article 2 TEU. In L.M. (Deficiencies in the system of justice), which
deals precisely with the Polish measures, the CJEU emphasized this link between the
essence of a Charter right (the right to a fair trial and an impartial court in Article
47 (2) CFR) and Article 2 TEU and allowed a Polish national to invoke this essence
against the internal developments in his home state.37 With this logic, presumably
any violation of a value can somehow be tried in court.38 This is a kind of ‘reverse’
Solange doctrine: outside the scope of application of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, Member States remain autonomous with respect to fundamental rights, as
long as they guarantee the standard of Article 2 TEU.39 If this standard is undercut,
all public institutions in the European legal space must enforce the essence of the
Union’s fundamental rights against any measures of the Member State concerned.40
The Union’s steps against Poland are important not only on a normative, but also
on a cognitive level.41 Such steps disprove the assumption that all Polish citizens
stand with the governing majority. Indeed, many Polish citizens fight for liberal
34Luhmann (1993), p. 19; cf. also Habermas (1992), p. 311 et seq.
35Franzius (2018), p. 384.
36CJEU, Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, para. 42.
37CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. The term
‘deficiency’ can be found in the case’s denomination by the Advocate General as well as in the press
release, CJEU, Press Release No. 113/18. In detail von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019).
38Spieker (2019), Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), p. 1090.
39In detail von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 489; von Bogdandy et al. (2015), p. 235; von Bogdandy
and Spieker (2019).
40Cf. the contributions in Steinbeis et al. (2015), Croon-Gestefeld (2017), p. 371; Blauberger
(2016), p. 280; Russo (2014), Kochenov (2013), p. 145.
41Mälksoo (2009), p. 653.
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democracy in their country.42 In doing so, they refer to their status as citizens of the
Union, as is shown by the European flag accompanying government-critical dem-
onstrations. For Union citizenship, this might be a historic moment: it gains genuine
political weight.
A third reason for the Union to defend its values is the principle of mutual trust. In
the L.M. (Deficiencies in the system of justice) judgment, the Court made a clear
point: measures like the Polish ones endanger the fundamental structure of the Union
because they undermine mutual trust, without which vital areas of European coop-
eration cease to function.43 The principle of mutual trust states: all Member States
must trust that all Member States respect Union law and its fundamental rights in
particular.44 The status quo of integration can hardly be maintained without mutual
trust.45 But such trust requires defending the values on which it stands.46
3 The Principles Applied
3.1 The Toolbox
Many instruments might be used to defend European values. They are of diverse
legal nature (political, administrative and judicial, binding and non-binding), they
pertain to different legal orders and they are applied by different, sometimes even
competing institutions, such as a constitutional court and the CJEU. That calls for a
coordinating legal doctrine comprehending several legal orders.
Such a doctrine should not force the different instruments into a Procrustean bed.
Instead, it should elaborate their diversity while indicating how to connect them as
part of a functional tool box. Coordinated actions are more promising, whereas
uncoordinated ones might be counterproductive. In more general terms: a clear and
univocal reaction of the many European voices is essential for the protection of the
Union’s values.
Instruments of Union law are at the centre of attention.47 This is justified insofar
as action by the Union reduces the pressure on Member States to take steps on an
individual level: the latter, e.g., a reprisal, can be even more explosive than pressure
42The current governing majority only received 37.58% of all votes cast, with a voter turnout of
50.92%.
43CJEU,Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 35. In detail, Regan (2018), p. 231.
44CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Adhésion de l’Union à la CEDH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 191;
Lenaerts (2017), p. 805.
45CJEU, Case C-411/10 N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, para. 83; in detail von Bogdandy
(2018), p. 487.
46CJEU, Case C-578/16 PPU C.K. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, para. 95.
47For an overview see Closa et al. (2014) as well as the accounts given in Closa and Kochenov
(2016) and Jakab and Kochenov (2017).
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by the Union.48 Among the instruments of the political institutions, measures taken
under Article 7 TEU, the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework and the rule of law
dialogue of the Council are at the forefront.49 The Commission’s Justice Scoreboard
2018 has become a supervisory instrument, too,50 as has the Commission’s Country
Report on Poland within the framework of the European Semester.51 Regarding
someMember States, the Union disposes of additional instruments. The Cooperation
and Verification Mechanism in the Treaties of Accession with Bulgaria and Romania
is meant to ‘see the two countries develop the effective administrative and judicial
systems needed’.52 The Treaty of Accession with Croatia contains a similar instru-
ment.53 Further instruments are being planned: the Commission wants to make
funding subject to respecting EU values54 and to launch an ‘EU Justice, Rights
and Values Fund’ with an overall budget allocation of 947 million EUR.55
In the framework of the European Parliament, there are the plenary debate, the
law on sanctioning radical political parties,56 as well as disciplining instruments
within Europe’s political alliances.57
48Müller (2015), p. 145.
49Conclusions of the Council of the EU and the Member States meeting within the Council on
ensuring respect for the rule of law (16134/14).
50Cf. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
The 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard (COM(2018) 364 final), p. 4 et seq. On the Justice Scoreboard,
Dori (2015), Jakab and Lorincz (2017).
51Country Report Poland 2018 accompanying the document Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup: 2018
European Semester: Assessment of progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of
macroeconomic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011
(SWD(2018) 219 final), pp. 3, 29.
52Cf. the corresponding reports by the Commission, most recently Report from the Commission to
the European Parliament and the Council, On Progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and
Verification (COM(2018) 850 final); Vachudova (2016), p. 270; Carp (2014), p. 1.
53Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (2012) OJ L112/21, Art. 36. In detail,
Łazowski (2012), pp. 33–36.
54Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the
Member States (COM(2018) 324 final), Art. 2; see also Halmai (2018b).
55Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions, A modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends: The multiannual
financial framework for 2021–2027 (COM(2018) 321 final), p. 48.
56Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and
European political foundations (2014) OJ L317/1, art. 3 and art. 6.
57Art. 9 of the European People’s Party Statutes, for example, permits the exclusion of both
individual and Member State political parties, but does not define a reason for exclusion. Similar
provisions are contained in Art. 16 Statutes of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Party.
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Then there are the courts.58 Unlike political bodies, they cannot avoid making
decisions. The CJEU can be called upon to decide via the infringement and the
preliminary ruling procedures; both can lead to severe financial sanctions. Further-
more, the CJEU can support actions of political institutions: an important example
for this is the role it attributes to the qualifications made in the Commission’s
proposal to institute a procedure under Article 7 TEU.59 Accordingly, such a
proposal is sensible even when the Council and the European Council are unlikely
to act.
The Union’s institutions apart, those of the Member States can also defend
European values. In this context, the tool box of international law is to be considered,
from retaliatory measures to the mechanisms of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties60 to the extreme and contested option of an eventual humanitarian
intervention in case a state turns to state terrorism.61 The governments of the
Member States can coordinate such international instruments, as was the case against
Austria in 2000.62 They could also consider, and threaten, to advance integration
among themselves, excluding the countries that do not conform with the values.63
Member State courts, too, dispose of relevant instruments. They can defend
European values against their own state in the light of a ‘reverse Solange’ doctrine64
or against another Member State in the light of a ‘horizontal Solange’ doctrine.65 The
CJEU can support them in this via preliminary rulings. An important question is to
what extent national courts can proceed independently from Union law on such
matters.66
Other pertinent measures are those of the Council of Europe, especially recom-
mendations issued by its political institutions or by the Commission for Democracy
through Law (Venice Commission), as well as decisions of the ECtHR.67 While the
Council of Europe far exceeds the EU-centred European legal space, its relevance
inside the European legal space flows from Article 6 (3) TEU, Article 52 (3) and
Article 53 of the CFR. On an operative level, there is a close institutional
connection.68
58On this, see in particular Huber (2017), p. 409 et seq.
59CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, paras. 69 et seq.
60In detail, see Binder (2013).
61Crawford (2013), p. 931; International Law Association (2018), p. 20 et seq.
62In detail, see Schorkopf (2002), p. 77.
63Franzius (2018), p. 388.
64On this, see above, Sect. 2.3. See also the presently pending references on a preliminary ruling in
the cases Miasto Łowicz v Skarb Państwa – Wojewoda Łódzki (C-558/18); Prokuratura Okręgowa
w Płocku v VX, WW, XV (C-563/18); Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach (C-623/18).
65See in particular Canor (2013); a first case of application is the judgment of the Irish High Court in
the Celmer case, supra note 16.
66As indicated in BVerfGE 140, 317 – Identitätskontrolle.
67Cf. on the Venice Commission, Nergelius (2015), p. 291; Grabenwarter (2018), p. 21.
68von Bogdandy (2008), p. 69 et seq.
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Given that this legal framework comprises instruments of Union law, interna-
tional law and the law of the Member States, it pertains to European law and not
simply to Union law, international or domestic law alone.69 In the tradition of public
law thinking, such a doctrinal framework is to contribute to legal instruments
promoting their legitimacy as well as their efficacy. Its most important building
blocks are legal basis (Sect. 3.2), procedure (Sect. 3.3), the material standards (Sect.
3.4), and control (Sect. 3.5).
3.2 Questions of Competence
Any action to protect European values is prone to escalation. Therefore, it should be
in the hands of institutions that can shoulder such a responsibility and manage
conflicts. The first aspect responding to this concern is the requirement of a legal
basis, in many cases even the need of a specific competence.70 Thus, the first
question is to verify whether its adoption and use are supported by a legal basis.
3.2.1 Article 7 TEU in the Order of Competences
Article 7 TEU plays a key role in this respect, as it might bar other reactions to
systemic deficiencies under Article 2 TEU. In this case, the defence of the values
would be completely under the control of the governments of the Member States,
united in the Union’s institutions. Responsibility, therefore, would be crystal clear.
The drawback is that the extremely high requirements of Article 7 TEU might leave
EU values without defence. Besides this consequentialist consideration, doctrinal
arguments likewise militate against interpreting Article 7 TEU as an exclusive
mechanism.
A first issue is whether Article 7 TEU prohibits pertinent measures by Member
States. Article 3 TFEU does not list Article 7 TEU. Article 4 TFEU, which
enumerates the main areas of shared responsibilities, does not feature Article
7 TEU either. However, it lists the space of freedom, security and law. Hence,
there could be an argument to assume precedence of measures of Union law vis-à-vis
a defence by Member States. Then there is Article 344 TFEU.71
The CJEU’s case-law seemed to point towards pre-emption, especially in cases
like Melloni, which excluded the unilateral enforcement of one Member State’s
69On this understanding of European law, see in detail already Mosler (1968), p. 481 et seq.; von
Bogdandy (2016), p. 589.
70Bast (2006), p. 30 et seq.; Bast (2018), para. 13 et seq.
71On the expansive interpretation of this clause, see CJEU, Case C-459/03 Commission v. Ireland
(Mox Plant), ECLI:EU:C:2006:345, paras. 123 et seq.
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constitutional principles against another.72 After the German Federal Constitutional
Court emphasized its competence to protect the constitutional identity of the German
Basic Law against measures taken by other Member States, too,73 the CJEU has
acknowledged that European law leaves room for the national defence of
fundamental principles.74 Since the European values of Article 2 TEU and the
identity-informing fundamental principles of the Member State constitutions widely
overlap,75 neither the competences of Article 7 TEU nor other instruments of Union
law block Member State institutions from defending European values, according to
this case-law. This corresponds to the logic of the European legal space not to
monopolise a central question such as value defence in one institution. The consid-
erable need for coordination must be met with other means.76
The second issue is whether Article 7 TEU bars actions taken by other Union
institutions. Article 7 TEU does not contain an explicit statement as to whether other
Union institutions may defend European values using other instruments. The general
rules apply. It is well established that a specific procedure designed to deal with a
certain problem does not exclude developing other instruments,77 a core statement
since the Van Gend en Loos judgment.78 Accordingly, it is, in principle, admissible
to develop new instruments,79 such as the Commission’s Rule of Law Framework,
or the Justice Score Board.
Nevertheless, Article 7 TEU plays a role. Its wording, the inclusion of the
European Council and the extremely laborious procedure in Article 7 TEU indicate
that it stipulates the most intensive form of defence of values. Therefore, the Union
lacks any competence for developing stronger instruments. Hence, the expulsion of a
Member State80 or the dismissal of its government, an instrument the Spanish
government used against the Catalan government, are off limits.81 All instruments
complementing those of Article 7 TEU in defending the values of Article 2 TEU
must be less severe.82
72CJEU, Case C-399/11 Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107.
73BVerfGE 140, 317 – Identitätskontrolle.
74At least within the scope of fundamental rights, CJEU, Joined Cases C-404 and C-659/15 PPU
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198.
75Cf. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in CJEU, Gauweiler and Others, supra note 18.
76On this Sects. 3.3 and 3.4.
77Bast (2006), pp. 60–63.
78CJEU, Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:EU:
C:1963:1, p. 11.
79Bast (2006), pp. 42–67. Cf. also Brauneck (2019), pp. 37 and 59.
80On this, see the proposal by Stein (1998), p. 890; Blagoev (2011), p. 191.
81Recently in Spain under Article 155 Spanish Constitution. On this, García Morales (2018).
82In this sense also CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37; see also below, Sect.
3.4.
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3.2.2 Instruments of Secondary Law
So far, action under Article 7 TEU is paralyzed by the Council and the European
Council. Can other institutions defend the values through other instruments? As has
been shown, Article 7 TEU does not prohibit other instruments. But any new
instrument needs an appropriate legal basis. This requirement results from the
necessity to legitimise any action of public authorities, including ‘soft’ measures.83
A new instrument might even need a specific competence.84
With a view to the European Parliament, its general tasks allow it to discuss any
systemic deficiencies in the Member States,85 and it has done so for a long time. Its
resolutions have gained public attention. However, they have not had much
impact yet.
Measures taken by the other institutions could yield more powerful results, which
is why the law is more demanding than with respect to the European Parliament, as
has been shown by developments in other fields. The CJEU has declared Commis-
sion Communications invalid due to lack of competence (!).86 The Court’s require-
ment of a legal basis is particularly striking in the OMT procedure, whose subject
was the mere announcement of a new instrument for purchasing bonds by ECB
president Mario Draghi.87
The legal service of the Council has disputed the power of the Commission to
establish the rule of law mechanism;88 here, the general problem comes to the fore.
However, the admissibility of this mechanism flows from the Commission’s right to
make requests under Article 7 TEU as well as its general role of a guardian of the
Treaties according to Article 17 (1) TEU. On that basis, the Commission can also
examine whether the Member States respect the values of Article 2 TEU. The
competence to issue corresponding recommendations follows from Article 292 4th
sentence TFEU.89 These considerations also support the Justice Score Board.
Similar questions have emerged in the Council of Europe. One need only think of
the sanctions imposed by its Parliamentary Assembly against Russian
83See Nettesheim (2018), para. 200; Senden (2004), p. 478 et seq. On the legal boundaries, von
Bogdandy et al. (2015), pp. 273–275.
84In detail Bast (2006), para. 23 et seq.
85Bast (2006), para. 28.
86CJEU, Case C-57/95 France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1997:164; CJEU, Case C-233/02
France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:173, para. 40; Opinion of Advocate General Michal
Bobek in CJEU, Case C-16/16 P Commission v. Belgium, ECLI:EU:C:2017:959.
87Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in CJEU, Gauweiler and Others, supra note 18.
88Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law: –
compatibility with the Treaties (10296/14).
89Giegerich (2015), pp. 535–536; Toggenburg (2013).
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parliamentarians since the annexation of the Crimea.90 Another example are the
opinions from the Venice Commission issued without a request from the Convention
state concerned.91 All these measures constitute reactions to systemic problems and
can be treated analogously to the considerations on the instrument tool box of
Union law.
3.2.3 The Justiciability of the Values
The defence of values by political institutions has not been very effective so far. As
so often in the history of integration, the question arises whether the judiciary can
compensate for this. For the CJEU, this is a question of its powers within the
procedures of the Articles 257, 258 and 267 TFEU. Article 7 TEU does not block
these procedures; Article 269 TFEU only determines that the Court cannot review
the material prerequisites of Article 7 TEU. Given the lack of any explicit ban and
the CJEU’s general role in the union of law, there is good reason to assume that
values can play a role in procedures under the Articles 257, 258 and 267 TFEU.92
The actual crux is the justiciability of the values of Article 2 TEU. The term value
can be interpreted as the Treaty makers’ attributing a vagueness to Article 2 TEU that
excludes judicial application.93 Arguments relating to the separation of powers
might support this conclusion. The judicial application of values would immensely
extend the courts’ sphere of power to highly political conflicts.94 All of this can be
avoided by considering the values not to be justiciable.
However, following the established path of European Union law, the Commis-
sion and the CJEU have legally and credibly condensed the values of Article 2 TEU
so that they have become accessible to judicial decision making, the value of the rule
of law being at the centre. The most important path to condensing the values lies in
connecting these values to fundamental rights and the well-established principles of
the common constitutional traditions.95 The effort has proven successful: even from
the Polish ‘White paper on the reform of the Polish judiciary’—which presents the
highly controversial changes in the Polish judiciary as conforming to the values—
90Reconsideration on substantive grounds of the previously ratified credentials of the Russian
delegation (Resolution 1990 (2014) Final version) as well as the extension through: Challenge,
on substantive grounds, of the still unratified credentials of the delegation of the Russian Federation
(Resolution 2034 (2015) Final version); Steininger (2018), Henderson (2018), p. 393.
91von Bogdandy and Sonnevend (2015).
92In detail, Spieker (2019), Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1069–1073; Hilf and Schorkopf
(2017), para. 46; Hillion (2016), p. 59; Franzius (2018), p. 381 (386); a different attitude is
expressed by Levits (2018), p. 239 (262); Nicolisi (2015), p. 613 (643); Martenczuk (2018),
p. 41 (46).
93Kochenov and Pech (2018), p. 512 (520); Nicolisi (2015), p. 643.
94On the German discussion, Schmitt (2011), Böckenförde (1990), p. 25.
95CJEU,Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37. On the common constitutional traditions,
see Cassese (2017), p. 939 et seq.; Graziadei and de Caria (2017), p. 949 et seq.
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one can gather that European values have come to permit concrete legal assess-
ment.96 Two Commission communications in 2019 bring these developments
together.97
Two judgments by the CJEU from 2018 are leading the way for the judicial
operationalisation of the value of the rule of law. In the case Associação Sindical dos
Juízes Portugueses (ASJP), the Court has operationalized the value of the rule of law
by applying it together with another, specific and directly applicable Treaty provi-
sion. In the crucial passage, the Court states that ‘Article 19 TEU [. . .] gives concrete
expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2’.98 In the L.M.
(Deficiencies in the system of justice) case, it enabled individuals to defend
European values.99 The case dealt with the protection of the separation of powers
via an independent judiciary, and it accomplished this via the fundamental right to an
impartial court and to a fair trial. The Court’s approach is reminiscent of the German
Federal Constitutional Court’s Maastricht decision, which also made a fundamental
principle (democracy) justiciable via an individual right (right to vote, Article
38 (1) of German Basic Law).100 Since the L.M. case, the ‘vigilance of individuals
concerned to protect their rights’ might also protect European values.101
Accordingly, the courts, includingMember State courts, can decide on the values of
Article 2 TEU.102 The values have become judicially applicable though the doctrinal
paths may vary.103 This expansion of judicial competence mirrors the importance of the
values and the judiciary’s general role in the European legal space. By now, there is a
judicial line of defence beyond the political rationality of Article 7 TEU.
The judicial applicability of European values means that constitutional courts,
too, can defend them. However, in many Member States, Union law does not
provide a standard of constitutional review, according to most constitutional courts
concerned.104 Some reasons for this reticence are of a rather more legal nature,
especially the fact that Union law lacks constitutional rank in the domestic sphere.
Other considerations are of a more political nature, in particular the consideration
96Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland (2018), para. 166.
97Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and thee Committee of the Regions,
Strengthening the rule of law within the Union. A blueprint for action, COM/2019/343 final.
98CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
99CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 47 et seq.
100BVerfGE, 123, 267 – Lissabon; BVerfGE, 89, 155 – Maastricht; see, critically, Nettesheim
(2009), p. 2869.
101CJEU, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, supra note 78.
102See, especially, CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 98; CJEU,
Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37; now also CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission/
Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, para. 47; AG Tanchev, Opinion in Case C-192/18 – Commission/
Poland, para. 71; AG Tanchev, Opinion in Joined Cases C-585, C-624 and C-625/18 – A.K.
(Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême), para. 77.
103von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019).
104In detail, Paris (2017), p. 798 et seq.; Mengozzi (2015), p. 707; Lacchi (2015), p. 1663.
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that the constitutional courts’ abstention from applying Union law facilitates a
division of tasks that reduces conflicts between the CJEU and the constitutional
courts.105
These considerations meet with objections. There is enough interpretive scope to
include Union law into the purview of constitutional courts,106 as just decided by the
so far reticent German Federal Constitutional Court.107 Substantively, such a step
would result in a more effective implementation of Union law. Moreover, it would
strengthen the constitutional courts themselves: they could take a more active role in
interpreting Union law and shaping the European legal space.108
3.3 Procedure
The pivotal point of the CJEU’s L.M. (Deficiencies in the system of justice) judgment
is the fundamental right to a fair trial, Article 47 (2) CFR. It expresses a general legal
principle which, in the European legal space, protects not only individuals, but also
public authorities.109 Moreover, it applies not only in judicial procedures, but
whenever a legal subject is faced with the exercise of public authority,110 especially
when substantial interests are at stake.111 This is the case with conflicts concerning
systemic deficiencies: the interests in question here are the national reputation, the
interest of prosecution, the effective functioning of the national judiciary, financial
interests as well as the participation in institutions of the Union. A fair procedure is
important not only for the legitimacy of any specific decision, but also for general
cohesion in Europe.112
Of the many procedural questions, only two will be addressed here. The first one
concerns political and administrative procedures. A point of criticism regarding the
measures taken by the Commission and the European Parliament is that their
motivation is not the defence of Union values, but the sanctioning of an
EU-critical stance. To prove this point, it is said that measures comparable to the
Polish ones, when taken by EU-friendly governments, do not elicit any reaction.113
105See Paris (2017), p. 814.
106In detail Paris (2017), p. 809 et seq.; Griebel (2014), p. 204; Bäcker (2015), p. 411.
107BVerfG, Order of 6 November 2019, 1 BvR 16/13 – Recht auf Vergessen II.
108On this discussion, Voßkuhle (2018), pp. 175 and 197; Komárek (2015), p. 75; Thym
(2015), p. 56.
109Jarass (2016), para. 12.
110In this respect, Art. 47 of the Charter transcends Art. 6 ECHR; see also Alber (2016), para. 10.
On the validity of art. 47 para. 2 CFR also from an administrative procedural level, Nowak (2011),
para. 44.
111On the spill-over effects over administrative procedure, cf. Jarass (2016).
112Luhmann (1975), pp. 34 et seq., 48 et seq., 116–120; this was also an insight from the Eurozone
crisis, Farahat and Krenn (2018), p. 384.
113Mendelski (2016).
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Hence, the two institutions are accused of misusing their powers for partisan
purposes.
As described above (Sect. 2.1), there is room for discretion when deciding
whether to initiate a procedure. The accusation is thus to be dealt with under the
doctrine on discretion. This doctrine does, however, not limit parliamentary debate:
indeed, it is a general principle that parliaments enjoy full freedom of what to
debate.114 By contrast, the European Commission faces limits.115 If it uses an
instrument of supervision to sanction an integration-critical general attitude, this
would amount to an illegal use of discretion. But to identify such improper use, hard
evidence is needed. To date, the Commission’s actions seem justified by the
extraordinary severity of the situations at hand.116
With regard to judicial procedures, the core question is as to whether Member
State courts have to refer a case to the CJEU if its subject is a possible systemic
deficiency in another Member State. A national court can treat such a deficiency both
in the light of the European values, as did the Irish High Court in the Celmer case,117
and in the light of the fundamental principles of the national constitution, as in the
case ‘Identitätskontrolle’ of the German Federal Constitutional Court.118 The Ger-
man Court has been much criticised for not having made a preliminary reference.119
The general question of a constitutional court’s obligation to make such a
reference has extensively been discussed.120 When it comes to defending values,
such a referral to the CJEU is of particular importance for hedging the relationship
between the Member States in question. Only a procedure before the CJEU allows
for defending European values in a process which respects the very rule of law
because it requires a fair procedure. The Member State concerned must be involved.
A national court can hardly provide the government of another state with adequate
participation. A procedure before the CJEU appears to provide the only orderly way
of deciding critical questions in another legal order. There is, moreover, the consid-
eration that ‘Europe should speak with one voice’. Even if national courts refer to
principles of national identity instead of European values, such national principles
can be defended better in the framework of European values.121
114CJEU, Case C–230/81 Luxemburg v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1983:32, para. 39; Bast (2006),
para. 28.
115Bleckmann (1997), p. 59 et seq.
116In detail, Hoffmeister (2015), p. 195 et seq.
117IEHC, supra note 16.
118BVerfGE 140, 317 – Identitätskontrolle.
119On the criticism, Burchardt (2016), p. 527 et seq.; Schönberger (2016), p. 422; Nettesheim
(2016), p. 424; Sauer (2016), p. 1134; Classen (2016), p. 304; Nowag (2016), p. 1450 et seq.;
Rugge (2016), p. 789.
120On this, see Paris (2017).
121In detail, Spieker (2020).
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3.4 Material Standards
All systemic deficiency instruments contain elements describing a particularly prob-
lematic situation. Therefore, similar questions of interpretation and application arise.
Three questions will be discussed: the interpretive condensing of the requirements
(Sect. 3.4.1), the importance of a comprehensive and moreover collective assessment
(Sect. 3.4.2) as well as the question of how concrete a violation must be (Sect. 3.4.3).
3.4.1 Red Lines
As doctrinal treaties, handbooks and commentaries on the German Basic Law show,
many important features of a constitution, even of an entire legal order, can be
inferred from principles such as human dignity, rule of law and democracy. To this
end, German doctrine considers these principles as ‘laws of construction’122 and
even ‘optimization requirements’,123 thereby justifying a scholarship that has some-
thing to say on almost any important issue as well as a judiciary that is confident in
its sweeping law-making role. There are hints that the Commission is moving
towards a similar expansive understanding of EU values, in particular of the rule
of law value.124 Indeed, the Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist with its
53 pages, to which the European Commission refers, almost looks like a detailed
manual that provides practitioners with guidance on almost any relevant question.125
This cannot be a model for dealing with the values of Article 2 TEU, particularly
insofar as they apply to the Member States’ legal orders. By using the term value in
Article 2 TEU, the Treaty makers imply that its provisions are to be understood as
vague and, thus, open.126 And this openness is not an authorisation for the Union’s
institutions to gradually outline an ever more detailed common constitutional law.
While Article 2 TEU has become judicially applicable (see above Sect. 3.2), this
does not change the fact that it should not develop into a homogeneity clause similar
to Article 28 German Basic Law or Article IV Sec. 4 and Articles XIII to XV of the
US Constitution.127 That would force the constitutional autonomy of the Member
122Dreier (2015), paras. 5, 8 et seq.; Reimer (2001), p. 26 et seq.
123Schulze-Fielitz (2015), para. 44.
124Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and
the Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union State of play and possible next
steps, COM(2019) 163 final, p. 1.
125European Commission for Democracy Through Law, Rule of Law Checklist, CDL-AD(2016)
007 with its 53 pages just on the rule of law. The European Commission refers to this document as
authoritative, see Communication from the Commission, COM(2019) 163 final, p. 8.
126Openness is a pivotal point of Schmitt’s criticism, Schmitt (2011), pp. 23, 53 et seq.
127On this, see Giegerich (2015), p. 499 et seq. For a comparative view, Palermo and Kösserl
(2017), p. 321 et seq.
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States into a far too narrow corridor, going against European constitutional
pluralism.
The ‘thickening’ of the Article 2 values might endanger European constitutional
pluralism. The diversity of Member State constitutions, which is protected by Union
law, is enormous. It comprises states with strong, weak or no constitutional courts,
markedly different ways of organizing judicial independence, and considerably
divergent protections of fundamental rights; it allows for republics and monarchies,
parliamentary and semi-presidential systems, strong and weak parliaments, West-
minster democracies and consociational democracies, and democracies with strong
or weak party structures; and it respects strong or weak societal institutions, unitarian
or federal orders as well as anarcho-syndicalist, Catholic, civic, laic, Ottoman, post-
colonial, Protestant, socialist and statist constitutional traditions. All these elements
play into the various systems of checks and balances, which is why European
diversity is particularly pronounced when it comes to this basic feature of any
constitutional order. It would be incompatible with this diversity to interpret and
apply the values of Article 2 TEU in concrete cases in order to develop them into a
kind of DNA of how to set up checks and balances on public authority in the
European legal space.
Against this understanding one might argue that the EU Commission has made
very detailed requirements on candidate countries,128 including, for example, extra-
diting a former Croat general to the ICTY.129 These detailed requirements, never
challenged in Court, might be applicable to Member States after accession as
well.130 Technically, however, these requirements are not linked to Article 2 TEU
but to the political Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, candidate countries and Member
States have a fundamentally different status, and the accession criteria, finally, are
subject to severe criticism themselves.131
The constitutional considerations (2) resulted in the conclusion that the instru-
ments for fighting systemic deficiencies serve the cause of ensuring essentials of the
European union (Verbund), in particular its self-understanding as a community of
values, the core of fundamental rights, and the principle of mutual trust, but nothing
more. This explains the values’ vagueness as well as the extremely high hurdles in
Article 7 TEU. The logic of restraint extends to the entire tool box. Consequently,
the values are to be interpreted such as to only prohibit particularly problematic
measures, without indicating a ‘right way’, let alone stipulating the basic organisa-
tion of Member State institutions. In this sense, they do not constitute ‘laws of
construction’, but rather ‘red lines’.132
128See, e.g., European Commission, Communication: Agenda 2000. Vol. I: For a stronger and
wider Union, COM(2000) 97 final, p. 42.
129For a detailed analysis, see Rötting (2009), pp. 117 et seq.
130On the Copenhagen criteria as guidelines for the application of Article 2 TEU, see Hillion
(2016), p. 66.
131Kochenov (2008), p. 311; Kosar et al. (2019), 443 et seq.
132In detail, von Bogdandy et al. (2018), p. 963.
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The CJEU’s decisions can be understood in this light. The logic of red lines
explains a reasoning which may appear rather ‘thin’ and therefore little convincing at
first sight. In most cases, the pertinent value is illustrated only in a general manner,
with reference to principles;133 but there is only little interpretive development in
view of the matter concerned. The central aspect is what cannot be tolerated. While
the lack of interpretive development limits the persuasive power of the judgment, it
is by this abstaining that interpretative standards which could considerably limit the
Member States’ constitutional autonomy can be avoided.134
In the seminal Aranyosi e Căldăraru judgment, the Court refers only to absolute
rights, especially to the prohibition of inhuman treatment,135 i.e. to norms which are
part of the core of European self-understanding.136 This likewise holds true for the
essence of non-absolute rights: In the L.M. (Deficiencies in the system of justice)
judgment, the CJEU states that the newly established disciplinary chamber is
problematic, given its appearance as an instrument to cow judges.137 The judgment
outlines further ‘red lines’ by referring to the qualifications on Poland made in the
Commission proposal under Article 7 TEU. Of course, the Court does not treat the
proposal as a source of law. Nevertheless, the ‘information (. . .) is particularly
relevant’ and thus serves to assess the Polish measures.138 This Commission pro-
posal concretely articulates which measures are incompatible with the values and
must therefore be revoked for crossing ‘red lines’.
This logic of ‘red lines’ provides indications on how to rebut the presumption,
founded in Article 49 TEU, that a Member State complies with European values.
Such a doctrine, however, is fundamentally different from a conventional constitu-
tional doctrine of principles that aims at developing from principles an ‘overall
structure’ for the entire legal order.139 It would rather have to follow the logic of
‘negative dialectics’, which is characterised by the very fact of not specifying what
the ideal situation should look like, but rather what must not be.
133Cf., in particular, Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious
breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final), para. 6 et seq., and
CJEU,Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, paras. 62–67. At the same time, it should be
underlined that the L.M. judgment provides much more justification than the similarly seminal
CJEU, Ruiz Zambrano, supra note 36.
134On this way of forming standards, Lepsius (2011), p. 182 et seq.; von Bogdandy and Venzke
(2014), p. 254 et seq.
135CJEU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note 74.
136Grabenwarter (2017), p. 3052.
137CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 67.
138Id., para. 61.
139Schuppert and Bumke (2000), pp. 28, 39; on ‘guiding principles’, Volkmann (2008), p. 67 et seq.
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3.4.2 The Comprehensive and Collective Assessment
Most institutions base the determination that a value has been violated on a com-
prehensive assessment. The analysis of the Commission’s and the CJEU’s pertinent
decisions shows that they consider a series of facts to this end, often described in
detail, in the light of principles that remain abstract.140 Such an application, which
essentially consists in a comprehensive assessment of developments, events, mea-
sures and political statements, is an exercise in discretion and hence inevitably
evaluative, and in that sense political. This easily gives rise to the accusation that
the decisions are biased or motivated by illicit considerations.141
Yet, this practice of assessing is justified by three aspects. Firstly, it is the
inevitable consequence of the restrained interpretation, which in turn is justified by
the constitutional considerations described in the preceding passage. Secondly, the
practice responds to the specific problems of legally capturing authoritarian tenden-
cies. Thirdly, it must be taken into account that the comprehensive assessment is
often based on similar perceptions of other institutions and thus takes place collec-
tively (Einschätzungsverbund).
The central role of a comprehensive assessment is justified by the very nature of
systemic deficiencies. Usually, the law is applied to a single action or measure. This
mode fails with regard to authoritarian developments, as in most cases only a series
of actions and measures in their entirety will reach the critical threshold. The actions
and measures, taken individually, can often be plausibly justified.142 The Polish
government defends its judicial reforms by means of a legal comparison with
‘unsuspicious’ countries.143 In order to establish a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’
of Article 2 TEU, a comprehensive view of all measures taken by the Polish
government with regard to the judiciary is needed, with due consideration of the
general political and social conditions of the country. One needs to assess the actions
against the judiciary in the context of the actions against other controlling institu-
tions, mainly the parliamentary opposition, the media, science, and NGOs.144 This
contextual approach has been confirmed by the Court of Justice stated in A.K., which
140Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final), paras. 109, 173; CJEU, Minister for
Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 68; CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/
18 A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour supreme), ECLI:EU:C:2019:982,
para. 127, 134, 152.
141See above, Sect. 3.3.
142Scheppele (2016), p. 105. Nevertheless, some Polish measures against the country’s own
constitutional court appear as rather clear cases, cf. Iustitia (2018), Gersdorf (2018); Venice
Commission, Opinion on Amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal
of Poland, Opinion no. 833/2015, CDL-AD(2016)001, paras. 126, 137, 138.
143Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland (2018).
144This logic of the comprehensive assessment is by no means restricted to the values. The process
of establishing a systemic deficiency in the banking sector is similar, cf. Regulation (EU) on
European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European
Systemic Risk Board (2010) OJ L331/1.
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dealt with the independence of the Polish Supreme Court’s Disciplinary
Chamber.145
A third aspect contributing to the legitimacy of a comprehensive assessment lies
in basing it on concurrent evaluations of other independent institutions, institutions
with a recognized authority in questions of values. The regular application takes
place in an Einschätzungsverbund, i.e., the comprehensive assessment of all circum-
stances must be widely shared. The more institutions perceive a substantial problem,
the stronger the evidence for a systemic deficiency.
It is noteworthy that when it comes to systemic deficiencies, interpretation and
application are not presented as being autonomous, but as part of a collective
assessment involving many institutions of various legal orders. The Commission
and the CJEU, but also many other institutions, recur to other authoritative sources
when dealing with such questions, in particular to judgments of the ECtHR and
opinions of the Venice Commission.146 Evaluations of international bodies as well
as civic organisations are also significant.147 In the light of the cherished autonomy
of Union law, it appears especially noteworthy that the Commission and the Court
give much weight to evaluations under the national legal order concerned; such
evaluations even enjoy particular relevance. In the Polish case, an important point is
that authoritative Polish voices consider the governing majority’s reforms as deeply
unconstitutional.148 Thus, a situation or measure is more likely to qualify as system-
ically deficient the more institutions of the various legal orders share this
qualification.
Such a comprehensive assessment is also important in other respects. One need
only think of the accusation that the Union itself does not meet the requirements that
it demands Poland to fulfil.149 Certainly, the possibility of the CJEU’s judges to be
re-elected does not meet the highest standards of judicial independence. However, in
pertinent research, it is undisputed that the CJEU is an independent court.150
3.4.3 On the Concreteness of the Risk
The political institutions usually assess a general situation and decide whether there
is a general risk for the values, for example by the Polish remodelling of its judiciary
145CJEU, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour supreme), ECLI:EU:
C:2019:982, paras. 142, 152.
146Cf. Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final), paras. 18, 32, 95, 116 et seq.; CJEU,
Case C-404/15 Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note 74, para. 90; Opinion of AG Tanchev in CJEU,
Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 10.
147Proposal for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final), paras. 33, 63, 76, 80, 82.
148Id., paras. 19, 21, 29, 81, 83, 86; cf. in particular Iustitia (2018), Gersdorf (2018).
149Cf. Weiler (2016).
150Krenn (2018), p. 2024.
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since 2015. For the courts, the question arises whether such abstract risk is enough
for a judicial decision, or whether a risk would have to materialise concretely in the
case at hand in order to be relevant. The L.M. case concerned the question of whether
an Irish court must surrender an individual to Poland under a European arrest warrant
notwithstanding the general remodelling of the Polish judiciary. The CJEU answered
that the national court must verify in a two-step procedure (1) whether there is a
systemic deficiency in Poland and (2) if there are ‘substantial grounds for believing
that the individual concerned will run a real risk of breach of his fundamental right to
an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a
fair trial’.151
This two-step review helps to distinguish the legal procedure from the political
one under Article 7 TEU. It thus contributes to justifying the CJEU’s decision.152
However, it meets with considerable doubts. Since the measures of the Polish
government undermine the independence of the entire Polish judiciary, any case
runs the risk of being decided by a compromised judge at some point. Moreover, the
CJEU’s stipulation that Member State judges must review the independence of their
Polish colleagues153 appears hardly feasible.154 At least there is a reversal of the
burden of proof: in case of a (general) systemic deficiency, it is the Member State in
question to give evidence that there is no concrete risk for the individual
concerned.155
3.5 Control
The last building block is the issue of legal protection. It deals with the question of
whether and how the instruments’ lawfulness as well as the lawfulness of their use
can be judicially reviewed. Such review is a core aspect of the European rule of law:
the control of public authority by independent and impartial courts is sometimes
even considered the crowning element of the rule of law.156 Article 269 TFEU
therefore describes an exception that is to be interpreted narrowly.
Self-evident as this principle might appear, its application is problematic with
regard to instruments that do not yield a legal consequence; the protection by the
CJEU has long been fragmentary and uncertain in this respect. It appears anything
but certain that a Member State can take legal action against a recommendation of
the Commission in the framework of the rule of law procedure or against a
151CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 75. On this, von Bogdandy et al.
(2018), p. 983.
152Cf. above, Sect. 3.2.
153CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 77 et seq.
154Wendel (2019), p. 111; Krajewski (2018), p. 792; Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018), p. 353.
155CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 37, para. 78.
156Cf. CJEU, Case C-294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166.
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classification in the Justice Score Board that damages its reputation. Yet, the more
recent case-law of the CJEU is expanding judicial control with regard to such
measures.157 This should make control possible at least when a recommendation
of the Commission results in indirect legal consequences, e.g., when it provides a
basis for assuming a systemic deficiency.158 However, there is need for more legal
protection, e.g., against recommendations damaging a Member State’s reputation.
Another challenge is how to coordinate judicial control between the various legal
orders of the European legal space. This leads again to Article 267 TFEU. There is an
urgent need for such coordination when defending European values or their equiv-
alents in the national constitutions. The coordination and control of national courts is
primarily a task of the CJEU. Yet this does not imply that the CJEU itself is beyond
control: it remains subject to the general mechanisms, which assume particular
importance with regard to this explosive question. In this respect, the multilevel
cooperation of the European courts might find here its finest hour.159
4 Towards a Tyranny of Values?
To many people, the European institutions appear distant and foreign. If they urge or
even try to force democratically elected governments to revise important political
projects, invoking European values, they run the risk of being rejected as self-
important, arbitrary and illegitimate actors. Just thumping on the lawfulness of
such actions is hardly an appropriate response to accusations of moving towards a
tyranny of values. ‘Being right’ is not sufficient. In order to credibly defend
European values, one must make use of fair procedures to convincingly show a
broad European public what the values require, why they have been violated and
what needs to be done. Defending European values in such a way will not appear as
potentially tyrannical, but rather what most European citizens expect the Union to
do.160
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Abstract The rule of law is a value on which the European Union is founded, and
which shall be respected and observed by its Member States. This value is not
merely an ethical standard but a binding legal principle that is applicable to legal
disputes under Union law. The treaties, however, do not provide a definition of this
principle. From a Union law perspective, it is therefore indispensable to determine
the rule of law more precisely; not only is it referred to in treaty law (Article 2 TEU),
but understood by Union courts as a constitutional meta-principle that informs other
constitutional norms and may justify review proceedings and sanctions against
Member States. The Commission Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law of
2014 does not suffice to shape a ‘Union rule of law’. It relies primarily on the case
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law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Yet, this judicial concept of the
rule of law is somehow restricted as it focuses almost exclusively on the role of the
judicial branch in the Union’s constitutional system. Common European constitu-
tional traditions, however, show that the core concern of the rule of law is the
containment of public authority by institutional arrangements. In view of these
traditions and the practice of the Union institutions, including the CJEU, consensus
at the Union level might be achieved on the fact that the rule of law comprises not
only strictly formal standards, but also material criteria of justice related to the
juridical shaping of decision-making processes. These elements of the rule of law
are intrinsically linked to fundamental rights and shall ensure that within the scope of
Union law any public power is exercised in a non-arbitrary and legitimate way. To
this end, the Union rule of law may not only be understood as a formal set of
objective norms, but as ensuring the protection of individual rights as well.
1 Dangers for the Rule of Law in the Union
According to the first sentence of Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),
the European Union is founded on values among which figure the respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and the respect for human
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. The second sentence
of this provision assumes that the Member States respect and observe these values.
In the last years, however, the political situation in some Member States has made
manifest that these values are in part jeopardised to a considerable degree; this
notably holds true for the principle of the rule of law1 which, as a common principle
of the EU Member States, restricts the majority rule in the State through institutions
such as separation of powers, independence of the courts and which guarantees the
liberty of individuals.2 Since the Union draws a great part of its legitimacy from the
fact that its organs and Member States respect the rule of law, the indicated dangers
for the rule have meanwhile grown into a significant problem for European
integration.3
It is problematic, however, to operationalise the rule of law in the Union’s
constitutional system and, in particular, to use it as an argument for sanctioning
certain Member States without having clarified its normative character, its meaning
and scope. In this contribution the issue of ‘content’ shall be addressed: What does
the principle of the rule of law, as mentioned in Article 2 TEU, actually mean and
imply?
1Scheppele (2015), p. 112.
2For the genesis of Art 2 TEU, see Mangiameli (2013), para. 2 note 6.
3Kochenov (2013); von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014), p. 60; Hillion (2016), pp. 59 et seq.; von
Bogdandy et al. (2018), pp. 983 et seq.
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2 Origins As a Principle of Union Constitutional Law
Already at the beginning of the 1960s, Walter Hallstein coined, in regard to the then
European Economic Community (EEC), the concept of a ‘community based on
law’.4 This term has made a remarkable career since then and represents an essential
element of Union law doctrine nowadays.5 Interestingly, however, Hallstein’s
remark did not refer to the Member States of the then Community as all being States
governed by the rule of law. He did not primarily seek to illustrate that the
Community has institutions such as fundamental rights, separation of powers,
legal protection and so on, and is therefore endowed with all insignia of a State
based on the rule of law. He rather aimed at emphasising that the Community
‘solely’ disposed of legal power, not of means of coercion. Hence, the Union’s
power is exclusively based on the respect for the law.6 The Union’s legal concept for
the handling of borderline situations7 that involve a threat of the rule of law in and by
Member States does not provide for the use of force, but—as it is common in other
modern federal systems—relies on cooperation8 and consideration. The sanctioning
procedure for massive violations of rule of law principles, as enshrined in Article
7 TEU, does little to change this, precisely because it does not allow for the use of
force against a Member State.
As is commonly known, the Court of Justice endorsed the notion of a ‘community
based on law’ in its famous Les Verts v. Parliament-Ruling in 1986, linking it to the
constitutional character of the Treaties. According to the Court, the then EEC is ‘a
Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its
institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by
them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty’.9 Method-
ologically, this jurisprudence draws on the fact that the rule of law stems from a
common European heritage. It can be conceived of as an element of the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States and as an element of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and, therefore, as a general principle
of Union Constitutional law.10 The Court of Justice made the topos of the rule of law
4Hallstein (1979), p. 109. See also Fuß (1968), pp. 16 et seq.
5Critically von Bogdandy (2017), p. 487.
6Hallstein (1969), p. 33.
7For the state of emergency as a test case of jurisdiction, see Schmitt (1985), p. 11. Critically with
regard to the application of Schmitt’s theory to the Union system, see Pernice (1995),
pp. 109 et seq.; Schroeder (2002), p. 220.
8Scharpf (1985), pp. 323 et seq.
9CJEU, Case C-294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para. 23; Joined Cases
C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and
Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 281. But see CJEU, Case C-362/14 Schrems v. Data
Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, para. 60: the European Union is a ‘union based
on the rule of law’.
10von Bogdandy (2009), pp. 23, 28 et seq.; Pech (2010), pp. 361 et seq., 367. On the general
principle see Tridimas (2013).
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part and parcel of its own constitutionalisation strategy.11 It perfectly lends itself to
support the proposition that the Union is not an intergovernmental organisation as
the others, but a public authority sui generis endowed with a supranational consti-
tution.12 The Court of Justice also applies such ‘constitutional’ and ‘rule of law’
terminology to the effect of securing the substantial legitimacy of the law of the
Union, particularly by underscoring that the rule of law constitutes an element of the
Union’s particular identity on the international plane.13
It has, however, taken several decades for the rule of law to acquire the status of
and establish itself as a principle pertaining to the constitutional law profile of the
Union (Article 2, second sentence and Article 7 TEU), i.e. to be understood as a
‘constitutional principle’.14 This is understandable, given the fact that the objectives
and means of operation originally agreed upon by the Member States of the
Community were primarily of an economic and social-policy character, with the
‘Common Market’ and ‘market freedoms’ forming the heart of this economic order.
Therefore, the Treaties of Rome did not contain, with the exception of legal
protection, any elements testifying an explicit rule of law terminology.15
With the advent of the interpretation of the Treaties as a constitution which
organises and legitimises supranational public authority not only in economic, but
also in highly political fields, the Member States became increasingly interested in
giving an explicit status to ‘constitutional principles’ governing the Union’s public
authority. The rule of law principle, as one of these constitutional principles, is first
mentioned in a Union law context in the Conclusions of the European Council of
Copenhagen in 1993 committing the candidate countries for EU membership to
‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
respect for and protection of minorities’.16 The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 adopts
this approach inasmuch as in Article 6 paragraph 1 TEU it states that the Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, the respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms; these principles are common to all Member States. In Article
I-2 of the 2004 Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe which has not entered
into force, these principles were re-baptised as ‘values’. This very term, by the way,
is also used by the identical provision of Article 2 TEU.
11See Weiler (1981), p. 274; Mancini (1989), pp. 595 et seq.; Lenaerts (1990), pp. 205 et seq. See
also Fuß (1968), pp. 16 et seq.; Hallstein (1969), pp. 41, 48 et seq.
12CJEU, Opinion 1/91 EEA I, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para. 108; Opinion 2/13 Accession of the EU
to the ECHR II, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paras. 156 et seq., 163 et seq.
13In contrast to the UN system, see CJEU, Kadi, supra note 9, paras. 281 et seq. See further Hilf and
Schorkopf (2015), paras. 12–54.
14See von Bogdandy (2009), pp. 13, 22.
15Calliess (2011), para. 1. On the impact of the deepening of European integration for the meaning
of the rule of law see Lenaerts (2017a), p. 640.
16(1993) 26 (6) EC Bull, para. I.13.
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3 No Homogeneity as Regards the Rule of Law in the Union
Article 2 TEU is sometimes referred to as a ‘homogeneity clause’. It is derived from
Article 2, first and second sentence TEU as well as from Article 7 TEU that a similar
rule of law standard applies both vertically between the Union level and the Member
States’ level and horizontally among the Member States themselves. Every exercise
of public authority, irrespective of whether it has its origin on the Union or national
level, is subject to a set of legal limitations and shall be assessed according to this
standard.17
Such claims for congruence of constitutional principles in federal systems are
often based on federal ideas or models.18 When applied to the law of the Union, they
imply the existence of a supremacy of the Union vis-à-vis its Member States and
suggest supervisory powers in the relationship between the both. But can a claim for
constitutional homogeneity and for similar rule of law standards on Union and
national level be sustained under these conditions in the first place? Such a claim
is in need of critical reflection. First of all, it is problematic to reconstruct the Union’s
constitution in the light of federal state models since the institutional situation of the
Union follows its own rules.19 Even though the Union exercises and organises public
authority,20 only limited conclusions for the understanding of the Union’s constitu-
tion can be drawn from theories that take national federal systems as their point of
reference. In view of the different nature of the Union as a community of integration,
its constitutional structures and principles differ from those of the Member States.21
The claim for constitutional homogeneity between Union and Member States must
thus be rejected.22
Furthermore, it is difficult to assume that there exists a form of rule of law
homogeneity in the relationship among the Member States (horizontally). No
Union law fiction is available in this regard since, concerning essential constitutional
17Hilf and Schorkopf (2015), paras. 9 et seq.; Pech (2010), p. 364; Mangiameli (2013), paras.
42 et seq.; von Bogdandy et al. (2012), pp. 509 et seq.
18For a homogeneity requirement with respect to federalism and the principle of democracy,
Schmitt (2008), p. 388. With respect to positive constitutional law see Art. 28 para. 1 German
Basic Law, which is calling for constitutional homogeneity between the German Basic Law and the
federal states. The German Constitutional Court handles the claim strictly, see BVerfG, 1 BvL
30/88, Rundfunkentscheidung, Judgment of 22 February 1994, paras. 84–88. See also Art. 99 para.
1 B-VG, which states that the state constitutions in Austria may not contradict the federal
constitution. This does also apply for the principle of the rule of law.
19See CJEU, Case C-359/92 Germany v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:1994:306, para. 38. Against consti-
tutional analogies, see also ECtHR [GC], Matthews v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 18 February
1999, Application No. 24833/94, para. 48.
20CJEU, Opinion 1/78 International Agreement on Natural Rubber, ECLI:EU:C:1979:224, para. 7.
21BVerfG, Judgment of 31 May 1995, 2 BvR 635/95. See previously BVerfG, 1 BvR 1474/92,
Maastricht, Judgment of 17 August 993, para. 182; BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08, Lissabon, Judgment of
30 June 2009, para. 370.
22But see von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 489.
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principles such as the content of human dignity, there is no respective ‘common
conception’ of the Member States, as the CJEU has acknowledged.23 Also with
respect to the other elements of the rule of law such as legal protection, separation of
powers and so on, as regards the details a common conception of the Member States
cannot be found.24
The claim for the rule of law should therefore not be understood as a claim for
homogeneity. This would do justice neither to the European constitutional reality nor
to the Treaties. Article 4 paragraph 2 TEU acknowledges that the ‘national identity’
of the Member States, which the Union shall respect, is based on their ‘fundamental
structures, political and constitutional’. Thus, it is the law of the Union itself
recognising that, in spite of the common constitutional values of Article 2 TEU,
there exist differences between the Union’s constitution and the constitutions of the
Member States. Individual national approaches as to the legal classification of the
rule of law confirm such an understanding.25 In areas where Union law may not
ensure a uniform level of legal protection, it leaves room for ‘rule of law diversity’,
provided that the ‘primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby
compromised’.26 The idea that Article 2 TEU orders and supervises a federal state-
type constitutional homogeneity—vertically as well as horizontally—is not compat-
ible with such a model of constitutional pluralism27 as it is after all laid down
explicitly in the Treaty.
The claim for the rule of law of the Union and the Member States does therefore
not seek the existence of uniform principles and rules, but solely the observance of a
European minimum standard in terms of the rule of law.28 To define this minimum
standard, however, is not an easy task (see Sect. 5 below).
4 Normative Character of the Union Rule of Law
4.1 Rule of Law As Value and Principle
It has already been mentioned that the rule of law was first referred to as a ‘principle’
in the Amsterdam Treaty and has only been modified into a ‘value’ with the Lisbon
23CJEU, Case C-36/02 Omega, ECLI:EU:C:2004:614, para. 37.
24Regarding the difference of the rule of law in common law and continental legal systems, see
Dicey (1961), pp. 189 et seq., 267 et seq.; Konstantinides (2017), pp. 30 et seq., 39; Krygier (2012),
p. 233; Classen (2013), pp. 56 et seq.
25On the constitutional identity control, see BVerfG, Lissabon, supra note 21, para. 343, according
to which the ‘inviolable core content of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law’ has to be
respected within the framework of the Union.
26CJEU, Case C-399/11 Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para. 60.
27On constitutional pluralism in the EU, see MacCormick (1995), p. 259; Baquero Cruz
(2008), p. 389.
28Lenaerts (2017a), p. 640.
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Treaty. Although terminology issues should not be overrated in Union law, the
question arises what normative consequences this renaming may have. Most
scholars take the position that nothing has changed from a legal point of view.
They continue to use the term ‘principles’ as it represents a common category of
legal hermeneutics.29 They interpret the ‘linguistic turn’ as merely indicating the
theoretical uncertainties of the law of the Union in the dealing with constitutional
principles. In addition, they refer to the case law of the CJEU, Article 21 TEU and
the Preamble of the FRC which, in the context of the rule of law and fundamental
rights, continue speaking of ‘constitutional principles’30 and ‘principles’.31
It is indeed problematic to use the term ‘values’ in Article 2 TEU because it is a
meta-legal term. Values shall, beyond the realm of legal norms, guide the individual
in decision-making situations to ethically ‘right’ conduct. They articulate general
considerations on the basis of which one state of affairs is declared preferable in
relation to another state of affairs.32 As moral strategies, values only function on the
basis of a consensus on their respective set and content which cannot, however, be
assumed and realised at any given time.
However, the distinction between principles and values can be normatively
reconstructed on the basis of Union law itself. First of all, values, insofar as they
are laid down in black-letter legal texts, such as Article 2 TEU, refer to doctrinal
principles which shall guide decision-makers in the Union in their structuring of the
legal order. In this context, principles are understood in a pragmatic manner.33 They
are understood as legal norms which do not state specific rights or duties, but which
are of a general nature and are in need of being concretised by the legislative, the
executive and the judiciary. They can be made operable in the Union legal system by
means of adopting more specific legal rules, in particular, by the courts that—by
drawing on principles, values, interests and goods which, thus, become an element
of a balancing decision—identify them as legally relevant. In so doing, the CJEU
has, for instance, derived the principle of legal certainty from the rule of law
principle.34 In such a case, a principle can even turn into a self-standing standard
of legality.
Secondly, in the Union legal system, values as being ethical, supra-positive
norms have an orientation and ordering function. They are therefore of an identity-
building and legitimacy-creating character.35 This is also the function of the rule of
29See von Bogdandy (2009), pp. 22 et seq.; Pech (2010), pp. 366 et seq.; Hilf and Schorkopf (2015),
para. 21.
30CJEU, Kadi, supra note 9, paras. 281, 285; Case C-355/04 Segi, ECLI:EU:C:2007:116, para. 51.
31CJEU, Accession of the EU to the ECHR II, supra note 12, para. 167.
32Luhmann (1987), p. 433.
33On different interpretations of the function of principles in the law of the Union, see von
Bogdandy (2009), p. 20; Bengoetxea (1993), pp. 183 et seq.; Schroeder (2002), pp. 262 et seq.
34See CJEU, Case C-234/04 Kapferer v. Schlank & Schick GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2006:178, paras.
20 et seq.
35Calliess (2004), p. 1034.
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law and of the other values mentioned in Article 2 TEUwhich shall endow the Union
with a particular identity,36 especially on the international level (see Article 3 para-
graphs 1 and 5 TEU, Article 8 TEU in Article 21 paragraph 2, Article 32 and Article
42 paragraph 5 TEU), but also vis-à-vis the Union citizens inasmuch as they can
form the basis of a common political conscience.37 The value of the rule of law, in
particular, is that of a reference standard for the common self-assurance of the Union
and its Member States.38
In view of the foregoing, the third point is that values have therefore a legal and
ethical double-nature. Legal norms concretise values and transform them from the
societal system into the legal system. This double-nature of the rule of law as a value
of the Union and a principle of Union law also becomes manifest in the structure of
Article 2 TEU. In Article 2, second sentence TEU values such as pluralism,
tolerance, solidarity are characterised as contents of the European societal model
that have no legal character. The Union is not ‘founded’ on these values but
presupposes them as societal values. This distinction is taken further in the provision
on the sanctioning procedure in Article 7 paragraph 1 TEU which solely refers to the
‘legally relevant values’ in the meaning of Article 2 paragraph 1 TEU. It has also left
terminological traces in the CJEU’s case law. In the context of human dignity, the
Court of Justice, on the one hand, speaks of it as a ‘fundamental value’ laid down in
the national constitutions, but on the other hand also as a ‘general principle of
[Union] law’.39 And in its opinion on the accession of the Union to the ECHR, the
Court of Justice declares that the legal structure of the Union is based on the
fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member
States [. . .] a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as stated in Article
2 TEU.40
4.2 Binding Legal Norm
If a norm is referred to as a value, this means to shift it to a political or ethical level.
In terms of legal doctrine, this creates problems. It notably gives rise to the question
of how the values which are laid down in the Union’s constitution should be
interpreted and applied. Are they subject to judicial control or a standard for such
a control?
36See Commission ‘Communication on Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union: Respect for and
promotion of the values on which the Union is based’ COM (2003) 606 final, 3.
37von Bogdandy (2009), p. 14.
38Lenaerts (2017a), p. 640.
39CJEU, Omega, supra note 23, paras. 23, 32, 34.
40CJEU, Accession of the EU to the ECHR II, supra note 12, para. 168.
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First of all, one must refer to the fact that the rule of law is enshrined in Article
2 TEU, i.e. in a legal text, and has therefore normative character.41 This proposition
is emphasised by the wording and system of the Treaty, namely by pointing out that
the rule of law is ‘common’ to the Member States and that the Union is ‘founded’ on
it, amongst others (Article 2 TEU). The normative character of the rule of law also
becomes manifest in Article 3 paragraph 1 TEU which makes it the Union’s primary
goal to promote its values, as well as in Article 13 paragraph 1 TEU which makes the
promotion of values the reference point of the ‘institutional framework’ of the
Union. Both the Union’s institutions and the Member States are legally bound by
the treaty objectives of the Union, as also follows from Article 4 paragraph 3 TEU.
The normative character of the rule of law is further confirmed by the references in
the sanctioning procedure pursuant to Article 7 TEU42 and the accession procedure
pursuant to Article 49 TEU.43 In these cases, specific legal consequences are tied to
the respect for and the promotion of the rule of law. This presupposes that the rule of
law itself is of legally binding nature.
Moreover, Article 2 TEU only constitutes the black-letter law manifestation of
principles which have already been developed by the CJEU in the 1980s as unwritten
general principles of law.44 Against this background, the reference in Article 2 TEU
to such principles and their denomination as values is of solely declaratory nature.
They do not change their already existing normative character. Their codification is
above all relevant as a reference point for the sanctioning procedure against the
Member States pursuant to Article 7 TEU as well as for reasons of legal certainty.
In addition, the rule of law has, together with the other values referred to in Article
2 TEU, a programmatic function. Their respect by the Member States is evoked in
Article 2, second sentence TEU, and for the Union itself this provision serves as
characterisation of the classical structural features of the liberal constitutional
model.45 Due to the systematic position at the beginning of the Treaties, its profound
character, its open wording as well as its significance similar to goal and value
clauses in the constitutions of some Member States, Article 2 TEU constitutes the
fundament of a membership in the Union.46 Besides, the promotion of the rule of law
is, according to Article 3 paragraph 1 TEU, one of the overarching objectives of the
Union and its institutional framework (Article 13 paragraph 1 TEU). The realisation
of the principle of the rule of law, therefore, pertains to the decision-making
programme for the Union’s institutions which determines the handling of their
41This can be illustrated in the light of the CJEU’s case law on Articles 2 and 3 EEC Treaty, which
were regarded as legally binding norms, see CJEU, Case C-126/86 Giménez Zaera, ECLI:EU:
C:1987:395, para. 14; Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique, ECLI:EU:C:1991:28, paras. 8 et seq.
42See Commission ‘Reasoned proposal under Article 7 para. 1 TEU regarding the rule of law in
Poland’ COM (2017) 835 final, para. 1.
43Ohler (2015), para. 15; Cremona (2005), p. 3.
44CJEU, Case C-138/79 Roquette Frères, ECLI:EU:C:1980:249, para. 33; Les Verts, supra note
9, paras. 23 et seq. See also Lenaerts (2017a), p. 640.
45Hilf and Schorkopf (2015), para. 9; von Bogdandy (2009), p. 22.
46Pech (2010), pp. 361 et seq.; Calliess (2004), p. 1036.
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discretionary powers47 and constitutes a guideline for the interpretation of Union law
provisions.48 By virtue of Article 4 paragraph 3 TEU, this objective entails legal
effect vis-à-vis the Member States which must refrain from any measures that could
jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives and shall, vice versa, do every-
thing to facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks.49
4.3 Operational Legal Norm
Although it is now undisputed that the rule of law is a legally binding norm, the
question arises whether it is also applicable in a legal dispute. The vagueness of the
concept of the rule of law—more on this later—raises the question of whether this
norm has any self-standing value in legal procedures.50
In fact, the Court of Justice has emphasized the normative character of the rule of
law principle very early by deriving concrete legal rules from this principle, for
example, the duty of the Union to provide legal protection mechanisms.51 Later, the
Court has operationalised the rule of law. Specifically, by referring to the rule of law
it called on the Member States to ensure judicial independence and the full judicial
protection of the rights of individuals.52 By now, the rule of law is well established as
an operational principle and as a basis for legally assessing the Member States.53
The premise that each Member State respects the rule of law, as stated in Article
2 TEU, also entails legal consequences as far as it forms the basis of the principle of
mutual recognition. The legal concept of mutual recognition, which is based upon
mutual trust among the Member States that Union law will be respected,54 draws on
the idea that in areas which have not been fully harmonised by the Union, the
authorities of a Member State have to accept the legal acts of another Member State
in regard to certain factual circumstances as binding, thus treating them as if they had
been decided upon by the Member State’s own legal order.55 Important fields of
application of this principle are the Union citizenship, where the Member States
must recognise the grant of citizenship by another Member State,56 or legal acts in
47CJEU, Case C-14/68 Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, ECLI:EU:C:1969:4, para. 5.
48See Case C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, para 24; EEA I, supra note 12, para. 18.
49CJEU, Wilhelm and Others v. Bundeskartellamt, supra note 47, paras. 6 et seq.
50Kochenov (2015), p. 88.
51CJEU, Les Verts, supra note 9, para. 23.
52CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:910, para. 21; Case C-216/18
PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (LM), ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, paras. 48 et seq.
53von Bogdandy et al. (2018), p. 986.
54CJEU, EEA I, supra note 12, para. 168.
55Möstl (2010), p. 405.
56CJEU, Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen, ECLI:EU:C:2004:639, para. 37.
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the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) such as the European Arrest
Warrant on the basis of Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA.57
It becomes clearer and clearer, however, that in some Member States the legis-
lative, administrative and judicial procedures do not satisfy the rule of law minimum
standards which are presupposed by the principle of mutual recognition. In such a
case, there is no basis in Union law for the recognition of such procedures and
decisions by other Member States58 since ‘mutual recognition’must be performed in
conformity with primary law, i.e. in conformity with Article 2 TEU. Hence, the
CJEU has expressly obliged the Member States, in particular, national courts and
administrative bodies to suspend their legal cooperation with such Member States
that massively violated rule of law minimum standards.59 More recent legal acts
demonstrate that the Union legislator has become aware of this problem, too. For
instance, according to Article 11 paragraph 1 lit f) of the Directive 2014/41/EU
regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters60 the recognition or
execution of a European Investigation Order on gathering evidence for criminal
proceedings issued by the authorities of one Member State may be rejected by the
authorities of other Member States where there are substantial grounds to believe this
could be incompatible with Article 6 TEU and the FRC. Besides, Article 3 paragraph
2 sub-paragraph 2 of the Regulation (EU) 604/201361 (Dublin III Regulation)
obliges the Member States, when determining which Member State is responsible
for the examining of an application for international protection, to also check
whether ‘there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws
in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in [another]
Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment’. In such case,
the determining Member State must not transfer the applicants in that other Member
State.62
57See CJEU, Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, ECLI:EU:C:2007:261, paras. 28 et seq.
58See CJEU, Case C-135/08 Rottmann, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, paras. 48 et seq. for the limits of
recognition of granting citizenship by a Member State by the others in arbitrary decisions.
59See CJEU, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, para.
86, regarding Council Regulation (EC) 343/2003 establishing criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the
Member States by a third-country nation (Dublin II Regulation) (2003) OJ L 50/1. With regard to
the European Arrest Warrant, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and
Căldăraru, ECLI: EU:C:2016:198, paras. 77 et seq.; Case C-452/16 PPU Poltorak, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:858, paras. 44 et seq.; LM, supra note 52, para. 59. See further Lenaerts (2017b),
pp. 810 et seq.
60(2014) OJ L130/1.
61Regulation (EU) 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless
person (Dublin III Regulation) (2013) OJ L 180/31.
62See CJEU, Case C-578/16 PPU C.K., ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, paras. 92 et seq.
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These examples demonstrate that the systematic disregard by a Member State of
rule of law minimum standards in the scope of application of EU law also can have
directs effects on the legal cooperation with other Member States.63
5 The Rule of Law As a Legal Concept
It is problematic, however, to operationalise the rule of law without having clarified
its content before.
5.1 Determining the Content of the Rule of Law
In fact, it is often questioned whether the rule of law, despite its importance being
undisputed, is able to perform a valuable function for the Union’s legal order as it is
too vague and undetermined.64 Ambiguities as to the content of the Union rule of
law can be explained, first of all, by the fact that the Treaties do not contain explicit
statements on rule of law issues. To be sure, Articles 7 and 49 TEU refer to the rule
of law via Article 2 TEU. Yet, the Treaties do not define what is to be understood by
this concept.
The Commission and the courts when enforcing the rule of law vis-à-vis a certain
Member State, however, cannot simply refer to Article 2 TEU and content them-
selves to an ‘I know it when I see it’-approach.65 A concretisation of the rule of law
beyond the mere reference in Article 2 TEU is, however, needed from the point of
view of the rule of law itself. The principle of legal determinateness requires that
legal provisions which impose a certain code of conduct on legal subjects are
sufficiently specific, so that the persons affected by them can align their conduct
with these provisions.66 In addition, the policies adopted by some Member States
have shown that a lack of consensus on the content of the Union rule of law might be
understood as an invitation to test the limits of Article 2 and 7 TEU.
63von Bogdandy et al. (2018), pp. 992 et seq.
64Kochenov (2015), p. 79; Claes and Bonelli (2016), pp. 267 et seq.; Barnett (2018), p. 24.
65This famous phrase on the difficulties of legal decision-making appears in U.S. Supreme Court,
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) p. 197 (Stewart, J, concurring).
66CJEU, Joined cases 212 to 217/80 Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v. Meridionale
Industria Salumi and Others, ECLI:EU:C:1981:270, para. 10; Barnett (2018), p. 26.
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5.2 The European Tradition of the Rule of Law
There might be a number of reasons why the conceptions as to the content and
significance of the rule of law in Europe are unclear, even though the preamble of the
TEU refers to the rule of law as a ‘universal value’.67 One of these reasons is
certainly that the concept of the rule of law has a more limited European tradition
than, for example, the concept of democracy which is meanwhile extensively
described in Articles 9 et seq. TEU.
To be sure, the concept of rule of law can be long traced back, at least in the
English history of law. The concepts of rule of law in the UK, of
‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit’ in Germany and of ‘État de droit’ in France have, however,
developed a particular impact only after the nineteenth century and flourished in the
era of European constitutionalism.68 Even more, most EU Member States’ consti-
tutions are familiar with the concept of the rule of law only since the 1970s.
Ultimately, there is a considerable range of legal concepts in Europe which are
gathered under the notion of the rule of law.
5.3 Formal and Material Aspects of the Rule of Law
Regardless of different approaches and rule of law traditions most would agree that a
basic meaning of the rule of law comes down to the idea that all public power must
act within certain constraints by law, i.e. that it is bound by legal norms which are
outside of its control.69 The rule of law is a legal principle organising the relationship
between a community and its governing institutions, reducing the discretion of
public power by subjecting it to means of effective legal and judicial control.70
Sometimes doubts are expressed concerning the usefulness of this broad defini-
tion.71 It reveals that the rule of law does not constitute a straightforward concept,
but rather an aggregate notion for a set of subprinciples which are themselves in need
of concretisation depending on the respective context.72 It is correct that constitu-
tional law problems are primarily to be solved on the basis of constitutional
subprinciples that form part of the meta-concept of the rule of law but are closer to
the problem, for example, principles such as legal certainty or separation of powers;
the concept of rule of law should be drawn upon only subsidiarily. At the same time,
67Cruz Villalón (2007), para. 60.
68For a comparative analysis, see Loughlin (2010), pp. 312 et seq., especially 314 et seq.;
Heuschling (2002), pp. 384 et seq.; Holterhus (2017), pp. 453 et seq.
69Kochenov (2015), p. 81; Crabit and Bael (2016), p. 198.
70Holterhus (2017), p. 432; Konstantinides (2017), pp. 29 et seq.; Sobotta (1997), pp. 21 et seq.
71See Kunig (1986), pp. 89 et seq., 457 et seq.
72Waldron (2008), p. 3; Holterhus (2017), p. 432. See the case law of the German Constitutional
Court, e.g. BVerfG, 2 BvL 25/81, Judgment of 22 November 1983 (BVerfGE 65, 283, 290).
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the rule of law is far from being a mere ideological formula without any normative
self-reliance. It has an autonomous role where the challenge is to link these various
elements in systematic fashion in order to thereby obtain functional insights.73
Against this background, it may not come as a surprise that there is a discourse in
Europe on which subprinciples may be attributed to the rule of law and form part of
it. At the heart of the struggle for conceptualising the rule of law lies the choice
between a formal (‘thin’) or on a material (‘thick’) concept.74 Behind this discourse
lies the question of whether the rule of law principle is identical to claims regarding
‘process and form’ or whether it also contains demands concerning the content of
legal norms in terms of fairness. Formal interpretations of the rule of law as mere
obligation to respect the law were for a long time not only common in the UK.75 The
principle of legality and other aspects associated with formal rule of law qualities
like the hierarchy of norms also constitute the core elements of the formal
‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit’ in Germany, Austria and France.76 In fact, representatives of
a ‘negative’ or ‘thin’ concept of the rule of law caution even today against
overburdening the concept with diverse social objectives, so that it does not become
devoid of content and practically irrelevant. They assert that the core of the rule of
law rather consists of a set of requirements such as that the legal norms of a given
legal order should be general, public, prospective and certain.77
There is some truth to this warning, but it is also true that according to most
constitutional provisions in Europe, legal norms must satisfy elementary require-
ments of justice in regard to an obligation of fairness and prohibition of arbitrariness.
This claim for a just creation, application and interpretation of legal norms is secured
by virtue of binding the legislator to the constitution and material constitutional
principles such as fairness, equality and certainty of law.78 This conception of the
rule of law which is based on a combination of both formal and material aspects has
become the most accepted one in many Member States.79 This approach has also
found favour on the Union level as will be shown below.
73Schmidt-Aßmann (2004), § 26 paras. 8 et seq. See also BVerfG, 2 BvR 215/81, Judgment of
26 March 1981 (BVerfGE 57, 250, 276) where the principle of the rule of law ‘selbst’ (itself) is used
as a systematically relevant anchor for requirements of procedures.
74Magen (2016), p. 1052; Wennerström (2007), pp. 76 et seq.
75See especially Dicey (1961), p. 188. Critically, Craig (1997), pp. 470 et seq.; Krygier (2012),
pp. 236 et seq.
76Classen (2013), pp. 63 et seq.; Loughlin (2010), pp. 315 et seq.
77See e.g. Raz (1977), pp. 210 et seq.
78See e.g. Dworkin (1985), pp. 335 et seq. Regarding Germany, see von Simson (1982), p. 109.
79Bingham (2010), p. 37.
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6 The Rule of Law in the Union’s Practice
6.1 Rule of Law As Described in the Commission Framework
The Commission has sought such clarification in its Communication of 11 March
2014 on a ‘New framework to strengthen the rule of law’.80 The text represents some
principles meant to be common to the constitutional traditions in Europe. It relies,
however, on the case law of the CJEU when identifying the elements of the rule of
law.81 The CJEU judgments cited in the Communication refer to the principles of
legality, legal certainty, effective legal protection as well as prohibition of arbitrar-
iness, but only in regard to the conduct of the Union’s institutions and mostly in the
field of European competition law. These judgements of the Court of Justice do,
however, not deal with the legal situation in the Member States, i.e. whether the
conduct of the national powers meets the rule of law standard of the Union.
This does not suffice to give shape to a Union rule of law in the meaning of
Article 2 TEU. The reference of the framework to the CJEU’s jurisprudence may
serve as an indicator when determining the rule of law, but it should be taken into
account that the exercise of public authority by Union institutions and national
authorities cannot be equally treated in legal terms82 and that the national constitu-
tional traditions regarding the rule of law in Europe may differ from the concept
pursued by the CJEU. Moreover, the framework itself has the character of a checklist
that has been created in an inductive way. Like other rule of law checklists, it does
not claim to be exhaustive nor of absolute character.83
The added value of the new rule of law framework of the Commission particu-
larly lies in the fact that on the basis of a dialogue between the Commission and
Member States, the Member States’ obligations deriving from the rule of law can be
specified. Accordingly, the biggest shortcoming of the Union rule of law, i.e. the
indeterminacy as regards its content, can be overcome. The Commission has sought
to strengthen the normative relevance of its rule of law definition by reiterating the
framework in legal documents relating to the rule of law situation in certain Member
States.84 In addition, it has relied on the framework’s rule of law interpretation in its
proposal for a regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of
generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States. However,
80Commission ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council:
a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ COM (2014)158 final, 4 and Annex 1; see
Crabit and Bael (2016), p. 197; von Bogdandy et al. (2018), pp. 985 et seq.
81See Lenaerts (2017a), p. 641.
82See CJEU, Germany v. Council, supra note 19, para 38. Against constitutional analogies also
ECtHR, Matthews v. United Kingdom, supra note 19, para. 48.
83See Fuchs (2018), pp. 239, 243 with regard to the ‘Rule of Law Checklist’ of the Venice
Commission for Democracy through Law (Study No. 711/2013, CDL-AD(2016)007 Strasbourg
18 March 2016).
84See COM (2017) 835 final, supra note 42, para. 1 and other documents relating to the situation in
Poland (SWD/2018/219 final).
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these measures have contributed little to the establishment of a specific Union rule of
law definition because the Commission’s definition merely consists of a list of legal
subprinciples.85
6.2 Rule of Law in the Case Law of the CJEU
It has already been outlined that the Court of Justice uses a rule of law terminology
reminiscent of national constitutional law and has located the source of the rule of
law in the general legal principles of Union law. However, questions arise as to
which substantive changes are associated with the conceptual extension and appli-
cation of the rule of law to the Union level. What are the attributes of a ‘Union based
on the rule of law’?86
The case law of the Court of Justice is based on a twofold concept reflecting
formal as well as substantive aspects of the rule of law. The formal binding of the
public authority to the law and the requirement that any intervention by public
authorities in the sphere of private activities of any person must have a legal basis
is—in line with prominent constitutional traditions of the Member States—the
nucleus of the rule of law of the Union.87 Another typical formal aspect of the rule
of law, which can also be found in Union law, is the principle on the hierarchical
relationship of norms88 which helps the structuring of the legal order.
Article 19 paragraph 1, second sentence TEU manifests, however, that the Union
law contains also material aspects of the rule of law. The Union’s public authority
must be exercised by respecting supra-positive elements of justice (‘the law’).89 This
notion of the ‘law’ itself as mentioned in Article 19 paragraph 1, second sentence
TEU served in the jurisprudence as the starting point for the developing of the Union
rule of law as a general principle of law. Yet, this judicial concept of the rule of law is
somehow restricted. It refers, due to the systematic place of Article 19 TEU within
the Treaty, mainly to the role of the judicial branch in the constitutional system of the
85See Article 2 lit a) of the proposed regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in
the Member States, COM (2018) 324 final defining the rule of law as ‘the Union value enshrined in
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union which includes the principles of legality, implying a
transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic process for enacting laws; legal certainty;
prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial protection by independent
courts, including of fundamental rights; separation of powers and equality before the law’.
86See CJEU, Schrems, supra note 9, para. 60.
87CJEU, Case C-496/99 P Commission v. CAS Succhi di Frutta, ECLI:EU:C:2004:236, para. 63.
See also CJEU, Joined Cases C-46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337,
para. 19. But see Kochenov (2015), pp. 81 et seq.
88See CFI, Case T-51/89 Tetra Pak v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1990:41, para. 25. See Merli
(2016), p. 37.
89See Rodríguez Iglesias (1996), pp. 125, 128.
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Union.90 This becomes particularly clear when the Court emphasises the relevance
of judicial independence to the Union rule of law.91
First of all, the Community of law defines itself in view of the obligation of
comprehensive and effective legal protection.92 The CJEU’s major reference point
for the development of the rule of law was therefore for a long time Article 6 ECHR.
Further elements of the rule of law, as emphasised by the Court, such as the right to a
fair trial and independent courts, which ensure the respect for rules and rights
established by Union law,93 and even the principle of separation of powers94 are
also interpreted to serve legal protection before the European Courts.
To be sure, one can derive from the case law further propositions on legal
principles such as fundamental rights which are inseparably linked to a material
perception of the rule of law.95 Without doubt, also the principles of legal certainty
and the protection of legitimate expectations96 as well as the principle of propor-
tionality pertain to the material concept of ‘law’, as enshrined in Article 19 TEU,
which guarantees ‘protection against arbitrary and disproportionate intervention’.97
The Court of Justice has, however, always placed these material principles in the
context of the legal protection in the Union. It regards the respect for these principles
as a requirement for the legality of acts ‘which it is for the Court to review in the
framework of the complete system of legal remedies established by the Treaty’.98
The Court has repeatedly pointed out that the material elements of the rule of law
must integrate themselves into the system of legal protection in the Union.99
90E.g. CFI, Case T-411/06 Sogelma v. AER, ECLI:EU:T:2008:419, para. 37. See also Rodríguez
Iglesias (1996), p. 125; Lenaerts (2007), p. 1625.
91See CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021, paras. 41 et seq.;
Commission v. Poland, supra note 52, paras. 21 et seq. See von Danwitz (2016), p. 155.
92This principle is specified in: CJEU, Les Verts, supra note 9, para. 23. With respect to Community
actions and Member States, see respectively CJEU, Case C-222/84 Johnston v. Chief Constable of
the Royal Ulster Constabulary, ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, paras. 18 et seq.; Kadi, supra note 9, paras.
281, 316. See von Bogdandy (2017), p. 497 who perceives judicial control as the core of the
‘Rechtsidee’ (i.e. legal idea) of the Union.
93CJEU, Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P Netherlands and Van der Wal v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2000:1, para. 17. See Badó and Bóka (2016), p. 46.
94CJEU, Poltorak, supra note 59, paras. 44–45; Case C-477/16 Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861,
paras. 43–44.
95CJEU, Kadi, supra note 9, para. 285.
96CJEU, Case C-10/69 Portelange v. Smith Corona Marchant International, ECLI:EU:C:1969:36,
para. 15/16; Joined Cases 205 to 215/82 Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH v. Germany, ECLI:EU:
C:1983:233, paras. 27 et seq. See Gamper (2016), p. 80.
97This norm is understood to be a general principle of (EU) law, see CJEU, Case C-4/73 Nold KG
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51, para. 13;Hoechst v. Commission, supra note 87, para. 19. See
Huber (2016), p. 98.
98CJEU, Kadi, supra note 9, para. 285.
99CJEU, Accession of the EU to the ECHR II, supra note 12, para. 177. See Jaeger (2018),
pp. 626 et seq.
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The motive of the Court’s quest for legal protection is not only a demand for the
safeguarding of individual rights, but also a demand for the full and effective
application of Union law in the Member States. The legal requirement that all courts
and tribunals in the Union have ‘to ensure the full application of EU law in all
Member States and judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law’, is,
in the words of the CJEU, an ‘expression (of) the value of the rule of law affirmed in
Article 2 TEU’.100 By this token, the rule of law may be regarded also as an
instrument safeguarding the autonomy of the Union legal order and to protect it
against internal and external challenges.101
7 Essence of the Union Rule of Law
What remains is the insight that the rule of law constitutes a ‘conceptual puzzle’ in
the Union legal order since there exist different conceptions of its significance and its
content beyond its basic meaning that any form of public power must be subordi-
nated to some kind of primary, unchangeable norms. This principle cannot be
defined conclusively and it may evolve over time.
At the same time, from the point of view of Union law, it is indispensable to
determine the rule of law more precisely; not only is it referred to in black-letter
treaty law (Article 2 TEU), but understood by Union courts as a constitutional meta-
principle that provides a justification for review proceedings and informs other
constitutional norms.102 Moreover, its respect, or not, entails legal consequences.
Inasmuch as the rule of law constitutes a general principle of law, it is necessary to
draw on both the pertinent case law of the European courts as well as the common
constitutional traditions of the Member States (Article 6 paragraph 3 TEU).
Due to the above-explained common European constitutional tradition it is well
established that the European rule of law does not only have a formal, but also a
material side and includes substantive claims for justice and the prohibition of
arbitrariness. At the same time, the vehement warning that the rule of law might
be overstretched shows that the containment of public authority by institutional
arrangements is still one of the core concerns of the rule of law. This also corre-
sponds to the jurisprudence of the European courts which underscores the procedural
safeguarding of justice. Among these principles figure the principle of hierarchy of
norms and of legality, i.e. the binding of the legislator to the constitution and of the
administrative and judicial powers to the law, the transparency and perceptibility of
100CJEU, LM, supra note 52, para. 50. Similar CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para. 32; Case C-284/16 Achmea, ECLI:
EU:C:2018:158, para. 36.
101This does, however, not imply that in the case law of the CJEU the rule of law is ‘pre-empted’ by
considerations of Union autonomy as Kochenov (2015), pp. 78, 93 et seq. suggests.
102Pech (2010), pp. 376 et seq.; Holterhus (2017), p. 460; Barnett (2018), p. 34.
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norms. In addition, also the principles of separation of powers and of effective legal
protection by independent courts are counted among the formal institutional guar-
antees of the rule of law. As far as the implementation and understanding of these
principles in a more detailed fashion are concerned, there exist significant differ-
ences among the Member States’ constitutions.
In view of the strong tradition of a formal approach to the rule of law in Europe,
consensus at the Union level might be achieved on the fact that the rule of law
comprises not only strictly formal standards but also material criteria of justice that
are related to the juridical shaping of decision-making processes. Characteristic
examples are principles such as legal certainty, protection of legitimate expectations
and proportionality.
All these subprinciples of the rule of law shall ensure that any public power is
exercised in a non-arbitrary and legitimate way. To this end, they may not only be
understood as objective norms but also ensure the protection of individual rights. As
Article 52 paragraph 1 of the FRC makes clear in relation to the principle of
proportionality, these material standards are intrinsically linked to fundamental
rights.103 To the extent that a restriction of fundamental rights is effected without a
legal basis within the meaning of Article 52 paragraph 1, first sentence FRC,104 that
this restriction is disproportionate given certain common interests, that it does not
satisfy the claims of legal certainty or that it does not provide for an appropriate legal
protection mechanism, one may not only assume that human rights have been
violated but also that a violation of the rule of law has occurred, which may be
challenged by any individual before a Union court of law.105
Fundamental rights and rule of law principles are, in the Union constitutional
system, mutually dependent and reinforce each other.106 The Union rule of law aims
at protecting individual fundamental rights and, conversely, fundamental rights are a
material prerequisite of such a rule of law. At most, one can say that the guarantee of
the institution of fundamental rights is an essential component of a Union under the
rule of law. Individual fundamental rights are, however, not necessarily part of the
rule of law,107 as is also made clear by Article 2 TEU which conceives the rule of law
and fundamental rights as different principles. Moreover, there is no constitutional
law surplus value in qualifying single human rights additionally as an element of the
rule of law as they are sufficiently assured by the Article 6 TEU and the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights which is legally binding.
103Venice Commission for Democracy through Law, Study No. 711/2013, supra note 83, para. 31.
104CJEU, Hoechst v. Commission, supra note 87, para. 19.
105CJEU, Kadi, supra note 9, para. 316; Commission v. Poland, supra note 52, para. 21; LM, supra
note 52, para. 48 et seq.
106This applies in particular to the principle of effective judicial protection which forms part of the
rule of law but finds also expression in Article 47 FRC, see Konstantinides (2017), p. 83.
107Lenaerts (2017a), p. 641.
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Abstract The goal of this chapter is to contribute to the growing Article 7 TEU
literature by showcasing the strong and weak points of this provision in the context
of the on-going rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland threatening the very
fabric of EU constitutionalism. This is done by presenting the general context of the
institutional reactions to the so-called ‘reforms’ in Poland and Hungary aimed to
hijack the state machinery by the political parties in charge; introducing the back-
ground of Article 7 TEU and the hopes of the drafters the provision was endowed
with; to move on to the analysis of its scope and all the procedures made available
through this instrument as well as the key procedural rules in place. The conclusion
restates the necessity of putting our hopes in alternative instruments of combatting
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rule of law backsliding, outlining three possible scenarios of this, which are not
(necessarily) connected to Article 7 as such.
‘Article 7 is dead. The European Commission lost.’
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the National TV in December 2018.1
1 Introduction
What is the situation with the rule of law in the European Union (EU) today? Is the
Minister responsible for undermining Polish constitutionalism right? Looking at the
most dramatic examples, Poland2 has now joined Hungary,3 and following the apt
description of what is going on provided by Pech and Scheppele, it is possible to
characterise the on-going troubles in the EU as ‘rule of law backsliding’, which is
deemed to be a ‘process through which elected public authorities deliberately
implement governmental blueprints which aim to systematically weaken, annihilate
or capture internal checks on power with the view of dismantling the liberal
democratic state and entrenching the long-term rule of the dominant party.’4 Con-
sidering that more states could follow this approach, the EU’s position is, apparently,
very weak: new soft law of questionable quality has been produced by each of its
institutions.5
1PolsatNews (2018).
2European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on
European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland – Proposal for a Council Decision on the
Determination of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law
[2017] (COM(2017) 835 final). Cf., most importantly: Sadurski (2018), Bodnar (2018), Koncewicz
(2018), Pech and Platon (2017), Koncewicz (2016). See also The Venice Commission for Democ-
racy through Law, Opinion on amendments to the Act of 25 June 2015 on the Constitutional
Tribunal of Poland, CDL-AD(2016)001, (Venice, 11 March 2016), http://www.venice.coe.int/
webforms/documents/?pdf¼CDL-AD%282016%29001-e.
3European Parliament, Resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to
determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of
a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)). Cf.,
most importantly, Szente (2017), Varju and Papp (2016), Scheppele (2015), Sólyom (2015), Collot
(2013), Bánkuti et al. (2012).
4Pech and Scheppele (2017), p. 8; Bugarič (2019). Aspects of this phenomenon have equally been
branded as ‘systemic deficiencies’ and ‘statutory anti-constitutionalism’: von Bogdandy (2019),
Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2019). For an overarching analysis, see, Bignami (2019).
5Council of the EU Press Release no. 16936/14, 3362nd Council meeting, General Affairs, (2014),
pp. 20–21; European Commission, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law (2014)
(COM(2014)158); European Parliament, Report with Recommendations to the Commission on the
Establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights
(2016) (2015/2254(INL)). For a comparison of all these instruments, see Kochenov et al. (2016),
Kochenov and Pech (2016), Oliver and Stefanelli (2016); but see Hirsch Ballin (2016), Kochenov
et al. (2015), Kochenov and Pech (2015a); See also Kochenov (2019c).
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The Treaties contain a special provision to deal specifically with situations of rule
of law backsliding: Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which however
has not emerged as a particularly effective instrument to solve the outstanding
problems the Union is facing. Thus the picture is grim, notwithstanding even the
belated activation of the Art. 7(1) TEU mechanism against both countries in ques-
tion.6 This activation per se is obviously somewhat misplaced, as we will see, since
Art. 7(1) TEU is about ‘threats’ to values, and the assault on the values in Poland and
Hungary are way beyond the ‘threat’ point, thus begging the question of how
appropriate the legal basis chosen actually is.7 Indeed, the situation would seem to
be evolving extremely fast and mainly—almost uniquely—in the direction of the
deterioration of the rule of law and abuses by the executive of independent national
institutions. The EU’s ability to effectively intervene and bring about significant
change, although discussed quite extensively in the literature, has failed to materi-
alise on the ground.8 Most worryingly, it seems that there is total disagreement
among essentially all the actors involved concerning what should be done, and the
political will to sort out the current impasse is lacking at the level of the Member
States too.
The goal of this contribution is to contribute to the growing Art. 7 TEU literature9
by showcasing the strong and weak points of this provision in the context of the
on-going rule of law backsliding in Hungary and Poland, which is threatening the
very fabric of EU constitutionalism. This is done by presenting the general context of
the institutional reactions to the so-called ‘reforms’ in Poland and Hungary aimed at
hijacking the state machinery by the political parties in charge; introducing the
background of Art. 7 TEU and the hopes of the drafters the provision was endowed
with; then moving on to an analysis of its scope and all the procedures made
available through this instrument as well as the key procedural rules in place. The
conclusion restates the necessity of putting our hopes in alternative instruments for
combatting rule of law backsliding, outlining three possible scenarios of this, which
are not (necessarily) connected to Art. 7 as such.
6European Parliament, 2017/2131(INL), supra note 3; European Commission, COM(2017)
835 final, supra note 2. Pech and Scheppele (2017), Blay-Grabarczyk (2019).
7Kochenov (2019a).
8Safjan (2018), Waelbroek and Oliver (2017), Jakab and Kochenov (2017a), Pech and Scheppele
(2017), von Bogdandy and Sonnevend (2015), Closa and Kochenov (2016), Mori (2016), p. 204;
Sedelmeier (2014), Müller (2014).
9On Article 7 TEU see, most importantly, Besselink (2017), Wilms (2017), Waelbroek and Oliver
(2017), pp. 313–319; Bugarič (2016), Hillion (2016), Bieber and Maiani (2014), Sadurski (2010),
Schmidt von Sydow (2001).
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2 A Brief Context of Coping with Rule of Law Backsliding
Art. 7 TEU, whatever sanctions it contains, cannot be a panacea. Blokker has been
absolutely correct in constantly reminding us of the need to deal with the deeper
roots of soft totalitarianism and populist turns.10 At issue is the phenomenon
characterised by Scheppele as ‘autocratic legalism’, which has deep implications
for the very fabric of the societies in question, potentially making the return to liberal
democracy difficult.11 Moreover, the problem of ‘democratic decay’, ‘backsliding’
and populism seems to be a global one,12 rather than confined to some EU Member
States per se. In the EU, just as elsewhere in the world—from Venezuela to
Turkey—‘sociological legitimacy’13 is crucially important and cannot be ignored.
The core issue is how to ensure that the EU’s own rule of law is meticulously and
consistently upheld, while enjoying, crucially, solid legitimacy? The issue of societal
internalisation of the core principles of Art. 2 TEU in the face of a populist wave is
fundamental here. Framed in this way, the problem clearly emerges as too ambitious
for the EU institutions to digest.
The Council is the most guilty of all the institutions in terms of downplaying the
importance of the rule of law backsliding and even presenting key moves by other
institutions to tackle it as potentially illegal. The Council legal service has been
negative—with no solid arguments for its position14—about the Commission’s ‘pre-
Article 7 proposal’.15 It similarly dismissed the attempts to cut the EU funding of the
backsliding states.16 Topping the list, however, is the position of the Council Legal
Service on the proposal to invite MEP Judith Sargentini to present in Council her
report that triggered the request from the Parliament to start Art. 7(1) procedure
against Hungary: the Council does not want to listen to Miss Sargentini in person. Its
position is based on legal advice which has been given ‘orally’, with the arguments
not disclosed, which however does not shield the Council’s position from criticism.
A more absurd move could only be to support Hungary in front of the Court, where it
has argued—not convincingly—that the Parliament managed to violate its own rules
of procedure in adopting the Sargentini Report under Art. 7(1) TEU.17
The explanation behind the Council’s unwillingness to act could be an obvious
one: since the Internal Market is an emanation of deep economic interpenetration,
aimed at making outright hostilities between the Member States impossible—
10Blokker (2016, 2018).
11Scheppele (2018).
12Daly (2019) and Anselmi (2018).
13Blokker (2019).
14Kochenov and Pech (2015b).
15Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service 10296/14, 14 May 2014, especially
para. 28.
16Kelemen et al. (2018).
17CJEU, Case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament (pending at time of writing).
Cf. Kochenov (2019b).
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precisely the reason behind picking economic tools to achieve the goal of peace18—
it has shaped the day-to-day reality of European integration, leaving no room for Art.
7 TEU. The very logic of the provision, which is both deeply politicised and deeply
confrontational, contradicts the logic of the Internal Market and the rich Member
States potentially stand to lose a lot as a result of taking a principled value-laden
position on rule of law backsliding. This is why expecting too much of the Coun-
cil—and, by extension, of Art. 7 TEU—would be naïve. Unless something truly
terrible happens in a backsliding Member State,19 the Internal Market, after all,
functions as designed.20
When the Council is naturally ill-inclined and other EU institutions are pro-
foundly ineffective, the CJEU, like in Andersen’s tale, de facto plays the role of
the last soldier standing. It ‘stands’ by gradually learning from own mistakes and
from the significant missteps of the Commission—especially in the ‘age-discrimi-
nation’ cases, where the hijacking of the Hungarian judiciary went unnoticed21—
bringing about a radically more robust result in Commission v. Poland on virtually
identical facts in the context of an attempted assault on the Supreme Court (more on
this in the last section).22
Undoubtedly however, the Court cannot solve the outstanding problems alone,
even when helped by the national judiciaries. A much more concerted effort is
required of all the actors involved in order to get the EU out of the current impasse.
In the meantime, the supranational political party groups, instead of helping, seem to
aggravate the situation.23 This inaction—or even attempts to hinder positive
change—on the part of the political institutions helps the powers of the backsliding
Member States consolidate their assault upon EU values even further, undermining
the truly heroic efforts of the Court of Justice and the national courts in Poland,24
Ireland,25 and elsewhere in the Union. The ‘stone-by-stone’ approach of the CJEU,26
although unable to solve the outstanding problems by itself, nevertheless gives
reason for optimism and could amount to one of the key legacies of the Lenaerts
court.
18This is exactly why the objective of peace has proven to be unexportable: Williams (2009).
Cf. Kochenov and Basheska (2016).
19But see Hirsch Ballin (2016).
20For a number of divergent perspectives, see Amtenbrink et al. (2019).
21CJEU, Case C–286/12 Commission v. Hungary (compulsory retirement of judges), ECLI:EU:
C:2012:687; cf. Belavusau (2013).
22CJEU, Case C–619/18 R Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:852 and EU:C:2018:1021,
Order ex parte of 19 October 2018 and Order of 17 December 2018; cf. Editorial comment (2019).
Cf. Kochenov and Bárd (2019).
23Kelemen (2017).
24Biernat and Kawczyńska (2018).
25See the whole saga surrounding CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality
(LM), EU:C:2018:586.
26As explained by President Lenaerts in the context of the EU citizenship law field: Lenaerts
(2015), p. 1.
Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About ‘Dead’ Provision 131
The inventiveness of the autocrats, populist voting, and the weakness of the EU’s
track record and current position on values are no doubt among the large variety of
factors that have produced a previously unimaginable situation; whereby the EU
harbours Member States which, besides obviously not qualifying for Union mem-
bership if they were to apply today (even the EU’s usual ‘window dressing’ of rule of
law conditionality notwithstanding)27 are working hard to undermine key principles
the EU was created to safeguard and promote: democracy, the rule of law, and the
protection of fundamental rights.28 The underlying issue is the creation of a modus
vivendi where the EU’s own instrumentalist understanding of the rule of law,
including principles such as mutual trust or the autonomy of EU law, reinforces
rather than jeopardises the respect for values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU.29
The claims that little to nothing can be done under the current legal framework—
which are heard with remarkable regularity—are entirely baseless, as Hillion,
Besselink and other scholars have consistently pointed out.30 In making such claims
the Commission and other institutions point to the fact that the powerlessness is not
caused by an absolute lack of Treaty instruments that would warrant intervention.
Rather, the instruments that are available are, apparently, too strong, or to put it
differently, too toxic to be used. The EU has a ‘nuclear’ option, we are told: Art.
7 TEU, which should not be used too easily. Indeed, the institutions observed the
deterioration of the Rule of Law in Hungary and Poland while embroiled in a clearly
useless commotion of constantly inventing new rules instead of using the tools at
hand. Art. 7 TEU was only activated at the end of 2018, offering too little too late.31
The talk of the legal difficulties surrounding the provision seems to be triggered
by two considerations. Firstly, the Member States and the institutions alike appar-
ently lack a strong and unreserved political commitment to throw their full weight
behind the defence of the Rule of Law. Secondly—and most importantly—Art.
7 TEU does not per se guarantee any successes in the fight. Its effectiveness is highly
doubtful. Such doubts stem from two considerations. The first, as already mentioned,
is the very logic of the internal market—created to socialise and intertwine
the Member States’ economies to ensure a lasting peace and common prosperity,
the internal market logic is poorly equipped to deal with the backsliding states due to
the overwhelming economic costs any serious intervention is prone to generate.
These costs will be, to a large extent, external to the backsliding Member State. For
example, in order to initiate regime change in Poland one needs to come up with
really stinging measures, which however will unquestionably hamper the success of
German, Dutch and British businesses in Warsaw, Cracow and other places. The
second consideration relates to the EU’s very nature: as it stands it is not necessarily
27De Ridder and Kochenov (2011).
28As well as other values expressed in Art. 2 TEU; Rideau (2012), Pech (2010), Kochenov (2017a).
Cf. Carpano (2005).
29Klamert and Kochenov (2019).
30Hillion (2016), Besselink (2017) and Scheppele (2016).
31Kochenov et al. (2017).
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well positioned to lecture the Member States on democracy and the Rule of Law—an
argument we have to take into account notwithstanding how urgent and pressing we
think the need for action might be.32 These two elements explaining why Art. 7 TEU
was only activated so late are unquestionably related. If one is asked to trigger a legal
mechanism which does offer any guarantees of success of the intervention—know-
ing that the activation will harm businesses across Europe and is bound to bring
about new scrutiny of the EU’s own track-record—the doubts appear not so irratio-
nal anymore.
3 Background of Art. 7 TEU
The initial versions of the Treaties relied on the presumption of compliance by the
Member States with the—then non-codified—values of the Communities, expressed
in the Schuman Declaration33 and the unwritten founding values of the Union,34
which gradually crystallised in the context of its enlargements.35 The enforcement of
compliance was strictly confined to the scope of the acquis, via what are now Arts.
258 and 259 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (later
reinforced by Art. 260 TFEU).36 This initial design created an unbalanced picture,
where compliance with the rules of EU law was strictly enforced while the enforce-
ment of the core principles on which all the law in question rested remained
seemingly out of reach for the supranational institutions in a situation where,
ironically, the legal nature of the core principles of EU law in terms of their
enforceability and contents remained and remains largely unclear.37 What this
configuration made obvious, however, was that the acquis did not necessarily
include the key values. So Poland, the crucial example of the aberration of consti-
tutionalism in Europe, is also the only ‘Developed Market’38 in Central and Eastern
Europe, while Hungary, the second key example of aberration of constitutionalism,
is the only ‘Partly Free’39 regime in the history of the EU. Thus, respecting the
acquis and Art. 2 TEU values do not seem to correlate. As a consequence, once one
turns to the issue of enforcement, the enforcement of the acquis and the enforcement
of values cannot be regarded as one and the same thing.40
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Given the importance of the duties of loyalty and mutual trust, which lie at the
foundation of EU law, the articulation of supranational policing of compliance with
the values was only a matter of time.41 This was particularly so because the diversity
of the Member States has been increasing with the numerous successive rounds of
enlargement, incorporating a large number of newly-democratised and post-
totalitarian states seeking democracy, the rule of law, and political stability in the
Union.42 From the incorporation of Greece, Spain and Portugal on to the former
republics and satellite states of the USSR, the issue of enforcing the values of the EU
in cases of eventual breaches was becoming more and more acute: the tradition of a
democratic rule of law-based state in these new Member States, so engrained as the
basis of EU law, was largely lacking. Art. 7 TEU now attempts to bridge the gap
between the presumptions of the founding fathers that all the Member States are
good enough to achieve the baseline values and the need to enforce the values of the
Union should this presumption turn out to be untenable. The scope of this provision,
which is, like Arts. 2 and 49 TEU, necessarily broader than what has been conferred
on the EU under Art. 5(1) TEU, is key to the understanding of the instruments Art.
7 contains, as will be discussed below under ‘scope’.
The acuteness of the potential problems arising from the discrepancy between
the crucial importance of the presumption of compliance of the Member States with
the values of the Union and the Union’s inability to check whether this indeed is the
case—let alone intervene—was quite apparent from early on. Already in 1978 the
Commission contemplated a proposal for a sanctions mechanism against the back-
drop of Greek accession and the obvious threat of backsliding from democracy and
the rule of law in that economically weak, newly-democratised state, fresh from the
experience of the colonels’ junta rule.43 It is thus not surprising that the draft EU
Treaty prepared by the European Parliament (EP) in 1984 contained such a
mechanism.44
Since 1991, the EU has included ‘human rights clauses’ in all association and
cooperation (‘Europe-’) agreements and incorporated these into the fabric of the
pre-accession political conditionality in the areas of democracy, the rule of law, and
human rights—which are now at the core of Art. 2 TEU.45 Deployed in the
pre-accession context via the Copenhagen Criteria,46 the sanctions for
non-compliance with the values and the core principles of the Union had only
limited implications for the Member States once full membership had been secured,




44Article 44, Draft Treaty Establishing the European Union (1984) (never entered into force). The
Court of Justice was supposed to play the key role in finding a breach. Cf. Mastroianni (2017a),
pp. 611–612.
45Kochenov (2007) and Inglis (2000).
46Hillion (2004) and Janse (2019).
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and Verification Mechanism, which was only applicable post-accession to Bulgaria
and Romania, the newMember States were out of reach of values enforcement, if not
for Art. 7 TEU.47
The current instrument goes back to the Treaty of Amsterdam—i.e. was adopted
in direct anticipation of the ‘big-bang’ Eastern enlargement of the EU—and was
explicitly linked to ex Art. 6 TEC, which listed the then ‘principles’ on which the
Union is built, which now regrettably came to be recodified as ‘values’ in Art.
2 TEU.48
From the very beginning Art. 7 TEU followed the principle of equal treatment of
the Member States. Although clearly designed with the new Member States in mind,
the instrument was framed from its very inception to apply to all the Members,
unlike, for instance, the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism.
The initial version of the provision contained only a sanctioning mechanism for a
‘serious and persistent breach’ of values, which made the provision unusable in the
event a swift reaction to a breach was necessary, which was exactly the situation in
Austria in 2000 as perceived by the majority of the European capitals following the
securing of the participation of the extreme-right FPÖ in government in Austria. The
reaction to this electoral result came in a series of illegal ad hoc ‘bilateral sanctions’
imposed on Austria by the 14 other Member States and orchestrated by the EU
institutions, which in addition to not relying on Art. 7 TEU were entirely placed
outside of the framework of EU law.49 Austria has never been accused by the
Commission or any other EU institution of violating any of the EU’s values and
principles. Moreover, the assessment by the ‘three wise men’ of the situation on the
ground concluded that ad hoc sanctions were introduced for no good reason at all.50
It is thus beyond any doubt that Austria was mistreated in breach of EU law.51 The
‘FPÖ crisis’ teaches us, ironically, that the EU does not need any law or a formal
legal basis if the political will is in place to act—so much for the supranational rule of
law, an issue we return to infra. The current Hungarian and Polish situations cannot
be compared to the former Austrian one, since the Hungarian and Polish situations
are long in the state of ‘constitutional capture’, which is well documented both by
European institutions and in the academic literature.
The Austrian story had two direct and important consequences. Firstly, it led to a
chilling effect, preventing the effective deployment of Art. 7 TEU when problems
with values are strongly observable on the ground: Austria was constantly and
erroneously cited by the EU institutions as a tale of caution about the momentous
47Vachudova and Spendzharova (2012).
48Pech (2010); cf. Levrat (2018), p. 157.
49The EU Council Presidency of 31 January 2010 formally launched the sanctions against Austria
on behalf of all the other Member States.
50Ahtisaari et al. (2001).
51Lachmayer (2017), Besselink (2017), von Toggenburg (2001), Merlingen et al. (2001), Bribosia
et al. (2000).
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implications of the use of Art. 7, even though the provision had not been used then.52
Secondly, it led to the upgrade of Art. 7 by the Treaty of Nice. The preventive
mechanism in Art. 7(1) to deal with serious and persistent threats of a breach of
values goes back to the Treaty of Nice. Art. 7(5) was changed with the Treaty of
Lisbon.
As the provision stands today, it thus incorporates three different procedures
which can be deployed to safeguard the values of Art. 2 TEU:
(1) a procedure to declare the existence of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach’ of the
values referred to in Art. 2 TEU and the adoption of recommendations how to
remedy the situation addressed to the Member State in breach (Art. 7(1) TEU);
(2) a procedure to state the existence of a serious and persistent breach of values
(Art. 7(2) TEU);
(3) and a sanctioning mechanism following a finding of a serious and persistent
breach (Art. 7(3) TEU).
The above procedures should not be regarded as small steps in a grand chrono-
logical order of things. In fact, Art. 7 does not exclude the possibility of starting the
procedure laid down in Art. 7(2) TEU directly, i.e. all the three paragraphs of it are
not part of one procedure with three steps. This fact is constantly forgotten in the
political speeches by the key actors responsible for the operation of Art. 7 TEU.53
The most popular presentation of Art. 7 TEU today—a consequence of the post-
Austria chilling effect—is to refer to it as the ‘nuclear option’.54 This is based on the
assumption that invoking the provision is extremely difficult and the results of its
application are too devastating to make it practicable.55 This view clearly ignores the
differences between the three procedures of Art. 7 TEU and is not justifiable from the
legal point of view.56 Moreover, given the overwhelming costs of regime change and
our general knowledge—based on countless historical examples—that sanctions are
not the most effective way to bring about compliance, the potential effectiveness of
Art. 7 TEU is clearly questionable, even if not impossible to attain.
The concerns of the drafters who included Art. 7 TEU into the Treaties have
recently been proven entirely justified, as outstanding problems persist in the field of
adherence to values. Following the ‘reforms’ of the Fidesz party in Hungary starting
with the second Orbán government, which used its constitutional supermajority to
provide an overwhelming overhaul of the totality of the legal-political system in
the country with a view to building an ‘illiberal democracy’ à la Putin, it is clear that
the problems Art. 7 was designed to tackle are not at all theoretical.57 Adding to the
situation in Hungary, where according to the Venice Commission the Constitution
52E.g. Timmermans (2015).
53Besselink (2017) and Wilms (2017).
54E.g. Barroso (2012).
55For strong arguments against this view, see Besselink (2017).
56Kochenov and Pech (2016), Oliver and Stefanelli (2016).
57Scheppele (2017), Szente (2017), p. 456; Tóth (2017).
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ended up being turned into a political tool of one-party rule, Poland followed suit
after the election of Prawo i Sprawedliwość (PiS) in 2015.58 Lacking a super-
majority to change the Constitution, the Polish government has simply ignored it,
systematically failing to comply with its laws: a situation amply documented by
scholars and analysed in detail by the Venice Commission.59 Democratic- and rule
of law-backsliding is thus on the rise in the EU and there is no guarantee that Poland
and Hungary will not be joined by more Member States which fail to adhere to the
values of Art. 2 TEU.
What Art. 7 has to say about the involvement and jurisdiction of the Court begs
the question of whether the provision is largely political in nature. As per Arts.
19 TEU and 269 TFEU, the CJEU only has jurisdiction over procedural issues.60
The observance of the voting arrangements applying to the EP, the European
Council and the Council, as laid down in Art. 354 TFEU, could thus be policed by
the Court. Importantly however there is no express exclusion of Art. 7 from the
CJEU’s jurisdiction, which means that the Court could be called upon to check how
the institutions involved used their discretion in a concrete case, broadening judicial
involvement somewhat compared with the silence of the provision itself about the
Court. Given the limited involvement of the judicial power, as well as the fact that
the Commission does not have an exclusive right of initiative, Art. 7 TEU remains a
blend of law and politics.61 It is a fundamental fact, however, that both these
components unquestionably play an important role in the functioning of this
provision.
4 The Scope of Application of Art. 7 TEU
The scope of application of Art. 7 TEU is necessarily broader than what is implied by
the principle of conferral: it is not confined to the scope of the acquis. As explained
by the Commission, Art. 7 ‘seeks to secure respect for the conditions of Union
membership. There would be something paradoxical about confining the Union’s
possibilities of action to the areas covered by Union law and asking it to ignore
serious breaches in areas of national jurisdiction. If a Member State breaches the
fundamental values in a manner sufficiently serious to be caught by Article 7, this is
likely to undermine the very foundations of the Union and the trust between its
members, whatever the field in which the breach occurs.’62 This position of the
58Cf. Bugarič (2015).
59Sadurski (2018).
60Cf. CF, Case T-337/03 Luis Bertelli Gálvez v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2004:106; Case T-280/09
Morte Navarro v. Parliament, EU:T:2010:28; Besselink (2017), p. 133.
61Williams (2006).
62European Commission, Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union –Respect for and promotion of
the values on which the Union is based (COM(2003) 606 final), 5.
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Commission finds overwhelming support in the literature. Only a very broad view of
the scope of Art. 7 TEU can make this provision an effective tool for safeguarding
the EU’s values.
All in all, as a lex specialis with a remarkably broad scope of application, Article
7 clearly does not preclude the application of Arts. 258, 259 and 260 TFEU in the
area of the defence of EU values. While some value violations can clearly fall within
or are paralleled by a breach of the acquis, a series of systemic acquis violations
could also amount to a serious breach of values.63 This is why the Commission
insists in its ‘Rule of Law Mechanism’ on approaching Art. 7 and standard infringe-
ment proceedings as deployable side by side.64
4.1 Clear Risk of a Serious Breach (Procedure No. 1)
Out of the three procedures contained in Art. 7 TEU, initiating 7(1) in order to state a
clear risk of a serious breach of values of Art. 2 TEU and address recommendations
on how to remedy the situation to the relevant Member State can be done by the
broadest array of actors: 1/3 of the Member States, the EP, or the European
Commission. Compare this with 1/3 of the Member States and the Commission
for the initiation of 7(2), and only the Council for the initiation of the actual
sanctioning procedure in Art. 7(3) TEU. All the three procedures are in clear
deviation from the main principle that the Commission holds the exclusive right of
initiative in EU law.
The aim of opening up the procedure to so many possible initiators clearly seems
to have been to make it easier to use, compared with other elements of Art. 7. It is
undoubtedly true that both under-enforcement and over-enforcement of Art. 2 TEU
values could create problems.65 Yet, given that the 7(1) procedure cannot possibly
lead to sanctions, as for the initiation of 7(3) by the Council the statement of a breach
under 7(2) is required, the essence of 7(1) seems to lie in pushing the Member States
where the breach could occur to engage in dialogue with the EU institutions in order
to prevent a possible breach. This is confirmed by the provision’s authorization,
addressed to the Council, to issue recommendations to the Member State concerned
in order to prevent a breach of values from occurring. The same procedure—a 4/5
majority in the members of the Council with the consent of the EP, is used both for
the statement finding the existence of a serious risk of breach and for the adoption of
the recommendations to be addressed to the Member State on the brink of breaching
the values. Moreover, basic requirements of the rule of law have to be observed
throughout, i.e. the Member State subjected to the procedure has to be heard. The
63Scheppele (2016).
64European Commission, supra note 5; European Parliament, supra note 5.
65Wilms (2017).
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institutions also have to react to the changes on the ground by regularly verifying
whether the grounds behind triggering Art. 7(1) TEU still persist.
With the Commission, the EP, and 1/3 of the Member States able to initiate the
procedure, it is obvious that the prevailing opinion of Art. 7’s ‘nuclear’ nature is
exceedingly exaggerated. Moreover, the 4/5 majority of the members of the Council
is not so difficult to reach, given that the Member State subjected to the procedure
will necessarily not be allowed to cast a vote. This threshold, however high it seems
to be, is clearly far below the unanimity in the European Council required for a
statement of an actual breach under Art. 7(2) TEU. It is notable in this regard that
Art. 7, which requires the opinion behind the initiation of 7(1) to be ‘reasoned’, also
requires the initiating actors to do their ‘homework’ and prepare the case by
collecting and systematising the necessary information and evidence. Such prepara-
tory work is clearly implied in the text of the provision.
Given that the Art. 7(1) procedure is relatively easy to trigger, the arguments to
the contrary underlying the Commission’s ‘Rule of Law Mechanism’—a
non-binding explanation on how the Commission will prepare its own activation
of Art. 7(1) or 7(2) TEU66—are hardly convincing. In introducing the mechanism,
the Commission aimed at introducing some informal dialogue with the problematic
Member State before Art. 7—the misnamed ‘nuclear option’—is triggered. The
Commission would thus address recommendations to that Member State and receive
replies: a procedure criticised by the Council Legal Service; but for very bad reasons,
given that as one of the initiators of the 7(1) (and also 7(2)) procedures the
Commission clearly has to have internal rules for judging the situation on the ground
and the collection of evidence to prepare its Reasoned Opinion.67 However, the Rule
of Law mechanism as introduced looks suspiciously like a double of Art. 7
(1) TEU—only with no involvement of other institutions.68
The only effect of the mechanism’s deployment can be a delay in the triggering of
Art. 7—even though other institutions having the power to trigger Art. 7 clearly are
not obliged to wait for the Commission to finish with the non-Treaty mechanism of
its own creation. In practice the delay is the least of the evils created by the
Commission in order to ultimately not trigger Art. 7. When such triggering was
needed, it showed three things.69 Firstly, it showed that the Commission is incapable
of being coherent and consistent in managing its own newly-created procedure. The
Mechanism has never been triggered against Hungary, even though the situation
there was as bad—if not worse—than in Poland, against which the Mechanism was
triggered. Secondly, it demonstrated that the Commission is incapable of sticking to
the steps of its own procedure: following Poland’s de facto refusal to cooperate and
following the Commission’s recommendation under the Mechanism, the Commis-
sion, instead of triggering Art. 7(1) TEU as its own Mechanism required, came up
66European Commission, supra note 5; Kochenov and Pech (2015b).
67Council of the European Union, supra note 15; Kochenov and Pech (2015b).
68Kochenov and Pech (2016).
69Id.
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with a new, supposedly ad hoc recommendation instead, while the situation with the
Rule of Law and democracy in Poland continued to deteriorate at an increasing pace.
Thirdly, it demonstrated that triggering Art. 7 and its related mechanisms should be
done without committing grave tactical mistakes: having moved against one out of
the two current backsliding Member States, the Commission handed the veto power
over any serious move under Art. 7(2) TEU against Poland to Hungary, making the
deployment of the Treaty provision de facto impossible as a result of its own
inventiveness and masking profound indecision. In the event the Rule of Law
Mechanism is now regarded as a semi-official step preceding the deployment of
Art. 7 TEU—which could be a possibility in practice—the undermining of the effet
utile of this provision by the Commission would extend even further, creating an
unwelcome and dangerous precedent.
The main question that the Rule of Law Mechanism supposedly had to answer is
how to decipher a threat of a serious breach of Art. 2 values. In this sense the
mechanism is useful in that it builds on the Venice Commission practice (see the
discussion of Art. 2 TEU) in defining the elements of the rule of law, which could be
useful to the institutions in finding a risk of breach under Art. 7(1) TEU. Moreover,
the Commission relies on the Venice Commission’s opinions in its Rule of Law
recommendations.
It is fundamental to keep in mind that a statement finding the existence of a
serious risk of breach under Art. 7(1) TEU is not necessary to activate Art. 7(2) TEU.
The same applies, of course, to the Commission’s Rule of LawMechanism which, as
the Commission itself stated, is not obligatory and not legally binding.70 Although
activated at the time of this writing against both Poland and Hungary, Art. 7(1) TEU
is too little too late: both countries are at such a stage of backsliding that only
pro-government trolls could benevolently characterise it as a ‘threat’: the capture of
the state is a done deal in both countries—and this is absolutely not what Art. 7
(1) TEU could in any way remedy. By saying that the provision is ‘dead’, the Polish
minister could not be more right, in part: it is both dead and misused.
4.2 Stating the Existence of a Serious Breach (Procedure
No. 2)
There is a huge difference between a mere ‘serious threat’ of a breach of values and a
serious breach of values actually observable in a Member State of the Union. This
difference explains the existence of a separate procedure in Art. 7 TEU for finding
such a breach, as well as the definitively higher thresholds required by this proce-
dure: unanimity in the European Council and consent of the EP. Unlike Art. 7(1),
Art. 7(2) cannot be initiated by the European Parliament, even though the EP can,
under its own Rules of Procedure, call on others to act in the context of both
70European Commission, supra note 5.
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paragraphs in question.71 Even taking into account the fact that unanimity does not
imply that each member of the European Council—not counting the representative
of the Member State potentially subjected to 7(2), which will not, logically, take part
in the vote—has to vote in favour of triggering the procedure,72 this makes finding
the existence of a serious breach procedurally very difficult.
This difficulty is not illogical, since a simple breach of Art. 2 TEU is not enough
to activate Art. 7(2) TEU. What is required—and what is meant by ‘serious’—is
presumably the systemic nature of the breach, which means that the institutions of
the Member State concerned cannot, on their own, successfully resolve the problem
of failing to adhere to EU values.73 In this context it is only logical to have a
procedure in place that makes it extremely difficult to over-police Art. 2 TEU,
which is the objective behind the high thresholds contained in Art. 7(2) TEU. The
emphasis on ‘systemic’ helps understand why the question of Art. 7(2) has never
been raised with regard to some Member States which have manifestly
underperformed under Art. 2—like Berlusconi’s Italy with its terrible track-record
on media pluralism;74 or Sarkozy’s France deporting EU citizens of Roma origin in
violation of EU law.75 If there is a certain ‘spectrum of defiance’, Art. 7(2) TEU only
covers the absolute extremes of such defiance.76 What is required is the constitu-
tional capture of the Member State’s institutions, resulting in the paralysis of the
liberal democracy and rendering making it impossible for the State’s institutions to
make auto-corrections (as were made in Italy and France).77 Hungary and Poland are
cases in point, as they represent an example of ideological defiance: a choice made
by the government to reform the Member State institutions (in the case of Poland in
direct violation of the Constitution and the decisions of the Constitutional Court78) in
such a way as to make wholehearted adherence to the values of Art. 2 TEU
impossible.
While naming and shaming could be a potent tool for change, in order to be
effective the shaming of those Member States which have chosen a path of systemic
non-compliance needs to be backed by possible sanctions, as in and of itself it may
have little effect on the ground. This is why, while the main outcome of a successful
deployment of Art. 7(2) TEU is a statement finding a serious breach by the Member
State concerned of the values of Art. 2 TEU, the core significance of the 7
71European Parliament, Rule 83, ‘Rule of Procedure’ (2014) (10296/14).
72Art. 7 TEU does not limit its activation to one Member State at a time, so in a situation where
more than one Member State is suspected of a breach of Art. 2 values, the activation of Art.
7 against both states is indispensable to avoid the blockage of the Art. 7 procedures by the
backsliding Member States supporting each other.
73von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014).
74CJEU, Case C-380/05 Centro Europa 7 S.r.l., ECLI:EU:C:2008:59. Cf. Mastroianni (2017b).
75Carrera and Faure Atger (2010).
76Jakab and Kochenov (2017b), p. 3.
77Müller (2015).
78Koncewicz (2018).
Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About ‘Dead’ Provision 141
(2) procedure seems to lie in the fact that it opens the way to the triggering of the Art.
7(3) procedure by the Council, thus making real sanctions a possibility—unlike in
the case of the 7(1) procedure.
4.3 Suspension of Rights and Revocation of Sanctions
(Procedure No. 3)
The third procedure is contained in Art. 7(3) TEU, which goes beyond the ‘shaming’
resulting from the deployment of the 7(1) and 7(2) procedures and implies actual
sanctioning of a Member State. This procedure is initiated by the Council and
requires a reinforced qualified majority voting (QMV), since Art. 354 TFEU
makes a reference to the requirements of Art. 238(3)(b) in this respect, implying
the support of at least 72% of participating Council Members comprising 65% of the
Union population (again with the representative of the Member State subjected to the
procedure not taking part in the vote or affecting any counts towards the vote as per
Art. 354 TFEU). Yet the procedural threshold is very high, since Art. 7(3) TEU
cannot be initiated without a successful deployment of Art. 7(2) TFEU.
The 7(3) procedure is suitably vague so as to allow the Council to adapt the exact
scope of the sanctions as it sees fit with a view of maximizing the likelihood of
compliance in the Member State concerned. While the provision speaks of the
suspension of ‘certain rights deriving from the application of the Treaty’, it is clear
that the sanctions meant to be invoked can be either economic and non-economic in
nature. Both access to EU funds and the voting of the Member State in breach in the
Council—just to give two examples—can be affected. While the academic literature
is sceptical about the effect of the sanctions, in those cases when a Member State is
heavily reliant on EU funds and concerned about its prestige in EU institutions these
could probably bring about the desired effect, although there is no successful
example to cite here since Art. 7(3) TEU has never been invoked.
What is absolutely clear, vagueness notwithstanding, is that Art. 7(3) does not
authorise the exclusion of the Member State from the Union: the very issue of
membership of the Union cannot be put in question.79 Only Art. 50 TEU provides
guidelines for leaving the Union.80
Under Art. 7(4) TEU, lifting the sanctions is very straightforward: again, a simple
QMV in the Council without the participation of the violator state is required.
Importantly, the same procedure applies to altering the substance of the sanctions
in place, giving the Council sufficient flexibility to react to the changes on the ground
in the Member State concerned.
79Besselink (2017), p. 130.
80Blagoev (2011).
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4.4 Procedural Requirements Specific to Article 7 TEU
Now let us look in some more detail at Art. 354 TFEU, which lays down the rules of
the procedural aspects of Art. 7 TEU. There are several significant points of
difference compared with the familiar procedures used by the institutions involved,
which can be found elsewhere in the Treaties. Firstly—and most importantly—
although Art. 354 TFEU refers to a concrete Member State which is to be excluded
from voting in such cases, the wording clearly implies that in the cases where several
Member States are suspected of failing to adhere to EU values all such Member
States should not be given a chance to derail the application of Art. 7 TEU. Should
the contrary be the case, all the procedural requirements of Art. 7 TEU, especially
those requiring unanimity, would end up being deprived of their intended effet utile,
given that the backsliding Member States would most likely obstruct the application
of sanctions to each other’s cases. Excluding several Member States from voting can
thus be deemed as implicitly authorised by Art. 354 TFEU in the context of Art.
7, especially in the context of the Art. 7(2) TEU procedure. It will be up to the Court,
when approached by one such Member State under Art. 269 TFEU, to clarify the
exact extent of such an exclusion. Options potentially range from requiring the
simultaneous consideration of the application of Art. 7(2) TEU to several backslid-
ing Member States already subject to Art. 7(1) TEU procedure, to the default
exclusion from the vote in the context of Art. 7 TEU of any state subjected to Art.
7(1) TEU in the context of any proceedings arising under Art. 7 TEU, without
necessarily taking into simultaneous consideration the situation regarding the
infringement of values in the several Member States.
The QMV required under Art. 354(2) TFEU is of the strictest nature, since the
support of at least 72% of participating Council Members comprising 65% of the
Union population is required as per direct reference to Art. 238(3)(b). As already
mentioned, the Member State subjected to the procedure does not participate. The
QMV could be even stricter in practice than its strictest emanation in the Treaties,
since while Art. 354 TFEU speaks of excluding the Member State subjected to the
procedure from the procedural thresholds concerning the numbers of Member States
required to reach Art. 7 TEU decisions by the text of that provision, nothing in Art.
354 TFEU refers to the population threshold counts, which are part of the QMV.
This leaves open two possible interpretations of QMV under Art. 354 TFEU: one
including and one excluding the population of the Member State subjected to Art.
7 TEU procedure in the 65% of the Union population required. Given that no express
reference is made to such an exclusion in Art. 354 TFEU, a strong argument can be
made to include the population while excluding the Member State, while the
contrary reading (exclusion of both the Member State and its population from the
count) is more consistent with the raison d’être of the special procedure in question.
The obvious lack of absolute clarity on this issue allows for the likelihood that the
exact count of QMV thresholds will be the subject of a case in front of the CJEU
under Art. 269 TFEU once an Art. 7 TEU procedure is activated. Art. 354 TFEU thus
potentially requires the strictest QMV threshold available in the Treaties.
Article 7: A Commentary on a Much Talked-About ‘Dead’ Provision 143
Also, the EP’s decision-making procedure deployed in Art. 7 TEU, as specified in
Art. 354(4) TFEU, is exceptionally strict. A two-thirds majority of the votes cast
representing the majority of component MEPs amounts to a much higher procedural
threshold than a similar majority of the EP members present and voting. The votes
cast in favour should thus come from at least the majority of the component members
of the House, while also not falling below two-thirds of those present on the day of
voting. How to count abstentions is not entirely clear based on the wording of Art.
354(4) TFEU, which posed a problem during the EP vote to activate Art. 7 TEU
against Hungary in September 2018. Following the advice of the Directorate of
Legislative Acts (the EP service responsible for the procedures), abstentions were
not deemed to be ‘votes cast’, which affected the majority required. This reading is
consistent with the interpretation of ‘votes cast’ in the context of Art. 231 TFEU and
is supported by Rule 178(3) of the EP Rules of Procedure. Thus by analogy the
two-thirds majority of ‘votes cast’ required in the context of Art. 354(4) TFEU is
counted disregarding the abstentions.81 All in all the procedure thus contains two
thresholds to be met by the EP, both of which are exceptionally high, especially in
the context of the relatively low quorum rules in the EP.
5 (Utopian) Scenarios for the Future: No Room for Art. 7
Art. 7 TEU is unique in that it establishes the procedures for finding the threat of a
breach of EU values by a Member State; the existence of such breach; as well as a
possible sanctioning mechanism to bring the recalcitrant Member State(s) back into
compliance, while not being confined by the general EU competence limitations.
This commentary has briefly discussed all the sub-instruments and stages of deploy-
ment of the provisions in question and has demonstrated Art. 7’s eminent usability,
despite the claims by the institutions to the contrary, which are as baseless as they are
persistent. The ‘nuclear’myth, proclaiming Art. 7 TEU to be ‘unusable’ clearly lacks
any connection with the observable legal reality. It is deployed by those in search of
a valid pretext—however feeble—to exclude EU law from resolving a rule of law
crisis of the European Union, which is a most problematic way of interpreting and
employing EU law. In activating the ‘naming and shaming’ part of Art. 7 TEU, as we
have seen with regard to Hungary and Poland, the EU does not and cannot solve any
of the outstanding problems: this provision has not been designed to ensure regime
change.
Crucially, Art. 7—and especially 7(2) TEU, which would be most appropriate in
the current context—is atypical and difficult to use since it both contradicts the logic
of the internal market and makes clear the Union’s own vulnerabilities in the field of
81This did not prevent the Hungarian government from attempting to challenge the outcome of the
vote in front of the CJEU, Case C-650/18 Hungary v. European Parliament (pending at the time of
writing).
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the Rule of Law and democracy. It is a confrontational provision with a broad
mandate for sanctions, which ensures economic losses throughout the internal
market at the moment when its sanctions kick in, which is a direct spillover of the
logic of economic integration into the sphere of protection of democracy and the rule
of law. As a consequence, gathering the necessary political will to activate Art.
7 TEU is both immensely difficult and—ultimately—most likely a pointless exer-
cise: Art. 7 TEU, no matter which procedural aspect of it we are talking about, does
not bring with it any guarantee of regime change of the backsliding Member State.
Consequently, it is not at all surprising that the only activations of Art. 7 TEU known
to us happened only when the Member States in question de facto left the ambit of
the rule of law world, as Sadurski,82 Scheppele, Sólyom83 and other scholars have
clearly demonstrated. It seems that such activations, being ultimately entirely incon-
sequential—while offering one argument in a world of mutual recognition of
disputes could potentially harm the EU more than the powers that be in Hungary
and Poland.
Indeed, it is unfortunately beyond any doubt that the Commission’s move to
activate 7(1) TEU against Poland in 2018 will not result in any positive change on
the ground in Poland. The Hungarian case is in no way different. Abundant time has
passed to see that PiS and Fidesz do not inhabit a dialogue-friendly universe. The
result of the Art. 7(1) procedure is thus most likely a new flow of insults from
Warsaw, which does not help European values and is probably counter-productive in
the eyes of ordinary Poles. The Commission and EP’s actions are thus unlikely to
bring about any positive change, and should be viewed as what they are—symbolic
signals. Let us be frank here: the Treaties have failed to avert backsliding disasters in
the Member States.
Three scenarios of possible action emerge in this context, all of them unrelated to
Art. 7 TEU.
5.1 Thinking Short-Term: Scenario No. 1: Cutting the Funds
The preferred outcome of this realistic scenario would be a shake-up of the Polish
and Hungarian political life to an extent likely to bring about speedy change—the
populist government running out of cash will have to change its course. Unfortu-
nately the amounts flowing into these backsliding states, however significant, are
probably not suffient to bring about the expected result, so they should be scrutinised
both with caution and skepticism.
82Sadurski (2018).
83Scheppele (2015), Sólyom (2015).
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5.2 Thinking Mid-Term: Scenario No. 2: Overwhelming Ad
Hoc Political Pressure
Leaving aside its timidity with respect to the use of Art. 7, the Haider affair of 2000
has taught the Union a great lesson about how powerful political pressure outside the
context of the Treaty framework can be. This aggressive tool, even if lying outside
the realm of EU law sensu stricto, is sure to topple the PiS or Fidesz governments,
triggering speedy change. The questions that arise in this regard are related to the
sociological legitimacy of such actions and the powers to replace the autocrats.
Blokker urges a lot of caution on this count, and he is most likely right.
5.3 Thinking Long-Term: Scenario No. 3: A
Multi-Speed Union
This instrument would require strict political conditionality with respect to any move
towards the core. A conditionality-based multi-speed Europe is unavoidable and the
incorporation of conditionality techniques into policing each of the integration’s
concentric circles will be a necessary element of the edifice. As the speed and vectors
of integration evolve, Poland and the likes of Poland could find themselves outside
the scope of meaningful activity, i.e. behind the door of the integration kitchen. With
the growing pressure on the Union’s values from a number of countries, this seems
like the most realistic way to preserve the EU as a union of values over the long term,
while also being sufficiently open towards those states hijacked by Belarus-inspired
plutocrats. Before blessing any moves between the concentric circles, a strict
quarantine should be applied to the poisonous regimes outside the ambit of the
values contained in Art. 2. However here too a voice of caution is in order: since the
Commission has failed the conditionality exercise once, there is no guarantee it
would succeed the second time round.
6 A Realistic Scenario for the Future: No Room for Art. 7
Gradual adaptation of the infringement proceedings to the needs of the current
context is the final scenario proposed here for consideration. This scenario gets no
number, since it is merely a description of the on-going developments. The Com-
mission, together with the Court of Justice, is gradually pushing for the increasing
the effectiveness of Arts. 258, 259, 260 and 279 TFEU as well as the Charter by
using the principle of the independence of the judiciary and the EU-level function of
the local judicial institutions in the backsliding Member States as the key trigger of
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jurisdiction.84 This approach is starting to yield results and is much less utopian that
the other three outlined above. In being less utopian, it is also the most incremental
and the least political, which endows it with additional legitimacy.
The crises have allowed the judiciaries of the EU to shine, bringing inter-court
dialogue to a vital new level and upgrading its substance.85 At the core of this
dialogue are also the fundamental principles of EU law, even those not confined in
their entirety to the EU’s scope of powers.86 In particular this includes the indepen-
dence of the judiciary—interpreted by the CJEU as an EU-law principle and a vital
element of the Rule of Law,87 as opposed to merely issues of validity and the
interpretation of EU law per se, however broadly conceived.88 Such an interpreta-
tion—a spectacular innovation reshaping the constitutional system of the Union as
we speak—has given voice to vertical concerns related to the independence of the
judiciary,89 as well as horizontal rule of law concerns, leading to a significant
refinement of the principle of mutual recognition.90 This has allowed the Court to
learn from its past mistakes in dealing with assaults on the rule of law.91 The
presumption that the strict enforcement of the acquis is sufficient to guarantee
adherence to the EU’s values is clearly not valid any more.92 Together with the
endowment of Art. 19(1) TEU with a new significance, the on-going crisis of the rule
of law has helped open a new chapter of European constitutionalism. The very fact
that the current concerns arose, rather than being strictly confined to the national
legal orders, demonstrates the actual maturity of the level of supranational law and
integration, or at least of its aspirations.93
A key element in the ongoing fight for the rule of law is, at the EU-level, the
principle of the independence of the judiciary. This is derived from Art. 19(1) TEU
84Safjan and Düsterhaus (2014).
85Editorial comment (2019), p. 3; Dawson (2013), p. 371.
86For more on the shift of Art. 2 TEU principles from ‘principles’ to ‘values’ without undermining
the essence of the former, see Pech (2010).
87CJEU, Case C–64/16 Associação sindical dos juízes portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117;
Krajewski (2018), Pech and Platon (2018), Ciampi (2018).
88For a criticism of the classical inter-court dialogue before the most recent case-law, see
e.g. Kochenov and van Wolferen (2018).
89This allowed the national courts under threat to deploy the preliminary ruling procedure in an
innovative way in order to guarantee the preservation of their own independence: Biernat and
Kawczyńska (2018); cf. Broberg (2017).
90E.g. CJEU, LM, Case C-216/18 PPU, supra note 25; Rizcallah (2018). Cf. Lenaerts (2017).
91Compare CJEU, Commission v. Hungary, Case C–286/12, supra note 21, with Commission
v. Poland, Case C–619/18, supra note 22, Order ex parte of 19 October 2018 and Order of
17 December 2018.
92For more on this difference, see Kochenov (2017a).
93Even though numerous international organizations around the world facing similar crises are
trying to resolve these with varyings degree of success: Closa (2017).
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and regarded as a vital part of the value of the rule of law.94 Judicial independence
has thus emerged as a crucial nexus between EU law and the enforcement of Art.
2 TEU values outside of the scope of the acquis sensu stricto,95 which explains the
relative silence over the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) among those who are
busy trying to deal hands-on with the ongoing rule of law concerns:96 Art. 51 CFR
still stands, despite all the literature on the need to move on from this competence
block.97 After all, we are learning that 19(1) TEU is good enough.98 A range of tools
from pecuniary99 to interim measures having retroactive force100 can now be
deployed to freeze at least some attempts on the part of the backsliding governments
to undermine the independence of the judiciary even further. This new, more
thoughtful approach could definitely have a significant impact of other areas of EU
law too. It is marked however by one fundamental aspect: there is no place in it for
Art. 7 TEU.
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Abstract Modern constitutionalism is based on the paradigm that courts are inher-
ently entitled and obliged to enforce the constitution of the respective polity. This
responsibility of courts also applies in the context of the European Union to both the
CJEU and national constitutional courts. The present chapter argues that in the face
of constitutional crises the CJEU and the Hungarian Constitutional Court shy away
from applying the law as it is to the full. The reasons behind this unwarranted judicial
self-restraint are most different: the CJEU aims to avoid conflicts with national
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constitutional courts whereas the Hungarian Constitutional Court has been facing a
legislative power also acting as constitution making power willing to amend the
constitution to achieve specific legislative purposes or to undo previous constitu-
tional court decisions. Yet both courts respond to expediencies that do not follow
from the law they are called upon to apply. It is argued that rule of law backsliding
requires these courts to abandon the unnecessary self-restraint and exploit the means
already available.
1 Introduction
In the past several years, the European Union has been struggling with ensuring
respect for the rule of law in all member states. The political mechanism envisaged
by Article 7 TEU has thus far proved to be ineffective, there being only two instances
of triggering this procedure, on 20 December 2017, by the Commission in respect of
Poland,1 and on 12 September 2018, by the European Parliament in respect of
Hungary.2 No visible progress can be detected in any of these cases. Equally, the
Rule of Law Framework set out by the European Commission in 2014 has been
activated only once, and even the European Commission acknowledges that ‘it did
not solve the detected rule of law deficiencies’ in Poland.3 The recent communica-
tion of the European Commission on further strengthening the Rule of Law within
the Union4 tries to move forward the debate, but fails to provide any specifics on how
the system on enforcing the rule of law may become more effective.
It occurs that the political enforcement mechanisms have failed to deliver a
sensible result.5 This inevitably shifts the focus to the courts that are entrusted
with the task of ensuring respect for foundational constitutional values. In the
European Union context, this court is most importantly the CJEU which is called
upon by virtue of Article 19 (1) TEU to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and
application of the Treaties the law is observed.’ Besides, national constitutional
courts also bear responsibility for maintaining the values common to the Member
States of the EU, including the rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy.
This common responsibility—which is of legal and constitutional nature—applies
irrespective of political pressures or eventual repercussions.
1Proposal for a Council Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017) 835 final, 20.12.2017).
2European Parliament resolution of 12 September 2018 calling on the Council to determine,
pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious
breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded (2017/2131(INL)).
3Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the
Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union, State of play and possible next
steps, Brussels, 3.4.2019, (COM(2019) 163 final) p. 3.
4Id.
5Kochenov and Bárd (2018).
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That courts are at the centre of maintaining the rule of law is also recognised by
the recent case law of the CJEU on the independence of the national judiciary.
Starting with the seminal ASJP judgment on the Portuguese judges association6 and
leading up to the ruling on the Polish law on the Supreme Court7 the CJEU made it
clear that an independent and effective judiciary is indispensable for ensuring the
application of EU law in the Member States and ultimately for maintaining the
membership of the respective Member States in the EU. Judicial independence, is,
however, just a bare minimum which does not on its own guarantee a proper
interpretation and application of the law.8 What if judges respond to unspoken
expectations and political realities and fail to exhaust their full capacity to protect
the fundamental values they shall maintain in their respective constitutional order?
What if courts exercise self-restraint that does not follow from the language and the
context of the constitutional document they are supposed to enforce? What if this
self-restraint ultimately undermines the coherence of the polity these courts are
supposed to serve?
This chapter tells the tale of two courts in utterly different positions yet demon-
strating a certain similarity in self-restraint in exploiting the means at their hands.
These two courts are, on the one hand, the CJEU, and, on the other, the Hungarian
Constitutional Court. It is not submitted that these two courts would have a compa-
rable mandate or an even a vaguely similar political environment. What is common
is their reluctance to take the risk inherent in applying the law to the fullest extent.
This reluctance has far reaching consequences for both the legal system of the EU
and of Hungary.
In the following I shall first outline the interpretation of Article 51 (1) CFR by the
CJEU and the consequences of this restrictive interpretation to Hungary in such
important areas as the freedom of the press, the independence of the judiciary and of
the data protection commissioner (Sect. 2). In the second part of the chapter, I will
argue that the Hungarian Constitutional Court still has powerful and mostly unused
opportunities at disposal to control the legislative power, even if this legislative
power acts most of the time as constitution making power, and frequently amends
the Basic Law in order to achieve specific policy objectives or to counter decisions of
the Constitutional Court (Sect. 3). In conclusion I submit that rule of law crises call
for a more robust and courageous approach by both the CJEU and constitutional
courts.
6CJEU Case C-264/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Judgment of the Court of
27 February 2018.
7CJEU Case C-619/18, European Commission v. Poland, Judgment of the Court of 24 June 2019.
8Cf. from the perspective of the internal independence of judges Avbelj (2019).
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2 Narrowing the Charter’s Applicability: Article
51 (1) CFR
2.1 Siragusa, Hernández: Context and Consequences
The evolution of the case law of the CJEU on Article 51 (1) CFR need not be retold
here. It is, however, necessary to recall the context and consequences of the shift
from the Åkerberg Fransson judgment9 to the Siragusa and Hernandez case law in
order to assess the implications of this shift for situations in which the rule of law is
threatened.
Åkerberg Fransson was certainly an attempt by the CJEU to return to a case law
that existed long before the framing of the Charter. Since the ERT judgment it has
been the consistent case-law that general principles apply to Member States in
situations falling within the scope of application of EU law.10 In fact, the decisive
paragraph of the Åkerberg Fransson judgment quotes the langue of the ERT
judgment literally.11 By that, the CJEU actually followed the explanations to Article
51 (1) CFR which describe the framing of the relevant part of this provision as an
expression of the previous case law of the Court.12
In contrast, it was submitted especially in German scholarship before13 and
after14 the Åkerberg Fransson judgment that the framers of the Charter intended to
correct the breadth of the application of EU fundamental rights suggested by the ERT
case law by using the term ‘implement’ in Article 51 (1) CFR. For this view, the
explanations to the Charter have a questionable status as on the basis of Article
9CJEU, Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, Judgment of 26 February 2013, para. 19.
10CJEU, Case C-260/89 ERT, Judgment of the Court of 18 June 1991, para. 42.
11The Court ‘has no power to examine the compatibility with the European Convention on Human
Rights of national rules which do not fall within the scope of Community law. On the other hand,
where such rules do fall within the scope of Community law, and reference is made to the Court for
a preliminary ruling, it must provide all the criteria of interpretation needed by the national court to
determine whether those rules are compatible with the fundamental rights the observance of which
the Court ensures’, ERT, supra note 10, para. 42, Åkerberg Fransson supra note 9, para. 19.
12Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Explanation on Article 51—Field of
application ‘As regards the Member States, it follows unambiguously from the case-law of the
Court of Justice that the requirement to respect fundamental rights defined in the context of the
Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the scope of Union law (judgment of
13 July 1989, Case 5/88 Wachauf [1989] ECR 2609; judgment of 18 June 1991, Case C-260/89
ERT [1991] ECR I-2925; judgment of 18 December 1997, Case C-309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR
I-7493). The Court of Justice confirmed this case-law in the following terms: ‘In addition, it should
be remembered that the requirements flowing from the protection of fundamental rights in the
Community legal order are also binding on Member States when they implement Community rules
. . .’ (judgment of 13 April 2000, Case C-292/97 [2000] ECR I-2737, paragraph 37 of the grounds)’
OJ 14.12.2007 C 303/32.
13Huber (2008), p. 197.
14Schorkopf (2014), para. 26; also Hancox (2013), p. 1411.
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52 (7) CFR they only need be considered to provide guidance in the interpretation of
the Charter.15
This debate would have not had particular bearings if only the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht did not take up the issue only two months after Åkerberg
Fransson in its judgment on the counter-terrorism database.16 Here Karlsruhe went
as far as to use the term ‘ultra vires’ in relation to the Åkerberg Fransson judgment
and advised Luxemburg that ‘[t]he decision must thus not be understood and applied
in such a way that absolutely any connection of a provision’s subject-matter to the
merely abstract scope of Union law, or merely incidental effects on Union law,
would be sufficient for binding the Member States by the Union’s fundamental rights
set forth in the EUCFR.’17
The Siragusa and Hernandez judgments can be understood in this context. In
Siragusa the CJEU in essence requires the assessment of the following for the
applicability of the Charter against Member States: whether that legislation is
intended to implement a provision of EU law; the nature of that legislation and
whether it pursues objectives other than those covered by EU law, even if it is
capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether there are specific rules of
EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it.18 In essence it needs be ascertained
whether there is an EU law obligation on Member States with regard to the situation
at issue.19 This ‘specific obligation’ test was soon articulated more clearly in the
Hernandez judgment20 and can now be regarded as the guiding interpretation of
Article 51 (1).
It may occur that the CJEU still relies on the Åkerberg Fransson doctrine, as the
judgment has been referred to in the case law several times even after the Siragusa
judgment. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that Åkerberg Fransson is not invoked
to exploit the ‘scope of application’ doctrine. Rather, Åkerberg Fransson is quoted to
deny the applicability of the Charter,21 or in a solely VAT related context.22 The only
exception to this pattern is Delvigne, where the Court ultimately found the Charter to
be applicable relying on Åkerberg Fransson because the member state in question
was implementing its obligation under Article 14(3) TEU and Article 1(3) of the
15Schorkopf (2014), para. 26.
16BVerfG 133, 277.
17BVerfG 133, 277, 316 para. 91. For a detailed analyses and critical appraisal see Thym (2013),
p. 391 et seq.
18CJEU, Case C-206/13 Siragusa, Judgment of the Court of 6 March 2014, para. 25.
19Siragusa, supra note 18, para. 26.
20CJEU, Case C-198/13 Hernández, Judgment of the Court of 10 July 2014, para. 35.
21CJEU, Case C-265/13, Torralbo Marcos, Judgment of the Court of 27 March 2014, para. 30;
CJEU, Cases C-650/13 and C-395/15 Mohamed Daouidi v. Bootes Plus SL and Others, Judgment
of the Court of 1 December 2016, paras. 63–64; CJEU, Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. État belge,
Judgment of 7 March 2017, para. 45.
22CJEU, Case C-42/17, M.A.S. and M.B., Judgment of 5 December 2017, para. 31.
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1976 Act while excluding certain convicted EU citizens from the right to vote in the
elections to the European Parliament.23
The Court gets closest to applying the ‘scope of application’ doctrine in cases
where it deals with the classic ERT scenario in which the member state is relying on
grounds envisaged in the TFEU or on overriding reasons in the public interest that
are recognised by EU law in order to justify the obstruction of one or more
fundamental freedoms by the member state.24
It is fair to state that the ‘scope of application doctrine’ would have given more
teeth to the Charter as an instrument of protecting the constitutional values enshrined
in Article 2. It may seem somewhat exaggerated to assume that Åkerberg Fransson
would subject a nearly unlimited breadth of Member States competencies to the
application of the Charter.25 Nevertheless the scope of application doctrine would
definitely have yielded a more flexible approach and a far more effective enforce-
ment of the basic values of Article 2 against Member States.
Especially damming are the underlying considerations behind the restrictive
‘specific obligations’ doctrine. According to Siragusa, the reason for pursuing the
objective of fundamental rights protection by the EU is ‘the need to avoid a situation
in which the level of protection of fundamental rights varies according to the national
law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and effectiveness of
EU law.’26 According to this, the CJEU still seems to regard the protection of
fundamental rights as a necessary evil to protect the supremacy of EU law from
fundamental rights based challenges by national constitutional courts. Fundamental
rights are thus not protected following the mandate of Article 2 TEU, but as a matter
of expediency for the uniform application of EU law. To put the message bluntly:
the CJEU will protect fundamental rights in order to prevent interferences by the
constitutional courts but will not take it as far as to disturb the sensitivity of the very
same constitutional courts, especially the Bundesverfassungsgericht.
In the following I shall demonstrate how the restrictive approach of the CJEU in
relation to the interpretation of Article 51 (1) impacted the handling the case of
Hungary and how it did not serve the promotion of the rule of law in the EU.
23CJEU, Case C-650/13, Delvigne, Judgment of the Court of 6 October 2015, para. 27–33.
24CJEU, Case C-201/15, AGET Iraklis, Judgment of the Court of 21 December 2016, paras. 62–63;
CJEU, Case C-235/17, Commission v. Hungary, Judgment of 21 May 2019, paras. 64–65.
25Schorkopf (2014), para. 26.
26Case C-206/13 Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia – Soprintendenza Beni Culturali e
Ambientali di Palermo Judgment of the Court of 20 March 2014, para. 32 ‘The reason for pursuing
that objective is the need to avoid a situation in which the level of protection of fundamental rights
varies according to the national law involved in such a way as to undermine the unity, primacy and
effectiveness of EU law.’
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2.2 Consequences of the Restrictive Interpretation of 51
(1) CFR Until 2017 in Hungary
Against the above outlined background, it does not come as a surprise that until
December 2017 the European Commission attempted to intervene with undesired
constitutional developments in Hungary by means of an infringement procedure
only in three cases. All three cases addressed issues of primary importance for the
rule of law and democracy: the freedom of the press, the independence of the
judiciary and the independence of the date protection commissioner. Out of these
only two made it to a judgment by the CJEU, and none was based on the Charter.27
2.2.1 The Media Law
One of the first steps of reshaping the legal landscape in Hungary in 2010 was to
adopt new laws on print and electronic media: Act CIV of 9 November 2010 on the
freedom of the press and the fundamental rules on media content (Press Freedom
Act)28 and Act CLXXXV of 30 December 2010 on media services and on the mass
media (Mass Media Act). These laws raised a number of grave concerns from the
perspective of the freedom of the press.29 To name a few, the new regulation
provided for an obligation to register for all media, including print, electronic and
online media;30 it obliged all media to provide balanced coverage;31 it contained a
general, broadly framed content based prohibitions for all media to protect vaguely
defined concepts as human dignity,32 human rights and privacy;33 it reduced signif-
icantly the protection for sources, created the position of a Media Ombudsman
giving it vaguely defined sanctioning powers and it authorised the newly created
National Media and Infocommunications Authority to impose severe sanctions.34
The President of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority was to be
appointed for the unusually long term of nine years (more than two legislative
periods) by the President of the Republic.35
27Article 47 (2) EU Charter (right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial tribunal); Article
8 (3) EU Charter (guarantee of an independent data protection authority).
28For an English translation of the original text see http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/
cmcs-archive/act_civ_media_content.pdf.
29For a critical appraisal see Polyák (2015), p. 125 et seq.
30Sec. 41 (4) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
31Sec. 13. Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12 (1) Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
32On this specific aspect see Koltay (2013), p. 823 et seq.
33Part Two Chapter I Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
34Secs. 185–187 Mass Media Act as of 31 December 2010.
35Sec. 111/A. (1) Mass Media Act.
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It is by no surprise that the European Commission reacted quickly and strongly to
the new legislation.36 Already on 23 December 2010 Neelie Kroes, vice-president of
the European Commission addressed her Hungarian counterpart in a letter, stating
her concerns in general terms.37 This letter was followed by a more detailed one on
21 January 201138 requiring clarifications of three issues.39 The Hungarian side gave
in rapidly in all points raised by the Commission. Although the amending legislation
was only adopted on 7 March and published in the Official Gazette on 22 March
2011,40 Commission Vice-President Kroes welcomed the planned amendments to
Hungarian Media Law already on 16 February in a press release.41
Notably, these amendments did not address many general concerns relating to the
freedom of the press and focused on those aspects that had a direct link to European
Union law.42 Especially telling is the exclusion of the Charter of the discussion
between the Commission and Hungary.
36For a highly informative collection of relevant documents, see https://cmcs.ceu.hu/node/
26249#euro. See also Hoffmeister (2015), p. 195 et seq.
37See http://www.kormany.hu./download/8/01/10000/kroes.pdf. According to the letter: ‘Indepen-
dent regulatory authorities for the broadcasting sector have an important role to play to ensure the
existence of a wide range of independent and autonomous media. Concerns have been expressed by
numerous commentators that the recently adopted Media Act risks jeopardising the rights by giving
very broad competences to the Media Authority. These same commentators also allege that the
composition of the Media Authority does not seem to guarantee its independence. In addition,
doubts have been raised about some of the provisions of the Act which apparently are applicable to
broadcasters established in other Member States, which raises potential questions of coherence with
one of the basic principles of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive.’
38See http://cmcs.ceu.hu/sites/default/files/domain-69/cmcs-archive/EC_lettertoHungary_
2011Jan21.pdf.
39These included the obligation to provide balanced coverage applicable to all audiovisual media
service providers on the basis of Sec. 13. Press Freedom Act and Sec. 12 (1) Mass Media Act, the
power of the National Media and Infocommunications Authority to impose fines and other
sanctions on media service providers established in another member states of the EU on the basis
of Sec. 176 ad 177 Mass Media Act, as well as the requirement in Sec. 41 Mass Media Act that all
media, in particular press and online media be registered. The Commission and the Hungarian
authorities held thereafter meetings in Brussels at experts level between on 7th February and 15th
February.
40A sajtószabadságról és a médiatartalmak alapvető szabályairól szóló 2010. évi CIV. törvény és a
médiaszolgáltatásokról és a tömegkommunikációról szóló 2010. évi CLXXXV. törvény
módosításáról szóló 2011. évi XIX. törvény.
41See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-89_en.htm.
42The amendments agreed included the following:
– limitation of the balanced coverage requirements to broadcasting, these no longer apply to
on-demand media services;
– broadcasters and other audiovisual media service providers legally established and authorised in
other Member States can no longer be fined for breaching the Hungarian Media Law’s pro-
visions on incitement to hatred;
– on-demand audiovisual media service providers, media product publishers and ancillary media
service providers established in Hungary and in other Member States are no longer subject to
prior authorisation by the Hungarian authorities;
– the prohibition not to cause offence to individuals, minorities or majorities is limited to situations
of incitement to hatred or discrimination.
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In her first relevant letter of 23 December 2010 Vice-President Kroes seemed to
take a broader approach which would have warranted the examination of the
Hungarian legislation on the basis of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. First, the
letter expressed the understanding that the media legislation ‘primarily aims to
transpose the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Directive 2010/13/EU)’. It
then continued by stating that ‘[t]he freedom of expression constitutes one of the
essential foundations of our democratic societies[. . .] Media pluralism, freedom of
expression and press freedom are underlying elements of European democracy
guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights.’43 This opening could be under-
stood as paving the way for the application of Art. 51 (1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights inasmuch it referred to the Hungarian legislation as an imple-
mentation of EU law.
In contrast, the following letter of 21 January 2011 took a narrow approach and
only relied on specific provisions of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive as
well as on the freedom of establishment and the free provision of services guaranteed
by Art. 49 and 56 TFEU.44 This letter made no mention of the Charter of Funda-
mental Rights whatsoever.
2.2.2 The Forced Retirement of Justices
Until the entry into force of the Basic Law, relevant legislation essentially allowed
judges to remain in office until the age of 70. The Basic Law provided in its Article
26(2) that ‘with the exception of the President of the Kúria, judges may remain in
office until the general retirement age’. This provision was supplemented by Article
12(1) of the Transitional Provisions. With these provisions, applied together with the
relevant pension legislation, the constitution-maker tied the cessation of the mandate
of the judges to the general retirement age, which in 2012 was 62 years and would
progressively increase up until 2022, when it will be 65 years. As a result, around
10% of all judges, including many in leading positions, were forced to leave office
within a year.
The Constitutional Court was confronted with the forced retirement of judges in
its Decision 33/2012 (VII.17) AB.45 The Court declared the sudden reduction of the
upper age limit for judges unconstitutional on the grounds that it was a breach of
judicial independence protected by article 26(1) of the Basic Law. Ultimately, the
Decision annulled the statutory provisions on early retirement with ex tunc effect.
The implementation of this judgment has resulted in considerable legal uncertainty.
The legal basis of forced retirement was declared null and void, but this did not




45Kocsis (2013), p. 556.
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dismissed the judges. What is more, the President of the National Judicial Office did
not initiate a procedure to reinstate those who had been removed, and without an
appropriate proposal the President of the Republic could not repeal the previous
decisions. Even if a justice was reinstated, by that time the leading positions were
already filled.
The European Commission and the CJEU also reacted to the issue of early
retirement, but in a different context. The lowering of the mandatory retirement
age of judges from 70 to 62 was addressed by the European Commission as
discrimination in the workplace on grounds of age in the light of the rules on
equal treatment in employment (Directive 2000/78/EC).46 The CJEU acceded to
the position of the European Commission and ruled that the relevant national
legislation gives rise to a difference in treatment on grounds of age which is neither
appropriate nor necessary to attain the objectives pursued and therefore does not
comply with the principle of proportionality.47 Judicial independence or Article
47 CFR were not addressed.
In response, Hungary, taking into account the previous decision of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court as well, amended the legislation on the legal status of the
judges, and it introduced a new method of calculation, setting the retirement age to
between 65 and 70, depending on the date of birth of the judge. The law also set forth
a unified retirement age calculation method for judges, prosecutors and notaries.48
Nevertheless, only a small number of judges requested to be reinstated, and none of
them regained the leading position they previously possessed.
2.2.3 The Removal of the Data Protection Commissioner
The six-year term of the incumbent Data Protection Commissioner was prematurely
terminated by Article 16 of the Transitional Provisions on the day of the entry into
force of the Basic Law on 1 January 2012. This came along with the creation of a
new National Agency for Data Protection to replace the current Data Protection
Commissioner’s Office.
This move was challenged by the European Commission before the CJEU. In its
action submitted on 8 June 2012, the Commission relied on Article 28(1) of Direc-
tive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
46Letter from Vice-President Viviane Reding to Vice-Prime Minister Tibor Navracsics (Brussels,
12 December 2011), available at www.lapa.princeton.edu/hosteddocs/hungary/letter_from_vp_of_
the_european_commission.pdf. European Commission Press Release, ‘European Commission
Launches Accelerated Infringement Proceedings against Hungary over the Independence of its
Central Bank and Data Protection Authorities as well as over Measures affecting the Judiciary’
(Strasbourg, 17 January 2012), available at www.europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference¼IP/12/24.
47C-286/12 Commission v Hungary, Judgment of the Court of 6 November 2012, para. 48 et seq.
48Act XX of 2013 (2013. évi XX. törvény az egyes igazságügyi jogviszonyokban alkalmazandó
felső korhatárral kapcsolatos törvénymódosításokról).
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personal data and on the free movement of such data and argued that the removal
from office before time of the authority responsible for supervising data protection
undermines the independence required by the Directive of that authority.49 The
judgment of the CJEU on 8 April 2014 confirmed this.50 It is remarkable that the
central concern in the case was actually orchestrated as a matter of the personal fate
of the previous Commissioner, and not as a matter of principle. Besides, the
judgment does not mention Article 8 (3) CFR which, in the light of Article
51 (1) CFR has the potential to be interpreted as referring also to national supervi-
sory authorities.
2.3 Article 19 (1) TEU as a Partial Supplement for a Broad
Interpretation of Article 51 (1)
By the time Polish constitutional developments took a turn in 2015, the forced
retirement of justices and the removal of the data protection commissioner were
the only cases where an infringement procedure was initiated against Hungary for
concerns relating to the values listed in Art. 2 TEU. They show a pattern which can
be best characterised by recourse to narrow internal market related provisions and by
strictly avoiding the conflicts that may arise from the application of the Charter to a
member state. This approach clearly reflects the Siragusa and Hernández line of
cases and the expediencies following from the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s stance on
fundamental rights protection by the CJEU.
By that, the CJEU clearly had ignored that protection against removal from office
is one of the most important aspects of independence of the judiciary or of any other
independent office. In relation to the judiciary, the European Court of Human Rights
has repeatedly made it clear that the irremovability of judges by the executive during
their term of office must in general be considered as a corollary of their independence
and thus included in the guarantees of the right to a fair trial.51 This does not
necessarily mean that this irremovability must under all circumstances be formally
declared in law. It suffices that the irremovability is recognised in fact and that the
other necessary guarantees are present.52 From this it follows that independence
presupposes a general protection from removal from office except in cases clearly
and narrowly defined by law relating to the misconduct or lack of capabilities of the
person bearing the office.
49CJEU, Case C-288/12, Commission v Hungary [2012] OJ C227/15–16.
50CJEU, Case C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary, Judgment of the Court of 8 April 2014.
51ECtHR, Campbell and Fell v United Kingdom, Judgment of 28 June 1984, Application no. 7819/
77; 7878/77 para. 80.
52Id., with reference to ECtHR, Engel and others, Judgment of 8 June 1976, Application no 5100/
71 para. 68.
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Irremovability is also considered an important guarantee of independence under
express provisions of EU law. With regard to the CJEU, Art 19 TEU and Art
254 TFEU stipulate the independence of the Justices of the Court. This is
supplemented by several provisions of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Union. Amongst these, Article 5(1) provides that ‘[a]part from normal
replacement, or death, the duties of a Judge shall end when he resigns’. Article 6 of
the Statute only allows for removal from office if a Justice ‘no longer fulfils the
requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office.’ As a procedural
safeguard in Article 6 of the Statute, decision on the removal may only be taken by a
unanimous Court and all Advocates General. Similar rules apply to members of the
European Commission. Article 17(3) III TEU declares that ‘in carrying out its
responsibilities, the Commission shall be completely independent.’ The Commis-
sion being a political organ with political responsibility, a motion of censure of the
Commission in the European Parliament is possible under Art 18(8) TEU. But the
independence of individual commissioners is protected by Art 247 TFEU which
only allows for the removal of individual commissioners if he or she ‘no longer
fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties or if he has been
guilty of serious misconduct.’
These considerations had to have a bearing as it became clear that Hungary will
not remain an isolated case and Poland would use the same legislative means to
change the composition of the judiciary. The decision in ASJP53 and the Commis-
sion v. Poland case on the Supreme Court54 clearly indicate this understanding.
Nevertheless Article 19 (1) TEU is not a vehicle to trigger the application of the
Charter through Article 51 (1) CFR.55 Rather, the second subparagraph of Article
19 (1) TEU is a stand-alone guarantee which shall be interpreted in the light of
Article 47 CFR. This was the position of the Commission at the hearing in the
Commission v. Poland case,56 and this follows from the operative parts of the
judgments in the same case and in the ASJP case. In ASJP the requesting court
sought an interpretation of Article 19 (1) and Article 47 CFR,57 but the CJEU merely
pronounced on the former.58 In Commission v. Poland, the operative part of the
judgment found solely a violation of the obligations following from the second
subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU, but did not establish a violation of Article
47 CFR.59 It is to be expected that the cases pending in relation to the judiciary in
Poland60 will be decided along the same lines.
53CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6.
54CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7.
55For a different view see Spieker (2019).
56CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7, para. 32.
57CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6, para. 1.
58CJEU Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 6, operative part.
59CJEU Commission v. Poland, supra note 7, operative part 1.
60See the case relating to the law on ordinary courts organisation—CJEU, Case C-192/18,
European Commission v. Republic of Poland, Opinion of AG Tanchev of 20 June 2019; the case
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2.4 Revival of ERT?
It follows that the CJEU regards the independence of the judiciary as an issue
completely separated from the application of the Charter to Member States. ASJP
thus has not broadened the applicability of the Charter to Member States. It is highly
questionable whether other vital elements of the rule of law protected by fundamen-
tal rights will still remain within the restraints of the Siragusa and Hernández
case law.
There are signs that the CJEU might take up the ERT case law in the stricter sense
and find the Charter applicable in situations where fundamental freedoms are
involved and Member States seem to rely on exceptions to such fundamental
freedoms. Examples can be found regarding Hungary, in relation to which the
European Commission launched three infringement procedures based on fundamen-
tal freedoms and the Charter. These include the following: (i) the case relating to the
amendment of the Act on National Higher Education affecting foreign universities,
most of all the Central European University;61 (ii) the case relating to the law on the
transparency of organisations that receive financial support from abroad;62 (iii) the
case of Act VI of 2018 on the amendment of certain laws relating to measures to
combat illegal immigration.63 Common to these cases is that the European Com-
mission relies on one of the fundamental freedoms and in connection with that
provisions of the Charter. In relation to the Act on National Higher Education the
freedom to provide services is invoked, and in relation to that Articles 13, 14(3) and
16 CFR. As regards the transparency of foreign funded organisations the vehicle is
the freedom of movement of capital, which seems to trigger the application of
Articles 7, 8 and 12 CFR. The case of Act VI of 2018 on the amendment of certain
laws relating to measures to combat illegal immigration the Commission invokes the
freedom of movement, whereas the press release on the reasoned opinion only refers
to the Charter in general terms.
As neither the reasoned opinions nor the applications of the Commission to the
CJEU are public, it is unclear whether the Commission indeed utilises the ERT
precedent to trigger the application of the Charter. Yet these cases certainly point in
that direction. It would mean that while the CJEU is not ready to apply the ‘scope of
application’ doctrine of the ERT and Åkerberg Fransson judgment to broaden the
applicability of the Charter to Member States in situations sensitive to the rule of law
in general, it sticks with the already established precedent of the ERT judgment if it is
applicable. This conclusion is reinforced by the already mentioned post-Siragusa
relating to the new disciplinary regime for Polish judges—Reasoned Opinion of the European
Commission of 17 July 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-4189_en.htm.
61CJEU, Case C-66/18, Commission v Hungary, Action brought on 1 February 2018.
62CJEU, Case C-78/18, Commission v Hungary, Action brought on 1 June 2018.
63Reasoned opinion of the European Commission of 24 January 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-19-469_EN.htm.
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and Hernández cases not involving systemic rule of law concerns where the CJEU
relied on the ERT precedent to invite the application of the Charter.64
3 UnusedMeans to Control the Constitution Making Power
3.1 The Convolution of Pouvoir Constituant and Pouvoir
Constitué
The circumstances of the activity of the Hungarian Constitutional Court could hardly
be more different than those of the CJEU. Out of the past ten years the governing
coalition in Hungary had a constitution making majority for about seven years
altogether.65 This majority did not refrain from amending the Constitution and
from 2012 the Basic Law. Between 2010 and 2012 the Constitution was amended
eight times. Following the adoption of a new Basic Law, seven different amendment
thereto were adopted within seven years. In other words, nine years have seen the
adoption of a new constitution (the Basic Law) and fifteen constitutional amend-
ments out of which seven affected the brand-new Basic Law.
Not only the statistics suggest a volatile constitutional environment. Almost all
constitutional amendments were borne out of immediate political needs and moti-
vations. With a few exceptions, they served to exclude or reduce the possibility of
challenging specific legislative projects before the Constitutional Court or attempted
to undo the results of previous Constitutional Court decisions.66 Especially the
curtailing of the competences of the Constitutional Court in tax matters by what is
now Article 37 (4) of the Basic Law and the Fourth Amendment made it clear that
the legislative power is ready to use its constitution making power to combat the
Constitutional Court.
As regards Article 37 (4) of the Basic Law, the restriction of the competences of
the Constitutional Court is certainly a very serious loophole in the Basic Law. This is
because Article 37(4) of the Basic Law excludes a wide range of laws on the central
budget, on the implementation of the budget, on central taxes, on duties and on
contributions, on customs duties, and on the central conditions for local taxes issues
from the competence of the Constitutional Court, and only allows for the review of
these on the basis of a limited list of fundamental rights, i.e. the rights to life and
human dignity, to the protection of personal data, to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion, and the rights related to Hungarian citizenship. This language arose out
of a conflict between Parliament and the Constitutional Court over a 98% punitive
tax charged on severance payments of dismissed civil servants and public employees
64See CJEU AGET Iraklis, supra note 24, paras 62–63; C-235/17, CJEU Commission v. Hungary,
supra note 24, paras. 64–65.
65May 2010 to February 2015, May 2018 to present (July 2020).
66Vincze (2014), p. 86.
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before the adoption of the Basic Law. In its Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB67 the
Constitutional Court declared this punitive tax to be in violation of the right to
property, even though Parliament had previously specifically amended the Consti-
tution to cover the impugned legislation. Apparently, Parliament felt it necessary to
protect its prerogatives by stripping the power of the Constitutional Court to
adjudicate tax matters in the broad sense, and introduced Article 32/A(2) of the
Constitution, the language of which was identical to what is today Article 37 (4) of
the Basic Law.68
The Fourth Amendment was adopted in reaction to Decision 45/2012 (XII.29)
AB of the Constitutional Court which had declared the so-called transitory pro-
visions of the Basic Law unconstitutional. Accordingly, the most important part of
the Fourth Amendment was that it incorporated those provisions of the Transitional
Provisions into the text of the Basic Law that were previously annulled by the
Constitutional Court. These reinstated rules included substantive provisions, such
as the reallocation of cases by the President of the National Judicial Office (Article
27(4)), the possibility to reduce pensions of former communist leaders (Article U
(5)), and the suspension of the statute of limitations for crimes not prosecuted for
political reasons in the communist regime (Article U(6)). Besides these, the Fourth
Amendment included in Article U(1) of the Basic Law the previous Preamble to the
Transitional Provisions, which declared, inter alia, that the Hungarian Socialist
Workers’ Party (the communist party before 1989) bears responsibility for different
wrongdoings, including ‘the systematic destruction of European civilisation, legacy
and prominence’. What is more, the newly inserted Article U(1) also declares that
the successor of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, the Hungarian Socialist
Party (MSZP, which is at the present time the strongest opposition), shares the
responsibility of its predecessor.
However, the constitution-making power did not stop at undoing one single
Constitutional Court ruling. Rather, the Fourth Amendment basically reversed all
politically sensitive decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court after the
2010 elections. This was carried out by including specific exceptions to fundamental
rights provisions in the Basic Law based on which laws previously annulled by the
Constitutional Court can no longer be regarded as unconstitutional.
For example, the Fourth Amendment inserted the following provision into Article
L(1) of the Basic Law: ‘Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union
of a man and a woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis
of the nation’s survival. Family ties shall be based on marriage or the relationship
between parents and children.’
This was a direct response to Decision 43/2012 (XII.20) AB,69 in which the
Constitutional Court annulled section 7 of the Act on Protection of Families.
Section 7 had defined family as a system of relations that generates an emotional
67Constitutional Court of Hungary Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB határozat para 900.
68I shall address this conflict in detail below at point 3.2.3.
69Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 43/2012 (XII.20) AB, para. 296.
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and economic community of natural persons, based on the marriage of a man and a
woman, next of kinship or adoptive guardianship. The Court found this concept of a
family too narrow as the state should also protect long-term emotional and economic
partnerships of persons living together (for example, those relationships in which the
couples raise and take care of each other’s children, or couples who do not have any
children or are not able to have any children, grandchildren cared for by grandpar-
ents, etc.).
Another reaction to one of the contemporary decisions of the Constitutional Court
was the amendment of Article VII(2) and (3) of the Basic Law which authorise
Parliament to recognise religious organisations as churches. Just ten days before the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment, in its Decision 6/2013 (III.1) AB, the Consti-
tutional Court decided, inter alia, that on the basis of freedom of religion Parliament
cannot be authorised to grant church status.70 Both of these will be elaborated on in
more detail in Sect. 3.2.
Similarly, to reverse a Constitutional Court Decision, Article XXII of the Basic
Law introduced an obligation of the state and local governments to strive for the
protection of homeless persons but at the same time granted authorisation for the
Parliament and the local governments to outlaw the use of certain specific sections of
public areas for habitation. This amendment was a reaction to Decision 38/2012
(XI.14) AB,71 in which the Constitutional Court reviewed the Petty Offence Act and
stated that the punishment of homeless people for living in a public area is in
violation of the right to human dignity. In the Court’s view, homelessness is a social
problem which the state must handle within the framework of social administration
and social care instead of punishment. Ultimately, therefore, the newly introduced
Article XXII(3) created an exception to the protection of human dignity concerning
homeless people at the level of the Basic Law.
Equally, the Fourth Amendment included a new paragraph in Article IX of the
Basic Law which explicitly allows for banning political advertisements from private
broadcasting in times of political campaign, thereby reversing Decision 45/2012
(XII.29) AB, discussed above. Besides this, the new Article IX(3) discourages
political advertising in private broadcasting by prohibiting media outlets from
charging for broadcasting political adverts, should they decide to air these.
What is more, some provisions of the Fourth Amendment relating to hate speech
aim to cut back a 20-year-old case law of the Constitutional Court. Between 1992
and 2008, the Constitutional Court found several laws to be unconstitutional that
aimed to penalise hate speech.72 As an answer to this, Article 5(2) of the Basic Law
stipulates that: ‘[t]he right to freedom of speech may not be exercised with the aim of
violating the dignity of the Hungarian nation or of any national, ethnic, racial or
70Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 6/2013 (III.1) AB para. 203.
71Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 38/2012 (XI.14) AB para. 185.
72See Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 30/1992 (V.26) AB; Constitutional Court of
Hungary, Decision 18/2004 (IV.25) AB; Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 95/2008
(VII.3) AB.
170 P. Sonnevend
religious community. Members of such communities shall be entitled to enforce their
claims in court against the expression of an opinion which violates their community,
invoking the violation of their human dignity as determined by law.’
In general, reversing several decisions of the Constitutional Court by constitu-
tional amendment resulted in a Basic Law packed with specific exceptions to
fundamental rights and provisions that are normally at the level of an ordinary
law. Not only did this lower the level of protection of fundamental rights, it also
had the aim of reducing the possibility of review by the Constitutional Court. And
above all, the Fourth Amendment sent an extraordinary strong message to the
Constitutional Court that no other power is supposed to control the legislative and
at the same time constitution making branch.
Under these circumstances it is fair to ask what role constitutional adjudication
can play. Is it at all possible to maintain a meaningful constitutional review, or is the
role of the Constitutional Court necessarily reduced to review politically
non-sensitive issues? Do we experience the development of a new, special Eastern
European type of the well-known political question doctrine? Naturally this ‘new
political question’ doctrine would not be a constitutional standard, rather the neces-
sity of judicial self-restraint in matters the actual legislative and constitution making
power would deem too important to be decided by anybody else than itself.
I submit that even under these difficult circumstances constitutional review is
possible. The Hungarian Constitutional Court had developed tools that are, to a
certain extent, capable of limiting the constitution making power or enable the Court
to adjudicate irrespective of the existing substantive and competence limitations.
As regards the limitation of the constitution-making power, the identity of the
Basic Law as well as international ius cogens serve as a standard (Sect. 3.2).
Constitutional adjudication is further possible in the present setting based on inter-
national human rights treaties, especially the European Convention on Human
Rights (Sect. 3.3).
3.2 Limits of the Constitution Making Power
The concept of an unconstitutional constitutional amendments is equally fascinating
and controversial, especially if the substantive limits to constitutional change are
implied73 and are not foreseen explicitly by the respective constitution. Declaring a
constitutional amendment to be unconstitutional by the constitutional court is not
only a harsh interference with popular sovereignty, but also comes dangerously close
to to a ‘juristocracy’74 and—due to the lacking standards against which constitu-
tional amendments can be reviewed (e.g. an explicit eternity clause)—even judicial
arbitrariness. It is therefore tempting for a constitutional court to seek objective and
73Jacobsohn (2006), p. 460 et seq.
74Hirschl (2007).
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relevant criteria in historic documents or European75 and international law. This
temptation may raise questions of legitimacy, but it can help overcoming accusations
that the respective constitutional court is inventing standards that do not exist.
It occurs that the case law of the Constitutional Court and ultimately the Basic
Law offer two different sets of supraconstitutional norms: the concept of constitu-
tional identity (Sect. 3.2.1) and international law. International law even has a double
role to play in this context: it is considered as a binding standard of interpretation of
constitutional provisions (Sect. 3.2.2) and constitutional amendments must conform
international jus cogens (Sect. 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Constitutional Identity
Constitutional identity is a new phenomenon in Hungarian law. It was first stipulated
in Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) of the Constitutional Court without an express
constitutional foundation and is now codified by the seventh amendment to the
Basic Law. The seventh amendment namely included a reference in the Preamble of
the Basic Law to the constitutional identity of Hungary. According to this new
language, ‘We hold that the protection of our identity rooted in our historic consti-
tution is a fundamental obligation of the State’. This is reinforced also in the
operative part of the Basic Law, as a new Article R (4) is included stating that ‘[t]
he protection of the constitutional identity of Hungary is an obligation of all organs
of the state.’
The contours of constitutional identity are rather vague. Decision 22/2016. (XII.
5.) states that the Constitutional Court ‘unfolds the content of this concept from case
to case, on the basis of the whole Fundamental Law and certain provisions thereof, in
accordance with the National Avowal and the achievements of our historical con-
stitution.’76 There is thus a close link between constitutional identity and the historic
constitution, which may be further reinforced by the seventh amendment to the Basic
Law declaring the constitutional identity of Hungary to be rooted in the historic
constitutions. Yet, there is a strong consensus in academia that the historic consti-
tution of Hungary is an empty shell, the content of which cannot be reconstructed.77
What remains at the moment is thus an exemplificatory reference in Decision
22/2016 (XII. 5.) to certain values as part of constitutional identity. These are
‘freedoms, the division of powers, republic as the form of government, respect of
autonomies under public law, the freedom of religion, exercising lawful authority,
parliamentarism, the equality of rights, acknowledging judicial power, the protection
of the nationalities living with us.’78
75On this, see Dupré (2015), p. 351 et seq.
76Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 64.
77Szente (2011), p. 1 et seq.
78Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 65.
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What makes the concept of constitutional identity intriguing is that it seems to
have a rank above the Basic Law. This follows from the language of Decision
22/2016. (XII. 5.) according to which ‘the constitutional identity of Hungary is a
fundamental value which was not created by the Basic Law, it is merely recognised
by the Basic Law’79 This clearly suggests the existence of pre-constitutional values
which serve as a standard for the actual written constitution, the Basic Law. And
because constitutional identity is defined by reference to the historic constitution,
and this concept is capable of having a variety of contents and meanings, the
Constitutional Court enjoys a considerable discretion in reviewing constitutional
amendments on the basis of constitutional identity.
3.2.2 International Law as a Standard of Interpretation of Constitutional
Provisions
For a long time, it seemed unclear, whether from the perspective of the Hungarian
constitutional order the role of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights is merely of non-binding, inspiring character, or whether the case law of the
Court should be deemed to define the scope and content of the respective rights, and
as such have a binding force.80
At the beginning, this question was answered almost unanimously in the nega-
tive. Representative of this was the view of the first President of the Hungarian
Constitutional Court, who argued that reference to the Strasbourg case law is merely
of auxiliary nature besides the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, and such
reference might also emphasize the importance of a specific rule of the Constitu-
tion.81 For two decades the Hungarian Court never went as far as to derive binding
constitutional standards from the Convention. Only once has the Constitutional
Court found that the understanding of the freedom of expression by the European
Court of Human Rights is ‘forming and binding the Hungarian jurisprudence.’82 Yet
this statement had no consequences in later decisions and the Court continued to
refer to the practice of the Convention without declaring them to be binding in the
interpretation of the Constitution.
79Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 22/2016 (XII. 5.) AB para. 67.
80This approach seems to follow from the Commentaries attached to the Charter of Fundamental
Rights. Cf. the comments on Article 52. (3) [2007] OJ C 303/33.
81Sólyom and Brunner (2000), p. 1317. This view was certainly in line with the case law of the
Bundesverfassungsgericht. Cf. BVerfG, Judgement of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, Görgülü,
para. 30–32, BVerfG, Judgment of 12 June 2018, 2 BvR 1738/12, Ban on strike action for civil
servants, para. 126: ‘Using them as guidelines for interpretation does not require that the statements
of the Basic Law and those of the European Convention on Human Rights be schematically aligned
or completely harmonised.’
82Constitutional Court of Hungary, 18/2004. (V. 25.) AB, ABH 2004, 303, 306. The Constitutional
Court referred to a series of judgments in this context, Hungary was not party to any of them.
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This picture seems to gradually change by decisions of the Court that actually
give effect to judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The first instance
of this was a consequence of the Judgment Bukta and others v. Hungary.83 Here the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the subjection of public assemblies to a
prior–authorisation procedure does not normally encroach upon the essence of
Article 11 of the Convention.84 But when an immediate response, in the form of a
demonstration, to a political event might be justified, a decision to disband the
ensuing, peaceful assembly solely because of the absence of the requisite prior
notice, without any illegal conduct by the participants, amounts to a disproportionate
restriction on freedom of peaceful assembly.85 Shortly after this judgment the
Constitutional Court decided on the constitutionality of the Act Nr. III of 1989 on
the right of assembly in its Decision Nr. 75/2008.86 This Decision actually comes to
the same conclusion as the ECHR. Yet the Hungarian Court merely refers to the
Bukta judgment in a brief paragraph, and the same paragraph also quotes the
jurisprudence of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. The substantive argument
is solely based on Article 62 para. 1 of the Constitution. It appears that the Court did
not want to tie its hands for the future, even if it was ready to follow the path of
interpretation drawn by the European Court of Human Rights,87 and even if the
Constitutional Court is deciding on a statute the application of which was reviewed
by the European Court of Human Rights.
The breakthrough came with Decision Nr. 61/2011.88 Here the Court declared
clearly that it is under an obligation to follow the case law of the Convention in its
decisions interpreting the Constitution as long as the language of both corresponds.
In the words of the Court: ‘In the case of certain fundamental rights the Constitution
sets out the essential content of the fundamental right in the same fashion as an
international treaty (i.e. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the European Convention on Human Rights). In these cases, the level of protection
for fundamental rights provided by the Constitutional Court may under no circum-
stances be lower than the level of international protection (typically elaborated by the
European Court of Human Rights). Therefore following from the principle of pacta
sunt servanda [Article 7 (1) Constitution Article Q (2)-(3) Basic Law] the Consti-
tutional Court has to follow the Strasbourg case law and the level of fundamental
rights protection defined therein even if this would not be necessitated by its
previous ‘precedents’.89 This statement was later referred to in Decision
Nr. 166/201190 and after the entry into force of the Basic Law in Decision
83ECtHR, Bukta and others v. Hungary, Judgment of 17 July 2007, Application no. 25691/04.
84Id. para. 35.
85Id. para. 36.
86Constitutional Court of Hungary, 75/2008. (V. 29.) AB, ABH 2008, 651.
87Id. 663 et seq.
88See Kovács (2013), p. 73 et seq.
89Constitutional Court of Hungary, 61/2011. (VII.13.) AB, ABH 2011, 321.
90Constitutional Court of Hungary, 166/2011. (XII.20.) AB, ABH 2011, 545.
174 P. Sonnevend
Nr. 43/2012.91 It occurs therefore that the rights of the Convention as interpreted by
the European Court of Human Rights are obligatory standards of interpretation of the
rights of the Basic Law at least in the sense that they provide for a minimum of
protection.92 Absent express provisions to the contrary in the language of the Basic
Law this shall help in maintaining European minimum standards domestically.
3.2.3 International Law as a Standard of Legality of the Constitution
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has already relied on international ius cogens to
define the eternal core of the constitution of Hungary in two of its decisions. Both
decisions were made in the context of a controversial constitutional amendment, yet
none of them actually found a violation of international ius cogens.
Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB was made under the 1989 Constitution in a battle
between Parliament and the Constitutional Court over a piece of tax legislation. On
22 July 2010, the Hungarian Parliament adopted several economic and financial
Acts. The Act, inter alia, introduced a new punitive tax on certain payments for
employees of the public sector (civil servants, public servants, etc.) whose employ-
ment was terminated. Accordingly, severance payments and other payments related
to the termination of employment exceeding a certain amount became subject to a
98% tax. The proposal of the Act justified the punitive tax by reference to the needs
of the society to do justice, claiming that under the previous government public
employees had been granted immorally excessive severance payments. Although the
Act entered into force on 1 October 2010, the punitive tax was to be applied to the
relevant incomes starting from 1 January 2010. In order to ensure the constitution-
ality of this Act, Parliament also amended Article 70/I of the 1989 Constitution by
including a new paragraph (2) in the Article that allowed for special taxes.93
The punitive tax was challenged before the Constitutional Court within the
framework of an actio popularis, and the Court found the relevant provisions of
the Act to be unconstitutional in its Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB, because, inter
alia, Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution did not cover the retroactive 98% tax.94
In response, Parliament reintroduced the 98% tax with certain modifications. At
the same time, Parliament modified Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution allowing for
retroactive taxation going back five years from the actual tax year. To prevent the
Constitutional Court from reviewing the legislation, a limitation was also introduced
91Constitutional Court of Hungary, 43/2012. (XII.20.) AB, ABH 2012, 320.
92In this sense Kovács (2013), p. 76.
93Article 70/I(2) of the Constitution (no longer in force): ‘In respect of any remuneration received
against the good morals from public funds, or from bodies entrusted to manage state assets and state
property, including bodies under majority state ownership or control, tax liabilities of a special
extent may be introduced on the strength of law, beginning with the given tax year.’
94Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 184/2010 (X.28) AB para. 900.
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in Article 32/A(2)–(3) of the Constitution, the language of which was basically
identical with what is today Article 37(4) of the Basic Law.
The Constitutional Court was confronted with this limitation on its powers in
Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB where several petitioners challenged the constitu-
tional amendments that made the new Articles 32/A(2) and 70/I(2) part of the
Constitution. The Constitutional Court was not ready to find these amendments
unconstitutional but indicated that it might be ready to review constitutional amend-
ments on the basis of international law. The Decision stated that ‘norms, principles
and fundamental values of ius cogens together form a standard which all subsequent
constitutional amendments and the Constitution must comply with.’95
In spite of this clear language Decision 61/2011 (VII.13.) AB did not state clearly
that the Constitutional Court would possess the power to enforce these standards
against the constitution-making power. This came only after the entry into force of
the Basic Law in Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) of the Constitutional Court.
Decision 45/2012 (XII. 29.) concerned the Transitional Provisions to the Basic
Law. The Transitional Provisions were a document separate from the Basic Law but
it were, according to Point 3 of the Final Provisions of the Basic Law, to be adopted
by Parliament according to the rules of the previous Constitution on constitutional
amendments. Since these provisions were also the legal basis of the Basic Law itself,
it seemed reasonable to suppose that the constitution-maker intended to attribute to
the Transitional Provisions a rank similar to that of the Basic Law. This was
reinforced by the First Amendment to the Basic Law which inserted Point 5 in the
closing provisions of the Basic Law, according to which the Transitional Provisions
form an integral part of the Basic Law.
In its Decision 45/2012 (XII.29) AB, the Constitutional Court declared the
Transitional Provisions null and void.96 The core of the Court’s argument was that
Parliament had overstepped its constitutional authorisation when it implemented
regulations in the Transitional Provisions which had no transitional character. It was
probably to reduce confrontation with Parliament that the Constitutional Court
cautiously framed its ruling as the enforcement of formal rules and emphasised
that it did not review the merits of the Transitional Provisions. Still, the Decision also
seems to establish the power for itself to review the constitutionality of constitutional
amendments in its paragraph 118, which reads as follows: ‘Constitutional legality
has substantive criteria besides the procedural, formal, public law ones. [These are]
[t]he constitutional requirements of the democratic state under the rule of law,
constitutional values and principles acknowledged by democratic communities
under the rule of law and enshrined in international agreements, as well the
so-called ius cogens, which partly overlaps with these. Under certain circumstances
the Constitutional Court is empowered to review whether the substantive
95Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 61/2011. (VII.13.) AB, ABH 2011, 321.
96Constitutional Court of Hungary, Decision 45/2012 (XII.29) para. 347.
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constitutional requirements, guarantees and values of a democratic state under the
rule of law are consistently respected and included in the constitution.’97
It is remarkable that the Court here not only reiterated its findings on the role of
international ius cogens as a standard of review of the constitutional amendments,
but also claimed the power to carry out a substantive review of norms formally
incorporated into the Basic Law.
3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights
as a Standard of Review by the Constitutional Court
The Basic Law of Hungary seems to be surprisingly open towards international law.
Article Q (2) of the Basic Law provides that ‘Hungary shall ensure harmony between
international law and Hungarian law in order to fulfil its obligations under interna-
tional law.’ Further, according to Article Q (3) international treaties become part of
Hungarian Law upon their promulgation by a piece of Hungarian legislation. From
these it follows that international treaties promulgated by an Act of Parliament shall
take precedence over domestic legislation. This is supplemented by Section 32 of the
Constitutional Court Act which specifically entitles the Constitutional Court to
review the conformity of domestic legislation with international treaties. Should
such a procedure establish a conflict between an international treaty promulgated by
Act of Parliament and a domestic piece of legislation, the Constitutional Court is
obliged to declare the domestic law null and void. What is more, the already
mentioned limitation on the competences of the Constitutional Court in Article
37 (4) in relation to tax laws does not apply to this type of procedure. In effect, the
combination of these provisions enables the Constitutional Court to conduct review
on the basis of international law.
The real question is who may initiate this type of review. The European Conven-
tion on Human Rights was promulgated in the Hungarian legal order by Act
Nr. XXXI of 1993, and therefore can be invoked by individuals before ordinary
courts. Yet individuals are not listed in Section 32 (2) amongst those entitled to
request the review of conflict with international treaties.98 Nevertheless concrete,
incidental norm control is open under Section 33 (2) of the Constitutional Court Act,
which provides that ‘judges shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Consti-
tutional Court proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication of a concrete case,
97Id., paras. 347, 403.
98Section 32 (2) CC Act ‘The proceedings may be requested by one quarter of Members of
Parliament, the Government, the President of the Curia, the Prosecutor General or the Commis-
sioner for Fundamental Rights. Judges shall suspend judicial proceedings and initiate Constitutional
Court proceedings if, in the course of the adjudication of a concrete case, they are bound to apply a
legal regulation that they perceive to be contrary to an international treaty.’
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they are bound to apply a legal regulation that they perceive to be contrary to an
international treaty.’
As a result, ordinary courts are not only bound to apply the applicable Hungarian
laws and interpret them in conformity with the Convention as far as possible.99
Should a harmonious interpretation not be possible because of the express language
of the Hungarian law in question, courts are entitled to call upon the Constitutional
Court and ask for a review of the Hungarian piece of legislation on the basis of
international treaties, notably the European Convention on Human Rights. In case of
a conflict the Constitutional Court is obliged to declare the Hungarian law in
question unconstitutional.
4 Conclusions
The present Chapter attempted to demonstrate that the enforcement of the basic
values of the EU by courts has unexploited potentials. It occurs that both the legal
system of the EU and Hungarian constitutional law offers possibilities that are not
used for considerations of non-legal nature.
In the case of the CJEU, deference to constitutional courts, especially the
Bundesverfassungsgericht and an outdated approach to fundamental rights protec-
tion are a crucial shortcoming. As demonstrated by the Siragusa judgment, the
CJEU seems to regard the protection of fundamental rights protection as a means
of preventing challenges to the supremacy of EU law by national constitutional
courts. I submit that this mid 1960s understanding does not fit the state of the EU as it
is in the 2010s, at least for two reasons. First, the constitutional foundations of the
EU have changed radically. Second, the realities changed with the accession of
Member States with more fragile democratic traditions and by the rise of populist
parties all over Europe.
As regards the changed constitutional foundations, the express stipulation of
constitutional values in Article 2 TEU clearly calls for the application of the Charter
as the concretisation of these values also against Member States. Besides, the EU is
equipped with far reaching consequences in the field of criminal cooperation and the
mandate to facilitate the full application of the principle of mutual recognition by
virtue of Article 70 TFEU.
Changed realities are clear from the developments in Hungary, Romania100 and
the subject matter of the present volume, Poland. It occurs that the presumption of an
approximately homogenic area of the rule of law no longer applies and certain
99Such a harmonious interpretation is a constitutional mandate repeatedly confirmed by the
Constitutional Court. Cf. Constitutional Court of Hungary 53/1993 (X. 13.) AB, ABH 1993,
323, 327; Constitutional Court of Hungary, 4/1997. (I. 22.) AB, ABH 1997, 41, 51.
100For these see inter alia von Bogdandy and Sonnevend (2015).
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Member States do not meet all supposedly common standards of fundamental rights
protection and the rule of law.
The implications and eventual perils following from the changed constitutional
and sociological realities are aptly demonstrated by the Aranyosi101 and LM102 line
of cases. Especially LM demonstrates that mutual recognition and mutual trust
presuppose a coherent level of respect for human rights in all EU Member States.
If this is missing, the whole fabric of EU law may fall apart. As a result, the
protection of fundamental rights by Member States is a common concern.
The situation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court is different in many respects.
Constitutional adjudication against the constitution making power is a seemingly
insurmountable task, especially when the constitution making power is not separated
from the legislative power. This situation requires extreme means like the concept of
an unconstitutional constitution. These means are, however, readily available. Both
the new concept of constitutional identity and the case law on international ius
cogens as a binding standard of constitutional provisions offer munition for extreme
situations. These possibilities, I believe, exist even in the face of Article 25 (4) of the
Basic Law, which enables the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of
Amendments of the Basic Law only on procedural grounds.103 In an already extreme
situation triggering the application of the constitutional identity of the Basic Law or
international ius cogens it is possible to argue that any competence limitation in
Article 25 (4) of the Basic Law is also in violation of said supra-constitutional norms.
Besides these extreme situations the European Convention on Human Rights
offers a perfect secondary tool of constitutional adjudication through the procedure
of review of conformity of laws with international treaties. This has remained thus
far completely underexplored and unused by the Constitutional Court. This, I
submit, is a self-restraint that does not follow from the law as it stands today.
The phenomenon of constitutional adjudication was borne for the first time out of
the consideration that courts are inherently called upon to apply the law, and the
concept of law necessarily encompasses the constitution. As the US Supreme Court
stated in Marbury v. Madison ‘[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
Judicial Department to say what the law is.’104 The birth of modern constitutionalism
101CJEU, Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Judgment of the Court of
5 April 2016.
102CJEU, C-216/18 PPU. LM, Judgment of the Court of 25 July 2018.
103Article 25 (4) of the Basic Law: ‘The Constitutional Court may review the Basic Law and an
amendment to the Basic Law only with respect to the procedural requirements set out in the Basic
Law pertaining to the adoption and the promulgation of the Basic Law and any amendment thereof.
This review may be initiated by:
a) the President of the Republic, in the case where the Fundamental Law or an amendment to the
Basic Law was adopted by Parliament but not yet promulgated;
b) the Government, one fourth of all Members of Parliament, the President of the Kúria, President
of the Közigazgatási Felsőbíróság, the Prosecutor General, or the Commissioner for Funda-
mental Rights within thirty days of promulgation.’
104Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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is thus intimately linked to the responsibility of the courts to enforce the constitu-
tional documents of the respective polity. All courts shall follow the mandate
resulting from this and apply all available means in order to preserve the common
basic values of constitutionalism.
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Abstract Mutual trust is the basis on which the Member States’ judiciaries are
expected to deal with each other in the European Union. By constitutionalizing
the principle of mutual trust, the CJEU has introduced an axiological addition to the
basic structure of the European Union. From a Union which concentrated on the
vertical relationships between each Member State and the central Union’s institu-
tions, the Union has turned out to be additionally preoccupied with the horizontal
relationships among the Member States, which are based on what might be called a
doctrine of Horizontal Solange.
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According to the principle of mutual trust, each Member State must presume that
all other Member States are in compliance with EU law, in particular promote its
values and respect European fundamental rights. This presumption, however, can be
rebutted in exceptional circumstances. These exceptional circumstances are based on
a two-prong test: first, the violation of the values or the fundamental rights must
amount to a systemic deficiency; second, there is a need for an assessment whether
the individual concerned will be the victim of this systemic deficiency.
This contribution critically analyses these exceptional circumstances. Regarding the
first prong, it is argued that the existence of systemic deficiencies should ideally be
established by the CJEU via preliminary ruling references or via direct infringement
proceedings. Alternatively, such systemic deficiencies may also be established by
domestic courts in a host Member State. Regarding the second prong, it is argued that
the individual test is redundant in cases where the systemic deficiency imposes chal-
lenges to the existing legal order of the Member State in question. Finally, it is argued
that the suspension ofmutual trust can serve as a decentralized instrument for protecting
the European rule of law by pressuring the violating state to restore the rule of law.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, the interstate relationships among the Member States of the European
Union are based on the principle of mutual trust. The principle of mutual trust is
based on the presumption that there are common values which all Member States
recognize and adhere to.1 In other words, there exists mutual confidence between the
Member States that their national legal systems are capable of providing equivalent and
effective protection of the values as recognized at the EU level. Since those values are to
be presumed as recognized by all Member States, they may not check, save in
exceptional circumstances, whether another Member State has actually observed the
values guaranteed by the EU. This is especially the case in situations when they are
called upon by EU law to assist each other to execute other Member State’s judgments.
Such exceptional circumstances can flow from deficiencies in respecting the rule
of law. The rule of law is one of the values on which the European Union is founded,
as is stated in Article 2 TEU.2 By now, it is well-established jurisprudence that in
1See e.g. CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 168;
CJEU, Case C-284/16 Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, para. 34; CJEU, Case C-128/18 Dorobantu,
ECLI:EU:C:2019:857, para. 45; CJEU, Case C-314/18 SF (Mandat d’arrêt européen—Garantie de
renvoi dans l’État d’exécution), ECLI:EU:C:2020:191, para. 35.
2The rule of law is also mentioned in the preambles of the EU Treaty and of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Respect for the rule of law constitutes, moreover, a
prerequisite of accession to the European Union, pursuant to Article 49 TEU. The concept of the
rule of law is also enshrined in the preamble of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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cases where a Member State systematically violates the rule of law, the trust
otherwise conferred upon it by other Member States is to be suspended and the
cooperation with its judiciary should be deferred.
This contribution aims to elaborate and assess this relationship between the
principle of mutual trust and the value of the rule of law. More concretely, the
central question is: what is the potential for a derogation from the principle of mutual
trust, because the credentials of one Member State on the rule of law are lacking, to
actually enhance adherence to the dictates of the rule of law in this Member State?
The Chapter will first examine the manner in which the Court elevated the principle
of mutual trust into a constitutional principle of the EU, the content which the Court
has poured into the value of the rule of law, and the way mutual trust and the rule of
law are intertwined in the jurisprudence of the Court. Finally, the Chapter will
critically assess the exceptional circumstances that, according to the Court, justify
the suspension of the horizontal cooperation between the Member States, mainly but
not exclusively with respect to the European Arrest Warrant. It will be argued that
Member States shall be able to freeze their horizontal cooperation with another
Member State which, systematically infringes the rule of law, following a less
stringent test than the one invoked by the Court. In this way, the principle of mutual
trust and its exceptions might encourage the infringing state to amend its ways and
adhere again to the rule of law.
2 Mutual Trust: The Path Towards Becoming a Founding
Constitutional Principle of the EU
2.1 Mutual Trust: Initial Steps
The term ‘mutual trust’ appeared in the jurisprudence of the Court as early as 1975.3
In Opinion 1/75, the Court ruled that the power to conclude international agreements
on commercial matters could not be a ‘concurrent power’ because, by using such a
power, there was the possibility that the Member States could adopt positions
towards third countries which differed from those which the Community would
otherwise adopt towards them, thereby calling into question the mutual trust within
the Community. In this Opinion, the Court refers to mutual trust as a vertical
principle concerning the relationship between the Community and the Member
States.
Almost simultaneously, the Court started using mutual trust for the horizontal
relationship between Member States in the context of the internal market. In
Bauhuis, the Court decided, for example, that the European harmonized system of
veterinary and public health inspections is ‘based on the trust which member states
3CJEU, Opinion 1/75 Arrangement OCDE—Norme pour les dépenses locales, ECLI:EU:
C:1975:145.
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should place in each other as far as concerns the guarantees provided by the
inspections carried out initially by the veterinary and public health departments.’4
At issue was the imposition of obligations for the inspections on the exporting state,
replacing thereby the systematic inspection measures at the border so as to make
multiple border inspections unnecessary. Hence, Member States should trust each
other and not monitor compliance with EU law of another Member State.5
2.2 Mutual Trust: A Horizontal Principle of Cooperation
Among the Member States’ Judiciaries
Subsequently, the principle of mutual trust has been elaborated by the Court in
relation to specific fields of law, mainly European Arrest Warrant, Common
European Asylum System, and European private international law and civil proce-
dure. Indeed, in these cases, mutual trust is applied horizontally, regulating the
relationships between the Member States in these matters.
Hence, for example, in Apostolides, mutual trust ‘in the administration of justice
in the Union’, was invoked to justify, as a rule, the almost automatic recognition and
enforcement of judgments given in one Member State in another Member State.6
The presumption is that, in a common market in which the internal borders were
abolished, the legal orders of the Member States have become closely intertwined.
Therefore, there is a stronger need to recognize and enforce judgments emanating
from another Member State, in comparison to judgments from courts of
non-Member States.
Therefore, the judiciary has been elaborating the principle of mutual trust in sync
with the principle of mutual recognition. Mutual trust provides for the almost
automatic horizontal enforcement of civil judgments among the Member States of
the EU. Because of that, a ‘fifth freedom’, namely the free movement of judgments,
was gradually emerging.7
Indeed, mutual trust has been the outcome of a long process, practically since the
establishment of the European Economic Community, the process of drawing the
Member State’s legal orders closer together. This process has been taking different
forms and has been occurring on different paths. These include the unifying and
harmonizing character of EU legislation; the elaboration of the principle of mutual
4CJEU, Case C-46/76 Bauhuis, ECLI:EU:C:1977:6, para. 21–22.
5See also, CJEU, Case C-5/94 The Queen v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte
Hedley Lomas, ECLI:EU:C:1996:205, para. 19, which concerned the European harmonized system
of stunning animals before slaughter, which according to the Court, does not allow the Member
States to restrict the free movement of goods on the ground of protection of health and life of
animals on the basis of Article 36 of the Treaty, as ‘the Member States must rely on trust in each
other to carry out inspections on their respective territories’; See also Janssens (2014), pp. 28 et seq.
6CJEU, Case C-420/07 Apostolides, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, para. 73.
7Lenaerts (2017), p. 805.
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recognition and the familiarization with the regulatory standards of other Member
States; the invocation of comparative law among the Member States’ courts when
relying on the acte clair doctrine; the emergence of constitutional traditions common
to the Member States which form part of general principles of European law; and the
admission requirement of new states to the European Union regarding their adher-
ence to the European acquis.
The result is that the legal orders of the Member States have become more similar
and closely intertwined. The Member States have been able to acknowledge that the
plurality of responses that each one of them might give to a specific civil conflict do,
nevertheless, correspond to a similar legal substructure lurking below. Thus, the
plurality of responses is based on a common denominator and would not result in
overly divergent responses. This in turn implies that the Member State issuing a
judgment (the home State) can be assured that the judgment will be almost blindly
and almost automatically recognized and enforced by the executing Member State
(the host State), even if the legal norm or the judicial decision to be executed differed
from the norm or decision which would otherwise be applied to the same situation by
a court in the host State.8
While mutual trust is intended to restrain national courts from invoking the
doctrine of public policy as a justification for non-enforcement of other Member
States’ judgments, it has never been intended to be an absolute principle.9 The Court
has ruled in Apotolides that mutual trust should be balanced against the possible
violation of the rights of the defence of an individual, which would then justify
non-enforcement of a judgment.
The principle of mutual trust is playing an important role also in criminal law in
matters relating to arrest warrant,10 or migration law in matters relating to asylum
seekers.11 Hence, this expansion of mutual trust made it mainly relevant to matters
within the area of freedom security and justice, that is to areas in which the Member
States retain many competences, but which have substantial EU harmonization and a
cross-border spillover element.
In this process, mutual trust gained an ever greater importance, culminating in
N.S, when the Court ruled: ‘At issue here is the raison d’être of the European Union
and the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice and, in particular, the
Common European Asylum System, based on mutual confidence and a presumption
of compliance, by other Member States, with European Union law and, in particular,
8Still, it should be noted that the exequatur was not fully repealed in the EU, Timmer (2013).
9Pergantis (2020), p. 409.
10CJEU, Joined Cases C-187/01 and C-385/01 Gözütok and Brügge, ECLI:EU:C:2003:87, para.
33; CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:198.
11See for example, CJEU, Case C-411/10 N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. For a critique
that the Court is using a too broad brush for these different fields, see e.g. AG Bot, CJEU, Joined
Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:140, paras. 44–59;
Janssens (2014), pp. 315 et seq.; van Ballegooij (2015), pp. 136 et seq.; Lavenex (2007).
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fundamental rights.’12 This line of jurisprudence can be framed as ‘horizontal
Solange’.13 The doctrine of ‘horizontal Solange’ is composed of two tiers. The
first, substantive, tier forms the Solange component. Cooperation between Member
States will be maintained as long as all the Member States systematically adhere to
core European fundamental rights. If the evidence shows that a systemic violation of
core European fundamental rights took place in a Member State, other Member
States should suspend their cooperation. The second, institutional, tier forms the
‘horizontal’ component. The national courts are entrusted with the task of reviewing
whether the other Member States abide by the European standard of protection of
fundamental rights.
2.3 Mutual Trust: A Constitutional Principle
Eventually, in Opinion 2/13, the Court upgraded the principle of mutual trust into an
overarching constitutional principle of the EU.14 This judicial upgrade matched the
legal emergence of the values on which the EU is founded, and which are common to
the Member States, as expressed in Article 2 TEU, as well as the emergence of the
Charter of fundamental rights. Once the EU was transformed from a treaty-based
market union into a union which is based on values, the ground was laid for this new
constitutional principle to emerge.
In Opinion 2/13, the Court mentions among the ‘essential characteristics of EU
law’, ‘a structured network of principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal
relations linking the EU and its Member States, and its Member States with each
other, which are now engaged, as is recalled in the second paragraph of Article
1 TEU, in a ‘process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe’.’15 Alongside the classic, long established, characteristic set of principles
of the EU: supremacy, direct effect and autonomy, the Court now refers also to the
principle of mutual trust.16 The Court ties together the newly introduced common
values mentioned in Article 2 TEU, on which the EU is founded, and which all the
Member States share and recognize, with the principle of mutual trust. The Court
rules that there exists a ‘premiss [which] implies and justifies the existence of mutual
12CJEU, Case C-411/10 N.S. and Others, supra note 11, para. 83; See also, Canor (2013).
13Canor (2013).
14Some find the roots of mutual trust in Article 4(3) of the TEU regarding the principle of sincere
cooperation.
15CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 1, para. 167; CJEU, Opinion
1/17 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, on the one part, and the
European Union and its Member States, of the other part (CETA), ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, para. 109;
CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K., ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, para. 156.
16CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 1, para. 166.
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trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore,
that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected’.17
The principle of mutual trust implies that: ‘when implementing EU law, the
Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that fundamental rights
have been observed by the other Member States, so that not only may they not
demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental rights from another
Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in exceptional cases, they may
not check whether that other Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU’.18 The Court completes its reasoning
by emphasizing that: ‘it should be noted that the principle of mutual trust between
the Member States is of fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an
area without internal borders to be created and maintained.’19
By this ruling the Court is, as a matter of fact, depicting the principle of mutual
trust as an underlying principle on which the EU has been constructed.20 The
constitutional principle of mutual trust has been transformed into one of the core
markers of the EU. It has become one of the guiding principles for contouring and
defining the meaning of being a Member States in the EU, in contrast to third
countries. It is the principle which justifies that each Member State must give
other EU Member States’ norms and judicial decisions special treatment in their
own legal orders. Member States must introduce these norms and judicial decisions
into their own legal orders in cases stipulated by EU law. Yet, mutual trust will not
be the underlying principle when a Member State is called to interact with other third
states, like, for example, the contracting parties of the Council of Europe or other
non-European states. As the Court confirmed in CETA, ‘that principle of mutual trust
. . . is not applicable in relations between the Union and a non-Member State’.21
As the principle of mutual trust is based on the common values of the Member
States, however, the question soon arose, how this principle would be applied in case
a host State suspects that a home State is violating these values. This article will
focus on the specific question of possible violations of the rule of law by the home
State.
17Id., para. 168. On the circularity of this construction, see e.g. Rizcallah (2019), p. 303: ‘En effet, le
principe de confiance mutuelle repose sur, en même temps qu’il impose, une présomption de
respect, par l’ensemble des États membres, de ces valeurs. En d’autres mots, c’est parce que les
ordres juridiques nationaux sont présumés respecter les valeurs de l’article 2 du T.U.E. que les États
sont tenus de se faire confiance; mais c’est aussi parce que les États doivent se témoigner une
confiance mutuelle qu’ils sont tenus de présumer le respect de ces valeurs par les ordres juridiques
des autres États membres.’
18CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 1, para. 192.
19Id., para. 191.
20Id., para. 194. See also Lenaerts (2017), von Bogdandy (2018) and Meyer (2017).
21CJEU, Opinion 1/17 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, on the
one part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part (CETA), supra note
15, para. 129.
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3 The Rule of Law and the Jurisprudence of the CJEU
A rule of law crisis is occurring in several Member States of the EU. These Member
States, which have authoritarian tendencies, legislate norms and take active mea-
sures that undermine the rule of law in their countries. Some of the measures directly
aim at undermining the national judiciaries’ legitimacy, in particular by interfering
with their independence. Indeed, attacks on the judiciary nowadays take many
forms. Often, under the pretext of ‘reform’ of the judiciary, governments aim to
cut or distort judicial powers. Budgets are cut, and changes are introduced to the
structure of the courts and the judicial proceedings. Also, the nomination and
employment conditions and the retirement scheme of judges are interfered with.
Structural changes are also introduced, so that the number of judges serving on
supreme or constitutional courts is changed, and the case allocation within courts is
newly restructured. Likewise, subordinating all judges to disciplinary measures
affects the courts’ independence.22 All this hampers the courts’ ability to serve as
a ‘check’ over the government.23
Such steps are of direct concern to the CJEU, which observes the rule of law
principally via the lenses of the rule of law’s requirements for courts. Indeed, the
notion of the rule of law is broad.24 Until today, however, the CJEU has mainly
focused on issues related to the judiciary. As early as the famous case Les verts, the
Court ruled that: ‘It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European
Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither
its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the
Treaty’.25 Hence, the Court has emphasized the requirement for a review of any EU
norm which produces legal effect by a court. Closely related is the Court’s ruling that
‘the European Union is a union based on the rule of law in which individual parties
22With regard to Poland, see e.g. the findings of the European Commission, Proposal for a Council
Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the
rule of law, COM/2017/0835 final. On the new Polish ‘muzzling law’, see e.g. Venice Commission,
Poland—Urgent Joint Opinion on the amendments to the Law on organisation on the Common
Courts, the Law on the Supreme Court and other Laws, CDL-PI(2020)002-e (16 January 2020);
ODHIR, Urgent Interim Opinion on the Bill Amending the Act on the Organization of Common
Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and Certain Other Acts of Poland, JUD-POL/365/2019 [AlC]
(14 January 2020); Polish Commissioner for Human Rights Adam Bodnar, Comments,
VII.510.176.2019/MAW/PKR/PF/MW/CW (7 January 2020); Opinion of the Polish Judges’ Asso-
ciation ‘Iustitia’ on the Act of 20 December 2019 amending the Act- the Law on the System of
Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and Certain Other Acts (10 February 2020).
23See also the contribution of von Bogdandy, in this book.
24EGC, Case T-242/16 Stavytskyi v. Council, ECLI:EU:T:2018:166, para. 69.
25CJEU, Case C-294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, para. 23.
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have the right to challenge before the courts the legality of any decision or other
national measure relating to the application to them of an EU act’.26
Similar emphasis on the judicial aspects of the rule of law, while mainly concen-
trating on the independence of the Member States’ judiciary, has been put forward
by the Court more recently when it was called to assess the legality of measures
taken by governments with authoritarian tendencies. Of a whole arsenal of measures
taken by these governments which has the potential to undermine the rule of law, the
Court concentrates distinctively on the independence of national judiciaries. As
Lenaerts explains, the absence of independent national judiciaries will undermine
the possibility of ‘integration through the rule of law’.27
The Court’s judgments provide substantiated and rather standard minimum
requirements for an independent judiciary. The Court outlines two aspects of such
independence: one external and one internal. The external requirement focuses
mainly on the autonomy of the courts which should be protected against external
intervention or pressure.28 The freedom from such external factors requires certain
guarantees to be given to the judges, such as guarantees against removal from office,
and guarantees of receipt of a certain level of remuneration.29 There is also a need to
prevent any risk of political control of the content of judicial decisions. The internal
requirement is linked to the impartiality of the judges. That aspect requires objec-
tivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from
the strict application of the law.30 The Court further elaborates that those guarantees
of independence and impartiality require clear rules, in order to dispel any reason-
able doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court to
external factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it.31
Yet, the independence of the judiciary, although being mentioned by the CJEU as
a core aspect of the rule of law, is actually mainly examined by the CJEU via the
26See, to that effect, judgment of CJEU, Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others
v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2013:625, paras. 91 and 94. See also CJEU, Case C-64/16
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para. 31.
27Lenaerts (2020), p. 31. Lenaerts further enumerates the reasons for such undermining: being the
inability to refer questions to the CJEU; the inability to recourse to effective remedies for the
violation of the EU law; and the challenge for the mutual trust between national courts of other
Member States.
28See, to that effect, CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note
26, para. 44; CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of
Justice), ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, para. 63. On this jurisprudence, see Lenaerts (2019), pp. 155–174;
Giegerich (2019); Jaeger (2018); Rizcallah and Davio (2019); Zinonos (2019).
29CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 26, para. 45; CJEU,
Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice), supra note
28, para. 64.
30CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 52.
31CJEU, Case C-222/13 TDC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2265, para. 32; CJEU, Case C-216/18Minister for
Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice), supra note 28, para. 66.
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lenses of the interpretation of Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter.32 Specifically, and
despite the fact that the CJEU is called upon to frame its decision as primarily
concerning the deficit of the rule of law,33 the Court is probably still conceiving the
rule of law in an overly abstract way, and therefore prefers to stick to the legal
analysis of the fundamental right closely derived from it.34 Obviously, the Court
identifies the close connection between Article 2 TEU (including the rule of law) and
Article 19 TEU, on the one hand, and Article 47 of the Charter on fundamental
rights, on the other hand. The CJEU has noted that Article 19 TEU, which gives
concrete expression to the value of the rule of law as it appears in Article 2 TEU,
entrusts the responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law in all Member
States and judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law to national
courts and to the Court.35 It further connects Article 19(1) TEU with Article 47 of the
Charter for ensuring the principle of the effective judicial protection of individuals’
rights under EU law, which is also a general principle of EU law.36 However,
beyond these general observations, the Court often retreats to a detailed examination
of Article 47 of the Charter stating, for example, that ‘it does not appear necessary to
conduct a distinct analysis of Article 2 and the second subparagraph of Article 19
(1) TEU, which can only reinforce the conclusion already set out [in relation to
Article 47 of the Charter].’37 Possibly, injecting content into a concrete fundamental
right is regarded by the CJEU as falling more squarely within its judicial
competence.38
4 Mutual Trust and Its Exceptions
According to the principle of mutual trust, each Member State must presume that all
other Member States are in compliance with EU law, promoting its values and
respecting fundamental rights. As discussed above, the derivative of this
32CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 67.
33As was recommended by Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018).
34Arguably, this gradually changes. The newer judgments of the CJEU rely equally on Art. 19 TEU
and Art. 47 of the Charter. However, the relationship of both is not clear yet. See Spieker (2019b);
See also Opinion of AG Tanchev, CJEU Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:529, paras. 115-16 who proposes a distinction between individualized infringements and
‘structural infirmities’; Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 630; Torres Pérez (2020), p. 112 et seq.
35CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of the Supreme Court), ECLI:EU:
C:2019:531, para. 47.
36Id., para. 49. CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K., supra note
15, para. 168.
37Id., para. 169. But see CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Independence of the
Supreme Court), supra note 35, paras. 72–97 which was decided on the basis of Article 19 TEU.
38Spieker (2019a), p. 1186.
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presumption is that Member State can very closely cooperate with each other;
specifically, each host State should assist each home State in executing norms and
judicial decisions stemming from the latter. This presumption, however, can be
rebutted in exceptional circumstances. Such exceptional circumstances warrant the
departure from the mutual trust principle and would oblige the host State to refuse
cooperating with the home State. As a matter of fact, cooperating with the home
State, while these exceptional circumstances take place, would amount, in and of
itself, to a violation of EU law by the host State. Therefore, defining more clearly
these exceptional circumstances is crucial in order to understand the importance of
the principle of mutual trust.
4.1 Political Versus Judicial Determination
In elaborating the content of the exceptions, the Court has made a distinction
between situations where, one, the political institutions of the EU have taken a
position in relation to the level of protection of the principles set in Article 2 TEU in
a certain Member State, and, two, courts decide on the same matter. These two
situations entail different legal consequences ranging from the suspension of the
wholemechanism of mutual trust to the denial of individual requests for cooperation.
As far as the political institutions are concerned, the Court ruled that once a
serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in
Article 2 TEU (including the rule of law) is determined by the European Council
pursuant to Article 7(2) TEU, with the consequences set out in Article 7(3) TEU, at
least regarding arrest warrant matters, the mechanism of mutual trust may be
suspended in respect of that Member State without any need for further examina-
tion.39 The executing judicial authority of the host State would be required to
automatically refuse to execute any European arrest warrant issued by the home
State, without having to carry out any specific assessment of whether, for the
individual concerned, there is a real risk that the essence of his or her fundamental
right to a fair trial will be affected.40 Such a determination amounts to exceptional
circumstances which will freeze the otherwise almost automatic cooperation.41
Hence, a political determination by the Council pursuant to Article 7 TEU will
have serious judicial horizontal implications on the cooperation between domestic
courts. Such a political decision determines the suspension of the horizontal coop-
eration between the domestic courts. All the courts in potential host states will be
required to stop assisting executing and enforcing the decisions of the home State’s
39CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note 10, para.
81; CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 70.
40Id., para. 72.
41Id., paras. 71–72.
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courts. The home State court’s decisions might, therefore, remain largely ineffective
to the extent that the execution of these decisions is sought outside the borders of the
home State.
To the extent that these political determinations extend beyond the category of
arrest warrant matters, they amount to a possible additional sanction to be imposed
on the home State, not directly mentioned in, but nonetheless flowing from, Article
7 TEU. In this way, the suspension of the principle of mutual trust might assist in
putting a supplementary pressure on the home Member State to mend its violations
of the rule of law.42
In the absence of such a political determination, the courts of the host State may
judicially decide whether the home State is violating the values mentioned in Article
2 TEU, including the rule of law. In order to determine whether such a violation
mandates setting aside the principle of mutual trust, the host State’s court must
undertake a more detailed examination based on a two-prong test: first, it must
establish whether the non-independence of the home State’s judiciary amounts to a
systemic deficiency. Second, a specific and precise assessment is required, specifi-
cally, whether the individual concerned will be subject to the risk embodied in the
systemic deficiency.43
Establishing the existence of a systemic deficiency (the first prong of the test) ‘is
capable of permitting the executing judicial authority to refrain, by way of excep-
tion, from giving effect to the principle of mutual trust’.44 In order to refrain from
giving effect to the principle of mutual trust, it is requested additionally to determine
whether the individual would be concretely subjected to the deficiency (the second
prong of the test). A determination by the political institutions of the existence of
serious and persistent breach of the rule of law can possibly entail a general
suspension of the principle of mutual trust without further ado.45 By contrast, the
CJEU holds that for the courts to suspend mutual trust without such a political
determination, further elements are needed. Only if both the systemic and the
individual examinations by the host state’s court regarding the situation prevailing
in the home State reveal problems, cooperation with the home State’s courts must be
suspended. Otherwise, by continuing to give effect to the home State’s judgments in
the host state, the latter will implicitly be helping the home State’s courts to spread
their flawed judgments, which violate the fundamental rights of the affected person,
throughout the EU. That would amount to a violation of EU law by the host state, in
particular by assisting the home State to violate the fundamental rights of the affected
person.
42Critically with regard to the pressure this might exert, see e.g. Spieker (2019a), p. 1197.
43CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note 10, para.
92 (emphasis added); CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the
system of Justice), supra note 28, para. 68.
44CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 59 et seq.
45Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States (2002) OJ L190/1, recital 10 in the preamble.
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As exceptions often help to understand the meaning of a rule, this two-prong test
for the suspension of mutual trust will now be critically examined.
4.2 Judicial Determination of Systemic Deficiencies
4.2.1 Substantive Matters
First, the courts of the host State must assess whether in general there are deficiencies
in respect for fundamental rights’ in the home State. These deficiencies have to be
systemic.46
The question is what will amount to a systemic deficiency, as far as violations of
fundamental rights are concerned. The CJEU has ruled that a violation of absolute
fundamental rights amounts to a systemic violation.47 Since no limitation may be
imposed upon fundamental rights that are absolute, such as human dignity, the right
to life, the prohibition of torture, and the prohibition of inhuman and degrading
treatment,48 the principle of mutual trust may not be interpreted as requiring coop-
eration with home States which infringe these rights.
Yet, the Court goes beyond that. It rules that the breach of the essence of other
fundamental rights may also amount to a systemic deficiency. For example, the
Court has ruled that the principle of judicial independence is part of the ‘essence’ of
the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter. This means that the right
to an independent court may not be subject to any limitations, regardless of the
public objectives put forward by the national legislature.49
Lenaerts, while relying on the notion of the ‘essence’ of a right as stemming from
Scherms, explains that ‘a measure that compromises the essence of a fundamental
right may not be justified on any ground’.50 Any attempt to compromise the essence
of the right will call into question the fundamental right as such.51 Lenaerts mainly
refers to ne bis in idem enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter, the right to vote in
elections to the European Parliament enshrined in Article 39(2) of the Charter and
the principle of non-discrimination as fundamental rights stemming from the Charter
the essence of which cannot be compromised. Hence, one might deduce that a
violation of the essence of these fundamental rights may also amount to a systemic
deficiency in the home State.
46The infringements cannot be minor ones, but have to be systemic, see CJEU, Case C-411/10 N.S.
and Others, supra note 11, paras. 85–86.
47See, for example, id., para. 86; CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and
Căldăraru, supra note 10, paras. 84–88.
48Lenaerts (2020), p. 783.
49CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, paras. 47–48.
50Lenaerts (2020), p. 782.
51Id., p. 784.
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It is still unclear whether, according to the CJEU, the violation of the essence of a
fundamental right will automatically amount to systemic violations. Given the
ambitious postulation of the principle of mutual trust as a founding constitutional
principle of the EU, which can be set aside only in exceptional situations, it seems to
me that the CJEU should take a nuanced approach by further discerning among the
different fundamental rights. The Court should identify the essence of those funda-
mental rights, the violation of which, one, imposes challenges to an existing legal
order of a Member State, two, are not met with an adequate institutional reaction
and, three, produces a problem to another Member State—an interrelated legal
order—to cooperate with it.52 Only a general infringement of the essence of those
fundamental rights which cannot be processed as a matter of routine and which have
an inter-systemic dimension should amount to a systemic deficiency, which then
might justify setting aside the constitutional principle of mutual trust.
4.2.2 Institutional Aspects
By compelling a domestic judge of the host State to assess the possible existence of
systemic (or generalized) deficiencies in the legal order of the home State, the Court
expands the role of national judges beyond their traditional function of settling an
individual dispute coming before them. Admittedly, nowadays, an approach in
which a court performs only a single function seems implausibly narrow.53 Along-
side the role of deciding a single dispute, based on a single infringement of a certain
fundamental right, there may be an additional role attributed to a national court,
namely, its role in controlling another legal order, by examining its systemic
approach to the protection of human rights.54 In this way, a court of a host State
may review, and hence legitimize or delegitimize, the home State’s legal order as a
whole.
Within the EU legal order, judges are not alien anymore to the task of undertaking
systemic examinations. This was, for example, a clear expression of the Solange
model, offered by the German Constitutional Court in relation to the primacy of EU
law. The German Constitutional Court undertook a systemic examination of the
legal order of the European Communities regarding the protection of fundamental
rights and ruled that ‘as long as the European Communities and in particular the case
law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental
rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities . . . and in so far as they
generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights, the Federal Consti-
tutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of
secondary Community legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German civil
courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of
52von Bogdandy (2020), p. 715.
53von Bogdandy and Venzke (2014), p. 5.
54See, by analogy, id., p. 15.
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Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution’.55
Yet, in my opinion, it is nevertheless questionable whether it is recommendable
that the court of a host State should review the existence of systemic deficiencies of
another (home) state. Obviously, all the Member States are equal and have the same
footing. Therefore, it might be difficult for a home State’s judges to pass a judgment
on a systemic deficiency of another national legal order.
First, generally, the home State does not usually have the possibility to join the
proceedings before the host State and to submit its observations and to defend its
position regarding a potential systemic violation of fundamental rights.56 Indeed, it
seems that the Court tries to mitigate this institutional defect by relying on the need
to also carry out the examination of the second—individual—prong of the test. At
this second stage, the Court instructs that the home State may provide the host State
with objective evidence which may rule out the existence of that systemic risk for the
individual concerned.57
Yet, in my opinion, the home State should have the right to intervene and defend
itself before the court which is called upon to decide whether a systemic deficiency
occurred. The absence of right to be heard of the home State undermines the general
legal principle for fair trial.58
Second, the evidence, which the court of the host State may rely on when
deciding whether there is a systemic deficiency, amounts, as a matter of fact, to
‘out of court’materials. The CJEU expects the national courts to ‘assess, on the basis
of material that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated . . . whether there
is a real risk . . . of systemic or generalised deficiencies . . .’.59 Thus, the Court is
stating that ‘that information may be obtained from, inter alia, judgments of inter-
national courts, such as judgments of the ECtHR, judgments of courts of the issuing
Member State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies
55GCC, BVerfGE 73, 339; Other courts in other occasions also make similar systemic assessments.
See for example the examination carried by the ECHR regarding the role of the CJEU in the EU
legal order, ECtHR, Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 30 June 2005,
Application No. 45036/98, paras. 155–156. Although in the latter decision the ECtHR also
mentions a case by case examination, the first prong of the decision is institutional, id., para. 156.
Similarly, see the examination by the CJEU of the UN sanctions system in CJEU, Case C-402/05 P
Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461
and the comparable examination by the ECtHR in ECtHR, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management
Inc. v. Switzerland, Grand Chamber Judgment of 21 June 2016, Application No. 5809/08.
56See also Wendel (2019), p. 43; Spieker (2019a), p. 1197; and the contribution of von Bogdandy,
supra note 23, section 3.3.
57CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 77.
58Jarass (2016), para 12.
59CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28 paras. 60–61. This standard was also adopted by the ECtHR, Romeo Castaño
v. Belgium, Second Chamber Judgment of 9 July 2019, Application No. 8351/17, para. 86.
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of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the UN.’60 This list goes beyond
traditional evidence submitted to a court, namely, witnesses or testimonies being
subject to examination. This procedure guarantees that the evidence is produced in
an objective manner, free from political or other bias, without manipulation, and also
gives the state involved the possibility to present its position regarding the evidence.
To take just one example, the CJEU has stated that ‘a reasoned proposal recently
addressed by the Commission to the Council on the basis of Article 7(1) TEU is
particularly relevant for the purposes of that assessment’.61 With this statement, the
CJEU aspires to give ‘bite’ to the political decision taken on the basis of Article 7
(1) TEU, and indeed such a reasoned proposal is issued after hearing the relevant
Member State, but the permission to the national court to rely on a reasoned proposal
when determining whether a systemic deficiency occurred in the home State, can
nevertheless be criticized: first, given the fact that such a reasoned proposal is solely
subject to the CJEU’s review regarding the procedural stipulation of Article 7 TEU,
but not regarding the substantive determinations;62 and second, the reasoned opinion
is probably not subject to judicial review by the courts of the host State. As a
preparatory act without legal effects vis-à-vis third parties, it cannot be challenged
neither before the court of the host State nor before the Court of Justice.63
I suggest that, in response to these institutional flaws, systemic deficiencies in the
home State should only be determined by the CJEU. Whenever a court of the host
state suspects that there is a systemic deficiency in the home State, the host State
court should seek a preliminary ruling from the CJEU.64 Only the CJEU has the
means to objectively conclude that there is a systemic deficiency at a home State.
The CJEU, being a court of the EU as a whole, is able to take a broader perspective
and can undertake a more comprehensive examination of the possible existence of a
systemic deficiency. Hence, the CJEU can better assess whether the human rights
violation which occurred in the home State is a minor one or a systemic one.
Moreover, procedurally, the home State can join the proceedings before the CJEU
and can argue its position regarding the allegedly systemic deficiency.65 Finally, by
receiving a preliminary ruling on behalf of the Court which will then serve as a
precedent to all the courts of the potential hosting states,66 it will be possible to
60CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note
10, para. 89.
61CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 61.
62Article 269 TFEU.
63See also Krajewski (2018), p. 801 et seq.
64See similarly von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019), p. 396. This was also proposed by Wendel
(2019), p. 41 who proposes a division of labor according to the two prongs test. Clearly if the host
State reaches the conclusion that there is no systemic deficiency in the home State it does not need to
refer a question to the CJEU.
65See also Wendel (2019), p. 43; Spieker (2019a), p. 1197; von Bogdandy, supra note
23, section 3.5.
66CJEU, Case C-283/81 CILFIT, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, paras. 13–14.
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isolate the judiciary of the home State, and therefore put pressure on the home State’s
judges to find a manner to undo the systemic deficiencies.
Alternatively, a ruling about a systemic deficiency in a home State can be
rendered by the CJEU via infringement proceedings that may be initiated by the
Commission or another EU country.67 Admittedly, there are differing views whether
systemic problems can be addressed by the procedure of infringement proceedings,
which is more focused on individual and concrete infringements.68 Yet, when
deciding about a specific infringement of the rule of law, the Court can also take a
position regarding the possible systemic dimension of such a specific or individual
violation in its ruling.
Thus, the CJEU will be able to assist the court of the host State if the latter is
called upon to establish whether systemic deficiencies are present in the home State.
Moreover, the courts of the host State, while freezing their cooperation with
the home State will be able to potentially assist the CJEU in enforcing its ruling in
the infringement proceedings. Such assistance will take place given the fact that, if
the home State opted to avoid executing the Court’s infringement proceedings’
ruling, the host State would be obliged (if also the second prong of the test will
also be fulfilled) to sanction the home State by suspending the cooperation with the
home State. In this way, I maintain, the vertical ruling in an infringement proceeding
by the CJEU is supported by the horizontal ruling of the host State by suspending the
cooperation among the Member States.69
Yet, even if the determination of systemic deficiencies in a home State is left to be
made solely by the courts of the host States, this might entail advantages, too. Before
making such a determination, each legal order will be required to take a deep look
and complete a profound examination of the other Member State’s legal order. The
Court is alluding to ‘a dialogue between the executing judicial authority and the
issuing judicial authority’.70 Such a dialogue might bring familiarity with the other
legal orders and draw all the domestic courts closer together, which helps the aim of
‘an ever closer union’. Admittedly, it might be that, given the possible comity among
the Member States, domestic courts will be reluctant to pass critical judgments over
their counterparts. Indeed, a finding that there exists a systemic deficiency has the
potential of stigmatization of the home State. This possibly implies that it will take a
considerable amount of time until a uniform approach among the courts of potential
host States will be created. This might lead to the result that, sooner or later, the
CJEU will in any case be called upon to rule on the matter and settle possible
conflicting views among domestic courts.
67Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018) and Kochenov (2015).
68Scheppele (2016) and Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018).
69For a different view according to which the horizontal route of mutual trust is the less preferred
route in comparison to the vertical infringement proceedings/preliminary references route, see
Kochenov and Bárd (2019), p. 275.
70CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 77.
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Against the approach, and against the horizontal Solange doctrine altogether, it
has been argued that ‘a decentralized control by each Member State might put the
functioning of the internal market, if not the very existence of the Union, in
jeopardy’.71 This criticism points also to the inadmissibility of ‘self-help’ in the
context of EU law.72 Yet, it seems to me that EU law has always advanced through
its application by domestic courts. Domestic courts are the real enforcers of EU law.
If a court of the host State decides wrongly or controversially in the context of a
certain pending case that there are systemic deficiencies in a home State, and if the
same matter reappeared before another host State, it is likely that, sooner or later, the
matter will likely to be referred to the CJEU for a preliminarily ruling. The Court will
then be able to voice itself whether there exists a systemic deficiency in this specific
Member State. This ruling must then be followed by all national courts. Indeed, in
my opinion, the principle of mutual trust transformed the EU and indirectly intro-
duced into the European legal order the principle of self-help. Due to the systemic
deficiency in the home State, the host State might be prevented from being able to
perform its own obligations stemming from EU law (i.e., enforce the home State’s
civil judgments or execution of a European Arrest Warrant, etc.). Therefore, the
principle of mutual trust permits the court in the host State to take the law into its
own hands and to independently decide to withhold its cooperation with this failing
home State. Just like in other cases regarding the interpretation of EU law, a
domestic court is not obliged to make a request for a preliminary ruling to the
CJEU, except when it decides on the non-application of EU legislation.73
4.3 Individual Examination
In the second prong of the two-prong test, the host judicial authority must determine,
in the event that cooperation with the home State should take place, whether there are
substantial grounds to believe that the person subject to the proceedings will be
exposed to a real risk of his or her fundamental rights being violated due to the
71Closa et al. (2014), p. 19; Spieker (2019a), p. 1197: ‘A decentralized control by each Member
State, however, could lead to diverging or incompatible decisions throughout the EU judicial space
and jeopardize the uniform application of Union law. Further, bilateral control mechanisms are
generally alien to the EU legal order. Therefore, at least the standards for review must be set and
strictly defined in a centralized manner and in much greater detail by the CJEU.’
72On inadmissibility of ‘self-help’ in the context of EU law, see, CJEU, Joined cases 90 and 91/63
Commission v. Belgium and Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:1964:80, p. 631.
73See CJEU, 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, para. 15.
Therefore, should the ruling by the court in the host State regarding the situation in the home
State be convincing, it is likely that it will be followed by other courts of other host States. Should it
not be convincing, either it will remain as an isolated violation of EU law, or the matter will be
referred to the CJEU, for an authoritative ruling.
200 I. Canor
systemic deficiency.74 Only if the risk of such an infringement is established, both in
general and in the specific case, the cooperation with the home State must be
suspended.
Yet, as already shown by others, this second prong makes the setting aside of
mutual trust almost impossible, given that the burden to show how a systemic breach
of the rule of law effects his or her case individually might be very high.75 Hence it
was proposed that once the first step of the test is satisfied, the burden of proof of the
second prong should shift to the stronger party, namely the home State.76
But, even beyond that, it seems to me that the second prong of the test should be
put in correlation to the systemic deficit which has been established in the examina-
tion of the first prong. Specifically, the more the systemic deficit in the home State is
about a serious violation of the rule of law, the less need (or even no need) there
should be to insist on the additional fulfilment of the individual prong. The individ-
ual prong should only be relevant to systemic deficiencies for infringements of
fundamental rights, while having almost no bearing (or even being altogether
discarded) when the home State’s systemic deficiency relates to how the State is
organized.77
In order to exemplify this comment, I contrast the decisions of the court regarding
the size of prison cells, with the decisions regarding the independence of the
judiciary as part of the rule of law. In the decisions regarding the size of prison
cells in the home State to which the individual is supposed to be surrendered, the
Court acknowledges that, with respect to the individual prong of the test, there is no
way that the host State will be able to assess the conditions of detention in all the
prisons in which the individual concerned might be detained in the issuing Member
State. This is perceived by the Court as an excessive task which would render the
operation of the European arrest warrant system wholly ineffective.78 But that leads
the Court to the conclusion that the host State ‘will only need to assess the detention
conditions in the prisons of the home State, in which according to the information
available it is actually intended that the person concerned will be detained, and it is
for the home State to guarantee the compatibility of the conditions of detention in the
other prisons in which that person may possibly be held at a later state.’79
The Court has been giving similar guidelines to the host State’s courts regarding
the individual prong of the test when the systemic violation related to the breach of
the rule of law. The examination requested from the host State’s court was relatively
74CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru, supra note 10, para.
88; CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 59.
75Kochenov and Bárd (2019), p. 274.
76van Ballegooij and Bárd (2016).
77Even more broadly, see Bárd and Morijn (2020a, b).
78CJEU, Case C-220/18 PPU Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie),
ECLI:EU:C:2018:589, para. 84.
79Id., para. 87.
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limited. It was called upon to examine whether the absence of the independence of
the judiciary is ‘liable to have an impact at the level of that State’s courts with
jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the requested person will be subject’.80
And then, even more specifically, the Court ruled: ‘If that examination shows that
those deficiencies are liable to affect those courts, the executing judicial authority
must also assess, in the light of the specific concerns expressed by the individual
concerned and any information provided by him, whether there are substantial
grounds for believing that he will run a real risk of breach of his fundamental right
to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his fundamental right to a
fair trial, having regard to his personal situation, as well as to the nature of the
offence for which he is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis
of the European arrest warrant.’81 Hence, the Court demands that the court of the
host State must conduct a detailed examination, but, at the same time, it insists on a
very limited examination solely of the level of the state’s court with direct jurisdic-
tion over the proceedings.82 By analogy to the size of the prison cells, the Court
might expect that if the individual concerned appealed even to the supreme instances
of the home State’s courts, it would be for the home State to guarantee that the
individual would not face a court which will expose him or her to a real risk of the
breach of his or her fundamental right to an independent tribunal.
Yet, it seems to me that the Court should have reached the opposite conclusion.
When the deficit is systemic, and the host State cannot guarantee the comprehensive
protection of a fundamental right which is closely connected to the rule of law in the
state, a finding that the state is suffering from a systemic deficiency should suffice for
suspending cooperation out of mutual trust. There is no place for the individual
test.83 Accordingly, in LM, once it was established that there was a systemic
deficiency regarding the independence of the judiciary in the home State (Poland)
the host State (Ireland) should not have been required to examine whether the
individual to be sent back to Poland would have been brought in front of a judge
who would nevertheless be independent. This is because the home State will not be
able to categorically guarantee that the individual’s fundamental right to an inde-
pendent court will be protected throughout the court hierarchy, all the way up to the
constitutional court, which has evidently been packed by the government.
Accordingly, I suggest a distinction should be drawn between systemic deficiency
regarding the custodial conditions of prisoners and systemic deficiency regarding the
non-independence of the judiciary. For the first case, examinations should be
conducted on an individual basis, but, for the second case, such individual exami-
nations should not be required. Therefore, at least in those systemic violations of
fundamental rights which are closely connected to the organization of the State and
80CJEU, Case C-216/18 Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of Justice),
supra note 28, para. 74.
81Id., para. 75.
82Spieker (2018), p. 21 et seq.
83See also, Krajewski (2018), p. 805 et seq.; Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018); Wendel (2019).
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affect the rule of law (like the independence of the judiciary), and which cannot be
individually examined, the second prong of the test should not be relevant.
Establishing a systemic deficiency in the home State regarding the rule of law should
suffice in justifying the suspension of the mutual trust.
4.4 A Horizontal Solange Doctrine
This suggestion mirrors the Solange test. Under the Solange test, as long as the
European system of protection of fundamental rights, as administered by the CJEU,
functions to generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights, which is
to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection offered by the German
Constitution, then possible variations regarding the protection of fundamental rights
are allowed.84 In respect of mutual trust, the mirror test would stipulate that once a
systemic deficit is established in the home State, even if the latter is willing to
guarantee the individual’s fundamental rights protection by the court at hand,
cooperation with the judiciary of the home State should, nevertheless, stop. There
is no requirement to trust a Member State, which does not live up to the rule of law as
defined by the Court for Article 2 TEU. The collective suspension of cooperation
with the home State’s judiciary by the courts of all host States might put pressure on
the home State to re-establish the rule of law. A comprehensive shaming effect
which such a suspension will entail might also encourage home States’ judges to act
in this direction and to regain their independence.
Such wide-ranging suspension of cooperation with the national judges of the
home State might harm the judges who remain independent in the home State’s
judicial system and might do them injustice and weaken them to the extent that they
try to fight the authoritarian tendencies from within. Yet, in my opinion, the overall
discrediting attitude towards the home State, by suspending any possible coopera-
tion with its courts, will be an effective method to assist all those from inside of the
home State who fight for the reestablishment of the rule of law.
5 Conclusion
Mutual trust is the basis on which the Member States’ judiciaries are expected to deal
with each other in the European Union. By constitutionalizing the principle of
mutual trust, the CJEU has introduced an axiological addition to the basic structure
of the European Union. From a Union which concentrated on the vertical relation-
ships between each Member State and the central Union’s institutions, the Union has
turned out to be additionally preoccupied with the horizontal relationships among
84GCC, supra note 55, p. 339.
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the Member States, which are based on what might be called a doctrine of Horizontal
Solange.
According to the principle of mutual trust, each Member State must presume that
all other Member States are in compliance with EU law, in particular promote its
values and respect European fundamental rights. This presumption, however, can be
rebutted in exceptional circumstances. These exceptional circumstances are based on
a two-prong test: first, the violation of the values or the fundamental rights must
amount to a systemic deficiency; second, there is a need for an assessment whether
the individual concerned will be the victim of this systemic deficiency.
This contribution critically analyses these exceptional circumstances. Regarding
the first prong, it is argued that the existence of systemic deficiencies should ideally
be established by the CJEU via preliminary ruling references or via direct infringe-
ment proceedings. Alternatively, such systemic deficiencies may also be established
by domestic courts in a host Member State. Regarding the second prong, it is argued
that the individual test is redundant in cases where the systemic deficiency imposes
challenges to the existing legal order of the Member State in question. Finally, it is
argued that the suspension of mutual trust can serve as a decentralized instrument for
protecting the European rule of law by pressuring the violating state to restore the
rule of law.
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Abstract This chapter builds on an assessment of infringement proceedings in the
EU rule of law crisis that we previously published in the Common Market Law
Review. We offer a close reading of two recent prominent infringement cases by the
European Commission against Poland (cases C-619/18 and C-192/18). Noteworthy
advancements in EU law made with them are in particular a clarification on the
parallel use of Articles 7 TEU and 258 TFEU, the use of both interim relief and an
expedited procedure prior to the judgment, and, as regards the merits, further
substance for the functioning of Articles 19 TEU and 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights regarding the operationalisation of the rule of law in EU law.
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We offer a critical assessment of the Court’s findings and contextualise in light of
two Commission communications on the rule of law published in 2019.
1 Introduction
When the European Commission published, in March 2014, a communication to
introduce a new ‘Rule of Law Framework’ to complement Article 7 TEU,1 it created
quite a stir, from academic analyses2 to a legal opinion by the Council’s legal
service.3 But no observer, academic or other else, could have imagined the develop-
ments over the coming years that have intensified to such a degree that the Commis-
sion’s First Vice President (now Executive Vice President) Frans Timmermans told
the public in April 2019 it was time for the Union’s Member States to decide if they
wanted to ‘bite the bullet’ for it.4 In other words, time had come to act.
It has become common ground in legal practice and academia, as made again
evident through this edited volume,5 that the general development surrounding the
‘Rule of Law Framework’ condenses in a rule of law crisis exhibited in particular in
Hungary and Poland. Among numerous academic debates that followed, two have
drawn our particular attention: the debates about which concept could be used to
grasp the crisis and which procedure should be used to counteract its most dramatic
consequences.
In an article published in 2018 in the Common Market Law Review, we took the
position that infringement proceedings are an effective option for the Commission in
the ongoing rule of law crisis. Building on previous, and what we consider ground-
breaking, suggestions,6 we indicated how the Commission and the Court of Justice
could continue on a path already initiated, and pursue systemic deficiencies in the
rule of law with the infringement procedure under Article 258 TFEU, notwithstand-
ing the procedure under Article 7 TEU.7
1European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council: A new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final/2 of
19.03.2014.
2Cf. in particular, Giegerich (2015), pp. 499–542; Taborowski (2019), pp. 103–140; for the
perspective of practitioners see notably Crabit and Bel (2016), pp. 197–206.
3Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service—Commission’s Communication for
a New Mechanism to Strengthen the Rule of Law, of 27 May 2014, Document no. 10296/14.
4‘Timmermans invites EU members to ‘bite the bullet’ on rule of law’, Report by EurActiv of
3 April 2019, available at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/
timmermans-invites-eu-members-to-bite-the-bullet-on-rule-of-law/.
5See previously also, for a wider context, Editorial Comments: 2019 shaping up as a challenging
year for the Union, not least as a community of values (2019), pp. 3–22; as well as the contributions
in Schroeder (2016) and Jakab and Kochenov (2017).
6Notably Scheppele (2016), pp. 105–132.
7Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1061–1100.
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While the procedure under Article 7 TEU has remained rather static in the
Council despite its launch against Poland and Hungary,8 infringement proceedings
have undergone several remarkable developments.
This justifies a continued focus on infringement proceedings in this article,
whereas recent and noteworthy case law justifies the focus on Poland.
This case law has answered several questions raised in academia while the
ongoing developments they assess pose new ones. They are accompanied by a
large body of other ongoing proceedings in that Member State. Among them are
not only infringement proceedings but also a variety of preliminary references from
Polish courts, focussing on the independence of the ordinary judiciary and notably of
the Supreme Court, referred by the Supreme Court,9 by the Supreme Administrative
Court10 as well as several lower ordinary courts.11
As regards infringement proceedings, the European Commission has brought
three actions under Article 258 TFEU before the Court of Justice, two of which have
already been decided: one focussing on the lowering of the retirement age of judges
of the Supreme Court,12 and the other one focussing more generally on the ordinary
judiciary.13 A third one, with a specific focus on the new ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ at
the Polish Supreme Court, that is likely to impact the entire judiciary, is pending.14
Rather than recapitulating considerations on the doctrinal framework or preced-
ing jurisprudence, for which we refer explicitly to earlier publications,15 this contri-
bution offers a close-reading of and comments on Case C-619/18 regarding the
‘independence of the Supreme Court’ and Case C-192/18 on the retirement age
differentiation between men and women in the Polish judiciary (Sect. 2). We will
focus in particular on the substantive yardstick, for which the Commission, in its
action, pleaded to rely on Article 19(1) TEU read together with Article 47 of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights (hereafter: Charter). We will then contextualise these
developments in court in light of recent action by the Commission out of court with
8One notable exception is the action brought by Hungary against the decision by the European
Parliament to commence an Art. 7(1) procedure against Hungary, see CJEU, Case C-650/18,
Hungary v. European Parliament, pending.
9See e.g. CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. (Indépendance de la
chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême), Judgment of 19 November 2019, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:982 or CJEU, Case C-487/19, W.Ż, pending.
10CJEU, Case C-824/18, A.B. and others, pending.
11See e.g. CJEU, Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18, Miasto Łowicz and others.
12CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), Judgment of
24 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
13CJEU, Case C-192/18 Commission v Poland (Indépendance des juridictions de droit commun),
Judgment of 5 November 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:924.
14CJEU, Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland, Action of 25 October 2019, O.J. (EU) C 413/36 of
9 December 2019.
15See, specifically on the infringement procedure Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018); on the concept
of systemic deficiency von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014) and von Bogdandy (2019); on a
preliminary stock-taking regarding the crisis von Bogdandy et al. (2018).
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reference to its two communications on the rule of law of April and its first-ever
public stakeholder consultation on this matter, of July 2019 (Sect. 3). The purpose of
this text is therefore to provide a concise overview on either case and to sketch the
most recent state of affairs regarding the Rechtspolitik surrounding the infringement
procedure in the rule of law crisis.
2 The Rule of Law Crisis in Court: The Commission
Infringement Cases Against Poland
In this section, we focus on the two recent infringement proceedings pertaining to the
rule of law in Poland, i.e. cases C-619/18 and C-192/18. Both cases concern the
independence of the judiciary. One has to remember, however, that the crisis in
Poland, while affecting its judiciary in particular, is broader, and several actions by
constitutional authorities are highly doubtful already under the national constitu-
tional yardstick. This concerns the Polish Parliament, the President and the govern-
ment, and in substance namely the freedom of the media, the civil service, and the
respect for fundamental rights.16
2.1 The ‘Independence of the Supreme Court Case’: C-619/
18
Case C-619/18 was filed by the Commission on 2 October 201817 after a letter of
formal notice of 2 July 2018 with a 1-month deadline for reply by the Polish
authorities and a reasoned opinion of 14 August 2018, with the same deadline.
Both deadlines were short, demonstrating the determination of the Commission to
see the matter through.18 The subsequent judicial proceedings, which were provided
by the Court with the above title, offer—even to the reader familiar with the
16Wyrzykowski (2019), pp. 417–418. For a longer analysis, cf. Sadurski (2019). On our observa-
tions regarding the concept of ‘systemic deficiency’ as underpinning this development, see Schmidt
and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1080 et seq.
17O.J. C 427/30 of 26.11.2018.
18This determination appears not lessened by the fact that, in the proceedings concerning the
‘Disciplinary Chamber’ at the Polish Supreme Court, CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18
and C-625/18, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême), supra note
9, the Commission gave the Polish authorities the ‘usual’ 2 months, both at the stage of the letter of
formal notice and the reasoning opinion, cf. Commission press release, ‘Rule of Law: European
Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control’,
IP/19/1957 of 3 April 2019.
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background—an impressive procedural complexity. In total, three decisions, by the
Court’s Vice President of October 2018,19 then the Court’s President of November
201820 and then the Grand Chamber of December 2018,21 preceded opinion22 and
final judgment.23 They were followed by a rectification order24 concerning the
Polish version.
The case was brought by the Commission in light of amendments to the law on
the Supreme Court, enacted in 2017 and with effect of 3 April 2018, and one further
amendment of 10 May 2018, all concerning the mandatory retirement age of its
judges. It had stood, since 2002, at 70 for all judges, with the possibility of extension
by the First President of the Supreme Court upon request and provision of a medical
certificate by the judge in question. It was lowered on 20 December 2017, the day the
Commission commenced in relation to it and other matters the Article 7 TEU
procedure against Poland, to 65, applying to all sitting judges. The possibility of
asking for an extension for 3 years remained, but authorisation was transferred to the
full discretion of the President of the Republic, who had to consult the National
Council of the Judiciary (NCJ). Neither the President’s decision nor the NCJ’s
opinion had to be motivated.25 A second extension was possible. The amended
law also provided for two cut-off dates limiting the possibility of requests which
ranged, depending on the age of the judge, from 3 months to 12 months. A second
amendment of May 2018 clarified certain procedural provisions.26
The Commission had voiced concerns primarily because of the effect of the
lowering of the retirement age, which, it held, amounted to ‘a profound and
immediate change in that court’s composition’.27 On 3 July 2018, the day after the
Commission had sent its formal notice in the case to Poland,28 a day that was used by
19CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, Order of the Vice President of the Court of
19 October 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2018:852.
20CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, Order of the President of the Court of
15 November 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:910.
21CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, Order of the Court of 17 December 2018 [Text
rectified by order of 2 July 2019], ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021.
22CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev of 11 April
2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:325.
23CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, supra note 12.
24CJEU, Case C-619/18 REC, Rectification d’arrêt of 11 July 2019, not published in the digital
reports.
25Consequently, as dramatically put by Wojciech Sadurski: ‘The new law on the [Supreme Court]
created severe moral dilemmas for the older judges who faced a choice: either make a request to the
president for an ‘extension’ beyond a newly lowered retirement age or accept the inevitable and step
down.’ See Sadurski (2019), p. 107.
26CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, cf. paras. 6–14, supra note 12.
27Id., para. 63.
28See Commission Press Release of 2 July 2018, ‘Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement
procedure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court’, IP/18/434.
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the Court as a reference point,29 the law affected 27 judges out of 72 who were to be
retired under the new rules, including then the Supreme Court’s First President,
Małgorzata Gersdorf. She and 14 others, i.e. 15 in total, were forced to retire on
different formal grounds, having not or not properly submitted a request to stay
on. Of the 12 others, another 7 received negative opinions by the NCJ, which the
President did not overturn. Thus, 22 judges in total were forced to retire.
The Commission was further concerned because the extension procedure fore-
seen to possibly remedy the impact of the lowering of the retirement age was not
subject to sufficient safeguards, in its opinion. It noted that the Polish President had
full discretion to decline a request by a judge and that the NCJ, which provided the
basis for an assessment, had in itself undergone a fundamental change by a separate
law outside the scope of the proceedings, due to which its judges’ members were no
longer elected by their peers but instead by the lower house of the Polish parliament,
the Sejm. With respect to the integrity of the members of the NCJ after that
amendment, the Commission noted drily ‘that doubt may be cast on their indepen-
dence’,30 meaning it now considered the NCJ by-and-large defunct and politicised,
so as to rubber-stamp the will of the legislature.
The complaint of the Commission in the main proceedings is rather concise and
two-pronged, of which one line of argument can be subdivided into two further parts.
It rests solely on primary law. The Commission had submitted that, (a) by lowering
the retirement age of judges of the Polish Supreme Court from 70 to 65 for all sitting
judges and applying it to judges appointed to the Supreme Court before 3 April 2018
and (b) by granting the Polish President discretion to extend the active mandate of
Supreme Court judges upon request and to review the application for renewal,
Poland had violated its obligations under Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with
Article 47 of the Charter.
Poland, supported by Hungary, disputed these findings in their entirety. Poland
claimed in particular that ‘the organisation of the national justice system constitutes a
competence reserved exclusively to the Member States, so that the EU cannot
arrogate competences in that domain’ and that the provisions invoked by the
Commission were not applicable since the case was not governed by EU law.31
2.1.1 Combined Interim Relief and Expedited Procedure
2.1.1.1 Procedural Novelties
Rather than to provide a chronological summary of either of the three orders prior to
the opinion, it makes sense to point out, first, that two of them, the order by the
Court’s Vice President of October, Silva de Lapuerta,32 and the order by the Grand
29CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Court, para. 14 et seq. supra note 21.
30CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, para. 100, supra note 12.
31Id., paras. 38 et seq.
32CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Vice President, supra note 19.
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Chamber of December 201833 concern the Commission’s application for interim
measures, whereas the order published ‘in-between’, i.e. in November 2018 by the
Court’s President, Koen Lenaerts,34 concerns the separate Commission application
for an expedited procedure.
The Polish Supreme Court case is therefore a novelty in EU law in several
aspects, not only as regards its fundamental legal and political questions, but also
its procedural structure. First, because of the combination of interim measures and
expedited procedure, for which the Court’s President, in his order, cites no prece-
dent,35 although allowing both to be combined.36 Secondly, the procedure is note-
worthy because there are two orders, not only one, as regards the interim measures,
of which one serves as interim injunction until a decision on the interim measures
themselves is taken, an ‘injunction for an injunction’ so to say. Thirdly, because both
applications were successful for the Commission, which, given their rare use and a
diminished success rate,37 is remarkable as such.
With the applications for interim relief and the expedited procedure, the case
differs from the second one discussed below. The reason for the Commission’s
decision to file for both measures is found in the facts surrounding the legal
amendments on the Supreme Court. As the Court’s Vice President reiterated, the
Polish President had increased the total number of positions at the Supreme Court
from 93 to 120 in March 2018, and 44 new vacancies had been advertised over the
summer of 2018.38 The Commission obviously saw this as a particular danger of
being confronted with a fait accompli; and the Court agreed.
2.1.1.2 The Application for Interim Relief and the Court’s Two Subsequent
Orders
The Commission set in motion both interim measures and the expedited procedure
with separate applications, all filed on the same day as the application in the main
proceedings.
We will devote some space to the application for interim relief, because of its
novel use, and because we had called, in our article of 2018, for increased recourse to
33CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Court, supra note 21.
34CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the President, supra note 20.
35Id., paras 26–27.
36For further discussion on this point, cf. Castillo de la Torre (2007), pp. 273–353, pp. 808 et seq.;
Jaeger (2013), pp. 3–28, p. 26.
37Between 2014 and 2018, the last period for which data is available, 17 applications for interim
measures were filed, of which 8 in 2018 alone, and none in 2015. In total, 10 were granted, 7 were
not granted. In 2014 and 2016, 2 out of 3 and 3 out of 5, respectively, were not granted. In 2018,
6 out of 8 were successful. See Court of Justice, Annual Report 2018, Judicial Activity, Luxem-
bourg, February 2019, p. 139.
38CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Vice President, para. 22, supra note 19.
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the procedure.39 The Supreme Court case now offers a very good opportunity to
assess how Commission and Court are developing this procedural tool.
The Commission’s application for interim measures, made pursuant to Article
279 TFEU in conjunction with Article 160(3) of the Rules of Procedure, contained
four requests: (a) to order Poland to suspend the national legal amendments in
question and to refrain from taking any action to implement them, (b) to assure
that all sitting judges of the Supreme Court could continue to exercise their office
under the conditions as they stood on 3 April 2018, the day the amendments came
into effect, (c) to refrain from any appointment of judges under the new rules on
posts becoming vacant because of them, in particular as regards measures to replace
the President of the Supreme Court, and finally (d) to keep the Commission
appraised of all measures taken in compliance in regular intervals.40 Sanctions
under Article 279 TFEU, such as those that had recently created considerable interest
in academia, were not subject of the proceedings.41
The Vice President of the Court, based on Article 160 (7) of the Court’s Rules of
Procedure, decided that the matter was so urgent that it could not even wait until the
Grand Chamber had decided on the interim measures but that, more still, interim
orders had to be issued until that decision prior to a judgment, i.e. that the above-
mentioned ‘injunction for an injunction’ was necessary.
In relation to the later order of the Grand Chamber, it is evident that the first order
remains briefer and necessarily more superficial, which is why we focus on the
reasoning of the second order. Nonetheless, there is one point of importance, on the
use of the fumus boni iuris.
As is the case in many national legal systems, the Court decides on the request for
interim relief by means of an ancillary procedure, based on a summary examination,
i.e. briefer and less in-depth than in the final judgment. However, the CJEU has
varied national blueprints with its own test, which is somewhat distinct and based on
three considerations: first, whether ‘such an order is justified prima facie in fact and
in law’ ( fumus boni juris), secondly, whether the order is required ‘to avoid serious
and irreparable damage to the applicants’ interests’ (urgency) and thirdly, whether
the applicants’ interests outweigh the interests of the defendant (balance of inter-
est).42 The assessment of the fumus boni iuris appears equivalent to the ‘summary
assessment’ in certain Member States.
39Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1078–1080.
40CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Vice President, para. 1, supra note 19.
41See, on them and the corresponding case, Wennerås (2019), pp. 541–558.
42Castillo de la Torre (2007), p. 283. In the concrete case, the Court formulated, at para. 30 of
CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Court, supra note 21: ‘the fumus boni juris requirement is met
where at least one of the pleas in law relied on by the applicant for interim measures in support of the
main action appears, prima facie, not unfounded.’
214 M. Schmidt and P. Bogdanowicz
With her (the first) order of 19 October, Vice President Silva de Lapuerta adopted
this test, but in a considerably condensed form.43 Her reasoning on the fumus boni
iuris is particularly noteworthy. She concludes that:
without it being possible to rule, at the current state of the proceedings, on the question of the
merits of these arguments, let alone on the existence of a fumus boni juris as such, the
[relevant] question must be analysed in detail.44
This means that the Vice President granted the request without seriously exam-
ining the fumus boni iuris, rather refusing to do so in light of the complexity of the
case. This approach ought to be contextualised, since it continues a development
long observed in academia,45 by which the Court has almost inversed its initial, very
restrictive, approach, having originally required a ‘manifest soundness’ of an appli-
cation in interim proceedings to accede to it.46 Since the Vice President of the Court
turns that original test on its head, the application of the Commission is also, with no
surprise, granted.
In its second order of December 2018, on the requested interim measures, that
follows the result of the first, the Grand Chamber confirmed its willingness to inverse
assumptions on the fumus boni iuris.47
The Grand Chamber extends the initial reasoning of the Vice President in a
motivation comprising no less than 118 paragraphs of its order, otherwise sufficient
for a full-blown judgment.
In order to assess the fumus boni iuris, on which it consecrates a full 29 para-
graphs, the Court carefully avoids to deal with the main plea of the Commission, the
infringement of Article 19 TEU read together with Article 47 of the Charter. It
emphasises instead that this raises ‘difficult legal issues’,48 to be reserved for the
judgment. This is in line with the general rule in national jurisdictions that the
interim measure does not serve to decide already on the merits.
In order to assess the complex situation in Poland prima facie nonetheless, the
Court uses a three-step test that can be deemed a smart solution.
The Court, after an extensive recapitulation of the parties’ arguments, first recalls
the importance, relevant jurisprudence, and content of Article 19 TEU and Article
47 of the Charter for Member States, except that the case it knowingly cites in
particular, the LM case, hardly deals with ‘every Member State’, as the Court
43CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Vice President, paras. 15–26, supra note 19.
44Id., para. 16 (emphasis added, our translation).
45Castillo de la Torre (2007), p. 284 et seq.; equally Glawe (2012), pp. 676–683, pp. 681–682.
46Cf. CJEU, Joined Cases 43/59 and others, Eva von Lachmüller and others v. Commission, Order
of the President of the Court of 20 October 1959, para. 11, ECLI:EU:C:1959:24. On this case and
the evolution of the fumus boni iuris as part of interim measures, see in detail also Sladič (2008),
p. 174 et seq., 178.
47CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Court, para. 30, supra note 21.
48Id., para. 45.
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formulates, but no other than the defendant in the present one.49 It therefore manages
to remain abstract and at the same time leave no doubt as to the concrete addressee.
Concentrating on the importance also of ‘maintaining the independence of those
bodies’, i.e. courts and tribunals, the Court, in a second step, recalls that it is
‘common ground’ that the functioning of the Supreme Court is particularly essential
for the Polish judiciary, and that, already for this reason, it is part of the judiciary in
the sense of Article 19 (1) TEU.50 This finding very much predetermines a later
confirmation in the judgment, while avoiding to explicitly look at its merits. This
assessment does not amount to a reasoning based on general principles or an
extensive substantive assessment, but a reduced reiteration of key case law waiting
to be further extended and deepened.
The Court then, in a third step, assesses different arguments brought forward by
Poland that might rebut the Commission’s claim, including that the Commission was
barred from invoking objections already made. The Court concludes that none of
them convince it prima facie, nor that Poland can successfully claim the novelty of
the Commission’s arguments.51
The Court is to be credited for having dwelled on the consequences of this case
law ahead of its later judgment, while a strict summary assessment may not have
required it.
The Court of Justice then turns to the urgency of the application, which it
condenses into the formula whether there is serious damage to be expected from
the situation at hand and whether that damage is likely to be irreparable.52 The Court
affirms that this is the case since any endangering of the Supreme Court, as an apex
court, is ‘likely to have an irreversible effect on the EU legal order’.53
As a last step, it agrees that the weighing of interest is in favour of the Commis-
sion. In this context it is particularly noteworthy that the Court highlighted, as
phrased by Maciej Taborowski, a ‘deep interference in national law and with the
autonomy of the national law-maker’.54 The Court rebuts the argument submitted by
Poland that the effect of the interim measure suspending the application of the
provisions of national legislation would be the creation of a legal lacuna as regards
the definition of the retirement age for judges of the Supreme Court. The Court rather
underlines that ‘granting such interim measures entails an obligation for that Mem-
ber State immediately to suspend the application of the provisions of national
legislation at issue, including those whose effect is to repeal or replace the previous
provisions governing the retirement age for judges of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme
Court), so that those previous provisions become applicable again pending delivery
49Id., paras. 40–42.
50Id., paras. 41–43.
51Id., paras. 47 et seq.
52Id., para. 70.
53Id., para. 71.
54Taborowski (2019), p. 250.
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of the final judgment.’55 In other words, provisions that were already repealed have
to be brought back into force in such a case.
2.1.1.3 The Application to Expedite the Procedure
Distinct from the Commission’s application for interim measures, but equally
present in the case at hand, is the possibility for the Commission to request that
the main procedure be expedited. The Court decided on this second application of
the Commission with its second order of November 2018, based on Article 133 of
the Court’s Rules of Procedure.
The expedited procedure does not use the same test as the application for interim
measures, even though the criteria used by the Court to grant it also rest on an
‘intrinsic urgency’ test, which bears some resemblance. Decisive here is not the risk
for permanent damage, should no interim measure be taken, but the possibility to
reduce the risk emanating from the main procedure by speeding it up. Thus, there has
to be a particular and intrinsic urgency to the case in the main proceedings.56
In contrast to the two orders for interim measures, Court President Lenaerts, who
decided on this annex application in the main case, considered also the substantive
yardstick found in the Commission’s application, but he looked in particular at
Article 47 of the Charter and did not relate his findings to Article 19(1)(2) TEU.57
His decision to grant the request based on urgency rests on two main considerations.
He first considered the importance of a functioning apex court, such as the Supreme
Court, to guarantee individuals access to an independent court, a right under Article
47 of the Charter, which, he continues, ‘forms part of the essence’ of the fair trial
right under the same norm, and which equally serves to safeguard as a ‘guarantee’ of
‘cardinal importance’ to safeguard the Union’s values under Article 2 TEU, includ-
ing the rule of law.58 That line of argument, we note, is thoughtful and daring at the
same time. The Commission had framed its argument much broader and relied on a
more objective notion. It had argued that the ‘systemic concerns on which those
complaints are based’ ‘hinder the proper functioning of the EU legal order’.59 While
we fully agree with this observation and welcome the use of the concept of systemic
deficiency, it was seemingly too early at this stage of the procedure for the Court’s
President to entertain such a broad concept. Next, Lenaerts considers the amend-
ments in Poland as a possible infringement of a Member State’s obligations to
guarantee a proper functioning of the preliminary reference procedure, which he
elevates to ‘the keystone of the EU judicial system’,60 a term later recalled in the
55CJEU, Case C-619/18, Order of the Court, para. 95, supra note 21.
56Barbier de la Serre (2006), p. 804.
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judgment.61 The term is borrowed from the opinion in Achmea,62 but it is the first
time that the Court itself used it.
2.1.2 Opinion
The opinion of Advocate General Evgeni Tanchev followed on 11 April 2019.
The main procedural point for Tanchev, before coming to the substance, is the
relation of Article 258 TFEU to Article 7 TEU,63 which the literature had long
disagreed on. Tanchev now clarifies that the wording of the treaties, notably in its
Lisbon version, does not argue for an exclusion of the infringement action in the area
of Article 7 TEU, since today’s Article 258 TFEU aims at an infringement of a norm
in both treaties, compared to the former Article 226 TEC. Further, he observes a
teleological difference, whereas ‘Article 7 TEU is essentially a ‘political’ procedure’
while ‘Article 258 TFEU constitutes a direct ‘legal’ route before the Court for
ensuring the enforcement of EU law by the Member States’.64 Article 7 TEU does
therefore not act as lex specialis to the infringement action.65 Rather, and without
Article 269 TFEU being an objection, he fittingly concludes that ‘the autonomous,
indeed complementary, nature of these procedures’ mean ‘that they may apply in
parallel’.66 This clarification is a major advancement for the interaction of the two
procedures in primary law, it was much needed and it is to be expressly welcomed.
The clarification of this very important doctrinal and procedural connection
between two core norms of the EU’s constitutional supervision system results in
the possibility for Tanchev to deal with two substantive points. He first turns to the
substantive yardstick of the infringement, for which the Commission, setting the
frame under the principle ne ultra petita, had aimed at primary law, and had
proposed a combined reading of Article 19(1)(2) TEU with Article 47 of the Charter.
The opinion now gave a chance to turn to this yardstick more extensively. The
importance of both norms, and notably of Article 19(1)(2) TEU as an
‘operationalisation’ of the rule of law as an EU value enshrined in Article 2 TEU,
had arisen against the backdrop of a more complex development, notably through
repeated use by the Commission and important case law of the Court of Justice.67
61CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, para. 45, supra note 12.
62CJEU, Case C-284/16, Achmea, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of 19 September 2017,
ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, para. 84.




67See, in detail, Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1092 et seq. and the case-law cited, in
particular CJEU, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP), Judgment of
27 February 2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
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Tanchev dealt a severe blow to the Commission’s legal point of view of a
combined reading, siding explicitly with the defendant and finding that the Com-
mission could invoke neither Article 19(1) TEU in combination with Article 47 of
the Charter, nor the latter by itself, for lack of an implementation of EU law, as
required by Article 51 of the Charter.68 In particular, he held that any
contrary finding would be apt to undermine the current system of review of the compatibility
of national measures with the Charter and open the door for Treaty provisions such as Article
19(1) TEU to be used as a ‘subterfuge’ to circumvent the limits of the scope of application of
the Charter as set out in Article 51(1) thereof.69
Moreover, he notes, the Commission could not rely on the Court’s assessment
of Art. 47 in the Achmea case, because, he stated, ‘the Court mentioned Article 47 of
the Charter and related case-law only to confirm findings made on the basis of
Article 19(1) TEU.’70
In a similar manner, the Advocate General also ruled out that the Commission
could invoke the ASJP case71 as a precedent for its combined reading of both norms.
He found that the passages cited by the Commission from that case proved only that
the Court relied on Article 47 of the Charter to support the substantive scope of
Article 19(1) TEU.72 In the passages cited by the Advocate General,73 the Court
declares that a previous reading of Art. 19(1) TEU is ‘now reaffirmed by Article
47 of the Charter’ or that it is ‘confirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 47 of
the Charter’.
In our view, the precedent in ASJP should be read as the Court’s opening—
through Article 19(1)(2) TEU—of the possibility to apply Article 47 of the Charter
in a combined standard required by these two provisions. Where Article 19(1)
(2) TEU applies, the substantive yardstick of Article 47 of the Charter can apply
as well, without contravening Article 51 of the Charter. In his second opinion in the
case discussed below, Tanchev would later underscore that he regards a meaningful
separation of the jurisdictions of the Court of Justice, the ECtHR as well as national
constitutional courts, as demonstrated by a limited applicability of certain EU norms,
i.e. here a ‘delimited scope’ of Article 19 TEU, to be as important under the rule of
law ‘as the protection of fundamental rights’.74 We fully agree with the Advocate
General that a meaningful distinction of jurisdictions is important. To commit to a
68CJEU, Case C-619/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, para. 52 et seq., supra note 22.
69Id., para. 57 et seq.
70Id., para. 55 in fine.
71See supra note 67.
72CJEU, Case C-619/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, para. 55 at footnote 33, supra
note 22.
73CJEU, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP), paras. 35, 41,
42, supra note 67. We note that, in para. 42, the Court does not again refer explicitly to both
norms but continues its reasoning of the previous paragraph.
74CJEU, Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev of 20 June
2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:529, para. 114.
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combined standard of both norms, Article 19 (1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter,
does not mean a hidden attempt to level the obstacle of Article 51 of the Charter. The
goal then is not a clandestine extended application of the Charter but a comprehen-
sive objective standard. Further, neither the Court nor the Advocate General even-
tually disregarded Article 47 entirely, as we will show below. It may have made for a
smoother assessment to not bar Article 47 and then requiring to take it into account
after all.
We also note that, in at least two cases, the Court appears to support a joint
reading. In the Berlioz case, the Court had stated that ‘[t]he obligation imposed on
the Member States in the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, to provide
remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union
law, corresponds to that right [scil.: Article 47 of the Charter].’75 Advocate General
Wathelet, in his opinion in that case, had even required a mandatory reading in
conjunction, stating that ‘Article 47 of the Charter cannot be treated independently of
the second paragraph of Article 19 TEU’.76
Returning to the opinion in the Supreme Court case, Advocate General Tanchev,
having thus narrowed the substantive yardstick for assessment to the ‘second
subparagraph of Article 19 (1) TEU’, assesses two points on the merits: the require-
ment of judicial irremovability from office and the principle of judicial indepen-
dence, both in light of the new retirement age at the Polish Supreme Court.
For the concept of judicial independence, the Advocate General reiterates the
ASJP formula,77 despite his previous narrow reading of that case.
To ascertain the meaning of irremovability, Advocate General Tanchev cites the
opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Zarabo Colomer in the De Coster case. This is a
very useful addition, since the opinion appears to have been previously overlooked
in the debate at hand. Accordingly, irremovability ‘is the basis and the reflection of
judicial independence and means that judges cannot be dismissed, suspended,
moved or retired except on grounds, and subject to the safeguards, provided by
law’.78 Hence, the distinction for Tanchev is that irremovability from office protects
the judicial position as such once acceded to it, while judicial independence, in the
specific setting of EU primary law, protects the proper and unhindered exercise of
said position. That juxtaposition, we observe, finds support in the same passage of
the above De Coster opinion.
75CJEU, Case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, Judgment of 16 May 2017, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:373, para. 44.
76CJEU, Case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet of
10 January 2017, ECLI:EU:C:2017:2, para. 38.
77CJEU, Case C-619/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, para. 86 and case law cited, supra
note 22.
78Id., para. 55, citing Case C-17/00,De Coster, Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Zarabo Colomer
of 28 June 2001, para. 93.
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Tanchev further elaborates the principle of irremovability based on ECtHR case
law and various non-binding guidelines by the Council of Europe, including the
Venice Commission. He equally cites the CCJE and UN documents,79 a noteworthy
reception of soft law and international law sources, that he would continue in similar
fashion in the subsequent case. From them, Tanchev deduces that
judges should have a guaranteed tenure until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of
their term of office, and can be subject to suspension or removal from office in individual
cases only for reasons of incapacity or behaviour rendering them unfit for office. Early
retirement should be possible only at the request of the judge concerned or on medical
grounds, and any changes to the obligatory retirement age must not have retroactive effect.80
The Advocate General finds that, as the Commission has shown, these require-
ments are not met.81 Tanchev further finds the principle of irremovability of judges
infringed because the termination of office was premature. Relying on precedent
case law, he concludes that Poland cannot invoke economic motives to justify the
decision.82
As regards the second principle in question, judicial independence, Tanchev’s
position is equally clear:
The Polish legal provisions in question
expose the Supreme Court and its judges to external intervention and pressure from the
President of the Republic in the initial extension and renewal of their mandate which impairs
the objective independence of that court and influences the judges’ independent judgment
and decisions. This is so, especially given that the requirement to apply to the President of
the Republic for the extension of retirement age is accompanied by a reduction in the
retirement age.83
As regards the possibility for extension requests to the Polish President, Tanchev
finds that this offers no judicial review and does not rely on binding criteria.84
Relying on these findings, the Advocate General therefore suggests to the Court
to find that there has been a violation of Article 19(1) TEU.
2.1.3 Judgment
In its judgment of June 2019, the Court’s Grand Chamber sides, in the operative part,
fully with the Advocate General, even though its reasoning differs in parts.
The Court finds that Poland violated its obligations under Article 19(1)(2) TEU
by enacting a law that retroactively lowers the retirement age for judges at the
Supreme Court and, secondly, by granting the Polish President discretion to extend





84Id., paras. 90 et seq.
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the mandate of its judges beyond the newly fixed retirement age. The applicability of
the infringement procedure to the case is not discussed.
Very close to Tanchev’s reasoning, the Court rejects Poland’s argument that the
subsequent amendments of November 2018 to the original law can impact the
Court’s own competence or indeed the requirement to assess the law in question,
recalling clearly that the relevant point in time is the date of the reasoned opinion,
even if later retroactive amendments came into effect.85
It then deals, as the Advocate General did, with the yardstick for the substantive
assessment, Article 19(1) (2) and Article 47 of the Charter. From the outset however,
it departs very notably from the Advocate General’s point of view; at the same time,
it avoids a clear positioning.
The Court uses its power to reformulate the application in a manner that takes
away the main point of difference between the Commission’s application and the
Advocate General’s opinion. It finds: ‘At the hearing, the Commission stated that, by
its action, it is seeking, in essence, a declaration that the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter, has been
infringed.’86 This is clearly not what the Commission had submitted in writing, it
had demanded an assessment ‘under the combined provisions of Article 19(1)
(2) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter’.87
The Court however does not find that Article 47 of the Charter must not be
considered. Rather, and now implicitly returning to the reformulated application, it
holds: ‘that the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU requires Member States to
provide remedies that are sufficient to ensure effective legal protection, within the
meaning in particular of Article 47 of the Charter, in the fields covered by EU law’
and that it is assessing the scope of Art. 19(1) TEU ‘as confirmed by the second
paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter’.88
The Court therefore mediates between two positions. Like the Advocate General,
it narrows the yardstick, but remains more extensive than Tanchev. From this basis,
the Court proceeds to assess the merits.
Before going into the assessment of the application, the Court, in contrast to the
Advocate General, adds a section on ‘applicability and the scope of the second
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU’.89 Given that the scope of assessment had
already been established, the Court could have omitted that section without imme-
diate loss to its reasoning. That it decides otherwise is very telling because the Court
85CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland, paras. 27-33 of the judgment, in particular para.
31, and case law cited, supra note 12.
86Id., para. 32.
87Id., para. 25 of the judgment, emphasis added, supra note 12. The French version, lacking the ‘in
particular’ reads ‘lu à la lumière de l’article 47 de la Charte.’ The German version is yet more
explicit, using the verb ‘interpret’: ‘ausgelegt im Licht von Art. 47 der Charta’.
88Id., para. 57.
89Id., paras. 34 et seq.
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uses the following paragraphs for general findings on the normative framework of
the case.
Only after these initial normative findings does the Court go into an assessment of
Article 19(1) TEU, combining both key findings of its previous judgments in ASJP
and LM into one, central statement:
Article 19 TEU, [. . .] gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in
Article 2 TEU [and] entrusts the responsibility for ensuring the full application of EU law in
all Member States and judicial protection of the rights of individuals under that law to
national courts and tribunals and to the Court of Justice.90
It coincides with that finding that the Court had included Article 2 TEU as
applicable law at the beginning of the judgment.91 The Court emphasizes that
Article 19(1) TEU demands full compliance irrespective of various counterargu-
ments, such as the possible presence of an excessive deficit procedure and
‘irrespective of whether the Member States are implementing Union law within
the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter’.92 The compliance requirement also
does not amount to a transfer of competences from Member States to the Union.93
The Court then also answers how it intends to read Article 19(1)(2) TEU ‘in the light
of’ Article 47 of the Charter. Accordingly, this combined interpretation requires
Member States to provide ‘effective judicial protection’, and that in turn entails
ensuring judicial independence,94 a finding with which the Court can commence its
concrete assessment in the case at hand.
The Court distinguishes two pleas of the Commission and examines them
separately.
In its first plea in law, the Commission in essence alleged that the application of
the lowering of the retirement age to all sitting judges of the Polish Supreme Court,
with two cut-off dates depending on their age, and in addition an increase in the
number of judges, leading both to a large number of vacancies, amounted to an
impression that the measures were used to ‘covertly’ change the composition of
‘judicial bodies’,95 a term by which the Commission meant the Polish Supreme
Court.
Poland, in turn, defended itself by stating that early retirement of judges, with all
salaries and immunities kept, did not amount to dismissal, this being the solely
prohibited measure in question here under Art. 19(1) TEU and further, that it had
only re-established a previously existing, earlier, retirement age, under which several
of the sitting judges had served, who were therefore not affected by the current
90Id., para. 47.
91Id., para. 2.
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measures. Further, Poland also claimed that the measures aimed at ‘improving the
age balance among senior members’.96 This is an argument with which the Court
was familiar, since it was raised, in similar fashion, by Hungary regarding its
judiciary in 2012.97 Hungary, in its support, claimed that the Commission had not
proven an impact of the measures in question on the Supreme Court’s capacity.98
Dealing further with the arguments for the first plea, it is noteworthy that the
Court addresses them solely under the principle of independence, to which it attaches
the notion of impartiality,99 whereas the Advocate General had previously addressed
either concept separately. The Court also separates the notion of independence
(tacitly the operative core of Article 19(1)(2) TEU) into ‘two aspects’, one, ‘which
is external in nature’ and the other being ‘internal in nature’.100 The latter, internal
one, concerns the behaviour and set-up of a bench in relation to concrete proceed-
ings, i.e. ‘that an equal distance is maintained from the parties to the proceedings and
their respective interests’.101 It subsequently only assesses the external aspect, the
‘freedom of the judges from all external intervention or pressure’102 for which it
adds, for the concrete case:
the requirement of independence means that the rules governing the disciplinary regime and,
accordingly, any dismissal of those who have the task of adjudicating in a dispute must
provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of that disciplinary regime
being used as a system of political control of the content of judicial decisions.103
In light of this high bar, the Court sets as a test four elements to find whether the
Polish law is compatible with the external aspect of judicial independence, and,
consequently, EU law: first, ‘a legitimate objective’ that is, secondly, ‘proportionate
in the light of that objective’ and, thirdly, ‘must not raise reasonable doubt in the
minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of the court concerned to external
factors’ nor, the fourth point, its ‘neutrality with respect to the interests before it’.104
It is somewhat surprising that the Court never openly finds that this test has not
been met. Instead, it speaks of ‘doubts’, first as regards the retirement as such,
secondly, related to the newly introduced possibility to have a mandate extended,
thirdly, as regards the combined effect of the measures and lastly, the extent of that
combined effect on the Supreme Court.105 In other places, the Court is more explicit.
In particular when it comes to additional material provided by Poland, such as an
96Id., para. 80.
97Cf. CJEU, Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, Judgment of 6 November 2012, ECLI:EU:
C:2012:687, para. 25.
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explanatory memorandum for the Venice Commission, it noted that this could raise
serious doubts as to whether the reform of the retirement age of serving judges of
the Supreme Court was made in pursuance of legitimate objectives, and not ‘with the
aim of side-lining a certain group of judges of that court’.106 Weighed against the
arguments of the defendant the Court first does not accept that some of the judges
had originally served under terms meaning a retirement at 65. The Court equally
rejected further Polish arguments, such as that the retirement of judges had to be
regarded as a right rather than an obligation,107 as well as the assumption that, in
light of the economic situation, the amendments were to mainstream and standardise
the retirement age of its judges. The Court is finally almost amused, it seems, by the
fourth argument, that the amendments were intended to improve the age balance at
the court and to allow positive discrimination.108 Consequently, the Court approves
of the first plea in full.109
The second plea of the Commission addressed the discretion granted to the Polish
President to extend the term of retired judges for 3 years, and to repeat that extension
once upon request.
The Court, rather concise in its reasoning, finds that the President’s manner of
appointment clearly did not satisfy the requirements it had set and that the NCJ did
not meet standards to aptly justify its decisions, which therefore could not rule out
the ‘imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their
neutrality with respect to any interests before them.’110 Interestingly, the Court
requires that a body such as the NCJ be itself independent of the legislative and
executive authorities and of the authority to which it is required to deliver its
opinion.111 Hence, for the first time in history, the Court specifies the terms for the
functioning of a body that is not itself a court but established for the purpose of
safeguarding judicial independence. It would return to that problem later.112
To conclude its reasoning, the Court reiterates, as the Advocate General had done
before, that Member States could not, if not in their own right, point to another
Member State to justify their own infringement of EU law, an important argument
given Poland’s frequent references to legal systems in other Member States, includ-
ing, but not limited to, Germany and France.113 As a last point, it notes drily that its





110Id., paras. 116–118, para. 118 for the citation.
111Id., para. 116.
112See CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre
disciplinaire de la Cour suprême), paras. 136 et seq., notably 143–145, supra note 9.
113See e.g. Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of the Polish
Judiciary, 7 March 2018.
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and of the panel provided for under Article 255 TFEU, to counter the argument by
Poland as to its own composition.114
2.2 The ‘Case on the Independence of the Ordinary Courts’:
C-192/18
The second important infringement action, Case C-192/18, is the ‘Case on the
Independence of the Ordinary Courts’, for which Advocate General Tanchev issued
his opinion on 20 June 2019 and the Court handed down its judgment on 5 November
2019. The case offers several interesting findings and complements the case on the
independence of the Supreme Court.
The title of the case, again assigned by the Court, is somewhat too narrow as it
does not concern only the ordinary courts, but a retirement differentiation according
to the sex of the person that concerned, other than ordinary court judges, mutatis
mutandis equally public prosecutors and Supreme Court judges. This differentiation,
according to which men retire in general at the age of 65, whereas women were set to
retire at the age of 60, with a possible extension of employment at the discretion of
the minister of Justice, had been introduced on 12 July 2017. The Commission was
faced with not only having to address the amendment concerning the lowering of the
retirement age, but also that new differentiation. It brought a letter of formal notice
only 2 weeks later, on 28 July 2017, a record-worthy speediness given its internal
procedures and stakeholders involved. The date of that initial decision of the
Commission coincided with the last (fourth) ‘Rule of Law Recommendation’
addressed to Poland and the threat to trigger Article 7 TEU.115 A reasoned opinion
followed on 12 September 2017. Since the case was not subject to an expedited
procedure, the Court took considerably longer to decide on it, and concluded the case
only in 2019, long after the Commission had taken non-judicial steps also regarding
that matter with the launch of Article 7 (1) TEU on 20 December 2017.116
The Commission addressed the age differentiation in the Polish law by two pleas,
first under the combined primary and secondary law equal treatment provisions
(Article 157 TFEU and Articles 5(a) and 9(1)(f) of Directive 2006/54/EC). With
the second plea, the Commission again invoked the view that Poland, by the same
token, had violated the ‘combined provisions’ of Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of
the Charter. For the yardstick, the Commission had limited its action during the
114CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland, para. 121, supra note 12.
115Cf. Commission Press Release of 26 July 2017, ‘European Commission acts to preserve the rule
of law in Poland’, IP/17/2161.
116Cf. European Commission, Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on
European Union regarding the Rule of Law in Poland—Proposal for a Council Decision: On the
determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the Rule of Law, COM
(2017) 835 final of 20 December 2017, see in particular mn. 5, point (2), mn. 114 et seq.
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hearing to Article 19(1)(2) TEU, read in the light of Article 47 of the Charter. The
Court understood this to mean a focus only on Article 19 (1) TEU, and did not
consider Article 47 further,117 in contrast to the previous case, where exactly that
reasoning had been upheld.118 The Court is yet to explain this difference.
2.2.1 Opinion
Advocate General Tanchev, also assigned to this case, proposed that the Court
should declare that Poland has breached its obligations under Article 157 TFEU,
along with Article 5(a) and Article 9(1)(f) of Directive 2006/54/EC, as well as under
Article 19(1)(2) TEU. He only briefly considered and rejected the motion by Poland
to declare the case hypothetical due to subsequent amendments to the laws in
question, for this case of April 2018, in particular because of the fundamental need
for clarification by the Court.119
As before, and already as discussed above in part, Tanchev remained of the
opinion that Art. 47 of the Charter again was not to be considered. He referred for
that purpose to his considerations in the above-mentioned case120 including a polite
reservation possibly against previous mediation attempts by the Court: ‘I therefore
take the view that prudence should be exercised in making direct recourse to Article
47 of the Charter in illuminating the protection with respect to the rule of law
provided by Article 2 TEU.’121
But he evidently felt the need to return to this point in more detail. As a rule, the
Advocate General regards an extensive application of Article 47 of the Charter, even
from an objective viewpoint, as non-compliant with the principle of conferral.
‘Contrary to the European Court of Human Rights, the Court does not have a specific
mandate to penalise all fundamental rights violations committed by the Member
States.’122 But that limitation, he continues, does not mean that the Court cannot
consider ‘common legal sources’,123 in the assessment of Article 19 (1) TEU.
Fundamental rights, notwithstanding their non-applicability to the individual under
the Charter in the case at hand in light of its Article 51, are part of these sources, as
indicated in particular by Article 6 (3) TEU.124 They are inherent in the ‘content of
the guarantee of the rule of law’.125 Following this logic, as the Advocate General
continues, there is necessarily ‘a tension inherent in Article 6(1) TEU, in the sense
117CJEU, Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland, paras. 85–86, supra note 13.
118Id., paras. 54, 57.
119CJEU, Case C-192/18, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, paras. 64 to 65, supra note 74.
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that the Charter is, in effect, recognised as a source of fundamental rights guaranteed
by the EU legal order, while the same provision also states, [. . .] that the ‘provisions
of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of the Union as defined in
the Treaties.”126
Tanchev’s solution for that tension is a novel concept in the Court’s terminology:
a ‘constitutional passerelle’ (‘passerelle constitutionnelle’ in the French version,
somewhat weak ‘verfassungsrechtliche Verbindung’ in the German version,
‘konstytucyjny pomost’ in the Polish version). Reminiscent of the ‘passerelle clause’
but of an evidently different meaning, the Advocate General uses this concept to
point out a necessary connection between both norms, requiring an interpretation ‘in
harmony’.127
As regards the two complaints by the Commission, the Advocate General first
assesses and confirms that there has been an unequal treatment between men and
women, and in particular also that remunerations in question were to be regarded as
pay in the sense of Directive 2006/54/EC on equal opportunities and treatment.128
It is the second complaint, and the above considerations, that are of considerably
more interest here. The Advocate General examines the fulfilment of both principles,
irremovability and independence, according to several subprinciples that he takes
from varying sources, including by international organisations.129 The point of view
essential for ascertaining, for each point, whether there has been an interference, is in
particular that of general public that is subject to the judiciary, or ‘whether the public
might legitimately perceive the arrangements in issue to taint the impartiality of
proceedings.’130 The Court would later adopt this viewpoint.
The assessment also condenses into a statement on the material scope of Art.
19 (1) TEU:
The material scope of Article 19(1), second subparagraph, TEU is confined, in the context of
irremovability and independence of judges, to correcting problems with respect to structural
infirmity in a given Member State; which is here the case given that the laws challenged by
the Commission impact across entire tiers of the judiciary. These might best be termed
systemic or generalised deficiencies, which ‘compromise the essence’ of the irremovability
and independence of judges.131
This formula adds further substance (‘impact across entire tiers of the judiciary’)
to the concept of ‘systemic or generalised deficiencies’, which the Court had
previously already dwelled on in LM, but left in its details to Member State courts.132
Accordingly, there can be particularly severe, ‘structural infirmities’ in a Member
126Id., para. 98.
127Id., para. 97.
128Id., paras. 74 et seq.
129Id., para. 102 et seq.
130Id., para. 112.
131Id., para. 115.
132CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (LM), Judgment of 25 July 2018,
ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, notably paras. 67–68.
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State, which can take the form of ‘systemic or generalised deficiencies’ and there is a
concept of ‘essence’ of a principle in EU constitutional law, which can be infringed
by these phenomena.133 The Advocate General may still have to further illustrate
what difference, if any, he sees between the adjectives ‘systemic or generalised’ and
how the new notion of ‘structural infirmity’ comes into play.
2.2.2 Judgment
The Court sided with the Advocate General and declared that Poland had breached
its obligations under Article 157 TFEU, along with Article 5(a) and Article 9(1)(f) of
Directive 2006/54/EC, as well as under Article 19(1)(2) TEU.
As regards the substance of the first plea, the main point of dispute between the
Commission and Poland was the scope of application of the Directive or a different
legal basis, which would have supposedly granted more leeway to the defendant.134
The Court dismissed Poland’s arguments as fundamentally flawed.135
As regards the second plea, the Court spent some time on the ‘applicability and
the scope of the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU’.136
Having repeated its findings on the different aspects of the guarantee of judicial
independence, the Court engages in a concrete assessment and clarifies, first, that
the main point for objection is not per se the lowering of the retirement age nor in fact
the involvement of the Minister of Justice. For both, the Court indicates some leeway
for the Member States. Rather, it is the concrete amount of discretion granted to the
Minister of Justice and, in return to the Advocate General’s reasoning, the impact on
concerned individuals in ‘that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, [. . .] as to
the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors and as to their
neutrality with respect to the interests before them’ that lead the Court to find its
yardstick infringed.137 Among other things, the Court noted that the new system
might actually have been intended to enable the Minister for Justice, acting at his
discretion, to remove, once the newly set normal retirement age was reached, certain
groups of judges serving in the ordinary Polish courts while retaining others of those
judges at their post.138 This reference to the context of the ‘reform’ of the judiciary
spikes Poland’s guns by contradicting the claim that nothing special is happening in
Poland, at least nothing that would differ Poland from other EU Member States.
133On the usefulness of the concept of systemic deficiency see recently von Bogdandy and Spieker
(2019), p. 425.
134Namely Poland has argued that the pension schemes at issue are covered by Council Directive
79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle of equal
treatment for men and women in matters of social security (OJ 1979 L 6, p. 24). CJEU, Case
C-192/18 Commission v. Poland, para. 52, supra note 13.
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3 Context of the Judgments: The Commission
Communications of April and July 2019
The two cases, of which we have offered summaries and close readings above, have
not yet settled the rule of law crisis, here in its manifestation in Poland. But they have
catapulted the doctrinal understanding of the Court forward on essential points that
far exceed the crisis. This is something which many observers, us included, had been
advocating for. Both cases have furthered the understanding of the protection of
Member States under the infringement action, now fully established in parallel to
Article 7 TEU. And they have contributing to the understanding of the overlapping
and interaction of Article 19(1)(2) TEU, Article 47 of the Charter, and in particular
their relation to Article 2 TEU, now termed a ‘constitutional passerelle’.
Both cases, as we said in the beginning, do not stand in isolation. On
19 November 2019, barely two weeks after having decided in the infringement
proceedings related to Poland’s ordinary judiciary, the Court decided the case of a
preliminary reference by the Polish Supreme Court, again concerning the new
amendments and flanking the cases portrayed here.139 The Court, while leaving
the final assessment to the referring court, also determined a yardstick for the Polish
courts to ascertain whether the new ‘Disciplinary Chamber’ set up within the
Supreme Court, could be deemed independent.140 It will, in the near future, have
to return to this point within the scope set specifically also by the Commission.141
We leave this case, since it did not arise from Commission infringement actions,
to separate assessment and would rather like to use the remaining space to draw the
reader’s attention to further Commission measures flanking its own initiatives. They
are relevant here because they illustrate, from a perspective that does not solely focus
on the Court, that the Commission pursues an integral strategy in dealing with the
rule of law crisis, both before and outside the Court of Justice and that it has
overcome an ad-hoc use of the infringement procedure in favour of a strategic
approach.
Such material is found in particular in two communications of the Commission of
April and July 2019. With the first communication,142 the Commission provides
readers with an overarching, analytical, and college-approved document, in which a
‘rule of law crisis’ is explicitly acknowledged for the first time since the beginning of
that crisis. The communication also serves the Commission to take stock of its own
actions and suggests that its different steps—such as the reasoned opinion under Art.
139CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre
disciplinaire de la Cour suprême), supra note 9.
140Id., paras. 131–153, supra note 18.
141CJEU, Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland, Action of 25 October 2019, O.J. (EU) C 413/36 of
9.12.2019.
142Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and
the Council, Further strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union: State of play and possible
next steps, COM(2019) 163 final of 3.4.2019.
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7 TEU, its infringement actions, as well as various other measures—form part of a
coherent legal regime, a ‘rule of law toolbox’.143 In the literature, we observe, a more
doctrinal concept that is explored elsewhere, that of a nascent ‘constitutional super-
vision’ serves a similar purpose of combining these different measures into a logical
whole.144
The Commission also introduces the concept of ‘rule of law-related infringement
actions’,145 reminiscent of the earlier concept of ‘values-related infringement
actions’, for which the Commission submitted to the Council background informa-
tion in particular on Hungary in late 2018.146 To us, it is evident that the cases
analysed above constitute prime examples of this category of infringement
proceedings.
At the end of the communication of April 2019, the Commission issued, in a
remarkable move, a call for stakeholders and interested parties of various back-
grounds to provide it with contributions on ‘three pillars for future action – promo-
tion, prevention and response’. It received around 60 replies to this call, including
non-papers from several Member States’ governments and in part other public
bodies, from Poland and Hungary included, which have been made publicly avail-
able.147 While it is difficult to summarise them here, a recurrent topic, alongside the
Commission’s suggested structure, is the way forward by means of supplementing
additional measures. Some suggestions have dwelled in particular on infringement
proceedings. Sweden and France e.g. both suggested to boost the reactivity of the
Court within the procedure by further developing notably the expedited procedure
and interim measures.148 Other interesting suggestions abound. Germany reiterated,
alongside Belgium, its desire to install a proposed ‘periodic peer review’mechanism
143Id., p. 3 et seq.
144Briefly Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), p. 1071; for earlier mentioning, Zuleeg (2000),
pp. 2846–2851, p. 2850 (for the Art. 7 TEU procedure) and Giegerich (2015), p. 520. Cf. further:
Matthias Schmidt, Verfassungsaufsicht in der Europäischen Union, forthcoming.
145European Commission, State of play Communication, p. 3 et seq., supra note 142.
146Council of the European Union, ‘Commission non-paper providing factual information on the
values-related infringement proceedings in relation to Hungary’, Document No. 14022/18 of
8 November 2018, made publicly available via: https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/6115/
response/19716/attach/6/st14022.en18.pdf.
147Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/stakeholder-contributions_en.
148Swedish input to the European Commission Communication on Further strengthening of the
Rule of Law within the Union (COM(2019) 163 final), p. 2 (no page nos.); Communication de la
Commission du 3 avril 2019 sur l’État de droit. Non-papier de la France, p. 6.
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for the rule of law in the Council,149 and France suggested to ‘codify’ (i.e. possibly
transfer into primary law) the Rule of Law Framework of the Commission.150
The Commission reacted by a second communication of July 2019, in which it
introduces the idea of a ‘blueprint for action’151 and structures the different pro-
cedures of what it had previously identified as a toolbox into a multi-procedural and
multi-actor scheme, consisting of a preventive and a reactive arm, and announcing
both its own actions as well as seeking the support of other actors. The preventive
arm, and a novelty, to be set apart notably from procedures in the Council, is the idea
of a ‘rule of law review cycle’,152 that is in part reminiscent of the background
analysis already carried out during the Rule of Law Framework. The reactive arm is
in particular an explicitly more ‘strategic use’ of the infringement procedure.153 How
this might look is still to be developed but in previous communications, such as in
2016, the Commission has provided some material.154
As regards the substance of such more strategic action, the Commission appears
focussed notably on the Union’s budget and financial interests, which is why here it
may be engaged, as it was in the summer of 2017 when it first brought up the
yardstick of Article 19(1) TEU in conjunction with Article 47 of the Charter, in
another attempt to further operationalise Union values. In its Toolbox Communica-
tion, the Commission states that ‘[t]he Commission will further build on the recent
case law of the Court, for example in relation to the independence of national courts
and to the effective protection of financial interests of the Union’.155 This links to the
Commission’s regulation proposal in relation to generalised deficiencies in the rule
149Input of the Federal Government regarding the Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament, the European Council and the Council ‘Further strengthening the Rule of
Law within the Union – State of play and possible next steps’ of 3 April 2019, p. 3 (no page nos.),
‘Communication of the European Commission of the 3rd of April 2019 “Further strengthening the
Rule of Law within the Union – State of play and possible steps” – Belgian elements’, p. 2 (no page
nos.). See also ‘Discours du Ministre D. Reynders lors de la 5ème Conférence belgo-allemand [sic]
(Debeko), axée cette année sur les thèmes de la digitalisation, l’énergie et le transport’, of 18 March
2019, p. 5, available at: https://diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/downloads/discours_
debeko_20190318.pdf; ‘Opening speech by Minister of State for Europe Michael Roth at the
Peer-Review-Workshop on Rule of Law’, of 7 November 2018, available at: https://www.
auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2158210.
150Communication de la Commission du 3 avril 2019 sur l’État de droit. Non-papier de la
France, p. 6.
151European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions, Strengthening the rule of law within the Union: A blueprint for action of 17 July
2019, COM(2019) 343 final.
152Id., p. 9 et seq.
153Id., p. 14 and 16.
154Communication from the Commission, C/2016/8600, OJ C 18 of 19 January 2017, p. 14.
155European Commission, State of play Communication, p. 13, emphasis added, supra note 142.
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of law and the protection of the EU budget, as well as a new ‘Commission Anti-
Fraud Strategy’ (CAFS).156
In its ‘Blueprint Communication’, the Commission moreover included, as an
‘obiter dictum’, a sentence that may be the start of a distinct policy development or,
not unlike before as regards Article 19 (1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, another
operationalisation attempt of an underlying value:
There is also an evolving jurisprudence of the Court highlighting how systematic problems
related to the rule of law may have a specific impact in the area of Union finances.157
The Commission relies here on Article 325 TFEU,158 under which the Union has
developed its comprehensive policy for the protection of financial interests. This
provision is already creating scholarly interest. It has e.g. recently been suggested
that Article 310 (6), read together with Article 325 TFEU, could provide a legal basis
for further Commission action.159 If so, this also could be the start of further action
before the Court in appropriate cases.
The preventive arm of the new blueprint, the ‘rule of law review cycle’, including
an announced ‘Annual Rule of Law Report’, also surely deserves further elaboration.
The Commission ought to make concrete, in particular, how such a report feeds into
decisions before the Council or the Court, in order to have added value. In short, any
report must provide sharp and notably original analysis and clear recommendations,
to which the Commission should feel encouraged.160 For such purposes, a ‘Rule of
Law Report’, must also clearly set apart systemic deficiencies, creating spill-over
effects on European level, from discrepancies or reform processes of judicial sys-
tems in Member States of varying kind and severity but to be left to their own
156Id. It is to be noted, though, that the CAFS in its current form, Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Com-
mittee, the Committee of the Regions and the Court of Auditors: ‘Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy:
enhanced action to protect the EU budget’, COM(2019) 196 final of 29.04.2019, lacks such a link.
157European Commission, Blueprint Communication, p. 13, supra note 151.
158Id., p. 13, at footnote 46.
159Brauneck (2019), in particular pp. 57–59.
160Looking for guidance outside the European Union, we suggest that the United States Department
of State’s annual ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’, even though created with a
different angle, might offer an example. They are available under: https://www.state.gov/reports-
bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/ for
almost all countries worldwide and regular used by U.S. decision-makers.
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resolve. Germany,161 France162 and Spain163 provide recent examples of such
non-systemic controversies.164
4 Conclusions
This article has offered a close reading of two recent Court of Justice judgments
regarding the EU’s rule of law crisis in its manifestation in particular in Poland.
In the previous section, the purpose of looking at two recent Commission
communications rather than other recent case law was to contextualise the use of
the infringement procedure by the Commission, and to ‘feel its pulse’ where it may
take the procedure in the near future. The material here proves that Commission and
Court are now fully engaged in effectively using the infringement procedure for the
defence of the rule of law, being, as aptly put by Emmanuel Crabit and Anna Perego,
the ‘guarantee of guarantees’165 in EU constitutional law. This is also what we had
advocated for previously.
In particular the case concerning the independence of the Polish Supreme Court
can be considered a landmark decision. The case presented the Court with the
opportunity to decide, for the first time within the context of an infringement action
under Article 258 TFEU, on the compatibility of national measures concerning the
organisation of its judicial system with the standards set down in EU law to ensure
the respect for the rule of law in the Union’s legal order. For the very first time, the
Court has found a Member State to have failed in its obligations under Art. 19(1)
161See CJEU, Joined Cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, OG and PI (Public Prosecutor’s Office of
Lübeck), Judgment of 27 May 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:456, concerning in essence a
pre-constitutional and dormant interference power of the Ministers of Justice of the Federation
and the Länder with their respective prosecution services, for a comment see Graf von Luckner
(2019). For the reaction of the German federal legislature, see now in particular the draft act on the
amendment of the Act on International Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Bundesrat-
Drucksache 195/20 of 24 April 2020, p. 15. Mutatis mutandis for Lithuania see Case C-509/18,
PF (Procureur général de Lituanie), Judgment of 27 May 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:457.
162See Loi n 2019-222 du 23 mars 2019 de programmation 2018-2022 et de réforme pour la
justice, not yet in effect, and the French government’s information website: https://www.
gouvernement.fr/action/reforme-de-la-justice; for the fierce domestic debate on this reform see
e.g. Jean-Baptise Jacquin, ‘Menace de blocage à l’heure de la rentrée judiciaire’, Le Monde of
14 January 2019.
163GRECO evaluation regarding, among other things, the Spanish Council for the Judiciary, see the
press report ‘El Consejo de Europa avala las reformas emprendidas por España contra la corrupción
en la justicia y el ámbito parlamentario’, available at https://elderecho.com/consejo-europa-avala-
las-reformas-emprendidas-espana-la-corrupcion-la-justicia-ambito-parlamentario.
164This article could not take into account the extensive novelties and analyses provided by the
European Commission in its 2020 Rule of Law Reports for all Member States, now available under
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2020-rule-law-report-communication-and-countrychapters_
en.
165Crabit and Perego (2019), p. 7.
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(2) TEU. Contrary to submissions of the Polish and Hungarian government, the
Court has confirmed that it has the competence to address issues of the internal
organisation of a Member State’s judiciary. While the cases can only close a chapter
in the development of the crisis, that chapter can at least end with a more positive
outlook than before.
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Abstract This chapter centres on the question of how to address violations of EU
values in judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice. Instead of relying on
fundamental freedoms, EU secondary legislation or the Charter, this chapter
explores a more promising path—engaging with Article 2 TEU itself. Yet this
path rests on a crucial premise: the judicial applicability of the values enshrined in
Article 2 TEU. Such a judicial applicability is far from self-evident and needs to be
carefully construed. Based on recent jurisprudential developments, this chapter will
propose ways to operationalise Article 2 TEU without curtailing its unrestricted
scope of application. The judgments of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,
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Minister for Justice and Equality (L.M.) and Commission v. Poland will be at the
heart of this contribution.
1 Introduction
As evidenced by many contributions in this volume,1 the developments in several
EU Member States have consolidated to a larger illiberal turn posing a systemic
threat to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Especially the governing parties in
Poland and Hungary started rejecting the model of a liberal democracy and attacking
checks and balances of the political process. Much has been written on whether the
Union should act2 and if so, how to institutionally and procedurally address these
issues.3 Yet one thing seems almost certain: any path requiring unanimity in the
Council (Article 7 TEU) or a Treaty change4 seems to be a political pipe dream.
Since backsliding Member States will be watching each other’s backs, these paths
are barred.5
This political petrification reminds a well-known pattern of European integration:
In times, when the necessary actions were not pursued in the realm of politics, the
CJEU stepped in as an ‘engine of integration’ to safeguard the European integration
agenda.6 In the late 1960s, it was the Court that compensated the political stagnation
with its constitutionalizing jurisprudence.7 In the face of a growing legitimacy deficit
on the Community level, it was the Court that developed fundamental rights as
general principles.8 And when facing the political inertia in constructing the internal
market, it was the Court that stepped in with its doctrine of mutual recognition.9
1See e.g. the contributions of Beata Bakó and Marcin Wiącek in this volume.
2On the EU’s mandate and legitimacy to intervene, see von Bogdandy (2020), pp. 711–715;
Maduro and Menezes Queiroz (2020), pp. 370–371; Iliopoulou-Penot (2019); Hillion (2016),
pp. 60–64; Closa (2016), pp. 15–22. Critically with regard to the Union’s own democracy and
justice deficits, see among many others Weiler (2016a).
3For a comprehensive assessment, see the individual contributions to Jakab and Kochenov (2017),
Closa and Kochenov (2016a) and Schroeder (2016a). See further Möllers and Schneider (2018),
Skouris (2018), Waelbroeck and Oliver (2017), Pech et al. (2016) and Schorkopf (2016).
4For an amendment of Art. 7 TEU or 51(1) CFR, see e.g. Reding (2013).
5See e.g. Orbán (2017): ‘a campaign of inquisition against Poland will never succeed, because
Hungary will resort to all the legal mechanisms offered by the European Union in order to show its
solidarity with the Polish people.’
6Lenaerts (1992), pp. 2, 10 et seq. See already Pescatore (1974), p. 89; Lecourt (1976),
pp. 306 et seq. Critically, Rasmussen (1986), p. 61.
7CJEU, Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1; Case C-6/64 Costa/E.N.E.L., ECLI:
EU:C:1964:66; Mancini (1989), p. 612.
8CJEU, Case C-29/69 Stauder, ECLI:EU:C:1969:57, para. 7; Case C-11/70 Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para. 4; de Búrca (2011), pp. 475 et seq.
9CJEU, Case C-120/78 Rewe, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42; Pescatore (2008).
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When it comes to countering the illiberal turn in several Member States, a similar
inertia seems to beset the political plane and especially the Council as the key
decision maker under the Article 7 TEU procedure. Therefore, many argued to
concentrate on judicial mechanisms, to employ the infringement procedure under
Article 258 TFEU10 or to interact with brave national courts via the preliminary
reference procedure (Article 267 TFEU).11
Although it might place an immense burden on the Court’s legitimacy,12 there are
solid arguments for involving the Court of Justice. First, the appearance of legality is
crucial for governments in backsliding Member States.13 Since the CJEU enjoys
considerable trust from both national courts and the public,14 an authoritative
judgment declaring the attacks on domestic checks and balances illegal would
constitute a severe set-back. Further, any non-compliance with these judgments
would not only damage the façade of legality but lead to a new stage of escalation.15
Second, governments in backsliding Member States try to shift the debate on their
value-compliance into the sphere of moral and ideological convictions. Such con-
flicts can easily turn heated and trigger antagonism or polarisation.16 Judicial pro-
cedures may help shifting the discourse to legal principles and thus into more
rational channels. Third, a frequent objection of backsliding Member States is that
the European Commission is ideologically biased seeking to force its own concep-
tion of the Union’s common values on the Member States.17 Being a court, the CJEU
might seem more neutral than the ‘politicized’ Commission. As some observed in
the context of the Euro-crisis, procedures before the Court have the potential to
depoliticize conflicts and unfold an integrating potential.18 Finally, the political
Article 7 TEU procedure reveals severe shortcomings with regard to procedural
10See e.g. Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018), pp. 1073–1080; Scheppele (2016). Critically, see
Kochenov and Bárd (2019), pp. 264 et seq.
11See e.g. Blauberger and Kelemen (2017), pp. 325–326. See already von Bogdandy et al. (2012).
12Möllers and Schneider (2018), pp. 107, 147; Blauberger and Kelemen (2017), p. 331.
13See e.g. Jakab (2020), pp. 12 et seq. See further Scheppele (2018), Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2018)
and Landau (2013).
14In 2012, the CJEU was ‘the only European institution that is trusted by a majority’, see European
Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 78 (Autumn 2012), p. 73 (after 2012, the Eurobarometer
does not include data specifically on trust in the CJEU anymore). On the trust of national judges in
the CJEU, see Mayoral (2016).
15On the general Member State compliance with CJEU decisions and the very limited number of
Article 260(2) TFEU procedures, see e.g. European Commission, Monitoring the Application of
Union Law, 2018 Annual Report, Part I: General statistical overview, p. 22. Critically with regard to
the reliability of this data, see e.g. Falkner (2018).
16See von Bogdandy’s contribution in this volume.
17See e.g. Press Release, ‘They want to make Soros’s man the President of the Commission’ (2 July
2019), www.miniszterelnok.hu/they-want-to-make-soross-man-the-president-of-the-commission/.
See also Mendelski (2016).
18Krenn and Farahat (2018). Cautious, see Everling (2015). On the depoliticising potential of court
proceedings more generally, see Sunstein (1999), pp. 24 et seq.; Möllers (2013), pp. 92 et seq.,
96 et seq. as well as Easton (1965), pp. 262, 264; Luhmann (1989), pp. 121 et seq.
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guarantees.19 As emphasised by Armin von Bogdandy, however, the fairness of
European responses is of essence.20 Such fairness is assured in CJEU procedures by
granting the defendant Member State a full set of procedural rights and guarantees.
So far, jurisprudential solutions seem to have proven successful, as the Polish
example demonstrates. Many Polish courts submitted references concerning the
Polish reforms curtailing the judiciary.21 Further, the Commission successfully
launched several infringement procedures.22 Already after the Court ordered interim
measures,23 the Polish government reversed some parts of its reforms.24 This shows
that even governments in backsliding Member States remain responsive to CJEU
decisions.
This leads to the following question, which will be at the heart of this chapter:
What happens when a case, in which Union values are at stake, reaches the CJEU?
What substantive provisions can be invoked? The preliminary problem is that
important parts of the Polish or Hungarian reforms seem to escape the scope of
EU law. As such, provisions of the EU acquis, like fundamental freedoms or
19See e.g. Niedobitek (2018), p. 241.
20See von Bogdandy’s contribution in this volume.
21See e.g. A. K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême) (Joined Cases
C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18) andMiasto Łowicz (Joined Cases C-558/18 and C-563/18). See
also the references by the Polish Supreme Court in W.Ż. (Case C-487/19), Prokurator Generalny
(Case C-508/19) and Getin Noble Bank (Case C-132/20), by district courts in Prokuratura
Rejonowa w Słubicach (Case C-623/18) and Prokuratura Rejonowa w Mińsku Mazowieckim
(Joined Cases C-748/19 to C-754/19), by the Polish Supreme Administrative Court in A.B.
u.a. (Nomination des juges à la Cour suprême—Recours) (Case C-824/18) and by the Disciplinary
Court of the Bar Association (Warsaw) in Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości (Case C-55/20). See
further the preliminary references concerning judicial independence by a Hungarian Court in IS
(Case C-564/19) and by Romanian courts in Asociaţia “Forumul Judecătorilor Din România”
(Joined Cases C-83/19, C-127/19 and C-195/19), SO (Case C-291/19), Asociația “Forumul
Judecătorilor din România” (Case C-355/19), DNA- Serviciul Teritorial Oradea (Case C-379/
19), Statul Român—Ministerul Finanţelor Publice (Case C-397/19), Asociaţia “Forumul
Judecătorilor din România” (Case C-547/19), Ministerul Public (Case C-811/19). Finally, there
are references from a German Court in Land Hessen (Case C-272/19) and a Maltese court in
Repubblika (Case C-896/19).
22See CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), ECLI:EU:
C:2019:531; Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland (Indépendance des juridictions de droit
commun), ECLI:EU:C:2019:924. Another procedure has been initiated against the disciplinary
regime for judges, see Commission v. Poland, Case C-791/19. Further, infringement proceed-
ings were successfully initiated against the Hungarian foreign-NGO and higher-education laws,
see CJEU, Case C-66/18 Commission v. Hungary (Enseignement supérieur), ECLI:EU:
C:2020:792; Case C-78/18 Commission v. Hungary (Transparency of associations), ECLI:EU:
C:2020:476.
23CJEU, Order of 19 October 2018 (ECLI:EU:C:2018:852) and 17 December 2018 (ECLI:EU:
C:2018:1021) in Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), supra note 22.
24On 21 November 2018 the Polish Sejm passed an act reinstating the previous retirement age for
judges, see the Press Release (17 December 2018), see www.president.pl/en/news/art,926,
president-signs-bill-amending-law-on-supreme-court.html.
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secondary legislation, cannot capture these measures.25 And even if some develop-
ments might fall within the scope of these provisions, the infringement procedures
against Hungary illustrate that relying on them can lead to superficial, eventually
unsuccessful results.26 The scope of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) is
equally limited. On one hand, the Charter’s applicability to Member State actions is
limited to ‘situations . . . within the scope of European Union law’.27 This excludes
purely internal situations, areas of not actually exercised EU competences28 and
purely hypothetical links.29 On the other hand, threats to democracy and the rule of
law are not always depictable as fundamental rights violations. Though being
essentially interrelated,30 democracy and the rule of law go beyond the protection
of fundamental rights and include structural or institutional elements that affect the
organization of State.31 So what is the alternative?
Taking up the latest jurisprudential developments, this chapter explores a more
promising path: relying on Article 2 TEU itself. That provision states at a prominent
position: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights . . . These values
are common to the Member States . . .’. Article 2 TEU presents two features
qualifying it especially for countering the illiberal tendencies in EU Member States.
First, it has an unrestricted scope of application—it applies to any Member State act
irrespective of any link to (other) EU law.32 Second, it is not confined to ensuring
25For examples of how these developments can still be addressed under fundamental freedoms and
secondary legislation, see the grounds on which the Commission based its infringement procedures
against Hungary, supra note 22. For a further discussion of this path, see e.g. Dawson and
Muir (2013).
26CJEU, Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687. See further
Halmai (2017).
27CJEU, Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, paras. 18 et seq. For attempts
to systematise the post-Fransson case law, see e.g. Lazzerini (2018), pp. 183 et seq.; Safjan et al.
(2016); Spaventa (2016). Many argue that the Charter’s scope can only be triggered by a specific
provision of EU law actually applying in the case at hand, see e.g. Borowsky (2014), para. 30b;
Safjan (2014), pp. 4 et seq.; Sarmiento (2013), p. 1279; Ladenburger (2012), p. 163; Rosas
(2012), p. 1284.
28CJEU, Case C-370/12 Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, paras. 180–181; Case C-198/13
Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, para. 36.
29CJEU, Case C-299/95 Kremzow, ECLI:EU:C:1997:254, para. 16; Case C-40/11 Iida, ECLI:EU:
C:2012:691, para. 77.
30Habermas (2005). See further Carrera et al. (2013), p. 30.
31EU Fundamental Rights Agency (2014), p. 10.
32See in rare agreement European Commission, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of
Law, COM(2014) 158, p. 5 and Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service:
Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law: compat-
ibility with the Treaties, 10296/14, para. 17. See further European Commission, Communication on
Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union (15 October 2003), COM(2003) 606 final, p. 5; European
Convention, Praesidium: Presentation of an initial draft set of Articles of Part I of the Constitutional
Treaty, CONV 528/03, p. 11; Klamert and Kochenov (2019), p. 25; Hilf and Schorkopf (2020),
para. 18; Calliess (2016), para. 10.
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‘respect for human rights’, but also threats to democracy and the rule of law in their
structural, institutional dimension.
Yet this path rests on a central premise: the judicial applicability of the values
enshrined in Article 2 TEU. This applicability, however, is far from self-evident and
needs to be carefully construed. While much has been written on the Union’s
common values,33 their position in EU law and how they feature in the CJEU’s
jurisprudence,34 there still remains a plethora of uncertainties. As such, this chapter
will first address uncertainties related to the values’ legal nature, their direct effect
and the jurisdiction of the Court (Sect. 2). Based on the CJEU’s recent jurisprudence,
this contribution will then propose ways to operationalise Article 2 TEU without
curtailing its unrestricted scope of application (Sect. 3). The judgments of
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP),35 Minister for Justice and
Equality (L.M.),36 and Commission v. Poland37 will be at the heart of this analysis.
Placing an activated Article 2 TEU in the hands of Luxembourg will most certainly
raise doubts and criticism. Therefore, this chapter will close by anticipating likely
objections and advancing possible rejoinders (Sect. 4).
2 Uncertainties Surrounding the Judicial Application
of Article 2 TEU
Before engaging with the most recent case law, it seems worthwhile to analyse the
uncertainties and potential shortcomings that might prevent a judicial application of
Article 2 TEU. These uncertainties can be narrowed down to three key points: Its
nature (Sect. 2.1), direct effect (Sect. 2.2), and the jurisdiction of the CJEU (Sect.
2.3).
2.1 Nature: Do Article 2 TEU Values Have Any Legal Effect?
Scott Shapiro once wrote that ‘there is often no way to resolve specific disagree-
ments about the law without first resolving disagreements about the nature of law’.38
This holds especially true for an overarching provision like Article 2 TEU. By using
the term ‘value’, the Treaty drafters introduced a rather ambiguous notion into EU
33See among many others Schorkopf (2020), Levits (2018a), Voßkuhle (2017), Kochenov (2017a),
Weiler (2016b), von Bogdandy (2010), Calliess (2009) and Williams (2009).
34See e.g. Rossi (2020), Cannizzaro (2018), Baratta (2018), Lenaerts (2017a) and Nicolosi (2015).
35CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
36CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
37CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), supra note 22.
38Shapiro (2011), p. 28.
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primary law.39 Values are widely used in very different contexts: law, politics,
economics, philosophy, ethics, religion, sociology, psychology . . . Values are very
close to what Uwe Pörsken called ‘plastic words’40—empty formulas that mean
everything and nothing. As context-dependent shapeshifters, they can be used in
different fields with different meanings.
In law, values are generally juxtaposed with ‘principles’ and ‘rules’,41 and in the
Treaties especially with ‘competences’ and ‘objectives’.42 Yet values somehow
transcend these dichotomies without revealing their precise character. One might
justifiably ask why the drafters burdened the Treaties with such a can of worms.
Unfortunately, analysing the European Convention’s travaux is of no further use.
Although several members saw the uncertainties tied to values and suggested
replacing them with principles,43 the term remained in the draft without being
grounded in a solid theory of what they were supposed to be.44
As such, it is not self-evident that Article 2 TEU values unfold legal effects. Some
even doubt their status as law.45 Such doubts, however, are hardly convincing. The
values of Article 2 TEU are laid down in the operative part of a legal text. They are
applied in legally determined procedures by public institutions (Article 7 and 49
(1) TEU) and their disregard leads to sanctions, which are of legal nature.46 In fact,
39See already draft Art. I-2 of the Constitution of Europe. Before the Constitution, the term
‘principles’ was used, see Art. 6(1) TEU-Nice, Art. F(1) TEU-Maastricht. See however the
reference to ‘values’ in the context of the Austria crisis, Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and
Marcelino Oreja, Report of 8 September 2000, paras. 115, 117 and of EU enlargement, see
e.g. Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, Dec. 14, 1973), 1973 Bull. EC 12/118.
40See Pörsken (2004), pp. 22, 26 placing ‘values’ in one line with notions like ‘identity’ or
‘substance’.
41On how to distinguish these categories, see e.g. Habermas (1996), pp. 255 et seq.; Alexy (2009),
pp. 86 et seq.; Dworkin (2013), pp. 38 et seq. Critically with regard to these distinctions, see Jakab
(2016), p. 368.
42See Larik (2014).
43European Convention, Praesidium: Reactions to draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional
Treaty, CONV 574/1/03, REV 1, pp. 17 et seq. See e.g. the suggestions for amendment by Ernâni
Lopes and Manuel Lobo Antunes: ‘Human dignity, liberty . . . are principles and not mere values.
Only principles may be legally binding and its violation invoked before a Court’; suggestion for
amendment by Meglena Kuneva: ‘Il serait préférable de garder la notion de ‘principes’, bien connue
du droit communautaire et qui est employée par l’article 6 du TUE.’ See also Plenary Session:
Debate on Draft Articles 1 to 16 (27–28 February 2003). The minutes are accessible here: www.
europarl.europa.eu/Europe2004/textes/verbatim_030227.htm. See e.g. 4-018 – Einem (Parl.-AT):
‘Herr Präsident! . . . wir treten dafür ein, lieber von Grundsätzen – principles – statt von Werten –
valeurs – zu sprechen’ or 4-083 – Kutskova (Gouv.-BG): ‘Concerning Article 2, we consider it
preferable to keep the notion of principles typical of the acquis’.
44Hilf and Schorkopf (2020), para. 21; von Bogdandy (2010), p. 21.
45Such uncertainties are provoked first and foremost by the Commission itself, European Commis-
sion, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2017) 835 final, para. 1: ‘The Commission, beyond
[!] its task to ensure the respect of EU law, is also responsible . . . for guaranteeing the common
values of the Union’ (emphasis added). See further Möllers and Schneider (2018), p. 125.
46Dumbrovsky (2018).
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the legal framing of the Union’s values seems almost inevitable. The rule of law
warrants that normative requirements enforced by public institutions are laid down
in the form of law. Otherwise, the mechanisms of Article 7 or Article 49 TEU would
provide political morality with public authority without making it subject to any
constitutional limitations.47 For this reason, Article 2 TEU values are necessarily
part of EU law.
Yet, the views on their exact nature differ considerably. First, Article 2 values can
be understood as ‘rules’, as they form legal parameters relevant for both the
sanctioning mechanism under Article 7 and the admission procedure under Article
49 TEU. Second, one could argue that values are in fact ‘principles’.48 Indeed, the
Treaty drafters used both notions in a rather undifferentiated way.49 Further, the
‘values’ enshrined in the first sentence of Article 2 TEU were termed ‘principles’ in
Article 6(1) TEU-Nice/Amsterdam, which is generally understood as a predeces-
sor of Article 2 TEU. Finally, one could perceive Article 2 TEU as a new form of
legal category, which still has to be determined. Whatever the response to this
question might be, one thing seems rather clear: Article 2 TEU does not only contain
a set of rough ideals or solemn aspirations—it unfolds legal effects.
2.2 Direct Effect: Are Article 2 TEU Values Directly
Applicable?
Nevertheless, the acknowledgment of legal effects does not necessarily entail Article
2 TEU’s direct applicability (or even justiciability).50 Indeed, the values—for
example, the rule of law—are extremely vague and open.51 Hence, it is not entirely
clear whether Article 2 TEU fulfils the essential criteria for direct effect: A Treaty
provision must be precise, clear, and unconditional.52 While these rigid criteria have
often been criticized,53 recent jurisprudential developments indicate a more nuanced
understanding of direct effect. Concerning the direct effect of Charter rights, the
47von Bogdandy (2020), p. 716.
48See e.g. von Bogdandy (2010), p. 22; Mangiameli (2012); Streinz (2018); Pérez de Nanclares
(2019), p. 136.
49This becomes especially apparent in the preamble to the TEU. On one hand, the Treaty drafters
draw ‘inspiration from the . . . universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human
person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law’ on the other hand, they confirm ‘their
attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights . . . and of the rule of
law’.
50Kochenov and Pech (2015), p. 520.
51On the need for a ‘non-controversial’ and thus deliberately open set of values, see European
Convention, supra note 32, p. 11.
52See e.g. CJEU, Case C-176/12 Association de médiation sociale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, para. 36.
Further Craig and de Búrca (2020), p. 223.
53See e.g. Wohlfahrt (2016) and Pescatore (1983).
244 L. D. Spieker
Court started to distinguish between two categories:54 first, ‘mandatory effect’,
meaning that a provision is sufficient in itself to entail a right or obligation;55 and
second, the ‘unconditional nature’, meaning that a right does not need ‘to be given
concrete expression by the provisions of EU or national law’.56
According to this recent understanding, the application of Article 2 TEU faces
three options. First, Article 2 TEU could be perceived as mandatory and uncondi-
tional and thus apply as a self-standing provision.57 Second, Article 2 TEU could
lack a mandatory effect but still be unconditional. In this case, Article 2 TEU could
be considered by the CJEU or national courts through some sort of (non-binding?)
value-oriented interpretation of EU and national law. A third option would be that
Article 2 TEU is mandatory but not unconditional. It would need to be applied with a
more specific provision giving concrete expression to the values enshrined in Article
2 TEU.58 Such a combined approach could be construed in two ways: On one hand,
Article 2 TEU could be applied directly but informed by a more specific provision.
On the other hand, one could apply a specific provision of EU law giving expression
to a value enshrined in Article 2 TEU and thus operationalizing the latter.
2.3 Jurisdiction: Does the Court Have Competence to Review
the Member States’ Value Compliance?
Even if we assume that Article 2 TEU has direct effect and creates directly applicable
(and thus in principle justiciable) obligations for the Member States, it is not said that
the CJEU has jurisdiction to assess and enforce Article 2 TEU compliance in the
Member States. Generally, the Court’s competence encompasses the interpretation
and assessment of the ‘law’ (Article 19(1)(1) TEU). This includes Union law in all
its shapes, forms, and manifestations.59 In this light, it seems very likely that the
54See e.g. CJEU, Case C-684/16 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, para. 74; Case
C-569/16 Bauer, ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, para. 85: ‘Article 31(2) of the Charter, is thus, as regards its
very existence, both mandatory and unconditional in nature’ (emphasis added).
55CJEU, Case C-414/16 Egenberger, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, paras. 76–77; Case C-193/17 Cresco
Investigation, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43, para. 77.
56CJEU, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, supra note 54, paras. 74, 78; Bauer, supra note 54, paras.
85, 89.
57For an approach relying directly on Art. 2 TEU yet specified i.a. via the Copenhagen Criteria, see
Hillion (2016), pp. 66 et seq. This is further what the proposal of an ‘systemic infringement action’
boils down to, see Scheppele et al. (2020); Scheppele (2016); Skouris (2018), p. 50.
58For first sketches, see Cannizzaro (2018); Closa and Kochenov (2016b), pp. 182–184; Pech et al.
(2016), p. 198.
59The CJEU has assessed recommendations (CJEU, Case C-322/88 Grimaldi, ECLI:EU:
C:1989:646, paras. 7-8; Case C-16/16 P Belgium v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2018:79, para. 44),
communications (CJEU, Case C-57/95 France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1997:164, para. 23),
guidelines (CJEU, C-233/02 France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:173, para. 40), memoranda
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Court has a competence to interpret and assess Article 2 TEU as well. Yet it is highly
debated whether the Article 7 TEU procedure and the Court’s limited competence to
review the latter (Article 269 TFEU) bar an assessment and enforcement of Article
2 TEU values via the Article 258 or 267 TFEU procedures60—especially beyond the
scope of application of (other) EU law.61
Nevertheless, there are good arguments in favour of the Court’s jurisdiction.
While the former Treaties have kept the EU’s foundational principles out of the
Court’s reach,62 the Lisbon Treaty does not contain any comparable limitation with
regard to Article 2 TEU. First, Article 269 TFEU is an exception to the CJEU’s
general competence under Article 19(1)(1) TEU, which must be interpreted nar-
rowly. Second, the political Article 7 TEU and the judicial Article 258/267 TFEU
procedures have very different objects and consequences. Article 7 TEU concen-
trates on a political situation and entails, as a last resort, the suspension of Member
States’ rights. In contrast, the Court adjudicates an individual case and its sanction-
ing powers are limited to Article 260 TFEU (penalty payments).63 For this reason,
there seems to be no identity between the judicial and the political procedures that
would afford exclusivity to the latter.
3 Turning Article 2 TEU into a Judicially Applicable
Provision
In an emerging line of jurisprudence, the CJEU could be seen as resolving these
uncertainties by developing Article 2 TEU into a judicially applicable provision
justiciable before the Court. The pierre fondatrice of this emerging jurisprudence is
the judgment in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP). In this seminal
case, the Court established the Member States’ obligation to guarantee the judicial
independence of virtually the whole national judiciary irrespective of any specific
(CJEU, Case C-258/14 Florescu, ECLI:EU:C:2017:448, para. 30) and even mere announcements
(CJEU, Case C-62/14 Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 27).
60Arguing in favour of the Court’s jurisdiction, see e.g. the Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C-619/
18, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), para. 50; Rossi (2020),
pp. 655–666; Giegerich (2019), p. 80; Skouris (2018), pp. 50 et seq.; Schmidt and Bogdanowicz
(2018), pp. 1069–1073; Franzius (2018), p. 386; Hilf and Schorkopf (2020), para. 46; Waelbroeck
and Oliver (2017), p. 335; Hillion (2016), pp. 71–73; Scheppele (2016), p. 114. Arguing for a
restriction, see Levits (2018a), p. 521; Martenczuk (2018), pp. 46 et seq.; Nicolosi (2015), p. 643.
61Against the Court’s jurisdiction outside the scope of EU law, see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons
(2017), p. 774.
62According to Art. 46(d) TEU-Nice the CJEU was only competent for what was then Art. 6
(2) TEU-Nice but not for the ‘principles’ laid down in Art. 6(1) TEU-Nice. The CJEU nonetheless
relied on them, see CJEU, Case C-402/05 P Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 303.
63This becomes most visible in L.M., where the Court rejected to generally suspend the EAW
Framework with regard to Poland, see CJEU, Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note
36, paras. 70 et seq.
246 L. D. Spieker
link to EU law (Sect. 3.1). Although this stance can also be reconstrued as a
manifestation of the well-established effet utile rationale (Sect. 3.2), I propose a
reading relying on Article 2 TEU. According to my understanding, the Court opted
for a combined approach, operationalising Article 2 TEU through a specific provi-
sion of EU law (here Article 19(1)(2) TEU). This operationalisation, it is argued,
leads to a ‘mutual amplification’ of both provisions: While the specific provision of
EU law translates Article 2 TEU into a judicially applicable legal obligation, the
operationalized Article 2 TEU charges and eventually extends the scope of applica-
tion of the specific provision. Such a reading kills two birds with one stone: it leads
to the judicial application of Article 2 TEU without limiting its unrestricted scope.
As such, it allows reviewing and sanctioning any Member State action violating the
Union’s common values in judicial proceedings before the CJEU—irrespective of
any link to other EU law. Finally, this approach is not confined to Article 19 TEU but
could be extended to any provision giving expression to a value enshrined in Article
2 TUE (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 The Groundbreaking Judgment in ASJP
On its face, ASJP seems like a rather innocent case. A Portuguese court asked the
CJEU whether salary reductions for judges adopted in the context of an EU financial
assistance program violated judicial independence. Generally, there are two Treaty
provisions guaranteeing judicial independence: Article 47 CFR and Article 19(1)
(2) TEU. The former only operates under the scope defined in Article 51(1) CFR.
The salary reductions were part of spending cuts conditional for financial assistance
under the EU financial crisis mechanisms. Since the Court already applied the
Charter in comparable situations,64 Advocate General Øe proposed to grasp this
thin material link and rely on the CFR.65 The CJEU could have followed this
approach and ASJP would have disappeared discreetly as another clarification of
the meandering post-Åkerberg Fransson case law. Yet, this is not what happened.
The Court referred to Article 19(1)(2) TEU, which stipulates that ‘Member States
shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields
covered by Union law.’ Such effective legal protection presupposes an independent
judiciary.66
According to the Court, this obligation applies ‘irrespective of whether the
Member States are implementing Union law, within the meaning of Article 51
(1).’67 This is already indicated by the different wording of both provisions. Article
19(1)(2) TEU limits its scope to ‘the fields covered by Union law’, whereas the
64See e.g. CJEU, Florescu, supra note 59.
65Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe, Case C-64/16, paras. 43–53.
66CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 35, para. 36.
67Id., para. 29 (emphasis added).
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Charter applies to ‘situations . . .within the scope of European Union law’.68 ‘Fields’
are different from ‘situations’. According to this semantic difference, ‘fields covered
by Union law’ could be understood in a more extensive manner.69 But how broad
should the scope of Article 19(1)(2) TEU be? The Court refers to the preliminary
ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU: ‘[T]hat mechanism may be activated
only by a body responsible for applying EU law which satisfies, inter alia, that
criterion of independence’.70 ‘Responsible for applying EU law’ includes all author-
ities which are potentially in the situation of applying it.71 This means practically
every Member State court.72 For Article 19(1)(2) TEU to be triggered, it is not
necessary that the respective Member State court actually adjudicates a matter of EU
law in the specific case at hand; the mere potentiality of dealing with such matters
suffices.
After the Court’s stance in ASJP, Article 19(1)(2) TEU reaches even situations
which do not present any other link to EU law. Accordingly, ASJP has been
interpreted as establishing a ‘quasi-federal standard’73 for judicial independence.
How does the Court justify this ample scope? A thorough analysis of ASJP reveals
two (complementary) rationales, a functional and axiological one.74 A similar
reading has been advanced by Advocate General Tanchev in Miasto Łowicz.
According to him, the ample scope is justified because
Article 19 TEU is a concrete manifestation of the rule of law, one of the fundamental values
on which the European Union is founded under Article 2 TEU, and Member States are
bound under the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU to ‘provide remedies sufficient
to ensure effective legal protection’. Structural breaches of judicial independence inevitably
impact on the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267 TFEU and therefore on the
capacity of Member State courts to act as EU Courts.75
In this sense, the CJEU’s broad interpretation of Article 19(1)(2) TEU can be
justified both by a recourse to the functioning of the EU’s judicial system and the
values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
68CJEU, Åkerberg Fransson, supra note 27, para. 19. More recently, CJEU, Case C-117/14
Nisttahuz Poclava, ECLI:EU:C:2015:60, para. 29. But see Egenberger where the Court referred
to Charter rights as applying ‘in a field covered by EU law’, supra note 55, para. 76. See also CJEU,
Case C-68/17 IR, ECLI:EU:C:2018:696, para. 69.
69See for this interpretation Lenaerts (2019a); id. (2019b); Giegerich (2019), p. 76; von Danwitz
(2018); Levits (2018b); Pech and Platon (2018), p. 1837; Miglio (2018), p. 426. On the problematic
doctrinal implications of diverging scopes under Art. 19(1)(2) TEU and the Charter, see Spieker
(2019b); Bonelli and Claes (2018), pp. 630–632.
70CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 35, para. 43 (emphasis added).
71See also CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), supra note 22, para.
51; AG Tanchev in Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz, paras. 87–88, 94, 125.
72Similarly, von Danwitz (2018); Pech and Platon (2018), p. 1838; Bonelli and Claes
(2018), p. 623.
73Pech and Platon (2018), p. 1847; Adam and Van Elsuwege (2018), p. 341.
74See also von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019), pp. 413 et seq.
75Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz, para. 92 (emphasis added).
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3.2 First Rationale: Securing the Functioning of the EU’s
Judicial System
At first sight, the CJEU seems to employ the well-established effet utile rationale.
First, the Court refers to the functioning of the preliminary reference procedure in
Article 267 TFEU. National courts have an indispensable position in the effective
and uniform application of EU law.76 As they are obliged to apply EU law in the
respective Member States even where it may conflict with national law, they are
considered to be the first ‘Union courts’77 and as such an arm of EU law.78 Such a
system cannot work if Member State courts are not independent. Not without reason,
one of the key pre-conditions for a court to be eligible for launching preliminary
references is its independence.79 Second, the rationale behind Article 19(1)(2) TEU
supports the Court’s findings. Despite a limited extension of the demanding locus
standi criteria for individual actions before the CJEU (see Article 263(4) TFEU),80
the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty retained the decentralized judicial system based on
both the CJEU and Member State courts.81 The function of Article 19(1)(2) TEU is
to ensure that this diffused judicial system works and that no protection gaps arise.82
This necessarily enables the CJEU to specify and harmonize Member States’ pro-
visions regarding judicial remedies and procedures.83 These two considerations
seem to strongly indicate that the CJEU is relying on its well-known effet utile
76See e.g. CJEU, Case C-284/16 Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, para. 36; Opinion 2/13 Accession
of the EU to the ECHR II, para. 176; Opinion 1/09 Agreement creating a Unified Patent Litigation
System, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, paras. 84–85.
77See CJEU, Case C-106/77 Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49; Case C-294/83 Les Verts
v. Parliament, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166; Unified Patent Litigation System, supra note 76, para. 80.
See further Fennelly (2013).
78Lenaerts (2019b).
79For cases, in which the CJEU actually assessed the independence of the referring entity, see
CJEU, Case C-203/14 Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, ECLI:EU:C:2015:664, para. 19; Case
C-222/13 TDC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2265, paras. 28–36; Joined Cases C-58/13 and C-59/13 Torresi,
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2088, paras. 18–25; Case C-109/07 Pilato, ECLI:EU:C:2008:274, paras. 21–30;
Case C-506/04 Wilson, ECLI:EU:C:2006:587, paras. 49 et seq.; Case C-53/03 Syfait, ECLI:EU:
C:2005:333, paras. 29, 31; Case C-516/99 Schmid, ECLI:EU:C:2002:313, paras. 35 et seq.; Case
C-407/98 Abrahamsson and Anderson, ECLI:EU:C:2000:367, paras. 29–37; Case C-103/97
Köllensperger and Atzwanger, ECLI:EU:C:1999:52, paras. 19–24; Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult,
ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, paras. 34–36. More generally, see Broberg and Fenger (2014), pp. 62 et seq.
80For a sharp critique of these demanding criteria, see the Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-50/00 P,
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores, paras. 36–49; Konstadinidis (2017), pp. 111 et seq.
81See e.g. Tridimas (2013).
82See Lenaerts (2007), pp. 1629–1630.
83See e.g. CJEU, Case C-432/05 Unibet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, paras. 40-43; Case C-213/89
Factortame I, ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, paras. 19 et seq. See further da Cruz Vilaça (2013),
pp. 300 et seq.; Lenaerts et al. (2014), pp. 107 et seq.
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argument.84 In this light, ASJP could be read as an important step in the jurispru-
dential line of Simmenthal, Opinion 1/09 and Unibet.
3.3 Second Rationale: Operationalizing the Values in Article
2 TEU
Yet there is another, potentially groundbreaking explanation for the ample scope of
Article 19(1)(2) TEU leaving the beaten tracks and venturing into uncharted terri-
tories of EU law. In the crucial passage of ASJP, the Court states that ‘Art. 19 TEU
. . . gives concrete expression to the value of the rule of law stated in Article 2’.85
According to my understanding, this recourse to values lays the groundworks for the
judicial applicability of Article 2 TEU. The Court implicitly rejected a self-standing
application of Article 2 TEU and opted for a combined approach (see supra Sect.
2.2). It operationalizes Article 2 TEU through a specific provision of EU law (here
Article 19(1)(2) TEU).86 How does this operationalization work and what is its
effect?
Like the Charter, Article 19(1)(2) TEU’s scope of application is a derived one. It
only applies within the ‘fields covered by Union law’.87 This means, however, that
some kind of ‘Union law’ is needed to trigger its scope. Since Article 2 TEU
presumably lacks direct effect and is thus no self-standing provision either, it
would per se not allow for such a triggering.88 Taken in isolation, both provisions
are therefore not applicable: Article 19 because of its derived scope and Article
2 TEU because of its lacking direct effect. What could be a way out of this impasse?
At first glance, Article 19(1)(2) TEU would have to be triggered by other Union
law (e.g. a directive or fundamental freedoms). In consequence, Article 2 TEU
operationalized by Article 19(1)(2) TEU would depend on the scope of other
84For such a ‘functional’ interpretation of ASJP, see also Schill and Krenn (2020), paras. 102 et seq.;
Jaeger (2018), pp. 615 et seq. On a ‘functional’ scope of Art. 19(1)(2) TEU, see also Bonelli and
Claes (2018), p. 631; Mickonyte (2019), pp. 830 et seq.
85CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 35, para. 32 (emphasis added).
Similarly, CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), supra note 22, para.
47; Commission v. Poland (Indépendance des juridictions de droit commun), supra note 22, para.
98; Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre
disciplinaire de la Cour supreme), ECLI:EU:C:2019:982, para. 167. See also Opinion of AG
Tanchev in Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance des juridictions de droit
commun), ECLI:EU:C:2019:529, para. 71; Opinion of AG Tanchev in Joined Cases C-585/18,
C-624/18 and C-625/18, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour supreme),
para. 77; Opinion of AG Tanchev in Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz, para. 92.
86von Bogdandy et al. (2018).
87On Art. 19(1)(2) TEU as a self-standing provision, see Pech and Platon (2018), pp. 1838, 1848.
88For a triggering relationship between Art. 2 TEU and Art. 51(1) CFR, see Jakab (2017), p. 255.
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Union law and could not operate beyond that.89 Such a limitation, however, seems to
severely neglect Article 2 TEU’s foundational character and its unrestricted scope of
application: The Member States are bound by it even in areas not covered by any
(other) Union law.90 Limiting Article 2 TEU to the scope of other Union law would
frustrate its overarching importance and deprive the recourse to Union values of any
added-value.
And indeed, the CJEU did not seem to have limited the scope of Article 19(1)
(2) TEU (operationalizing Article 2 TEU) to the scope of any other Union law
applying. It established standards for practically anyMember State court. How does
the Court reach this conclusion? According to my understanding, the combined
reading of Article 2 TEU with a specific provision leads to a cumulation of their legal
effects—a mutual amplification: While the specific provision of EU law (here
Article 19 TEU) translates Article 2 TEU into a specific legal obligation, the
operationalized Article 2 TEU triggers and determines the scope of application of
the specific provision.91 In this interplay, each contributes what the other lacks—
specificity and scope (see Fig. 1).
As it is Article 2 TEU, which determines the scope, the operationalized obliga-
tions can apply beyond the scope of any other Union law to any Member State
action. In this sense, the idea of mutual amplification kills two birds with one stone:
It allows for the judicial applicability of Article 2 TEU through a specific provision
without losing its unrestricted scope.
Fig. 1 Mutual amplification
89This would also be the case if Article 2 TEU was operationalized by other provisions, like Charter
rights or a specific directive.
90See supra note 32.
91See already Spieker (2019a), pp. 1204 et seq.; von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019),
pp. 416 et seq. See also Rossi (2020), p. 650: ‘c’est en réalité l’ancrage à l’article 2 et à ses valeurs
suprêmes qui a permis de donner à l’article 19, paragraphe 1, . . . un épaisseur et une portée qu’avant
l’arrêt Juízes Portugueses il aurait été difficile à imaginer. Il s’agit donc d’une “concretisation” au
moins réciproque.’
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Eventually, this approach could be extended to any norm of EU law containing a
specific obligation and ‘giving expression’ to values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. As
already mentioned, Article 2 TEU contains the values of ‘respect for human rights,’
democracy, and the rule of law. The Charter can be understood as a specific
realisation of these values.92 As such, a mutual amplification of Article 2 TEU and
Charter rights seems possible.
The Court’s judgment in L.M. could be a first, careful step in this direction. The
case dealt with the surrender of a Polish national, who is wanted to face trial in
Poland and was arrested in Ireland based on an European Arrest Warrant (EAW).
The referring Irish High Court asked whether the surrender could be denied on the
basis that the rule of law in Poland has been systematically damaged and the
respective person would thus face trial in a jurisdiction where an independent
judge is not guaranteed. The CJEU applied the two-pronged Aranyosi-test93 and
extended it to violations of the essence of the right to a fair trial (Article 47 CFR).
While the CJEU left the final assessment of the situation in Poland to the referring
court, this test eventually allows reviewing the conformity of a situation which falls
at first glance beyond the scope of Union law with the essence of a Charter right.
Although the issue of an EAW is clearly within the scope of Union law as defined by
Article 51(1) CFR, this is not the case for what is scrutinized under the Aranyosi-test.
In L.M., neither the Polish judicial reforms nor the specific domestic criminal pro-
ceedings presented any apparent link to EU law—except for Article 2 TEU. Never-
theless, the referring Court is under the obligation to examine this situation for its
compliance with EU standards (the essence of Article 47 CFR). One could of course
argue that this review competence is a result of the specificities of mutual recognition
regimes or that the assessment of the internal situation in Poland is only conducted
indirectly in order to determine whether the EAW has to be executed or denied. Yet,
similar to ASJP, the Court establishes a nexus between the essence of Article 47 CFR
and Article 2 TEU:
Judicial independence forms part of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial . . .
which is of cardinal importance as a guarantee . . . that the values common to the Member
States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of the rule of law, will be
safeguarded.94
In this spirit, the Court started to increasingly connect Article 2 TEU and Charter
rights in its recent case law. In Tele2 Sverige, for instance, the Court established a
continuum between the freedom of expression under Article 11 CFR and the value of
92Voßkuhle (2017), p. 114; Hilf and Schorkopf (2020), para. 36; Rossi (2020), p. 653.
93First, the applicant must demonstrate systemic deficiencies amounting to a real risk of inhumane
and degrading treatment. Second, there must be ‘substantial grounds to believe that the individual
concerned will be exposed to that risk’, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU,
Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, paras. 89, 92.
94CJEU,Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 36, para. 48. On this continuum between Art.
47 CFR and Art. 2 TEU, see also Wendel (2019), pp. 27–29.
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democracy under Article 2 TEU.95 In light of these links, one could argue that the
concept of mutual amplification is not limited to the situation in ASJP, but instead
open to all provisions of EU law giving concrete expression to Article 2 TEU values.
4 Anticipating Objections and Advancing Rejoinders
In sum, the Court’s stance in ASJP could be interpreted as making the values in
Article 2 TEU judicially applicable through a mutual amplification with a specific
provisions of EU law. The decisions following ASJP reveal a twofold development.
First, the Court is willing to scrutinize and sanction Member State actions under the
operationalised Article 2 TEU. Although the CJEU refrained from finding any
violation in ASJP, the judgment served as a stepping stone for the infringement
proceedings against Poland.96 Second, the CJEU seems to develop the diffused and
decentralized EU judicial network into a value monitoring and enforcement mech-
anism. Today, violations of operationalised Union values can reach the CJEU not
only via infringement proceedings initiated by the Commission (constellation in
Commission v. Poland) but also through preliminary reference procedures—either
by ‘brave’ national courts directly against national measures (constellation in ASJP
or A.K.) or by courts in otherMember States assessing cooperation with backsliding
Member States under mutual recognition regimes (constellation in L.M.).
Without a doubt, the proposed reading of ASJP and its progenies leads to a
considerable development of the law. It seems to immensely extend the scope of
Union law and the Court’s jurisdiction. Indeed, no Member State area seems to
escape the obligations stemming from Article 2 TEU. As such, Article 2 TEU could
become the core of a European Constitution with federalizing potential, threatening
the federal equilibrium established by the Treaties. Therefore, this proposal of
activating Article 2 TEU will most certainly raise doubts and criticism. The follow-
ing section aims at anticipating some of this critique by referring to one of the
CJEU’s most accomplished national counterparts—the Bundesverfassungsgericht
(BVerfG).
95CJEU, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para. 93: ‘[t]
hat fundamental right, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, constitutes one of the essential
foundations of a pluralist, democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article
2 TEU, the Union is founded’. See also CJEU, Joined Cases C-511/18, C-512/18 and C-520/18 La
Quadrature du Net, ECLI:EU:C:2020:791, para. 111; Case C-623/17 Privacy International, ECLI:
EU:C:2020:790, para. 62; Case C-163/10 Patriciello, ECLI:EU:C:2011:543, para. 31. See further
the connection between Art. 47 CFR and Art. 2 TEU in CJEU, Case C-72/15 Rosneft, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:236, paras. 72–73.
96CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), supra note 22.
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4.1 Framing Possible Objections
Generally, it seems uncontested that EU primary law is characterised by a special,
evolutive dynamic97 and has to be interpreted accordingly.98 Due to the partial
incompleteness of the EU legal order, the creative judicial development of the
law99 has been an accepted feature of the CJEU’s legal reasoning since the very
beginning.100 This must apply especially in situations of new and unprecedented
challenges that threaten the EU’s very foundations.
There are, however, two key limits to such a judicial development of the law,
which the BVerfG sketched out in Honeywell:101 Horizontally, the Court should
respect the inter-institutional separation of powers. Accordingly, ‘[t]he Court of
Justice is . . . not precluded from refining the law by means of methodically bound
case-law’ respecting its judicial function.102 ‘[A]s long as the Court of Justice
applies recognised methodological principles’, the judicial development of the law
by the CJEU has to be accepted.103 Vertically, a ‘major limit on further development
of the law by judges at Union level is the principle of conferral’.104 Under this
premise, it is essential to anchor the proposed reading of ASJP and the idea of mutual
amplification carefully in the Court’s case law and established methods of legal
reasoning. At the same time, its impact must be strictly limited in order to safeguard
the Union’s federal equilibrium epitomised by Articles 4(2) or 5(1) TEU.
4.2 Methodologically Unsound?
Despite evident difficulties in agreeing on a common European legal methodol-
ogy,105 the CJEU’s interpretation generally revolves around ‘the spirit, the general
scheme and the wording of the Treaty’106 and concentrates especially on a mixture
97See e.g. the characterisation as ‘Wandel-Verfassung’ by Ipsen (1983), pp. 32, 51.
98Martens (2013), p. 475; Itzcovich (2009), pp. 549 et seq.; Bengoetxea (1993), pp. 251 et seq.
99The CJEU does not distinguish between ‘interpretation’ (‘Auslegung’) and ‘development of the
law’ (‘Rechtsfortbildung’), see Martens (2013), p. 503; Jestaedt (2014), p. 33.
100See BVerfG, 2 BvR 687/85, Kloppenburg, Judgment of 8 April 1987, paras. 58–60. See further
Lecourt (1976), p. 236; Everling (2000); Lenaerts and Gutman (2006), p. 7.
101BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, Order of 6 July 2010. See also Calliess (2005), p. 930;
Lenaerts and Gutman (2006), pp. 45 et seq.; Roth (2011), p. 834.
102BVerfG, Honeywell, supra note 101, paras. 62, 64 (emphasis added).
103BVerfG, 2 BvE 13/13, OMT, Judgment of 21 June 2016, para. 161 (emphasis added). See also
BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, PSPP, Judgment of 5 May 2020, para. 112.
104Id., para. 65.
105Dann (2005). In EU private law, see Fleischer (2011).
106CJEU, Van Gend en Loos, supra note 7. For a typology, see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (2014)
and Itzcovich (2009).
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of systematic and teleological considerations.107 On one hand, the Court can con-
sider the telos of a respective provision itself. On the other hand, it can refer to a telos
detached from said provision by referring to objectives or principles of the EU legal
order. This second type could be described as systematic or meta-teleological
interpretation.108 In this light, there is a twofold, interlocking methodological justi-
fication for the idea of mutual amplification between Article 2 TEU and a specific
provision of EU law.
First, the Court can rely on a teleological, concretizing, or gap-filling interpreta-
tion of Article 2 TEU itself—a practice accepted, for example, by the BVerfG as a
methodologically sound endeavour.109 Specifying the obligations enshrined in Arti-
cle 2 TEU by relying on existing provisions of the acquis not only provides such
specificity, but is also much more restrained than filling the gap solely based on case
law and praetorian principles. In doing so, a parallel could be drawn to the Court’s
case law on Union objectives. Although these objectives do not have any direct
effect,110 the Court found ways to make them judicially applicable. It stated that the
Union’s objectives ‘are necessarily applied in combination with the respective
chapters of the EC Treaty intended to give effect to those principles and
objectives’.111
Second, the Court can employ a systematic or meta-teleological interpretation of
the specific provision operationalizing Article 2 TEU (e.g. Article 19(1)(2) TEU,
Charter rights or any other provision giving specific expression to Article 2 TEU).
Although the existence of hierarchies in EU primary law is highly disputed,112 some
provisions—like objectives—seem to have been treated as primus inter pares and
served as guiding stars for its interpretation.113 After Lisbon, objectives seem to have
been placed behind the Union’s common values. Article 2 TEU symbolises a ‘shift
from a legal entity that . . . exists to strive for certain goals to one which, above all,
expounds what it stands for.’114 This shift should find its expression in the Court’s
107See e.g. CJEU, Case C-283/81 CILFIT, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, para. 20. On the difficulties to
separate teleological and systemic interpretation, see Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (2014), p. 17.
108Maduro (2007), p. 5.
109BVerfG, Honeywell, supra note 101, para. 64: ‘There is particular reason for further develop-
ment of the law by judges where programmes are fleshed out, gaps are closed . . .’.
110See e.g. CJEU, Case C-339/89 Alsthom Atlantique, ECLI:EU:C:1991:28, paras. 8-9. See also
Case C-260/89 ERT, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, paras. 39–40.
111See e.g. CJEU, Case C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros, ECLI:EU:C:2010:309, para. 46 (emphasis
added); Case C-293/03 My, ECLI:EU:C:2004:821, para. 29.
112Hinting towards the existence of hierarchies, see Kadi, supra note 62, para. 303; Opinion 1/91
EEA I, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, para. 6. See further, Rosas and Armati (2018), pp. 53–55. Similarly,
with regard to the former Art. I-2 of the European Constitution and Art. 6(1) TEU-Nice/Amsterdam,
see Tridimas (2007), p. 16; Peters (2000), pp. 341 et seq.; Gaudin (1999), p. 6. Critically concerning
any hierarchies in EU primary law, see Nettesheim (2006), pp. 740 et seq.
113See e.g. CJEU, Case C-85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, para. 125; Case C-53/
81 Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, para. 15; Case C-6/72 Continental Can, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22,
para. 24.
114Larik (2014), p. 951.
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legal methodology. Hence, it does not seem far-fetched to propose a new kind of
meta-teleological interpretation—not in light of the Union’s objectives, but in light
of its common values: An axiological interpretation.115 Under this method, the
specific provision would be interpreted in light of the Union’s founding values as
enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In case of specific provisions, which have no derived
(like Article 19(1)(2) TEU or the Charter) but nonetheless a limited scope of
application (e.g. cross-border requirements), this could lead to a careful teleological
reduction of their restricted scope insofar as Article 2 TEU values are at stake.116
Eventually, the idea of a mutual amplification—two mutually complementing
and reinforcing provisions—is not unprecedented in the Court’s case law. In a rather
recent line of cases, the Court had to decide on the interplay of rights stemming from
directives and Charter rights in horizontal situations between private parties. These
cases concerned the question of whether a national provision in a case between two
individuals conformed with EU law—first with rights stemming from specific
directives and second with EU fundamental rights. Directives do not apply horizon-
tally.117 The fundamental rights at issue apply horizontally118—yet they are acces-
sory to the scope of Union law (Art. 51(1) CFR). Thus, the Charter applies only in
case its scope is triggered by the directive.119 Taken in isolation, neither of them is
applicable. The Court, however, relied on a creative solution based on the notorious
Mangold judgment.120 Taken together, both the directive as well as the fundamental
right contribute to what the other lacks: Scope and horizontal effect. The directive,
although not directly applicable, has ‘the effect of bringing within the scope of
European Union law the national legislation at issue . . ., which concerns a matter
governed by that directive’.121 Once the scope is triggered, it is the Charter right that
applies horizontally in the case at hand. To add another layer to this complex
interplay, the Court applies the Charter right (or the general principle) in a manner
that is exactly equivalent to the right enshrined in the directive. This becomes most
apparent in Kücükdeveci, where the Court stated that Directive 2000/78 ‘gives
115On such a ‘value-oriented’ interpretation, see von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019), Potacs (2016)
and Calliess (2009).
116On the high burdens for justifying the use of this method, see Jakab (2016), p. 19.
117See e.g. CJEU, Case C-122/17 Smith, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, paras. 42–44.
118This has been confirmed by the CJEU in Bauer, supra note 54, paras. 79–90; Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft, supra note 54, paras. 75–79; Egenberger, supra note 55, para. 76; Cresco Investiga-
tion, supra note 55, para. 76; Association de médiation sociale, supra note 52, para. 47; with regard
to general principles CJEU, Case C-441/14 Danks Industri, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, para. 27; Case
C-555/07 Kücükdeveci, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, para. 51; Case C-144/04 Mangold, ECLI:EU:
C:2005:709, para. 77.
119On Article 51(1) CFR requiring an obligation of EU law actually applying in the case at hand, see
supra note 27.
120Mangold, supra note 118, para. 75; Kücükdeveci, supra note 118, para. 23. Critically BVerfG,
Honeywell, supra note 101; Danish Supreme Court, 15/2014, Dansk Industri (DI) acting for Ajos
A/S, Judgment of 6 December 2016.
121Kücükdeveci, supra note 118, para. 25. Similarly, Bauer, supra note 54, para. 53; Max-Planck-
Gesellschaft, supra note 54, para. 50.
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specific expression’ to the general principle of non-discrimination.122 The Court de
facto applied the Directive as the principle’s (or right’s) specific expression.123 As
such, this reasoning is a perfect example for the cumulation of legal effects sketched
out above: The general principle allows for the horizontal application, while the
Directive triggers the scope of Union law and provides for specificity.
4.3 Pretext for a Power Grab?
Naturally, the bold reading of the Court’s case law as proposed above has the
potential of severely upsetting the Union’s federal equilibrium epitomised by Arti-
cles 4(2) or 5(1) TEU.124 Therefore, it is essential to put safeguards in place ensuring
that Article 2 TEU does not become the ‘pretext for a power grab’.125 These essential
safeguards, however, should not be applied in a way that frustrates the respect for
Article 2 TEU values either. Both considerations have to be carefully balanced
against each other. In my view, the outcome of this balancing exercise could be a
threefold limitation ensuring Article 2 TEU’s function and simultaneously providing
a safety net for the ‘federal bargain’.
Limiting the Obligations Enshrined in Article 2 TEU First, Article 2 TEU must be
interpreted in a restrictive manner as being triggered only in exceptional situations.
On the one hand, Article 2 TEU cannot impose high standards upon the Member
States, since such an interpretation could not be squared with the legally guaranteed
constitutional autonomy of the Member States.126 Concerning the ‘respect for
human rights’, some have proposed operating with the concept of ‘essence’.127
Insofar as the ‘essence’ of Charter rights is concerned, they are also protected as
122Kücükdeveci, supra note 118, para. 21. See further CJEU, Cresco Investigation, supra note
55, para. 75; Case C-68/17 IR, ECLI:EU:C:2018:696, para. 67; Egenberger, supra note 55, paras.
47, 75; Dansk Industri, supra note 118, para. 35; Case C-447/09 Prigge, ECLI:EU:C:2011:573,
para. 48; Case C-297-298/10 Hennigs and Mai, ECLI:EU:C:2011:560, para. 68. Similarly, Max-
Planck-Gesellschaft, supra note 54, para. 72; Bauer, supra note 54, para. 83.
123See even CJEU, Case C-132/11 Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft, ECLI:EU:
C:2012:329, para. 23: ‘to be examined solely in the light of Directive 2000/78’ (emphasis added).
124See e.g. the arguments of Poland in CJEU, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour
suprême), supra note 22, paras. 39–40.
125Kochenov (2017b), p. 443.
126For similar conceptions, see Voßkuhle (2017), p. 117 (‘essential content’); Schroeder (2016b),
p. 11 (‘minimum standards’); Toggenburg and Grimheden (2016), p. 221 (‘minimum constitutional
cohesion’). See also European Convention, supra note 32, p. 11: ‘This Article can thus only contain
a hard core of values meeting two criteria at once: on one hand, they must be so fundamental that
they lie at the very heart of a peaceful society practicing tolerance, justice and solidarity; on the
other hand, they must have a clear non-controversial legal basis so that the Member States can
discern the obligations resulting therefrom’.
127von Bogdandy et al. (2012), pp. 509 et seq.; on the notion of ‘essence’, see further Brkan (2018);
Lenaerts (2019c). See further the special issue in 20 German Law Journal 763 (2019).
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values under Article 2 TEU, while Article 51(1) CFR continues to delimit the
application of the full fundamental right acquis. On the other hand, Article 2 TEU
can hardly force detailed obligations upon the Member States, because this would
ignore the actually existing constitutional pluralism in the Union. Due to the
practically countless possibilities of how to bring the abstract values to life, Article
2 TEU cannot—from a mere practical perspective—be understood as containing
very detailed obligations.128 Accordingly, Article 2 TEU’s high degree of abstrac-
tion necessarily correlates with a lower degree of review by the Court. Where does
that leave us? One feasible solution could be to understand Article 2 TEU as
establishing only a regime of ‘red lines’.129 On a conceptual level, Article 2 TEU
would determine negatively what is not allowed, without positively determining how
things should be instead. In a nutshell, Article 2 TEU would apply only in excep-
tional situations and only in the form of ‘red lines’.
Limiting the EU’s Competence Second, I argue that the Union’s
‘Verbandskompetenz’ (its competence as a legal order) to enforce Member State’s
Article 2 TEU compliance beyond the scope of (any other) Union law is limited to
the thresholds of Article 7 TEU. Indeed, the only provision explicitly empowering
the EU legal order to enforce EU values or sanction violations thereof beyond the
scope of (any other) Union law is Article 7 TEU. Hence, this provision contains a
strong indication that the EU’s Verbandskompetenz is limited at least to the sub-
stantive thresholds triggering Article 7 TEU (a ‘serious and persistent breach’).130
This could provide the starting point for a workable restriction operating in form of a
sliding scale (see Fig. 2): The more or the clearer a situation falls within the scope of
Fig. 2 Sliding Article 7 TEU scale
128von Bogdandy (2010), p. 40.
129von Bogdandy et al. (2018).
130See similar Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, supra note
32, para. 17.
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other EU law, the more the EU and the less the respective Member State is affected.
This means that in case of a clear link to EU law, every violation of Article 2 TEU
values can be sanctioned by EU institutions (e.g. under the Charter). If the link is
weaker or nonexistent, it approaches the confines of Article 7 TEU. To assess and
sanction every violation in such situations would exceed the EU’s
Verbandskompetenz. Therefore, the more the situation departs from the scope of
Union law and comes solely under Article 2 TEU, the more a violation must reach
the thresholds of Article 7, and the more it must constitute a ‘serious and persistent’
breach to be claimed before the CJEU.
Limiting the Exercise of the CJEU’s Jurisdiction Finally, there are several ways in
which the CJEU might limit the exercise of its jurisdiction over Article 2 TEU: First,
as proposed by the Reverse Solange doctrine, the Court could introduce a presump-
tion of value compliance accompanied by a high threshold for its rebuttal. Such a
threshold could be fixed on the level of systemic deficiencies—a notion which is
well-established throughout the European legal space.131 Therefore, simple and
isolated infringements upon the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU would not suffice
to rebut the proposed presumption. The justification for such a presumption could be
derived from the principle of mutual trust. Although mutual trust has been invoked
only horizontally between the Member States,132 this does not mean that it is
excluded in the vertical relationship of EU and Member States. Indeed, mutual
trust is based on or at least intrinsically linked to the principle of loyal and sincere
cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU.133 The principle of mutual loyalty, however,
expressly extends to Union institutions and hence the CJEU as well.134 Similar
developments could be predicted for the principle of mutual trust.
A second option could consist of a more deferential approach, leaving the final
determination of value compliance in the hands of national courts—at least in case
of preliminary references. Indeed, the Court can vary and adjust the degree of
specificity it applies.135 While it sometimes leaves the final determination to the
referring court,136 it can also fully assess the situation in the respective Member
131See von Bogdandy and Spieker (2019), p. 424; further von Bogdandy and Ioannidis (2014).
132CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 35, para. 30;Minister for Justice
and Equality, supra note 36, para. 35.
133See e.g. CJEU, Case C-5/94 Hedley Lomas, ECLI:EU:C:1996:205, para. 19. See further AG
Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer in Case C-297/07, Bourquain, para. 45: ‘experience shows that mutual trust
applies . . . fulfilling a role similar to that of loyal cooperation’. See also Meyer (2017),
pp. 179 et seq.; Prechal (2017), pp. 90–92; Gerard (2016), p. 76. But see Lenaerts (2017b),
p. 807 who derives it from the principle of equality between the Member States.
134See the wording of Article 4(3) TEU. See further CJEU, Case C-339/00 Ireland v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2003:545, para. 72; Case C-197/13 Spain v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2157,
para. 87.
135On deference in the CJEU’s jurisprudence, see e.g. Zglinski (2018).
136See e.g. Minister for Justice and Equality, supra note 36.
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State.137 These variations are no random exercise but a conscious judicial choice.138
A differential approach can not only lead to a burden sharing between the interacting
courts but is also more respectful towards national autonomy.139 The Court’s stance
in L.M. and in A.K. especially could be understood as an expression of this defer-
ential attitude. Yet deference does not come without risks. In A.K., for instance, the
Court left the final decision of whether the new Polish disciplinary chamber violates
judicial independence to the referring court.140 Thus, both the Polish government as
well as the affected judiciary tried to capitalize on the judgment and claimed it as a
victory.141 The referring court decided that the disciplinary chamber does not
comply with the standards of independence set out by the CJEU.142 Instead of
changing the problematic appointment procedures, however, the Polish government
countered with a new bill aimed at tightening its control over the judiciary and
preventing judges from questioning the independence of peers.143 Further, it
increased its disciplinary proceedings against critical judges.144 As these continuing
attacks demonstrate, deference is a two-edged sword: While it shows greater respect
for national autonomy and diversity, it risks leaving affected national courts with a
burden too heavy to shoulder. In this sense, the CJEU will have to carefully assess
the situation in the respective Member State before determining the degree of
deference applied.
137See e.g. CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 35. Concerning systemic
deficiencies, see e.g. CJEU, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:
C:2011:865; Case C-220/18 PPUGeneralstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie),
ECLI:EU:C:2018:589.
138Tridimas (2011), p. 749.
139See also Schiffauer (2019), p. 568.
140CJEU, A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour supreme), supra note 85.
141For the statements of the Minister of Justice, see e.g. Ziobro o wyroku TSUE: Wielka porażka
nadzwyczajnej kasty, Do Rzeczy (19 November 2019), dorzeczy.pl/kraj/120931/ziobro-o-wyroku-
tsue-wielka-porazka-nadzwyczajnej-kasty.html.
142Polish Supreme Court, Judgment of 5 December 2019, Case III PO 7/18; Judgments of
15 December 2020, Cases III PO 8/18 and III PO 9/18. See also the Resolution of three joint
chambers of the Polish Supreme Court of 23 January 2020, Case BSA I-4110-1/20. In two rulings,
however, the captured Polish Constitutional Tribunal declared the resolution to be unconstitutional,
see Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Decision of 21 April 2020, Kpt 1/20; Decision of 20 April 2020,
U 2/20. See further European Commission, 2020 Rule of Law Report Country Chapter on the rule
of law situation in Poland (30 September 2020), SWD(2020) 320 final, pp. 4 et seq.
143For critical accounts, see e.g. Venice Commission, Poland—Urgent Joint Opinion on the
amendments to the Law on organisation on the Common Courts, the Law on the Supreme Court
and other Laws, CDL-PI(2020)002-e (16 January 2020); ODHIR, Urgent Interim Opinion on the
Bill Amending the Act on the Organization of Common Courts, the Act on the Supreme Court and
Certain Other Acts of Poland, JUD-POL/365/2019 [AlC] (14 January 2020); Polish Commissioner
for Human Rights Adam Bodnar, Comments, VII.510.176.2019/MAW/PKR/PF/MW/CW
(7 January 2020).
144See e.g. PACE, Report—The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland, Doc. 15025
(6 January 2020), paras. 95 et seq. See further Gajda-Roszczynialska, Markiewicz (2020).
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5 Conclusion
In entering the European Union and opening their respective legal orders for direct
effect and primacy, the Member States simultaneously accepted an openness towards
internal developments and decisions taken by other Member States. The EU does not
only extend the ‘transnational reach’ of each Member State, but also creates a
situation of mutual vulnerability.145 Internal developments in one Member State can
lead to spill-over effects in all other Member States. The complex network of
cooperation created by the European Union is not only enabling, it is transmitting
and intensifying these effects. Especially through the introduction of majority deci-
sions in the Council, each Member State partially and indirectly governs all others. As
Commissioner Jourova put it: ‘the EU is like a chain of Christmas lights. When one
light goes off, others don’t light up and the chain is dark.’146 Therefore, it is of utmost
importance to secure Member States’ adherence to the Union’s common values as an
underlying basis and essential safety net on which cooperation can take place.
The last 2 years have shown that the Court seems more than willing to protect this
common value basis against the illiberal turn in some Member States. The judgment
in ASJP especially represents a veritable stepping stone towards a strong union of
values—a judgment on par with van Gend en Loos, Costa/ENEL, or Les Verts.147
With ASJP, the Court turned Article 2 TEU into a judicially applicable provision and
paved the way for its activation in the EU value crisis. According to the interpreta-
tion advanced in this chapter, the Court renders Article 2 TEU applicable by
operationalizing it through specific provisions of EU law without, however, losing
its unrestricted scope. Due to this mutual amplification, anyMember State act can be
scrutinized under the operationalised Article 2 TEU—albeit under very restrictive
conditions and only in very exceptional circumstances. As such, Article 2 TEU has
become the Archimedean point for judicial proceedings against backsliding Member
States.
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Abstract The existing scale of violations of the rule of law by some Member States,
including capturing judicial independence by their governments, is a relatively new
phenomenon for the EU; the one for which the EU based on the EU common values
(Article 2 TEU) originally was not prepared to effectively deal with. The EU reacts
to current rule of law crisis by using different legal methods and instruments: it inter
alia applies existing procedures (Article 7 TEU procedure and with more success
general infringement procedure under Articles 258-260 TFEU) and struggles to
develop new ones. This contribution is focused on the new EU legislative initiative
of connecting in the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 transfers
of EU funds to Member States with their observance of the rule of law. Or to put it
differently, this legislative initiatives would authorize the EU institutions to suspend
regular transfers of EU funds to Member States that systematically breach the rule
of law.
1 Introduction
Although in many people’s views the EU was established to achieve individual and
common interests of the Member States, it would be over simplistic to recognise the
EU only as the community of interests. The EU is, if not primarily, the community of
values such as human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and
respect for human rights (Article 2 TEU). If these values are put at risk or violated
and the mutual trust among the Member States is hence infringed, possibilities of
identifying and accomplishing common European interests are weakened. This may
undermine legitimacy and rationality of the whole ‘European project’. Therefore the
protection of the common European values (Article 2 TEU) lies at the heart of the
EU integration process.
This chapter presents the latest Commission’s proposal aimed to ensure the
Member States’ respect of the rule of law—one of the common values on which
the EU is based. The Commission intends to make regular transfers of EU funds to
Member States paid from the EU budget for the implementation of different EU
policies (mainly the agriculture and the cohesion policies) conditional upon their
respect of the rule of law (known as ‘the conditionality mechanism’). This contri-
bution comments on the Draft Regulation as first proposed by the Commission
(hereinafter: Commission version1) and amended during the first reading by the
European Parliament (hereinafter: European Parliament version2). This mechanism
1Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the
Union budget in the event of generalized gaps in the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018)
324 final). See Halmai (2018).
2European Parliament legislative resolution of 4 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of
generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States (COM(2018) 324 final).
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toward Member States and relations between this mechanism and other EU Treaties
procedures aimed at stopping breaches of the rule of law (the Article 7 TEU
procedure) and the general infringements procedure (Article 258-260 TFEU).
2 Conditionality Mechanism in EU Law
2.1 The Conditionality Mechanism in EU Internal
and External Relations
The conditionality mechanism is an EU policy tool which has been in use since the
late 1980s.3 It is based on the assumption that the Member States and third countries
are prompted to comply with requirements established under EU law in return for the
advantages obtained. Or in other words, they would adhere to EU law due to the risk
of losing advantages, particularly financial ones.
Initially, the conditionality mechanism was applied in the EU’s external relations,
in international agreements in which the EU made the granting of humanitarian aid
to third countries conditional upon their respect for human rights.4 It continues to be
so applied at present. To give some examples. If countries participating in the
European Neighbourhood Policy5 implement actions agreed upon with the EU, in
return they receive financial assistance and the trade and visa facilitation from the
EU.6 As another example, if candidate countries want to join the EU, they must have
institutions which guarantee a stable democracy, the rule of law, respect for human
and minority rights as well as market economy allowing the national producers to
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU (the so called
‘Copenhagen criteria’).
Increasingly, the conditionality mechanism is being used in the EU’s internal
relations as well, in legal acts governing relations between the EU and its Member
States. For example, the macroeconomic conditionality mechanism was introduced
in 1994 to support the establishment of the European Monetary Union. It condi-
tioned access of the less developed Member States (then Greece, Ireland, Spain and
Portugal) to the Cohesion Fund on the adoption by these States of economic
convergence plans and their compliance with the EU budgetary deficit rules. It has
3For more on the concept of the conditionality see: Vita (2017).
4Fierro (2003), Bartels (2005), McKenzie and Meissner (2017) and Cornelius (2016).
5Through its European Neighbourhood Policy, the EU works with its southern and eastern
neighbours to foster stabilisation, security and prosperity, in line with the Global Strategy for the
EU Foreign and Security Policy. See: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-
neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en; Joint Communication to
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, A review of the European Neighborhood Policy (JOIN (2015) 50 final).
6Council Implementing Decision 2012/156/EU of 13 March 2012 suspending commitments from
the Cohesion Fund for Hungary with effect from 1 January 2013, OJ L 78/19.
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been enforced only once, against Hungary in 2011, albeit without leading to an
actual cut-off in funding.7 As another example, in order to address the 2008 financial
crisis in the EU and support those Member States with major budgetary difficulties,
the EUmade the financial assistance granted to them conditional on their compliance
with the macro-economic convergence criteria.8
It has been observed that the increasing use of the conditionality mechanism in
the EU’s internal relations marks a shift towards a generalised ‘conditionality
culture’ in the relationship between the EU and its Member States. The compliance
function that the conditionality mechanism was aimed to ensure in the EU’s external
relations was—in the EU’s internal relations—initially supposed to be fulfilled
primarily by the principle of sincere cooperation between the EU and the Member
States.9 If a Member State breaches its EU obligation(s), the principle of sincere
cooperation does not allow the EU institutions themselves or other Member States to
deprive the State in breach of its EU benefits; however the Commission or another
Member State can take the case against this State to the CJEU, and as a last resort
financial sanctions may be imposed on the breaching State.10 Based on this principle,
the compliant Member States must continue to comply with their EU obligations,
even if others do not. It has been observed that the shift from the principle of loyal
cooperation to the conditionality mechanism in the EU’s internal relations was
brought about by the 2004 enlargement, with its attendant concerns that some
‘new’ Member States might decline to fulfil their EU obligations.11 Calls for the
establishment of the conditionality mechanism, allowing for the suspension of EU
funding to Member States breaching the rule of law (discussed further on in this
chapter), may be considered as proof that these concerns related with ‘new’Member
States were correct. That could mean that we are heading toward a new era of
conditionality in the EU.
2.2 The Financial Conditionality Mechanisms in EU
Secondary Law on EU Funds
In the debate on the Draft Regulation introducing a new conditionality mechanism to
EU law it is rightly noted that there already exists a legal basis that the Commission
could apply to suspend transfers of EU funds to Member States violating the rule of
law.12 It has been claimed that such an opportunity is provided by the Common
7Council Implementing Decision 2012/156/EU of 13 March 2012 suspending commitments from
the Cohesion Fund for Hungary with effect from 1 January 2013, OJ L 78/19.
8Atik (2016) and Louis (2010).
9Article 4 (3) TEU.
10Article 258-260 TFEU.
11Cremona (2005).
12Butler (2018), Scheppele et al. (2018) and Kelemen and Scheppele (2018).
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Provisions Regulation (hereafter: CP Regulation)13 containing rules on spending the
European Structural and Investment Funds (hereafter: ESIF) which finance imple-
mentation of the cohesion policy in the Member States. Similar rules also allow for
the suspension of EU funds transferred to Member States for implementation of
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).14
Under the CP Regulation, the Member States spending ESIF must establish a
management and control system and ensure its effective functioning.15 This system
is comprised of the bodies designated by the Member States (e.g. the managing
authorities, audit institutions), tasks they carry out in relation to EU funds
(e.g. carrying out controls, making payments, imposing sanctions) and tools
allowing for proper management and control of EU funds (e.g. databases, computer
systems). This system should guarantee that these funds are spent in the Member
States in accordance with EU law and that the risk of their losses is minimised. If the
Commission finds a serious deficiency in the effective functioning of the manage-
ment and control system in the Member State, which has put at risk the EU funds, it
is authorised to suspend the payments of these funds transferred to this State.16 It
may also recover them17 by imposing financial corrections on this State which leads
to definitive loss of the amount of the EU funds imposed as corrections. It is claimed
in the EU legal doctrine that systemic violations of the rule of law by a Member
State, e.g. undermining of judicial independence, can be classified as a serious
deficiency in the effective functioning of the management and control system in
such State. In such a case, the Commission could suspend the EU funds transferred
to this State, or recover them by imposing financial correction on this State. So far,
the Commission has not explored either of these possibilities.18
Another example provided by the CP Regulation relates to the national system of
legal complaints. Under this Regulation, the Member States must ensure they have
effective arrangements for the examination of complaints concerning the EU
funds.19 They thus must ensure the access of natural and legal persons to remedies
13Articles 23-24 Regulation No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17.12.2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the
European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development
and the EuropeanMaritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European
Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European
Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1083/2006 (OJ L
347, 20.12.2013, p. 320).
14Article 58 (2) Regulation No 1306/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
17 December 2013 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural
policy and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) No 352/78, (EC) No 165/94, (EC) No 2799/98,
(EC) No 814/2000, (EC) No 1290/2005 and (EC) No 485/2008 (OJ L 347, 20.12.2013, p. 549).
15Articles 72–74 and Article 122 (1) CP Regulation. The same concerns the agricultural spending,
see: Article 58 (2) 2 and Articles 67–73 Regulation No 1306/2013.
16Article 142 (a) CP Regulation.
17Article 144 (1) (a) CP Regulation.
18Kelemen and Scheppele (2018).
19Article 74 (3) CP Regulation.
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allowing effective legal protection in cases concerning these funds, including access
to independent and impartial tribunals.20 For a Member State with an established
record of breaching the rule of law, including capturing an independent prosecution
and judiciary, it could be difficult to prove that it fulfils this requirement.
So far the Commission has not applied the possibilities offered by the CP
Regulation to try to influence onMember States breaching the rule of law. Therefore,
the real problem may be not the lack of adequate legal tools, but the lack of political
will on the part of the Commission to use the tools that already exist. Instead, the
Commission has proposed the Draft Regulation establishing the conditionality
mechanism which is commented on in this chapter.
3 The Conditionality Mechanism Applied for Breaches
of the Rule of Law
The EU is a community of law and its values constitute the very basis of its
existence. Respect for these values must be ensured throughout all EU policies,
including the EU budget.21 Having this in mind the Commission presented the Draft
Regulation to respond to the common diagnosis that the EU lacks effective legal
instruments to stop systemic breaches of the rule of law by Member States.22 It
claimed that it cannot be accepted any longer and that these breaches damage the
financial interests of the EU.23 Some authors point out a paradox: that the EU
transfers the largest amounts of EU funds to governments of the Member States
with a history of long-standing violations of the rule of law,24 for example to
20Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. See: CJEU, Case C-562/
12, Liivimaa Lihaveis MTÜ, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2229, paras 67–75.
21Communication from the Commission. A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a
European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020. COM(2018) 98 final.
22Closa and Kochenov (2016), Jakab and Kochenov (2017), Schroeder (2016), Hatje (2018), Costa
(2017) and Konstadinides (2017).
23The Commission based the Draft Regulation on Article 322 (1) (a) TFEU which authorises the
European Parliament and the Council to adopt regulations containing financial rules determining
inter alia procedures for establishing and implementing the EU budget. This Article is commonly
applied as a legal basis for adopting Financial Regulations—the main EU secondary budgetary law
(presently binding Financial Regulation no 2018/1046). Selection of this legal basis could indicate
that the Commission finds the conditionality mechanism as an instrument ensuring sound imple-
mentation of the EU budget (Article 317 TFEU). This is, however, in contradiction with the overall
assumption expressed in the Draft Regulation that its primary objective is to protect the financial
interests of the EU against damages resulting from the breaches of the rule of law by the Member
States. Protection of these interests would require that the Draft Regulation would be adopted based
on Article 325 (4) TFEU. Under both articles (Article 322 (1) (a) TFEU and Article 325 (4) TFEU)
legal acts are adopted by the European Parliament and the Council in accordance with the ordinary
legislative procedure after consulting the Court of Auditors.
24Kelemen and Scheppele (2018) and Peel et al. (2019).
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Poland—the largest overall recipient taking in 86 billion EUR from various ESIF in
the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2014–2020; and Hungary—the largest
recipient of EU funds on a per capita basis, with more than 95% of all public
investment in MFF 2014–2020 having been co-financed by the EU.25 The condi-
tionality mechanism proposed to be introduced by the Draft Regulation is supposed
to remedy this situation. Before discussing this, it is necessary to engage in some
terminological explanations.
3.1 The Notion of ‘the Rule of Law’
Understandably, the key notion ‘the rule of law’ was defined in the Draft Regulation
with regard to the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.26 They include the
principles of legality, implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic
process for enacting laws; legal certainty; a prohibition of arbitrariness of executive
powers; effective judicial protection by independent courts, including protection of
fundamental rights; separation of powers; and equality before the law. On top of this
the European Parliament proposed to include the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ in this
notion, which candidate countries must fulfil in order to accede to the EU. They
include, beyond the rule of law, the stability of the institutions guaranteeing democ-
racy, respect for and protection of human rights and minorities, and further a
functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with the competition and
market forces, as well as the ability to meet the obligations of Union membership.27
3.2 The Notion ‘Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule
of Law in a Member State’
A key notion of the Draft Regulation is ‘the generalised deficiency as regards the
rule of law in a Member State’.28 Detection of such a deficiency in a Member State is
a necessary premise to apply the conditionality mechanism to this State.
A generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a Member State is defined as
a widespread or recurrent practice or omission, or a measure by public authorities
which violates the rule of law and affects or risks affecting the principle of sound
25It has been noted that the situations of Poland and Hungary differ, since there are no well-proven
cases that breaches of the rule of law by the Polish authorities have led to the misspending of EU
funds (von Brauneck 2019), while such is the case in Hungary (Kelemen and Scheppele 2018) and
Romania (Pech et al. 2019).
26Article (a) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
27Article 49 TEU.
28On similar notion of ‘systemic deficiency as regards the rule of law’ see: von Bogdandy (2019).
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financial management or the protection of the financial interests of the EU.29 Some
clarification is necessary as regards the principle of sound financial management and
the protection of the financial interests of the EU.
3.2.1 The Principle of Sound Financial Management (Article
317 TFEU)
The ‘principle of sound financial management’, as set forth in the TFEU,30 relates to
the EU budget and its implementation. The Financial Regulation no 2018/104631—
the main EU secondary budgetary law act—provides explanations on the meaning of
these terms.
The EU budget forecasts and authorises for each financial year all revenue and
expenditures considered necessary for the EU. Implementation of this budget
requires the carrying out of activities related to the management, monitoring, control
and auditing of EU appropriations, undertaken in accordance with the relevant
methods of its implementation.32 The TFEU entrusts responsibility for the imple-
mentation of the EU budget to the Commission.33 The latter is obliged to implement
the EU budget in cooperation with the Member States, on its own responsibility and
within the limits of the appropriations, having regard to the principles of sound
financial management. Member States must cooperate with the Commission during
implementation of the EU budget in order to ensure that the appropriations are used
in accordance with this principle.34 When the European Court of Auditors (the ECA)
undertakes its core tasks and examines how the Commission implements the EU
budget, it checks, inter alia, whether the financial management has been sound.35
According to Financial Regulation no 2018/1046,36 the principle of sound finan-
cial management—one of the EU budgetary principles37—requires that the EU
budget is implemented in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency,
29Article 2 (b) Draft Regulation.
30Article 287 (2) 2 TFEU, Article 310 (5) TFEU and Article 317 TFEU.
31Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July
2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations
(EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/
2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU
and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, OJ L 193, 30.7.2018, p. 1, hereafter
Financial Regulation no 2018/1046.
32Article 2 (7) Financial Regulation no 2018/1046.
33Article 310 (5) TFEU.
34Article 317 TFEU.
35Article 287 (2) TFEU.
36Article 2 (59), Article 6 and Article 33 Financial Regulation no 2018/1046.
37Next to principles of unity, budgetary accuracy, annuality, equilibrium, unit of account, univer-
sality, specification, and transparency.
276 J. Łacny
and effectiveness.38 The CJEU claims that the principle of sound financial manage-
ment (applied in area of the EU funds) corresponds to the principles of sincere
co-operation (applied in general terms of EU law39). The CJEU often recalls this
principle in the context of EU rules establishing tasks related to the management and
spending of EU funds, to underline the necessity to protect them.40
3.2.2 Protection of the Financial Interests of the Union (Article
325 TFEU)
The objective of the conditionality mechanism, eventually to be established by the
Draft Regulation, is to protect the financial interests of the Union (the EU budget)
against damages deriving from breaches of the rule of law by the Member States.
This fact is stipulated in the title of this Draft (Regulation on the protection of the
Union’s budget) and in its provisions.41 They foresee that this Draft would establish
rules necessary for the protection of the Union’s budget in the case of generalised
deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States.42 What’s more, a
generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a Member State—a premise
necessary to launch the conditionality mechanism—was defined as a common
national practice violating the rule of law and affecting or risking to affect the
protection of the financial interests of the EU.43
38The principle of economy stipulates that the resources used by the EU institutions concerned in
the pursuit of its activities are made available in due time, in appropriate quantity and quality, and at
the best price. The principle of efficiency concerns the best relationship between the resources
employed, the activities undertaken and the achievement of objectives. The principle of effective-
ness concerns the extent to which the objectives pursued are achieved through the activities
undertaken.
39Article 4 (3) TEU.
40CJEU, Cases C-138/03, C-324/03 and C-431/03 Italy v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:714,
para. 44; CFI, Case T-345/03 Evropaïki Dynamiki v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2015:168, para. 77;
CFI, Case T-549/08 Luxemburg v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2010:244, para. 47; Court, Case
T-265/08 Germany v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2012:434, para. 40; CJEU, Case C-500/99 P
Conserve Italia v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2002:45, para. 88; CFI, Case T-308/05, Italy
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2007:382, para. 109; opinion of AG Trstenjak, Case C-539/09 Ger-
many v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:345, para. 95.
41See also paras 9–11, opinion of the Court of Auditors No 1/2018 concerning the proposal of
2 May 2018 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the
Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States,
hereafter: ECA opinion No 1/2018.
42Article 1 Draft Regulation.
43Article2 (b) Draft Regulation.
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The notion ‘protection of the financial interests of the Union’, is used in the
TFEU,44 defined in EU secondary law,45 and clarified by the CJEU.46 The ‘financial
interests of the Union’ encompass revenues, expenditures, and assets covered by the
EU budgets, the budgets of the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies
established under the EU Treaties, and budgets directly or indirectly managed and
monitored by them. Article 325 TFEU, the main Treaty provision regarding financial
interests of the Union, obliges the Member States and the EU institutions to counter
fraud and any other illegal activities affecting these interests through deterrent
measures that should ensure their effective protection. In turn, the Member State
on their side should take the same measures to counter fraud affecting the financial
interests of the EU as they take to counter fraud affecting their own financial interests
(the assimilation principle).
To sum up, a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law, the existence of
which in a Member State is a necessary premise of launching the conditionality
mechanism, indicates (1) a common conduct on the part of public authorities of the
Member States that (2) violate the rule of law, which (3) adversely affects or is likely
to affect the EU funds (the financial interests of EU, Article 325 TFEU) or its
management (the sound financial management of the EU, Article 317 TFEU).
3.2.3 Types of Generalised Deficiency As Regards the Rule of Law
Presented definition of ‘a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law’ was
formulated broadly-worded. To give some examples of these generalised deficien-
cies and to limit the scope of interpretation of this notion at the same time, the
Commission and the European Parliament established their specific types.
The Commission provided for two lists of generalised deficiency as regards the
rule of law. The first list includes, generally speaking, the conduct of national
authorities (administrative, investigative, and judicial) related to EU funds. The list
is left open. Deficiencies included there do not have to be serious, since they include,
e.g., practices on the part of a national authority affecting the effective and timely
cooperation with the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) or the European Public
Prosecutor’s Office.47 Detection of these types of deficiencies as regards the rule of
law in the Member States leads to48 the launching of a conditionality mechanism. In
contrast, the second list of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law
indicates conducts on the part of national administration that may lead49 to the
initiation of the conditionality mechanism. In this case the deficiencies are related
44Article 310 (5) and Article 325 TFEU.
45Article (1) (a) Directive (EU) 2017/1371.
46Opinion of AG Jacobs in Case C-11/00 Commission v. ECB, ECLI:EU:C:2002:556.
47Article 3 (1) (f) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
48Article 3 (1) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
49Article 3 (2) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
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merely to the national judiciary and concern its constitutional determinants
(e.g. judicial independence), administration (e.g. lack of relevant financial and
human resources), and actions performed (e.g. prosecuting, sanctioning). There is,
however, no requirement that these deficiencies must or may affect the financial
interest of the Union.
The European Parliament’s approach was similar, as it also created two lists of
generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law. The first, also open list, relates to
the conduct of national administration and justice and includes, e.g., failing to
prevent, correct and sanction arbitrary or unlawful decisions made by public author-
ities; limiting the availability and effectiveness of legal remedies, including through
restrictive procedural rules; lack of implementation of judgments or limiting the
effective investigation, prosecution and sanctioning of breaches of law. This list
includes inter alia ‘endangering the administrative capacity of Member States to
respect the obligations of Union membership, including the capacity to effectively
implement EU law’. Last but not least, measures that weaken the protection of
confidentiality of communications between lawyers and clients were also included
on this list.50 The second list includes generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of
law that endanger or risk to endanger financial interests of the Union.51 This list
includes general deficiencies included on the Commission’s first list,52 as well as two
new breaches, concerning among other Copenhagen criteria53 and fundamental
rights.54
To sum up deliberation on the notion of ‘a generalised deficiency as regards the
rule of law’—the premises necessary to launch a conditionality mechanism, it can be
said that it has been formulated extremely broadly, and its scope is virtually
impossible to determine. The general wording leaves the Commission and the
Council—the EU institutions that would launch the conditionality mechanism—
with a wide margin of discretion, which is undesirable, especially from the point of
view of the principles of legal certainty and legality of sanctions. This principle
requires that any provision imposing sanctions on entities must be formulated clearly
and precisely, so that they can determine with certainty the scope of their rights and
50Article 2 (a) Draft Regulation (European Parliament proposal).
51Article 3 Draft Regulation (European Parliament proposal).
52Article 3 (1) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
53Distortion or risk of distortion of proper functioning of the market economy and effective
implementation of obligations of membership, including adherence to the aim of political, eco-
nomic and monetary union could constitute generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law
(Article 3 (1) aa Draft Regulation, European Parliament proposal).
54This same classification could be given to the shortages in proper implementation of the EU
budget following a systemic violation of fundamental rights (Article 3 (1) fa Draft Regulation
(European Parliament proposal).
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obligations and take appropriate actions.55 As required by the CJEU, this principle
should be rigorously observed, particularly in the case of provisions that have or may
have a financial impact. Viewed in this light, it may be stated that the notion of a
generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law is neither clear nor precise. Its strict
formulation is even more necessary if one takes into account the oppressive nature
that the conditionality mechanism may have on the Member State and beneficiaries
(see Sect. 5.2). It seems highly undesirable that the EU institutions, in taking actions
against Member States for breaching the rule of law, may itself frustrate this rule by
applying premises which are formulated (too) broadly. The wide scope of the
competences conferred on the EU institutions under the conditionality mechanism
has also been criticized by the ECA, which recommended to the EU legislator to
establish precise criteria defining the concept of a generalised deficiency as regards
the rule of law, and to specify measures to be taken in this framework. The suggested
clarifications, sharpening the Draft Regulation, could satisfy the principle of legal
certainty and legality of sanctions as well as limit the scope of the EU institutions’
discretion.56
4 Measures Applied Under the Conditionality Mechanism
The conditionality mechanism is a general term under which specific measures
would be imposed on the Member States breaching the rule of law. These measures
would depend on which method of implementing the EU budget is used for spending
the EU funds. These methods—namely direct, shared, and indirect management—
require different entities incurring expenditures financed from the EU budget
(EU funds) to comply with related tasks and responsibilities established in EU
law, and authorise the Commission to take supervisory actions to ensure their proper
spending.57 These methods vary according to which entity is spending the EU funds.
In the case of direct management, the funds are spent by the Commission, through its
departments and executive agencies; in the case of shared management—by the
Member States; and in the case of indirect management—by third countries, inter-
national organizations, and other entities.58
55CJEU Cases: 70-83, Kloppenburg, ECLI:EU:C:1984:71; 325/85, Ireland v. Commission, ECLI:
EU:C:1987:546, para. 18; C-143/93, Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten, ECLI:EU:C:1996:45,
para. 27; C-177/96, Banque Indosuez, ECLI:EU:C:1997:494; C-439/01, Cipra, Kvasnicka, ECLI:
EU:C:2003:31, para. 49; C-110/03, Belgium v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:223, para. 30;
C-158/06, Stichting ROM-projecten, ECLI:EU:C:2007:370, paras 25–26.
56ECA opinion No 1/2018, paras 12-16, 19.
57The methods of implementation of the EU budget is determined by Financial Regulation 2018/
104, Article 62.
58Financial Regulation 2018/1046, Article 62 (1) (c).
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Here we focus on shared management,59 under which the EU funds are spent for
the implementation of the CAP and the cohesion policy, altogether constituting
about 70% of the EU’s budgetary expenditures.60 If the EU funds are spent under
shared management, the following measures can be applied under the conditionality
mechanism: suspension of approval of programs or amendments thereof; suspension
of commitments; reduction of commitments, including through financial corrections
or transfers to other spending programs; reduction of pre-financing; an interruption
of payment deadlines; and suspension of payments.61
The Draft Regulation does not establish how these measures should operate in
practice, nor even provide their general legal characteristics. There is also no
guidance as to which types of the above-mentioned measures should be applied in
the case of certain generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law. The Draft
Regulation simply refers to the names of particular measures, which may suggest the
essence of the activities undertaken. Very general information is given in the
preamble, which states that these measures should include the suspension of pay-
ments and of commitments, a reduction of funding under existing commitments, and
a prohibition on concluding new commitments with recipients.62
The application of these measures requires recourse to the EU sectoral Regula-
tions, which provide specific rules for the spending of the EU funds for EU policies,
e.g. for the CAP and the cohesion policy. Surprisingly, the Draft Regulation does not
mention such a reference. It must also be noted that, at present, a detailed and final
assessment of these sectoral Regulations is not possible since they are undergoing
legislative processes in the EU institutions heading the new MFF 2021–2027.63 At
this point in time, it can only be stated that these measures can be taken at various
stages of the implementation of EU policies: from the stage of approval of national
programs by the Commission to the stage of making legal commitments by the
Commission, followed by the payments of the EU funds to the Member States. It is
clear however that one of these measures consists of suspending the payment of EU
funds,64 and this is what the remainder of this contribution will mainly focus on.
The undefined nature of the measures to be imposed under the conditionality
mechanism deserves the same criticism which was already formulated towards the
59Craig (2012), p. 27; Hofmann et al. (2012); Schöndorf-Haubold (2011).
60Communication from the Commission. A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a
European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020. COM(2018) 98 final.
61Article 4 (1) (b) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
62Recital 13 preamble Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
63Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financing,
management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation
(EU) No 1306/2013 (COM(2018)393 final) and proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council laying down common provisions on the European Regional Devel-
opment Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, and the European Maritime and
Fisheries Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum and Migration Fund, the Internal
Security Fund and the Border Management and Visa Instrument (COM(2018)375 final).
64See point 7 ECA opinion No 1/2018.
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vagueness of the premise of its application, namely notion of ‘a generalised defi-
ciency as regards the rule of law’ (see: Sect. 3.2 above). Principles of legal certainty
and legality of sanctions must be recalled once again to evoke that any provision
imposing sanctions must be formulated clearly and precisely.65 The CJEU requires
that these principle should be rigorously observed, particularly in the case of pro-
visions that have or may have a financial impact. Viewed in this light, it may be
stated that neither the premise of launching the conditionality mechanism (the notion
of ‘a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law’) nor measures imposed under
this mechanism are clear nor precise. Its strict formulation is even more necessary if
one takes into account the oppressive nature that the conditionality mechanism may
have on the Member State and beneficiaries (see Sect. 6).
What’s important and deserves credit, the Draft Regulation provides rules which
the EU institutions (the Commission or the Council) should take into account when
imposing measures under the conditionality mechanism.66 They would be obliged to
ensure that these measures should be proportionate to the nature, gravity, and scope
of the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law. These measures also should,
insofar as possible, target the EU actions affected or potentially affected by that
deficiency. The requirement of proportionality between the generalised deficiency as
regards the rule of law, that is EU law infringement leading to launching of the
conditionality mechanism on one side, and measures adopted under this mechanism
on the other side signifies that these measures are deemed as sanctions imposed upon
the Member State for breaching the rule of law. Under EU law, the principle of
proportionality is the sine qua non condition of adoption of any sanctions imposed as
the result of an infringement of a law.
To sum up this sub-section, the Draft Regulation provides generally-formulated
premises for launching the conditionality mechanism together with their very spe-
cific examples, which can lead to measures of a really unknown (as yet) character.
This extremely broad formulation of provisions defining prohibited infringements of
the law and sanctions imposed for their perpetration raises concerns as to their
legality. It is because it cannot be claimed that these provisions are clear and or
precise, as the principles of legal certainty and legality of sanctions would require.
No matter how challenging this may be, respect for the principles of legality and
legal certainty would require the premises for launching the conditionality mecha-
nism to be formulated more unequivocally. Provisions of the Draft Regulation
should clearly indicate major types and a closed list of examples of systematic
breaches of the rule of law that could lead to the activation of this mechanism.
65CJEU Cases: 70-83, Kloppenburg, ECLI:EU:C:1984:71; 325/85, Ireland v. Commission, ECLI:
EU:C:1987:546, para. 18; C-143/93, Gebroeders van Es Douane Agenten, ECLI:EU:C:1996:45,
para. 27; C-177/96, Banque Indosuez, ECLI:EU:C:1997:494; C-439/01, Cipra, Kvasnicka, ECLI:
EU:C:2003:31, para. 49; C-110/03, Belgium v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2005:223, para. 30;
C-158/06, Stichting ROM-projecten, ECLI:EU:C:2007:370, para. 25–26.
66Article 4 (3) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal) and Article 5a Draft Regulation (European
Parliament proposal).
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These provisions should be formulated taking into account the standards established
in the case-law of the CJEU and the ECtHR for the imposition of sanctions.
5 The Procedure for Adoption of a Decision Applying
the Conditionality Mechanism
While the proposals lodged by the Commission and the European Parliament
concerning premises for launching the conditionality mechanism are generally in
line with each other, their proposals for procedural rules to be applied to this end
differ considerably. Disparities concern the key issue, namely determining the EU
institution that would adopt a decision applying the conditionality mechanism and
the procedural steps that would be taken in this regard. While the Commission
proposed that this decision should be adopted by the Council, on a request from the
Commission, according to the European Parliament this decision should be adopted
by the Commission, with a right of the European Parliament and the Council to
oppose it or change it. These issues are presented below.
5.1 Initiation of the Procedure
According to the Draft Regulation, initiation of the conditionality mechanism would
require a determination that there is at least one generalised deficiency as regards the
rule of law in the Member State targeted (see Sect. 3.2).
The Commission proposes that it would conduct an inquiry by itself and that if it
found a generalised deficiency, it would indicate it in a written notification submitted
to the Member State concerned. The Commission could request additional informa-
tion from this State, including proposals for remedial measures. The Member State
would have to provide the Commission with information within the time-limits set
by the Commission, not less than 1 month from the date of the written notification.
When assessing the existence of a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law,
the Commission could take into account all information, including judgments of the
CJEU, reports of the ECA, and recommendations of international organizations.67
The European Parliament has proposed two modifications to this procedure. The
first concerned the establishment of an advisory panel of independent experts
(hereafter: Panel) that would assist the Commission in assessing the existence of a
generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a given Member State. The
second one concerns obliging the Commission to take into account certain Copen-
hagen criteria while making such an assessment.
67Article 5 Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
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The primary function of the Panel would be to assist the Commission in identi-
fying generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States.68 This
function would be achieved in a twofold manner. Firstly, the Panel would adopt ad
hoc opinions concerning generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law as
examined by the Commission. Secondly, the Panel would annually assess situations
in all Member States as regards their respect for the rule of law and would make a
public summary of its findings each year. The Draft Regulation thus would create a
new body—the Panel—entrusted with the task of continuous monitoring of the rule
of law situation in all the Member States.
As regards the Copenhagen criteria, the European Parliament proposes that the
Commission should examine them when assessing the existence of generalised
deficiencies as regards the rule of law in a Member State. The criteria should include:
chapters of the aquis on judiciary and fundamental rights, justice, freedom and
security; financial control and taxation; as well as guidelines used in the context of
the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM).69 The idea to link the com-
pliance with the rule of law with the Copenhagen criteria may raise concerns. It is not
evident why and how the compliance of the Member States with the legal principle
(the rule of law) could be assessed by evaluation of political criteria, in some cases
not even substantially related with the rule of law (e.g. financial control and
taxation).
5.2 Who Adopts the Decision?
The subsequent action, after the Commission finds a generalised deficiency as
regards the rule of law in the Member State, consists of the adoption of a decision
launching the conditionality mechanism (see Sect. 4). The Commission’s and the
European Parliament’s proposals considerably differ as to who should adopt this
decision.
68The Panel would be established by the Commission from specialists of constitutional law and
financial and budgetary matters. Each national parliament of the Member States would nominate
one expert to this Panel and the European Parliament would appoint five experts. Representatives of
relevant organisations and networks could be invited to the Panel as observers. Article 3a Draft
Regulation (European Parliament proposal).
69CVM is a transitional measure established by the Commission to assist Romania and Bulgaria in
progress after their accession to the Union in the fields of judicial reform, corruption and organised
crime. The Commission assesses progress under CVM based on benchmarks established for each
State. The benchmarks for Romania concern effectiveness and transparency of the judicial system
and the fight against and prevention of corruption. The benchmarks for Bulgaria deal with the
independence, professionalism, and efficiency of the judicial system and the fight against corruption





The Commission proposes that if it detects a generalised deficiency as regards the
rule of law in a Member State, it would submit to the Council a proposal for a
decision imposing measures on this State, e.g. suspending its payments from the EU
funds.70 This decision would be deemed to have been adopted unless the Council
rejects it by a QMV within 1 month of the Commission’s submission of its
decision.71 The Council may also amend this proposal by a QMV, with no time
limits established for amendment.
The European Parliament proposal differs, as it foresees the adoption of two
decisions, both by the Commission. In the first decision, addressed to the Member
State concerned, the Commission indicates a measure to be imposed on this State
under the conditionality mechanism (e.g. suspension of EU funds). In the second
decision, addressed to the European Parliament and to the Council (the EU budget-
ary authorities), the Commission indicates an amount equivalent as a measure
adopted in the first decision (e.g. amount of EU funds suspended). Then this amount
is classified as a EU budgetary reserve. The idea to adopt the latter decision, regulating
the legal and financial status of the amount concerned under the conditionality
mechanism, fills the gap in the Commission proposal, which would not determine
what would in legal terms happen to these funds. Both decisions are considered to be
adopted unless the European Parliament (acting by majority of the votes cast) or the
Council (acting by QMV), amend or reject it within 4 weeks of its receipt.72
5.3 Voting in the Council by Reverse QMV
The procedure to be followed by the EU institutions to adopt a decision launching
the conditionality mechanism is peculiar and therefore deserves attention. This
decision is not adopted under the standard legislative procedures provided by the
EU Treaties (most commonly applied—the ordinary and special legislative pro-
cedures73), but under a peculiar procedure created by the Draft Regulation. The
same concerns the voting cast in the Council. The Council would not vote on this
decision by the simple majority votes or by the ordinary QMV, the latter being the
standard cast provided for the Council’s voting by the EU Treaties,74 but by reverse
QMV—not foreseen by the EU Treaties.
70Article 5 (6-8) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
71The Council votes on the Commission’s proposal by reverseQMV. For more on this, see Sect. 5.3
below.
72Article 5 (6 a) (6 b) (6 c) Draft Regulation (European Parliament proposal).
73Articles 289 and 294 TFEU.
74Qualified majority votes is the ‘standard’ voting method in the Council used when the Council
takes decisions during the ordinary legislative procedure. About 80% of all EU legislation is
adopted with this procedure. A qualified majority is reached in the Council if 55% of Member
States vote in favour (16 out of 28) and the proposal is supported by the Member States representing
at least 65% of the total EU population. The blocking minority includes at least four Council
members representing more than 35% of the EU population (Article 238 TFEU).
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In general, when the Council votes by the ordinary QMV, obtaining this majority
leads to the adoption of a legal act. In the case of voting by reverse QMV the logic is
different—a proposal submitted by an applicant (in our case—the Commission) is
adopted unless the legislator (the Council) rejects or amends it acting by standard
QMV in a vote held in a given period. Following this period, a decision is considered
adopted. Thus, in the case of reverse QMV—a failure to obtain the standard QMV
necessary to block or change a proposal results in its adoption (in the wording of the
Draft Regulation ‘the decision shall be deemed to have been adopted’), while this
majority is necessary to reject or amend it. Under reverse QMV abstention counts as
positive votes, forcing the Member States to take a clear position and obliging them
to explicitly vote against the proposal, rather than following a more politically
expedient route of abstaining.
It can therefore be concluded that if the Commission sought to suspend EU funds
to a Member State for breaching the rule of law, but it was not convinced of the
Council’s support, it would much easier achieve its intention under the reverseQMV
then under the ordinaryQMV. This is because in the case of voting by reverseQMV
the decision would only require that the Council would not reject it by ordinary
QMV (within 1 month) or otherwise amend it by such QMV. So, if there is no
ordinary QMV to reject (within 1 month) or amend the decision, it would be
adopted. In contrast, if this decision would be voted by ordinary QMV, to be
adopted, it would have to be approved by ordinary QMV.
According to the Commission, the idea that the Council would vote on a decision
launching the conditionality mechanism by reverseQMV is dictated by the necessity
to protect the financial interests of the Union (in short—the EU funds).75 It seems
rather unthinkable to claim that necessity to protect the EU funds requires circum-
vention of the EU legislative procedure. It is not the first time in history of the EU
when voting in the Council by reverse QMV is to be introduced as a remedy
allowing an effective implementation of the EU policies. Such voting was already
established in 2011 when rules aimed to strengthen effective enforcement of the EU
fiscal policy were agreed. Under EU fiscal rules (Article 126 TFEU), the euro area
Member States must avoid excessive government deficit (3% of GDP), debt (60% of
GDP) and maintain sound and sustainable public finance. The Stability and Growth
Pact (the SGP) was signed by all Member States based on Articles 121 and
126 TFEU to facilitate and maintain these rules. The SGP provides for fiscal
monitoring of the Member States’ budgetary situation by the Commission and the
Council. It purpose was to ensure that the Member States maintain and enforce EU
fiscal rules and do not exceed budgetary deficit and debt limits. Under the SGP
(‘preventive arm’) each year all Member States submit a compliance report
presenting expected fiscal development for the current and subsequent 3 years
(‘stability programmes’ for eurozoneMember States and ‘convergence programmes’
for non-eurozone Member States). If a Member State does not comply with the EU
fiscal rules, an ‘Excessive Deficit Procedure’ (EDP) is initiated under the SGP
75Recital 15 preamble Draft Regulation. See critics: ECA opinion No 1/2018, para. 12.
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(‘dissuasive arm’). If this situation continues to remain despite multiple warnings,
sanctions can be imposed on this Member State. In 2011, in the face of the world
financial crisis, enforcement of the SGP was strengthened by the adoption of ‘Six
Pack’, ‘Two Pack’ and ‘Fiscal Compact’. These acts provided for automaticity of
sanctions, including interest-bearing deposits, non-interest-bearing deposits and
fines to be imposed on the Member States for recurrent breaches of the EU fiscal
rules.76 These sanctions are imposed based on the reverse QMV in the Council. The
Commission can impose them unless the Council decides by the reverse QMV to
reject the Commission recommendation within a specified period (usually 10 days).
Adoption of these sanctions thus requires a minority of the Member States to agree
on the Commission proposal or alternatively an ordinary QMV to block or change
this proposal.77 Legality of imposing sanctions on the Member States by voting in
the Council by the reverse QMV was not contested in action brought before the
CJEU. Therefore the position of the CJEU on this issue is unknown.
Coming back to the conditionality mechanism, it can be stated that the logic
applied in 2011 in the ‘Six Pack’, ‘Two Pack’ and ‘Fiscal Compact’ in area of
sanctions to be imposed for breaching—by the Member States—the EU fiscal rules
established under Article 126 TFEU and the SGP was reused in 2018 in the Draft
Regulation (the Commission proposal) providing for suspension of EU funds trans-
ferred to the Member States systematically breaching the rule of law. In both cases
the procedural peculiarities facilitate a procedure of adopting EU secondary acts
imposing sanctions on the Member States and strengthen the procedural role of the
Commission vis à vis a Member State suspected to breach the EU law (the EU fiscal
rules or the rule of law). Procedural peculiarities concern both the type of a
legislative procedure to be followed to adopt a decision initiating the conditionality
mechanism (a special procedure established by the Draft Regulation) and the
necessary vote cast in the Council to adopt it (reverse QMV). As regards the
legislative procedure (adoption of a decision by the Council) the EU Treaties neither
provide it as one of the standard legislative procedures that the EU institutions apply
to adopt EU secondary law (e.g. legislative, delegated, implementing acts and acts
‘without adjective’) nor authorise the EU institutions to apply it. So, the Draft
Regulation establishes a legislative procedure specially for the sake of the condi-
tionality mechanism, which remains outside of the EU Treaties regime. The same
can be said about voting by the Council under the reverse QMV to adopt a decision
launching the conditionality mechanism. Such a majority is not foreseen under the
76Articles 4-6 Regulation No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area (OJ L
306, 23.11.2011, p. 1); Article 3 Regulation No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic
imbalances in the euro area (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 8); Article 10 (4) Regulation No 1176/
2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and
correction of macroeconomic imbalances (OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, p. 25); Article 7 Treaty on
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Compact).
77Van Aken and Artige (2013), p. 131; Chalmers et al. (2015), p. 751.
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EU Treaties. Just to remind Article 16 (3) TEU foresees that the Council act by a
standard QMV except where the Treaties provide otherwise. There is no provision
under the Treaties which authorise the Council to vote under reverse QMV. These
doubts inevitably lead to a question of legality of the Draft Regulation establishing
procedural conditions of adopting a decision initiating the conditionality mecha-
nism, not mentioned nor foreseen under EU Treaties.
5.4 Decision Lifting the Measures
The Member State against whom the conditionality mechanism was initiated is
authorized at any time to provide the Commission with evidence that it has remedied
or eliminated the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law. On this base the
Commission assesses the situation in this State with a view toward adopting a
decision lifting the conditionality mechanism.78 This formula was presented by the
Commission, and the European Parliament subsequently added two elements to
it. The first is that the Commission should assess the situation in the Member State
taking into account the opinion of the Panel (see Sect. 5.1) and second, that the
Commission should act within 1 month and in any case within a reasonable
timeframe from the date of receipt of the notification from the Member State.79
A decision lifting the conditionality mechanism would be issued by the EU
institutions that have adopted it—by the Council (as the Commission proposes) or
by the Commission (as the European Parliament proposes). The same procedure
would apply mutatis mutandis.80
6 Impact of the Conditionality Mechanism
The key issue related to the conditionality mechanism concerns its real financial
impact. In the public debate it is frequently claimed that its essence is a temporary
suspension of transfers of EU funds to the Member State breaching the rule of law.
However, analysis of the Draft Regulation reveals that this diagnosis seems overly
simplistic, and launching of the conditionality mechanism may end up as well in a
definitive loss of the EU funds by the Member State in question. What’s more, this
may also affect individuals. These issues are presented below.
78Article 6 (2) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
79Article 6 (2) Draft Regulation (European Parliament proposal).
80Article 6 (2) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal and European Parliament proposal).
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6.1 Impact of the Conditionality Mechanism on the Member
States
According to the Draft Regulation, if EU funds are suspended under the condition-
ality mechanism, the amounts corresponding to the suspended commitments are
re-entered into the EU budget subject to the Article 7 Draft Multiannual Financial
Framework Regulation81 (the Draft MFF Regulation). Re-entering allows
reallocation and future reutilisation of the EU funds in question (see Sect. 5.2).
What is important, the Article 7 Draft MFF Regulation proposes that commitments
suspended in year ‘n’ due to a generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law in a
Member State may not be re-entered into the EU budget later than in the year
‘n’+2.82 The Draft Regulation contains a similar provision, stipulating that
suspended commitments for year ‘n’ may not be entered into the EU budget beyond
year ‘n’+2.83 On the top of this, from year ‘n’+3, amounts corresponding to the
suspended commitments should be entered in the Union Reserve for Commitments
(hereafter: Union Reserve).84 This Reserve is a new financial instrument which
would be financed from, inter alia, funds committed to the EU budget but ultimately
not spent for the implementation of EU programmes and thus de-committed.
Amounts of the Union Reserve would be made available for the Member State in
the new MFF 2021–2027.
In should be thus reminded that according to political declarations and its
common understanding by the public, the conditionality mechanism is supposed to
only lead to a temporary suspension of EU funds of the Member States breaching the
rule of law, thus motivating them to eliminate the breaches promptly. If that is the
case, the funds should be returned to these States. However, this may not happen
because of the ‘n+2’ rule contained in the Draft Regulation and in the Draft MFF
Regulation. Application of the conditionality mechanism may thus relatively easily
result not in the suspension, but in the permanent loss of EU funds by the Member
States.85 This is because these Drafts introduce the ‘n+2’ rule which authorizes the
Commission to enter into the EU budget only the amounts corresponding to the
amounts suspended under the conditionality mechanism which were lifted within
2 years (year ‘n’+2) from the year they were suspended (year ‘n’). After the elapse of
these 2 years, the Commission will have no legal basis to enter these amounts into
the EU budget anymore. From year ‘n’+3 these amounts would be entered into the
Union Reserve and could be allocated to the Member States—all Member States, not
only the one on which the conditionality mechanism was applied and spend in the
MFF 2021–2027.
81Article 6 (3) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
82Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years
2021 to 2027 (COM(2018) 322 final).
83Article 6 (3) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
84Article 12 Draft MFF Regulation.
85Para. 8 ECA opinion No 1/2018.
Suspension of EU Funds Paid to Member States Breaching the Rule of Law: Is the. . . 289
This indicates that a Member State whose EU funds were suspended under the
conditionality mechanism practically has 2 years from the year of suspension (year
‘n’) to remedy the generalised deficiency as regards the rule of law and to request the
EU institutions to lift the suspension and re-enter the amounts corresponding to the
suspended commitments to the EU budget.86 If the Member State fails to undertake
these actions during the 2-year period, it loses the possibility to benefit from the
suspended EU funds. Conducting all these actions within 2 years can be extremely
difficult, taking into account that the elimination of rule of law breaches is usually
time-consuming and in addition further time is needed to complete the proceedings
in the EU institutions to lift the suspension.
6.2 Impact of the Conditionality Mechanism
on the Beneficiaries of EU Funds
In principle, the conditionality mechanism should solely affect those Member States
breaching the rule of law, and the consequences of the suspension of EU funds
should not in any way influence the beneficiaries of these funds (e.g. farmers,
entrepreneurs).87 To achieve this objective, the Commission foresees, in the Draft
Regulation, that unless the decision adopting the measures imposed under the
conditionality mechanism provides otherwise, its adoption does not affect the
obligation of the Member States to implement the programme or fund those affected
by the measures, and in particular the obligation to make payments to the beneficia-
ries of EU funds (hereafter: beneficiaries).88 In other words, despite the fact that the
regular transfer of the EU funds from the EU budget to Member States’ budget is
suspended under the conditionality mechanism, this State is nevertheless obliged to
continue to implement programmes financed from these funds and make payments
to beneficiaries. It could be assumed that since the Commission recognized the need
to protect the beneficiaries against the possibility that Member States will cease to
make payments to them due to the suspension of EU funds under the conditionality
mechanism, it should also specify in the Draft Regulation legal measures that
beneficiaries could apply against the Member States if this should occur. However,
the Commission has not done so.89
86Article 6 Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
87The European Parliament formulated this assumption in its resolution of 14 March 2018 on the
MFF (2017/2052(INI)). The Commission also pointed out that beneficiaries of EU funding must not
be affected by breaches of the rule of law by Member States. See page 2 of the Draft Regulation.
88Article 4 (2) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
89See critics: ECA opinion No 1/2018, point 27.
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The European Parliament has tried to remedy this deficiency and strengthen the
legal protection of beneficiaries against the misconduct of Member States.90 It
proposed that the Commission should provide information and guidance via a
website or internet portal for beneficiaries on the obligations of Member States to
implement the programme, in particular to make payments to them. The Commis-
sion should also provide, on the same website or portal, adequate tools allowing
beneficiaries to inform it of any breaches of these obligations by the Member States.
The information provided by the beneficiaries may only be taken into account by the
Commission if it is accompanied by a proof that they have lodged a complaint to the
competent national authority. Beneficiaries informing the Commission would be
protected under the proposed Directive on whistle-blower protection.91
The above-mentioned rules establish communication channels between the Com-
mission and beneficiaries enabling them to exchange information on any eventual
negative effects experienced by the latter due to Member States stopping to make the
payments of EU funds. It is, however, doubtful whether such communication itself
may effectively protect beneficiaries, without being accompanied by any formal
legal actions. Three solutions appear to exist. Firstly, beneficiaries could apply legal
remedies established under the national law to claim continuation of payments of EU
funds from national authorities. This may however be challengeable or even
unattainable in Member States in which an illiberal democracy has captured the
national administration and independent prosecution and judiciary. Secondly, the
beneficiaries could initiate an action for damages against the Member State claiming
the State has infringed its obligation under the Draft Regulation to make payments of
EU funds (Francovich liability). The success of this claim may still however depend
on the effectiveness and independence of the national judiciary, which could and is
troublesome in the case of some Member States. The Commission’s legal position is
more meaningful, as it could—as a third solution—initiate a general infringement
action (Article 258 TFEU) against a Member State who breaches the Draft Regula-
tion by ceasing to make the payments of EU funds to beneficiaries.
It is important to note that the Draft Regulation has equipped the Commission
with competences that may help to ensure that beneficiaries would receive their EU
funds if its transfer would be suspended on a national level. These competences
depend on the method under which the EU budget is implemented (see Sect. 4). Two
possibilities exist in this respect, since these EU funds may be spent under indirect
management92—by public and private law Member States’ organisations—or under
shared management93—by Member States, mostly for implementation of CAP and
the cohesion policy. If EU funds are spent under indirect management (by public and
90Recital 14 preamble and Article 4 (3) (a) and (3) (b) Draft Regulation (European Parliament
proposal).
91Proposal for a Directive on the protection of persons reporting on breaches of Union law COM
(2018)218 final.
92Article 62 (1) (c) of the Financial Regulation no 2018/1046.
93Article 62 (1) (b) of the Financial Regulation no 2018/1046.
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private law Member State organisations), the Commission may recover the pay-
ments directly made to these organisations for an amount equivalent to the amount
not paid to beneficiaries.94 When EU funds are spent under shared management
(by the Member States), the Commission may impose a financial correction95 on
them to recover the EU funds from these State. In both cases amounts recovered by
the Commission are transferred to the Union Reserve.96
These provisions, however, do not change the general rule describe above
according to which the Member States are obliged to make payments to beneficiaries
despite the transfer of EU funds to these States is suspended under the conditionality
mechanism. In other words, suspension of EU funds transferred to a Member State
does not change a legal situation of beneficiaries who can claim payments of these
funds only from the national administration, not from the Commission.
6.3 Impact of the Conditionality Mechanism on Relations
Between the National Authorities
Independently of the financial losses that the conditionality mechanism causes to the
Member State (Sect. 6.1) and may cause to beneficiaries (Sect. 6.2), it may also
affect internal relations within the national administration. More specifically, it may
lead to conflicts between the central government of the Member State (the addressee
of the EU decision suspending the EU funds) and public authorities functioning on
the lower levels in the structure of this State. This is because the Draft Regulation
imposes the obligation to make payments to beneficiaries not only on the central
government of the Member States, but also on ‘government entities’, which, as
defined, include all public authorities at all levels of government, i.e. national,
regional, and local authorities as well as Member State organizations.97 It can thus
be predicted that if transfers of EU funds would be suspended under the condition-
ality mechanism, these funds would not be paid to the government of a Member
State, whereas the obligation to pay them to beneficiaries would still rest on
government entities, e.g. local authorities and national organisations, which are
defined broadly. This could easily give rise to internal domestic conflicts.
94Article 12 draft MFF Regulation.
95Article 98 of CP Regulation, COM(2018) 375 final.
96Article 12 (2) (a) draft MFF Regulation.
97Article 2 (c) Draft Regulation (Commission proposal).
292 J. Łacny
7 The Conditionality Mechanism and Other Rule-of-Law
Mechanisms
The verification of Member States’ compliance with the rule of law that would be
performed under the conditionality mechanism if the Draft Regulation is adopted
may also be checked under other legal procedures established in EU Treaties. The
most important are: the Article 7 TEU procedure and the general infringement
procedures (Articles 258-260 TFEU). Since the Draft Regulation does not specify
the relationship between the proposed conditionality mechanism and these proce-
dures, this may lead to major legal disputes98 and require some clarifications.
7.1 The Article 7 TEU Procedure
Article 7 TEU allows the EU institutions to examine whether the Member States
respect the values on which the EU is based (Article 2 TEU) which include, inter
alia, the rule of law. Article 7 TEU foresees a procedure to be followed and measures
to be adopted if a breach of these values is detected. This procedure has already been
launched against Poland (in 2017) and Hungary (in 2018).
The Article 7 TEU procedure consists of two stages: ‘the preventive stage’, where
decisions are taken by the Council;99 and ‘the sanctioning stage’, which belongs to
the European Council and the Council.100 At ‘the preventive stage’ of the Article
7 TEU procedure, the Council hears the Member State, addresses recommendations
to it, and determines whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach by this State of
the rule of law.101 At ‘the sanctioning stage’ of the Article 7 TEU procedure, the
European Council determines the existence of a serious and persistent breach of the
rule of law by this State.102 After that, the Council may decide to suspend certain
rights of this State deriving from the application of the Treaties, including the voting
rights of the representative of the government of this Member State in the Coun-
cil.103 In response to changes in the situation which led to the imposition of the
above measures, the Council may decide to alter or revoke them.104 As regards the
judicial control of actions taken based on Article 7 TEU, the CJEU decides only on
98Taborowski (2019), pp. 205–207.
99Article 7 (1) TEU.
100Article 7 (2) and (3) TEU.
101The Council acts by a majority of 4/5 of its Members, on a reasoned proposal of 1/3 of the
Member States, by the European Parliament or by the Commission, after obtaining the consent of
the European Parliament.
102In this stage the European Council acts unanimously, on a proposal from 1/3 of the Member
States or by the Commission, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
103The Council acts by QMV.
104The Council acts by QMV.
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the legality of the procedural stipulations contained in this Article,105 with no
substantive control of measures (e.g. sanctions) adopted.
Article 7 (3) TEU, which allows the Council to suspend certain rights of the
Member States deriving from the application of the Treaties, deserves a closer look
inasmuch as actions undertaken on its basis prima facie may be similar to actions
performed under the Draft Regulation. The legal nature of actions undertaken based
on Article 7 (3) TEU is not determined by the Treaties. These provisions simply
indicate the essence of such actions (suspension of rights deriving from the appli-
cation of the Treaties) and provide one example (suspension of the voting right in the
Council); otherwise they describe such actions by using the neutral term ‘measure’.
The scope of competences conferred on the Council based on Article 7 (3) TEU have
given rise to a heated debate, in which it is commonly accepted that the Council’s
actions constitute political sanctions imposed on Member States for breaching the
values on which the EU is founded.106 It should thus be determined whether, based
on Article 7 (3) TEU, the Council is authorized to suspend the EU funds of a
Member State found to be in breach of the rule of law. In other words, is it true
that the competences to be created under the conditionality mechanism (the Draft
Regulation) already exist under Article 7 (3) TEU?
Given that under Article 7 (3) TEU the rights of a Member State deriving from the
application of the Treaties may be suspended, it should also be possible to suspend
transfers of EU funds to this State on this basis.107 Undoubtedly, receipt of the EU
funds is a right that the Member States benefit from as a result of their EU
membership, and the amounts received are set out in the MFF Regulations based
on political agreements reached by all Member States. It can therefore be stated that
by suspending transfer of the EU funds, the Member State is temporarily deprived of
the possibility to enjoy its right deriving from the Treaties.
It thus follows that the suspension of the EU funds of Member States breaching
the rule of law is possible both under Article 7 (3) TEU and would be under the
conditionality mechanism as well if the Draft Regulation is adopted. It has already
been pointed out that the Draft Regulation does not specify the relationship between
the Article 7 TEU procedure and the conditionality mechanism. This silence calls for
an analysis in which two options should be taken into consideration.
The first option, based on the hierarchy of EU legal norms, is that the Article
7 TEU procedure and the conditionality mechanism are interdependent. The Article
7 TEU procedure (regulated by EU Treaty) has a primary role and the conditionality
mechanism (regulated in the Draft Regulation) supplements it. The Article 7 TEU
procedure provides a general framework for a suspension of EU funds for breaches
of the rule of law, and the Draft Regulation ensures its practical implementation.
Based on this reasoning, in legal terms the suspension of EU funds under the
conditionality mechanism would constitute a ‘measure’ within the meaning of
105Article 269 TFEU.
106Geiger (2015), Mangiameli and Saputelli (2013), Besselink (2017) and Dumbrovský (2018).
107Taborowski (2019), pp. 194–197.
294 J. Łacny
Article 7 (3) TEU. Following this logic, the suspension of EU funds would have to
be first imposed under Article 7 (3) TEU and only then under the conditionality
mechanism. In this scenario, however, one breach of the rule of law would be
double-checked in two different procedures—first under the Article 7 TEU proce-
dure and then under the conditionality mechanism. At a glance, this seems counter-
productive. It may not be also excluded that decisions made under the Article 7 TEU
procedure and under the conditionality mechanism would differ, depending on the
political ambience, not to mention how unpractical and time-consuming this may
be. If one recalls that the reasons to create the conditionality mechanism regulated by
the EU secondary law was to overcome the political difficulties or even impossibility
of conducting the Article 7 procedure, proven by the unsuccessful proceedings
launched against Poland and Hungary, the idea to merge the Article 7 TEU proce-
dure and the conditionality mechanism multiplies existing difficulties. Therefore the
second option requires scrutiny.
The second option is based on the argument of procedural effectiveness, or the
effet utile principle. Under this option the Article 7 TEU procedure and the condi-
tionality mechanism are parallel and independent of each other, because their legal
nature is different. The Article 7 TEU procedure is a political one, while the
conditionality mechanism is a legal proceeding. In the Article 7 TEU procedure
decisions are made by a political body (the Council) based on political assessments.
Judicial control of the legality of these decisions performed by the CJEU is limited
only to reviewing the procedural requirements stipulated in Article 7 TEU. This
procedure aims exclusively to eliminate breaches of values on which the EU is
based, including the rule of law. In contrast, the objective of the conditionality
mechanism is more clear-cut, as it should safeguard the EU funds, or more precisely
their sound management108 and protection109 against damages resulting from sys-
tematic breaches of the rule of law in the Member State. In this procedure decisions
are made based on an assessment of the legal (and not political) criteria established
under the Draft Regulation, namely the existence of a generalised deficiency as
regards the rule of law in the Member State as defined in this Draft (see Sect. 3.2).
The key decisions are taken by the Commission,110 which is the guardian of the EU
Treaties,111 also responsible for the EU budget.112 The legality of these decisions is
fully checked by the CJEU under an action for annulment.113 This kind of jurisdic-
tion of the CJEU significantly strengthens the legal situations of the Member States
in comparison to the purely procedural checks of decisions performed by the CJEU
under the Article 7 TEU procedure.114 In conclusion, it is thus justified to claim the
108Article 317 TFEU.
109Article 325 TFEU.
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Article 7 TEU procedure and the conditionality mechanism are parallel and inde-
pendent of each other.
One could imagine to attack the Draft Regulation as an illegal circumvention of
the Article 7 TEU procedures. However, Article 7 TEU does not contain an explicit
statement as to whether other Union institutions may defend European values using
other instruments. Thus, the general rules apply. It is well established that a specific
procedure designed to deal with a certain problem does not exclude developing other
instruments,115 a core doctrine since the Van Gend en Loos judgment.116 Accord-
ingly, it is, in principle, admissible to develop new instruments,117 such as the
Commission’s Rule of Law Framework, or to use the budget to defend European
values.
7.2 The General Infringement Procedure (Arts.
258-260 TFEU)
The general infringement procedure is another legal proceeding that can be initiated
against a Member State’s breaching the rule of law. Under this procedure, if the
Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obligation under
the Treaties it may bring the matter before the CJEU. If the CJEU finds that the
Member State indeed infringed provisions of EU law, it confirms its finding in a
judgment.118 The Member State is then obliged to eliminate the infringement found,
and if it does not do so the CJEU may impose financial penalties on this State.119
The possibilities offered by the general infringement procedure (Article 258-260
TFEU) in the context of rule of law breaches have already been described by legal
scholars.120 Unlike the Article 7 TEU procedure fruitlessly conducted against Poland
and Hungary, the general infringement procedure has already been successfully
completed in 2019 in cases against Poland. In case C-192/18 Commission
v. Poland the CJEU ruled that by establishing a different retirement age for men
and women judges and prosecutors in Poland, Poland has failed to fulfil its obliga-
tions under Article 157 TFEU and Articles 5(a) and 9(1)(f) of Anti-Discrimination
Directive 2006/54/EC. In addition, by granting the Minister for Justice the right to
authorise judges to continue to carry out their duties beyond the new retirement age,
Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 19 (1) TEU.121 In similar cases
C-619/18 Commission v. Poland the CJEU also ruled that Poland had failed to fulfil
115Bast (2006), pp. 60–63.
116CJEU, Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, para. 26.
117Bast (2006), pp. 42–67.
118Article 258 TFEU.
119Article 260 TFEU.
120Wennerås (2017), Gormley (2018), Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2018) and Taborowski (2019).
121CJEU Cases C-192/18, Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:924.
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its obligations under Article 19 (1) TEU by lowering the retirement age of the judges
of the Supreme Court and by granting the President of Poland the discretion to
extend the period of their judicial activity beyond the newly fixed retirement age.122
In 2019 the Commission brought another case against Poland (C-791/19 Commis-
sion v. Poland) concerning disciplinary proceedings against judges also with charges
of breaching Article 19 (1) TEU. Although the charge of breaching the rule of law
was not explicitly raised in that case, it concerned judicial independence, which is a
key element of the rule of law.123
All in all, the general infringement procedure (Article 258-260 TFEU) and the
conditionality mechanism (Draft Regulation) are initiated by the Commission
against Member States in cases of possible breaches of the EU law, with a view
toward eliminating them. However, these procedures significantly differ.
While the general infringement procedure is regulated by EU primary law (Arts.
258-260 TFEU), the conditionality mechanism will be regulated by EU secondary
law (the Draft Regulation). Litigation is also resolved differently. In the case of the
general infringement procedure, the dispute between the Commission who brings
charges and the accused Member State is resolved by the CJEU. Under the condi-
tionality mechanism, the CJEU is involved only if a Member State—an addressee of
a decision launching the conditionality mechanism—challenges its legality in the
front of the CJEU under action for annulment (Articles 263 TFEU).
Last but not least, while the general infringement procedure is of a horizontal
nature, as it may concern all different kinds of violations of EU law (including
breaches of the rule of law), the conditionality mechanism is of a sectoral nature,
since its concerns only one specific EU law violation, namely a breach of the rule of
law detrimental to EU funds. The relationship between the general infringement
procedure (Articles 258-260 TFEU) and the sectoral procedures provided in EU
regulations allowing the Commission to protect the EU funds has already been
analysed by the CJEU. In cases concerning EU funds, the Member States have
claimed that if the Commission finds that expenditures financed by EU funds were
incurred in breach of EU law, it should initiate the general infringement procedure
against them (Article 258 TFEU), under which the CJEU would assess the charges
and legality of EU expenditures. By this approach the Member States opposed the
Commission’s practice to initiate, in such cases, ‘the clearance of accounts proce-
dure’, regulated in the CAP regulations. In these procedures, now already also
conducted in the cohesion policy, if the Commission detects irregular EU expendi-
tures incurred in a Member State, it adopts a decision imposing financial corrections
on said State, which obliges it to return the irregularly spent EU funds to the EU
budget. The CJEU did not share the Member States’ argumentation and ruled that
infringements of EU law related to the illegal spending of EU funds should be
decided within the framework of sectoral procedures and not under the general
122CJEU Cases C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:53, see: Wyrzykowski (2018),
Waelbroeck and Oliver (2018), Kmieciak (2019) and Klatt (2019).
123Bárd and Ballegooij van (2018).
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infringement procedure (Article 258 TFEU).124 The practice of bringing cases
involving the irregular spending of EU funds under sectoral procedures, developed
in, e.g., agriculture and cohesion regulations, is currently applied today. In such
cases the Commission does not bring general infringement proceedings against the
Member States (Arts. 258-260 TFEU) but applies procedures established under EU
secondary law regulations. The question that can be asked is whether the above-
mentioned case-law of the CJEU would apply to the conditionality mechanism.
Prima facie there are no legal obstacles excluding such a possibility.
8 Conclusions
Analyses of rule of law instruments established under EU law, analysed in this
chapter, lead to the following conclusions.
Practice of conducting the Article 7 TEU procedure—the main EU Treaties
procedure aimed to protect the ‘European values’, including the rule of law (Article
2 TEU) is disappointing. After few years from initiating it against Poland (in 2017)
and Hungary (in 2018) there is hardly any real progress made. With more success the
general infringement procedure is conducted (Article 258-260 TFEU)—in 2019 two
cases were settled by the CJEU (C-192/18 Commission v. Poland and C-619/18
Commission v. Poland) and one case was brought (C-791/19 Commission
v. Poland), all concerning capturing judicial independence of Polish courts. For
some (unknown) reasons, the possibilities offered by the EU secondary law, namely
the CP Regulation on the EU funds, allowing for the suspension and recovery of the
EU funds from the Member State infringing EU law, have not been tested yet by the
Commission. Instead the Draft Regulation establishing the conditionality mecha-
nism allowing for the suspension of EU funds transferred to the Member State
breaching the rule of law (commented on in this chapter) was put on the table.
Scrutiny of this Draft lead to the following conclusions. Two most important
remarks concern legality of (1) (too) generally formulated premises for applying of
the conditionality mechanism and unknown shape of measures to be imposed under
this mechanism and (2) launching this mechanism by the Council by the
reverse QMV.
First of all, premises for applying the conditionality mechanism were set out
extremely broadly, to the extent that their exact meaning and scope is extremely
difficult to determine (see Sect. 3.2). Their very essence is ‘a generalised deficiency
as regards the rule of law’ defined as widespread or recurrent practice of public
authorities which violates the rule of law and affects or risk affecting the EU funds—
their sound financial management (Article 317 TFEU) or the protection (Article
124CJEU Cases: 15 and 16-76, France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1979:29, paras 22-35, C-247/
98, Greece v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2001:4, paras 13-14; C-332/00, Greece v. Commission,
ECLI:EU:C:2002:235, para. 46.
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325 TFEU). To make this abstract notion of a ‘generalised deficiency’ more prag-
matic, the Draft Regulation provided some of their examples. This list contains, on
the one hand, such explicit infringements as e.g. ineffective and late cooperation of
national authorities with OLAF and EPP; or breaches of confidentiality of commu-
nication between lawyers and clients. On the other hand, the list also contains very
general breaches, e.g. limiting the effective investigation, prosecution and sanction-
ing of breaches of EU law; jeopardizing judicial independence; or endangering
capacity of the Member State to respect the obligations of EU membership, includ-
ing the capacity to effectively implement EU law. Instead of legal certainty, this list
creates further legal confusion. This lack of precision in formulation of premises to
apply the conditionality mechanism is problematic, if one takes into account that the
CJEU consequently requires that the principle of legal certainty should be respected
particularly rigorously in the case of sanctions and provisions having financial
implications. It is clear that the Draft Regulation establishing conditionality mech-
anism consists of sanctions that would have a financial impact on the Member States
breaching the rule of law. This is its essence and raison d’être. Therefore, it can be
claimed that excessively general phrasing of premises necessary to launch the
conditionality mechanism frustrates the principle of legal certainty.
The same can be said about specific measures (e.g. suspension of EU funds, their
recovery) to be imposed under the conditionality mechanism (see Sect. 4). These
measures are not regulated by the Draft Regulation, but under EU sectoral Regula-
tions that would establish EU spending rules to be applied in MFF 2021–2027 in
specific EU policies (e.g. agricultural, cohesion). Since these Regulations are pres-
ently under EU legislative processes run independently from legislative works on the
Draft Regulation, the final outcome and impact of the conditionality mechanism,
depended on this sectoral rules, cannot be presently assessed. Surprisingly, the Draft
Regulation does not mention such reference. What’s striking, in the legal debate on
the conditionality mechanism a legal relation between the EU sectoral Regulations
and the Draft Regulation is often missed with the effect that the conditionality
mechanism is described as the self-regulatory one. This is an evident omission.
Secondly, serious legal doubts concern peculiar procedure of adoption of a
decision launching the conditionality mechanism. This decision is not adopted
under the standard procedure and vote cast established by the EU Treaties but
under the specific procedures provided by the Draft Regulation in which the Council
votes by the reverse QMV. A proposal of a decision launching a conditionality
mechanism submitted by the Commission is adopted unless the Council rejects it
within 1 month or otherwise amend it by ordinary QMV. This procedure places the
Commission in a privileged position and facilitates the adoption of decisions. If the
Council is unable to obtain ordinary QMV to reject the decision (within a month),
the Commission’s proposal would become a legally binding decision. After 1 month
the decision may be however changed, if the Council votes on it by ordinary QMV.
At this point in time, it is difficult to definitively assess the legality of this procedure,
given the fact that the CJEU has not expressed its view on legality of voting by the
Council by reverse QMV. Establishing the legislative procedure and vote cast
remaining outside the EU Treaties toolbox may, however, raise serious legal
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concerns. To conclude this part, there is a strong evidence in the above-mentioned
parts of the Draft Regulations concerning (1) premises for applying the condition-
ality mechanism and measures to be imposed under it as well as (2) voting by the
Council by the reverse QMV to initiate this mechanism violates the EU Treaty.
Despite these reservations, other provisions of the Draft Regulation can also be
critically assessed.
Despite the common narration that the conditionality mechanism should only
lead to suspension of EU funds, it is clearly regulated in the Draft Regulation that a
Member State whose EU funds were suspended under the conditionality mechanism
can easily lose them forever (see Sect. 6.1). This will happen if, within 2 years from
the year of their suspension, this State will not remedy the breach of the rule of law
and convince the EU institution to lift (or alter) the suspension. In such a case the
Commission would not be authorised to re-enter the suspended amounts in the EU
budget. Because of this serious and automatic effect, the conditionality mechanism
may turn out to be a far more severe and detrimental financial penalty than perhaps is
envisioned. For this reason formulating precise premises for the adoption of the
conditionality mechanism, as stated above, is even more important.
The Draft Regulation provides beneficiaries of EU funds with a weak legal
protection if the Member States whose EU funds were suspended under the condi-
tionality mechanism stop making payments to them (see Sect. 6.2). The
E-communication channel foreseen would rather not suffice. Thus in effect the real
financial impact of suspension in some cases may be passed on beneficiaries. Then
the most effective legal remedy they could undertake would probably be an action
for damages brought against a Member State breaching the EU law (the Francovich
liability). From its side, the Commission could bring to the CJEU a general infringe-
ment action (Article 258-260 TFEU) against this State.
The Draft Regulation does not specify the relationship between the conditionality
mechanism and other EU Treaties procedures (the Article 7 TEU procedure and
general infringement procedure under Articles 258-260 TFEU) that may be applied
in cases of breaching the rule of law by the Member States (see Sect. 7). There are,
prima facie, no legal obstacles to introduce the conditionality mechanism to EU law,
as its legal construction (objectives, premises and procedure) significantly differs
from the EU Treaties procedures aimed at safeguarding the rule of law. While the
Article 7 TEU procedure is political in nature, the general infringement procedure
(Articles 258-260 TFEU) is aimed at any kind of infringement of EU law. In
contrast, the conditionality mechanism is a clear-cut procedure, regulated by the
EU secondary law, aimed to safeguard the EU funds from damages resulting from
systemic infringements of the rule of law by the Member States. It is mainly in the
hands of the Commission, as it is the guardian of the EU Treaties (Article 17 TEU)
and also responsible for management of the EU budget (Article 317 TFEU). In case
of doubts, any legal disputes arising from the application of the conditionality
mechanism are to be settled by the CJEU under the action for annulment (Article
263 TFEU).
To conclude the thoughts concerning the Draft Regulation it can be claimed that
the important issue to be tackled during coming legislative works on it would be to
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finding a way to ensure the protection of the rule of law without compromising this
rule and other values on which the EU is based.
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Abstract At present, the European rule of law enforcement framework under
Article 7 TEU (RLF) is vulnerable to unguaranteed, discretionary influences of the
Member States. This vulnerability arises from its procedural format which requires
high thresholds in decision-making with the effect that this procedure is prone to be
terminated by the EU Member States likely to be scrutinized under it, if only they
collude. Yet, the Framework may prove effective to correct serious breaches against
human rights (in the context of ineffective rule of law standards). The European
Commission is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving
relative uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European
Union a credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The RLF is an
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important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human rights and the rule
of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity resulting from the procedural
autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving this stability, the EU achieves
significant political weight in international dialogue concerning human rights and
the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global credibility in this context.
Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promoting the European model of
their identification and enforcement.
1 Introduction
The Rule of Law Framework (here referred to as ‘RLF’ or ‘the Framework’) is a
contingency procedure adopted to reflect on these processes of political (and legal
constitutional) developments in the European Union Member States which give rise
to significant enough doubts of whether these developments are in line with the
fundamental standards set forth in the EU Treaties, i.e. the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In
the context of the RLF, the most important provisions of these two legal instruments
are those which specify the constitutional standard values of the European Union as
an international organisation and those which provide for a legal basis of the RLF.
For the sake of analysis, two distinctive forms of RLF are distinguished:
(a) RLF sensu largo—which should be construed under Articles 2 and 7 TEU and
which includes all other legal vehicles adopted to enforce these two provisions;
(b) RLF sensu stricto—which, for analytical purposes, can be considered the mech-
anism of enforcement of Article 7 TEU designed by the European Commission
and adopted pursuant to its communication of 19 March 2014 (further referred to
as ‘the RLF communication’).1
The objective of this Chapter is to verify the following hypotheses:
1. In the RLF, the political element dominates over the legal one as much of the
Framework is owned by the EU Member States rather than by an independent
judiciary; in consequence, the very rationale of the RLF is contradictory: at the
material level, it is to protect the rule of law where the role of independent
judiciary is enshrined, whereas at the procedural level, its fundamental mecha-
nisms rely upon the political will of the EU Member States to protect them; this
makes the RLF a relatively easy prey for at least two European Union Member
States prone to collude in the situation where, at the same time, they may find
themselves within remit of the Framework because of their defiance of the EU
Treaty values.
1Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: A New EU
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, 10 March 2014, document COM (2014) 158 final/2.
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2. Despite this vulnerability, the RLF has significant systemic value as it is able to
put on a check all EU Member States’ practices which manifestly contravene the
values enshrined in the Treaties, including the rule of law; moreover, the RLF is
not a final format and is very likely to be further developed into a more stringent,
and legally certain construct—which is the area where the European Commission
evidently sees its significant role in the future, and where it nurtures its powers
vis-à-vis other EU institutions and the Member States.
3. The Commission is bound to pursue its active and, in terms of competences,
rather expansionary policy in order to ensure uniformity of EU law enforcement
internally and to preserve a high level of EU credibility as a globally significant
promotor of human rights.
2 Rule of Law Framework sensu largo: Articles
2 and 7 TEU
2.1 The Benchmark: Article 2 TEU
The RLF is meant to assure enforcement of EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
Article 2 provides that:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and quality between
women and men prevail.
The provision was adopted originally in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. It was
intended to provide for the axiological foundations of the European Union. In the
post-Lisbon setting (i.e. after 2008) this provision was meant to create—together
with the Charter of Fundamental Rights (which in the Treaty of Lisbon was given
binding force) and other, already existing, provisions of EU law (pertaining espe-
cially to EU citizenship)—a set of overarching systemic reference for any other EU
law provision, if only it concerned rights of individuals.
Article 2 TEU has its direct equivalent in Article I-2 of the Treaty establishing the
Constitution for Europe, i.e. the EU treaty of 2004 which had been intended to
replace the then present EU Treaty framework but had failed as a result of lack of
ratifications in all the EU Member States.
In the EUCJ’s jurisprudence of recent years, the question of the interpretation of
Article 2 TEU has been deliberated quite frequently especially in the context of
mutual trust of judicial systems. Thus, in its opinion 2/132 (EU accession to the
2CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2454.
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European Convention of Human Rights), the Court suggested that this mutual trust
required that fundamental to the EU legal system values would be recognized in each
and every EU member states as a precondition to the proper implementation of EU
law;3 this requirement was construed as a straightforward product of the very fabric
of EU law which represents ‘a structured network of principles, rules and mutually
independent legal relations linking the EU and its Member States’.4 In the judgment
of 27 February 2018 in case C-64/16 Associaçao Sindicos dos Juízes Portugueses
(ASJP),5 the Court held that Article 2 was a pivotal provision for the mutual trust of
national judiciaries in the EU jurisdictional system construed pursuant to Article 19
(1) TEU to consist also of national courts.6 Thus, guarantees of judicial indepen-
dence are required also at the national level.7 The Court also upheld that the
interpretation of art. 19(1) TEU could be rendered independently of whether, in a
given situation, Article 51(1) CFR applies.8 The issue has also been quite exten-
sively discussed in a series of illustrious opinions presented by Advocate General
Evgeni Tanchev.9 AG Tanchev adopted a broader, systemic view of respective
elements of judiciary reform in Poland (such as, especially, setting forth a lowered
cap on the retirement age of judges during their tenure or subjecting the access to
judicial positions or advancement in it to a scheme de facto controlled by the
executive). In his opinions, he assessed them as contributing to an extensive
systemic overhaul of the judiciary defying the relevant EU standards enshrined in
the EU Treaty, thus undermining mutual trust principle. All these recent develop-
ments has proved to be a departure from a narrower analytical concept which had
been adopted by the EU Court of Justice in the case C-286/12 Commission
v. Hungary,10 where the question of judiciary-concerned regulation on judges’ age
of retirement had been assessed in terms of its compliance with the EU principle of
proportionality.
No doubt, the systemic position of Article 2 TEU and the exact content of values
it enshrines has also been extensively debated in rule of law-concerned publications.
Many of them considered ASJP judgment to have ‘conceptional’ importance for the
whole rule of law discourse in the context of modifications of judiciary systems in







9Opinions in cases C-619/18 Independence of the Polish Supreme Court of 11 April 2018, ECLI:
EU:C:2019:325; C-192/18 (retirement age of judges) of 20 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:529;
C-585/18, C-524/28, C-625/18 Polish National Judiciary Council, Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court of 27 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551.
10Judgment of 6 November 2012, ECLI:EUI:C:2012:687.
11Pech and Platon (2018), pp. 1827–1854; Krajewski (2018), pp. 395–405; Bonelli and Claes
(2018), pp. 622–643.
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infringement procedures proved to be badly needed to defend basic principles of EU
law and that they are paramount for the development of the underlying legal
concept.12 Some authors argued that the rule of law procedures were important to
maintain the EU axiological system intact despite possible or existing stresses
arising from the ever-changing political strains in the EU member states.13 The
TEU arrangements for the protection of rule of law were interpreted as unique as
they were meant to provide for cooperation and axiological consensus instrumental
for the EU to maintain its character as a polity of constitutional quality able to
effectively protect its citizens whenever whey happen to enjoy EU law rights.14
Systemic approach and adequate institutional arrangements were considered to be
of acute importance for the effectiveness of the existing EU rules meant to promote
and/or protect EU values.15 It has been argued that a causal model of infringement of
values enshrined in Article 2 TEU was needed to make liability of the Member State
possible under art. 7 TEU.16
2.2 Two-Stage Procedure Under Article 7 TEU
A rough equivalent of Article 7 appeared in the EU legal system in 1997, with the
successful ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Now it is one of the provisions of
the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 7 can be applied in two distinctive situations emerging
in the EU Member States:
(a) in a situation of a ‘clear risk of a serious breach (. . .) of the values referred to in
Article 2’;
(b) in a situation of a ‘serious and persistent breach (. . .) of the values referred to in
Article 2’.
These two situations are addressed upon in two distinctive provisions of Article 7:
its paragraph 1 and 2, respectively. Depending on specific circumstances, these
provisions can be applied one after another, or—if the gravity of the situation
commends it—just paragraph 2 can apply even from the very outset. In the former
case, the two paragraphs concerned represent a two-stage description of the situation
in which the breach of the values referred to in Article 2 has persisted over
sufficiently long time or even aggravated.
For each of the so distinguished stages, different modes of situation identification
and application of corrective measures apply. In each of these models a fairly
12Prete (2017), pp. 6–10, 301–304.
13Kochenov (2017), pp. 9–27.
14Tichý (2018), pp. 85–108.
15Itzcovich (2017), pp. 28–43; Schmidt and Bogdanowicz (2017), pp. 1069–1073.
16Bagińska and Majkowska-Szulc (2018), pp. 125–144.
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complex and subtle interplay of the European Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Council and the Member States is granted.
The procedure of Article 7(1) is initiated by 1/3 of the EU Member States, or the
European Parliament of the European Commission; under Article 7(2) the mode of
the initiation is the same, with the exception that the European Parliament cannot
trigger the procedure. The core institution making the pivotal decision for each
procedure is different for paragraph 1 and 2. In Article 7(1) procedure, the decision
is made by the Council (in its General Council formation, i.e. in the format made up
of the European affairs ministers from all EU Member States) acting with a very
challenging 4/5 majority of votes. In contrast, in Article 7(2) procedure, the decision
on the existence of ‘a serious and persistent breach (. . .) of values referred to in
Article 2’ is to be made by the European Council. Only within the procedure under
Article 7(1), the Council may address to the Member State (under the preliminary
RLF scrutiny) its corrective recommendations prior to the determination that this
Member State experiences a situation of ‘a clear risk of a serious breach of the values
referred to in Article 2’. The European Council is not empowered to take a similar
step under Article 7(2).
The procedures of Article 7(1) and Article 7(2) can be distinguished also by their
different outcomes. Under Article 7(1), the Council is invested with the right to
regularly verify whether the grounds on which the Member State considered was
determined to experience ‘a clear risk of a serious breach (. . .) of values referred to in
Article 2’. In contrast, in the aggravated situation falling within the ambit of Article 7
(2), the outcome of the procedure is that the Council would now be empowered
(pursuant to Article 7(3)) to decide (by a qualified majority) ‘to suspend certain of
the rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member States in
question’. This coercive suspension may take the form of excluding the Member
State’s representative from voting in the Council; the suspension can as well involve
any negative deformation of the regular rights of the Member State under the TEU
and TFEU. The only limitations applicable to the power of the Council in this
context is that—under Article 7(3) TEU—it should ‘take into account the possible
consequence of such a suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal
persons’. Because of a high position of general principles of law in the EU legal
system, the Council should also make its measures applied under Article 7(3) in line
with these principles, especially with the principle of proportionality. Yet, as any
overview of the Court of Justice jurisprudence may indicate, only serious, ‘manifest’
errors in this principle application are most likely to make the measures so adopted
subject to annulment by the Court of Justice.17 Moreover, these measures may
escape any EU Court of Justice’s scrutiny initiated by natural and legal persons, as
under the well-established Plaumann doctrine they are required to substantiate that
the contested measures are uniquely applicable to the person challenging them—
which is a difficult task. In other words, the decisions adopted under Article 7(3) are
17See the judgment in the case 25-62 Plaumann & Co. v. Commission, ECR [1963] 95. See also:
Arnull (2006), pp. 41–49.
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bound to be quite enduring in the EU legal system.18 The RLF Treaty procedures
specified in Article 7 is graphically depicted in Fig. 1.
The Treaty does not offer any further or more detailed elaboration of the system
of Article 7 enforcement. This implies that neither does it give any guidelines which
may apply to the systematic monitoring of the situation in respective Member States
prior to the application of Article 7. This shortage is quite striking when the system
of Article 7 TEU is compared with the EU system of enforcement of rules of
economic governance set forth in Articles 121 and 126 TFEU as the latter system
is elaborated in a significant number of secondary legal acts which set forth detailed
rules on the evaluation of relevant criteria and procedural aspects of their application.
The Treaty model of RLF, as it is, is quite vulnerable to the Member States’
collective will to trigger its respective stages even in a rather hypothetical situation of
serious infringements of any of them against the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU.
This vulnerability arises from the very demanding unanimity threshold for the
decision made under Article 7(2), i.e. the one which would determine ‘serious and
persistent breach of the values referred to in Article 2’ by one of the EU Member
States. It is therefore enough that two EU countries will simultaneously be subject to
the RLF procedure to make it manifestly ineffective as each of these countries would
be able to vote on the case of another. Such a voting ‘complot’ is not a novelty in the
EU: e.g. exactly this type of cooperative behavior prevented the Council from
making its decision effective in the seemingly much less vulnerable system of
economic governance.19
2.3 Rule of Law Framework sensu stricto in the Preparatory
Stage: Its Origins and Formula
European Union statutory law does not contain any specific provisions concerning
the evaluation of the situation in any Member States with regard to Article 7 TEU. In
other words, the initiation criteria for the RLF or the procedure applicable to the
initiation of Article 7 application have not been detailed in the Treaties or any
legislative legal acts. The fact that the EU law falls short of expectations with regard
to the enforcement mechanisms of Article 7 (in connection with Article 2) TEU has
not gone unnoticed to many actors of the EU legal system. The most pronounced
political initiative to improve this situation was undertaken by a group of Northern
EU Member States: Denmark, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands which advo-
cated for the development of an instrument which would make it possible to monitor
the internal rule of law in EU Member States on a permanent basis. In the program-
ming document of this initiative, a 2013 report titled ‘Respect and Justice for All’,
18Tridimas (2000), pp. 89–123.
19See the judgment in the case C-27/04 Commission v. Council, ECR [2004] I-6649. See also
e.g. Andersen (2012), p. 27.
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majority): ‘suspension of rights deriving from the Treaes’
Fig. 1 Procedure of Article 7 paragraphs 1–2 TEU (Treaty of Lisbon). Source: Artur Nowak-Far
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the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained the rationale of the initiative in the
following way:
. . .the rule of law does not always function sufficiently well, even within EU member states.
To strengthen the rule of law within Europe, the government seeks to promote transparent
governance, independent judiciaries, respect for human rights, antidiscrimination policy and
legislation to curb corruption and conflicts of interest (. . .) Countries wanting to join the EU
must comply with strict accession criteria in the realm of the rule of law and human rights
(the Copenhagen criteria20) (. . .) At the moment, there are still too few resources to call
member states to account after their accession to the EU. Ideally, there should be a
mechanism within the EU enabling member states to remind each other of their obligations
on the basis of equality. There is already a system of this kind in the framework of the United
Nations, but the EU also has a responsibility to tackle problems in its own house on a
political level.21
The initiative coincided with some actions undertaken in the EU institutions: In
June 2013 the Justice and Home Affairs Council and the European Parliament,
respectively. The former called on the Commission ‘to take forward the debate in
line with the Treaties on the possible need for and shape of a collaborative and
systematic method’ to monitor the observance of EU values in respective EU
Member States and address detected departures from the generally accepted stan-
dards.22 The European Parliament requested that ‘Member States be regularly
assessed on their continued compliance with the fundamental values of the Union
and the requirement of democracy and the rule of law.’23
The said RLF initiative did not earn any firm enough support from other Member
States which remained neither neutral or negative to it. The Hungarian government
already feared that the procedure would be used against it; some governments (like
the Polish one, at least for some time) perceived it as an ‘elitist’ procedure which
would be used by the ‘better’ states (most likely the ‘old’ EU members) to scrutinize
political practices of the ‘worse’ countries (most likely to be the ‘new’ EU Member
States, i.e. the ones which acceded past 2004 and which, indeed, had to meet the
Copenhagen criteria). Some other Member States perceived the RLF as a tool to
expand the European Commission’s realm of authority—something they were
reluctant to easily accept.
Regardless of these hurdles, in response to these initiatives, the European Com-
mission came up with its own communication concerning the procedure which could
be used for activating the mechanisms foreseen in Article 7 TEU.24 According to the
Commission’s own statement, the proposed rules were to ‘precede and complement
20For the explanation of this point refer to the next section of this chapter.
21Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands (2013), p. 20.
22Press release 3244th Council Meeting – Justice and Home Affairs, Luxembourg 6–7 June 2013,
document 10461/13 (OR.en).
23European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report of
17 February 2014 on evaluation of justice in relations to criminal justice and the rule of law,
rapporteur Kinga Göncz, document A7-0122/2014.
24See supra Fig. 1.
The Rule of Law Framework in the European Union: Its Rationale, Origins, Role. . . 313
Article 7 TEU mechanisms’; their application was to be ‘without prejudice to the
Commission’s powers to address specific situations falling within the scope of EU
law by means of infringement procedures under Article 258 TFEU’ (i.e. its powers to
start up an EU law infringement procedure before the European Union Court of
Justice). Where there are clear indications of a systemic threat to the rule of law in a
Member State, the Commission can launch a ‘pre-Article 7 Procedure’ by initiating a
dialogue with that Member State through the Rule of Law Framework.
According to the Commission communication, the RLF procedure has three
stages:
(a) the assessment stage—where the Commission collects and examines all the
relevant information and assesses whether there are clear indications of a
systemic threat to the rule of law; at this stage, if the Commission’s concerns
have been substantiated, it would initiate a dialogue with the Member State
concerned by sending its ‘Rule of Law Opinion’ to that state;
(b) the recommendation stage—where the Commission would address its ‘Rule of
Law Recommendation’ to the Member State concerned, in which this EU
institution would make public expected actions and their applicable time-frame-
work—all meant to improve the situation in the Member State concerned,
(c) the follow-up stage—where the Commission would monitor the Member State’s
action and, if it found the State’s performance unsatisfactory, it would trigger
Article 7 procedure—either on its own, or by prompting 1/3 of the Member States
or the European Parliament to do so.
The RLF (sensu stricto) can thus be interpreted also as a system of structured
discourse as it involves a continuous dialogue and exchange or views between the
Commission and the Member State concerned and between the European Parliament
and the Member States (represented within the Council).
3 Exposition of EU Axiological Basis in the Treaties and Its
Procedural Ramifications
3.1 Driving Forces
The idea to expose the EU axiological basis in a EU treaty has been on the agenda for
a long time prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (in December 2009).
The sense of urgency with regard to this exposition emerged as a result of the
following two phenomena:
(a) the EU enlargement negotiations which started in 1998 and were successfully
concluded in 2004 and resulted in accepting a group of Central and Eastern
European countries as new Member States of the EU,
(b) the emergence of the authoritarian right-wing coalition in Austria (in the period
of 2000–2002).
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One of the challenges of the EU enlargement negotiations which involved a group
of Central and Eastern European countries (i.e. Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) was their authoritarian heritage
(in fact, a little bit less extensive for the Czech Republic, as prior to WWII, it had
been a fully-feathered liberal democracy). All these 8 countries had a Communist
past, the Baltic States (i.e. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) were even the component
republic of the USSR until 1991. For this reason, the rule of law and other EU
democratic values were included in the EU membership criteria negotiation package,
most importantly in the form of the so called ‘Copenhagen Criteria’. These were set
forth by the European Council in its summit Conclusions of June 21–22 1993. The
most relevant requirement was formulated in the following way:
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims
of political, economic and monetary union.25
Thus, throughout the negotiations, the incumbent States were required to modify
their institutional and legal systems in a way which could guarantee that the
Copenhagen Criteria were met. Interestingly, the question of meeting the Copenha-
gen Criteria had not been an issue in the 1995 EU enlargement which included
Austria, Finland, and Sweden, but had again been quite important in the 2007 EU
enlargement onto Bulgaria and Rumania and in 2013 when they were again applied
to Croatia. The problem with the sheer application of the Copenhagen Criteria was,
however, that—from the perspective of the EU legal order—these criteria represent
non-binding set of rules (which does not mean that they cannot be considered to
form contractual obligations-reference under international law). This means that they
could effectively be applied whenever, in the context of EU membership negotia-
tions, there was enough conditionality to enforce adequate standards in the EU
membership-aspiring countries; yet this element was lost whenever they entered
the EU as the European Council’s presidency conclusions of 1993 were not even
their own original political commitment but rather something imposed ‘from out-
side’. Thus, in order to avoid departures from the negotiated standards, an adequate
amendment of the Treaty appeared to be badly needed.
As it has already been said, the other phenomenon which prompted the process of
adoption of adequate Treaty standards of democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and the protection of minorities was that of the political rise of right, authoritarian
parties in Austria. The phenomenon found its pivotal moment after the 1999
parliamentary elections in Austria when the radical right party, Freedom Party of
Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), was able to create a coalition with
the mainstream Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, SPÖ).
25European Council in Copenhagen. Conclusions of the Presidency, June 21–22, 1993, document
SN 180/1/93 REV 1, p. 14.
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What now (unfortunately) appears not so unusual anymore, had in 2000 come as a
surprise because of a controversial, nationalistic, anti-immigration, and authoritarian
penchant of the controversial FPÖ’s leader Jörg Haider. The resulting situation made
it visible, that the only pressure other EU Member States could exert on the EU
country whose policy might not be completely in line with the EU values was the
political pressure (in fact, intra-EU cooperation with the Austrian government then
was limited), but no firm legal tool could be used.
The first ever legislative reaction to the threat of rightist populists was the
amendment of the Treaty introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), often
referred to as ‘Lex Austria’. Namely, in Article F.1, the Treaty was given a new
provision which provided that:
The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member
States.
It is quite striking that, when compared to Article 2 of the present TUE, Article F
(1) TUE (the Amsterdam version) made its reference to a narrower catalogue of
values. Moreover, it made a reference to liberty which is not made any more in the
present Treaty. Its reference to human rights goes together with the reference to
fundamental freedoms—whereas the present Treaty does not contain a reference to
the latter value. Most importantly, Article F(1) TUE does not contain any specific
catalogue of values which pertain to the societies of the Member States (such as
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between
women and men); rather, it points out an axiological network which should be
‘common the Member States’ but which apparently ‘stem from the fundamental
EU legal order’.
In Article F.1., the Amsterdam Treaty set forth, for the first time, a RLF proce-
dure, yet it was quite distinctive from the present one. The most important difference
is that the Amsterdam RLF was a single-stage procedure with the pivotal role of the
Council, acting in a very special format (not used anymore in the EU institutional
order) of the heads of states or governments (i.e. with no participation of the
President of the Council nor any of its own President, as this position had never
existed for this very special type of the Council). The Council was to act by
unanimity on a proposal by 1/3 of the Member States or by the Commission and
after obtaining the assent of the European Parliament—which is the same arrange-
ment as the one used now (also with respect to the majority requirements). Article
F.1 provided also that the Council’s decision should be made only after inviting the
Member State concerned to submit its observations. The procedure was to be
concluded with the determination by the Council of ‘the existence of a serious and
persistent breach by a Member State of principles mentioned in Article F(1)’. When
such a conclusion had been adopted in the decision, the Council, acting by a
qualified majority, might decide to suspend certain of the rights deriving from the
application of this Treaty to the Member State in question, including the voting
rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the Council.
The Amsterdam RLF procedure is depicted in Fig. 2.
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Article F.1. TEU contained the same modalities as the present Article 7(2).
Namely, the Council decision on the suspension of rights of the Member State put
under the RLF scrutiny had to take into account ‘the possible consequences of such a
suspension on the rights and obligations of natural and legal persons’. It could also,
acting by a qualified majority, decide to vary or revoke measures originally adopted
with respect to that Member States—reflecting on changes in the underlying
situation.
The RLF procedure specified in the Amsterdam Treaty was quickly considered
too rigid and inflexible as it did not allow for any preliminary stage where the
Member State concerned could be involved in a dialogue on its practices. Thus,
Article 7 TUE was amended in the subsequent revision of the TEU, now in the
Treaty of Nice (2000).
The rule of law became an important element of the agenda within the negotiation
of the EU Constitutional Treaty, which, in Article I-2 enshrined it together with other
values deemed inextricably interwoven with it: democracy and the human rights.
Moreover, it contained a clause not only stating that the EU-specific values listed in
it are ‘common’ to the EU Member States, but also formulating requirements
concerning the axiological fabric of their societies—all in the format which was
later adopted in the Treaty of Lisbon as well. Thus, the wording of Article I-2 of the
Constitutional Treaty was as follows:
Proposal of: 
(a) 1/3 of Member States











The Member State determined to have a situaon of the existence of a 
‘serious and persistent breach of the values referred to in Arcle 2’
Coercive decisions of the Council (made by a qualified
majority): ‘suspension of rights deriving from the Treaes’
Fig. 2 Single stage RLF procedure of Article 7 TEU (Article F.1. of the Treaty of Amsterdam).
Source: Artur Nowak-Far
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The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in
which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between
women and men prevail.
With regard to the RLF procedure, the Constitutional Treaty, in Article I-59, took
over the wording of the Treaty of Nice. Interestingly and uniquely for the Constitu-
tional Treaty, this act made also reference to these values in its preamble. It also
contained numerous clauses which provided significant guidelines for interpretation
of the values enshrined in its Article I-2. Interestingly, it also extended the require-
ments of the rule of law onto EU institutions, as well.
The Constitutional Treaty, adopted in 2004, had been intended to replace the then
present EU treaty framework. Yet, it was a failed endeavor—as it had failed to win
ratifications in all the EU Member States.
Soon after its failure, the EU Member States began the negotiation of a major
revision of the then existing treaties (TEU and the Treaty establishing the European
Community, TEC). These negotiations were successful. They produced a new
version of the TEU and transformed the TEC into its major revision named the
Treaty on functioning of the European Union. The new treaties (technically speaking
resulting from the accord called the Treaty of Lisbon), were duly ratified and entered
into force in December 2009.
This, however, has not solved the problems of an effective enforcement of the
rule of law in the EU. A possibility for the EU venue to achieve a high enough
standard in this area would be to accede to the European Convention of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). Yet, the EU failed to do it. The EU
failure to make an accession to the European Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) occurred despite the fact that the Convention is
referred to in Article 6 TEU which
(a) in its paragraph 2 provides that the Union shall accede to the ECHR, yet that
‘such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the
Treaties’,
(b) in its paragraph 3, provides that fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
Convention shall (together with the fundamental rights resulting from constitu-
tional traditions common to the Member States) constitute general principles of
the EU law.
The former provision was intended to defy the Court of Justice’s negative opinion
issued in 1994 (i.e. the opinion 2/9426) which upheld that with no express legal
Treaty basis, the Community was not entitled to accede to the ECHR. This ‘defying’
effect seemed to be even reinforced by a modification of the ECHR itself, by the
introduction of the Protocol No. 14, which in Article 17 provided for a change in
Article 59(2) ECHR with the effect that it now expressly foresaw the EU accession to
26CJEU, Opinion 2/94, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140.
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the Convention. The process of accession seemed to be reinforced by the fact that, by
virtue of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Chapter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) had been
included into the EU legal system as a binding instrument.27 As such, it required that
the rights enshrined in it be identical with the rights arising from the ECHR (Article
52(3) CFR), yet with an important reservation that these rights be not interpreted in
departure from the established EU law, international public law (at large) and
international conventions to which the Union or all its Member States were
counterparties (Article 53 CFR).
The specific conditions on which the EU was to accede to the ECHR were set
forth in the Protocol No. 8 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. This Protocol set forth
the following principles applicable to the accession:
(a) the principle of inter-semiotic retention (set forth in Article 1), i.e. the require-
ment that the accession should make it possible to retain specific features of the
EU and the EU legal system (especially with regard to the participation of the EU
in controlling mechanisms of the ECHR);
(b) the principle of non-modification of external and internal powers of the EU
(Article 2, first sentence),
(c) the principle of non-modification of the status of the EU Member States in the
ECHF legal order (Article 3, second sentence);
(d) the principle of exclusive competence of the EU Court of Justice with regard to
disputes concerning the interpretation and application of EU Treaties (Article
3 of the Protocol in connection with Article 344 TFEU).
In its opinion 2/13,28 the EU Court of Justice upheld that the already negotiated
agreement on the EU accession to the ECHR should not be signed. One of the most
significant arguments which prompted the Court to conclude negatively was that the
accession to the ECHR would result in a deformation of the principle of mutual trust
inherent in the EU legal system. This principle implies that the Member States
should not double-check, in any legal action context, whether other Member States
observe fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union.29 Nevertheless, such rights
should be interpreted ‘within the framework of the structures and objectives of the
Union’30 which are determined by EU substantive law. In the case of doubt, national
courts can refer to the Court of Justice within the preliminary questions procedure
27The Chapter of Fundamental Rights had been considered to have just a ‘declaratory’ value before.
28CJEU, Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2454.
29Id, para. 191 of the Opinion 2/13, supra note 2. See also the CJEU’s judgment of 25 June 2018 in
the case C-216/18 PPU LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586 in which the Court upheld that such a double-
checking should guarantee rights conferred to EU citizens under Article 47 CFR; the CJ emphasized
that the check should be based on specific and detailed analysis of the underlying situation and
should take into account the specific situation of an individual concerned as well as the information
provided for by the Member State whose legal system is to be trusted.
30Id, para. 170.
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under Article 267 TFEU. This important legal arrangement cannot be reconciled
with the mechanisms of application of ECHR, as—among others—any interpreta-
tion offered by the EU Court of Justice could not be binding to the separate Court of
Justice operating under the Convention. Instead, judiciary decisions of that latter
court would be binding onto the EU Court of Justice which could undermine the
principles set forth in Protocol No. 8.
Interestingly, this does not mean that the EU Treaties and the ECHR represent
two legal systems immune from each other. In practice, they are in a constant
intersemiotic dialogue (i.e. the dialogue in which two separate, yet interlegible
‘institutional languages’ are employed) as the judgments under the ECHR are
often treated as a type of preliminary rulings by the EU Court of Justice.31 In turn,
the ECHR Court sometimes invokes the EU preliminary questions procedure under
Article 267 TFEU considering denial of its application a breach of the ECHR (i.e. its
Article 6(2) which prohibits denial of justice).32 However, regardless of this dia-
logue, the linkage between the ECHR and the EU legal order proved to be insuffi-
cient to provide for a stronger enforcement mechanism of the EU values, especially
those enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and in Article 2 TEU.
3.2 Legal Interpretation of the RLF sensu stricto
The legal meaning of the procedure set forth in Article 7 TEU does not yield any
specific concerns as to its legal binding force. In contrast, the RLF sensu stricto does
give rise to some concerns about its legal force which would likely be raised by the
Member States subject to any form of the European Commission’s scrutiny in the
context of Article 7.
Admittedly, the RLF sensu stricto was set forth in the European Commission
communication (i.e. the RLF communication). The communication is not included
in the list of binding legal acts specified in the Treaties; most importantly, it is not
covered by Article 288 TFUE, which provides that regulations, directives and
decisions have binding force in the EU legal system. Thus, the RLF communication
can be considered an act of soft law.
The European Commission was empowered to make the RLF communication as
it was meant to ‘precede and complement Article 7 TEU mechanisms’ and provide
transparency in the Commission’s own actions—as such a specification can be
31See e.g. the judgment in the case C-404/15 and C/659/15 Criminal Proceeding against Pál
Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198 (where the Court upheld that the European
Arrest Warrant can be denied effect with respect to the Member State being persistently in
contravention of the ECtHR—what has already been confirmed in the ECtHR judgments in
Vociu v. Rumania, Application No. 22015/10, Bujorean v. Rumania, Application No. 13054/12,
Varga et al. v. Hungary, Applications No. 14097/12, 45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13,
64586/13.
32ECtHR Dhahbi v. Italy, Application No. 17120/09.
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considered a specification of the Commission’s general powers arising from this
Treaty provision. The rules set forth in the RLF communication can be interpreted as
a measure to eliminate uncertainty of law resulting from the incompleteness of rules
specified in Article 7 with regard to the triggering of the mechanism of RLF (sensu
largo). Thus, the procedure foreseen in it is meant to produce legal (and at the end of
the day, binding) effect, yet the RLF rules (sensu stricto) are deprived of a binding
force. In the terminology developed by Susan Senden, the RLF communication can
be classified as a decisional communication (as contrasted to informational or
interpretative ones), i.e. a communication which provides for general rules regarding
the way in which the already existing implementing powers will be exercised, in
particular, indicating, how the Commission will apply binding law provisions in
respective cases and how it will make use of the applicable discretion at its
disposal.33 Decisional communications are not binding but are apt to produce legal
effects by virtue of some other rules to which they pertain and to which they
pragmatically relate. In the specific RLF (sensu stricto) context, the RLF communi-
cation derives its legal effectiveness from the fact that it is meant to make sure that
the application of Article 7 should commence on a well-reasoned and adequately
substantiated basis. As such, the RLF sensu stricto could make the application of
Article 7 much more informed than without it. Moreover, as it performs an obvious
signaling element, the RLF sensu stricto guarantees that the Member States
concerned would not be surprised with the decision to become subject to measures
under Article 7. More than that—they will have a chance to get involved in a
dialogue with the Commission where they would be able to submit their own
argumentation concerning the rule of law situation.
It is a matter of serious doubt whether the Member States subjected to the RLF
sensu stricto would be able to challenge the recommendations addressed to them
within this procedure before the EU Court of Justice (under Article 263 TFEU,
i.e. within the action of annulment of an EU legislative act). The doubt arises from at
least two issues:
(a) the formal one, which is based on an argument that Article 263 TFEU overtly
excludes annulment actions brought against Commission’s recommendations,
(b) the material one, which is based on an argument that, even if Article 263 TFUE
were applicable (as—because of the clear intention to produce legal effect—the
‘recommendations’ under the RLF could be re-interpreted as acts falling within
the remit of actions for annulment34), at the end of the day, they could not be
challenged as they do not represent a final measure, but are rather steps in a
procedure to be completed and to involve challengeable legal acts.35
33Senden (2004), pp. 148–149.
34See e.g. the EU Court of Justice judgment in the case C-362/08 P Internationaler Hilfsfonds eV
v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2010:40, para. 52; 22/70 Commission v. Council, ECLI:EU:
C:1971:32, para. 42.
35The argument per analogiam based on the EU Court of Justice (the Court of First Instance)
judgment in the case T-126/95 Dumez v. Commission, ECLI:EU:T:1995:189.
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Not being able to challenge the RLF recommendations, the Member States
concerned, if only determined enough, would likely disregard them (as it was
recently the case with Poland). Since (genuine) recommendations are not binding
legal acts, the Commission will not be able to bring an action against the Member
States concerned (under Article 258 TFEU) for not fulfilling them. Yet, this
non-fulfillment will be a significant evidence in any further proceedings under
Article 7.
This conclusion is in the same time an argument supporting the Commission’s
competence to issue the RLF recommendations. In the context of the entire RLF,
they represent an important element of the dialogue between the Commission and
the Member State concerned. The fact that the Member State ignored them (if this is
the case) becomes an element of the argumentation sued for triggering the Article
7 procedure against this state.
4 The Content of the Rule of Law Under the RLF
To complete the analysis presented in this article, it is quite essential to identify what
exactly is meant under the term ‘rule of law’ in the context of the RLF, regardless of
its narrow or broader form. As the term does not have any Treaty definition, it is
quite in place to rely on the legal doctrine and the EU Court of Justice’s jurispru-
dence to answer this question.
4.1 The Legal Doctrine
More is known about what the rule of law is not than what it exactly is—especially in
national contexts. Yet, basic conditions for the rule of law can be identified in the
existing body of literature.36 It is most often held that the rule of law is achieved
whenever the following requirements are met:
(a) law generality—law should be general; particular regulation should be avoided;
(b) law publicity—law should be made public, known to those whom it concerns;
(c) law non-retroactivity—law should not act retroactively;
(d) law cataphaticity—law should be understandable to its primary stakeholders;
(e) law relative stability—law should be kept stable, whenever there are not good
reasons to amend it;
(f) systemic consistency—legal norms of the system should be consistent with each
other;
(g) law observability—it should be possible for law stakeholders to observe it;
36See e.g. May (2014), pp. 33–56; Sanchez-Cuenca (2003), pp. 62–93.
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(h) behavioral congruence between legal norms and stakeholders’ actions—all
stakeholders should effectively observe the law.
Adriaan Bedner divided the features/requirements of the rule of law into three
classes:
(a) procedural:
– the presence of the rule by law, i.e. the situation where the state actions are
subject to law;
– the law formalization, which requires that it is understandable, stable and
predictable);
– the creation of law in democratic procedures, i.e. under conditions requiring
that the legislative consent should determine or at least influence legal actions)
(b) substantive:
– the law subordination to justice;
– the protection of individual rights and liberties;
– the respect to human rights and group rights
(c) controlling:
– the independence of judiciary;
– the responsibility of administrative and other independent bodies for reviewing
legal process.37
Interestingly, most of these requirements are primarily addressed to law-makers.
Some of them require a good ex ante foresight into the expected perceptions/
reactions of those who would be most likely and/or most strongly concerned with
a given piece of law. It is striking that all of these requirements are formulated in
procedural terms or, if they concern the content, they are highly abstract. As a result,
the question about the ‘content’ law under the rule of law is quite justified.
One possible answer to this question is that the rule of law is about providing for
conditions in which ‘right’ relationships between the government and citizens as
well as between each and every citizen is set. ‘Right’means, that the resulting setting
is capable to protect and enforce individual rights and to give framework for a large
degree of responsibility and accountability in the government. Some answers aspire
even higher, as they would consider the ‘real’ rule of law to guarantee a perfect
impartiality of the law-making system.
37Bedner (2010), pp. 56–69.
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4.2 The EU Court of Justice Jurisprudence
The rule of law was highlighted in the European Union relatively often in various
forms. Most importantly in 1986, in its enshrined judgment in the case 294/83 Parti
écologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament,38 the Court of Justice held that the
Community was a ‘community of law’—and reminded that it required the consis-
tency of all law (including national law) with the Treaty serving as a ‘basic
constitutional charter’ (i.e. the systemic anchor of the entire, so defined, legal
system). In 1993, the European Council formulated the so called ‘Copenhagen
Criteria’ applicable to all states aspiring for EU membership, in which conformity
with the ‘rule of law’ was enshrined. In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam made
referrals to rule of law in Article 6 and the new suspension mechanism of Article
7 (so called Lex Austria). On some occasions, the Court of Justice upheld the idea
that the EU was also subject to the rule of law. In its judgment in the case C-50/00 P
Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council,39 the CJ stated that rule of law required
consistency of EU secondary law with fundamental rights (see also similarly in joint
cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Interna-
tional Foundation v. Council and Commission40). As it has already been argued, the
most recent CJ’s jurisprudence has contributed significantly to this rather rudimen-
tary understanding of the concept of rule of law—most importantly in the realm of
judiciary. The most recent development of CJ jurisprudence established a link
between Article 2 TEU and Article 19(1) TEU as well as the due process standard
set forth in Article 47 CFR (concerning the right to an effective remedy and to a fair
trial). The CJ construed the EU legal system as the one which is complete and fully
capable to enforce all rights conveyed by the EU law onto EU citizens or undertak-
ings, provided that the Member States effectively ensure judicial protection of these
rights.41 In such a complete system, the respective judicial systems, at both national
and supranational levels, sport mutual trust to each other.42 Yet, this trust is subject
to the results of a careful double-checking procedure which can be triggered by
national courts whenever there are substantiated grounds that the values enshrined in
Article 2 TEU are not fully observed or implemented in another Member State.43
The issue can be expected to be developed further as many cases concerning the rule
of law issue are still pending. So far, they have been extensively discussed in a series
38ECLI:EU:C:1986:166.
39ECLI:EU:C:2002:462.
40Judgment of 3 September; ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.
41Judgment of 6 March 2018 in the case C-284/16 Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, ECLI:2018:158;
see especially para 36.
42E.g. Opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, supra note 2; judgment of 27 February 2018 in case
C-64/16 Associaçao Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP), ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, para. 39.
43Judgment of 5 April 2016 in the case C-404/15 and C-659/15 PP Aranyosi and Câldâraru, ECLI:
EU:C:2016:198, para 104; judgment of 25 June 2018 in the case C-216/18 PPU LM, supra note
29, para 23.
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of illustrious opinions presented by Advocate General Evgeni Tanchev,44 who
adopted a broader, systemic approach in reviewing judiciary system quality in a
Member State.
All these actions have contributed to the understanding of the EU concept of the
rule of law. Yet, they definitely are not sufficient to make it possible to construe an
independent, EU-specific definition of it. The wording of Article 2:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons
belonging to minorities. . . (emphasis added)
suggests that the rule of law is one of the values on which the EU is founded and
that it is somehow different from other values enshrined in this particular provision
of the Treaty. We also know (from other provisions of the Treaty as well as from the
CJ jurisprudence) that the principle of procedural autonomy applies to the EU
Member States. In the procedural realm, its rectifications in CJ’s judgments in
e.g. cases 21-24/72 International Fruit Company NV et al. v. Produktschap voor
Groenten en Fruit,45 C-188/89 A. Foster et al. v. British Gas plc,46 103/88 Fratelli
Costanzo v. Comune di Milano47 indicate that its major aspect is the Member States’
free hand in shaping their basic constitutional (institutional) order. This means that
also the rule of law (as it has been construed under Article 2 TEU) can be applied in
divergent procedural settings of now numerous EU Member States. As a result,
uniformity of application of ‘the rule of law’ (and almost all other standards of EU
law) in the European Union is far from an ideal pattern attempted by the EU Court of
Justice. In consequence, ‘uniform EU law’ is—by definition—divergent in real
settings, where real interests of EU citizens are at stake. In other words, there is a
great deal of intersemiotic discourse of EU Member States’ judicial and administra-
tive systems over EU law purported to be ‘uniform’. Nevertheless, the already
discussed recent developments in CJ’s jurisprudence clearly indicated that the
substantive concept of rule of law heavily relies on the judiciary independence of
the executive.
44Opinions in cases C-619/18 Independence of the Polish Supreme Court of 11 April 2018, ECLI:
EU:C:2019:325; C-192/18 (retirement age of judges) of 20 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:529;
C-585/18, C-524/28, C-625/18 Polish National Judiciary Council, Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court of 27 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551.
45Judgment of 12 December 1972; ECLI:EU:C:1972:115.
46Judgment of 12 June 1990: ECLI:EU:C:1990:313.
47Judgment of 22 June 1989; ECLI:EU:C:1989:256.
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5 The International Dimension of the EU Rule of Law
Framework
5.1 The Rule of Law Importance for the EU Common
Foreign and Security Policy
The fact that the initiative for increased enforcement of the rule of law within the
Treaty of Lisbon system was promoted by the foreign affairs services of a group of
the EU countries is quite telling about the significance of that idea for the EU
external policy. It is enough to say that the TEU (in Article 21(1)) requires the EU
foreign service (operating within the framework of the EU Common Foreign and
Security Policy, CFSP48) to consider the rule of law to be one of its guiding
principles (together with democracy, the universality and indivisibility of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of
equality and solidarity and respect for the Principles of the UN Charter and interna-
tional law). Pursuant to Article 21(2) TEU, the Union shall define and pursue
international common policies and actions which, inter alia, consolidate and support
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law. As a
result, the rule of law has become an idea well pronounced at various levels and in
various fora where the EU is represented.
As a matter of fact, in the international sphere, the EU promotes its own model of
human rights and—within it—the rule of law. Generally speaking, this model
emphasizes the importance of the individual’s dignity and individual rights—the
ideas deeply rooted in the European Enlightenment. The rule of law can be consid-
ered a comprehensive instrument of safeguarding these rights and enforcing them in
a uniform manner. Thus, the RLF mechanisms are vital for assuring that—despite
the existing procedural divergences in respective EU Member States’ legal sys-
tems—the EU preserves the integrity of the EU human rights model, and that the EU
as an actor of international relations, maintains its high credibility in promoting this
model. In other words, the RLF is meant to curb the existing divergence and achieve
some uniform standards in the system of enforcement of human rights in order to
attract global adherence.
The problem of a proper (i.e. complete and functional) intersemiotic translation of
international human rights standards into domestic ones (i.e. the transposition of one
legal-pragmatic model of making them reality into another) is pronounced even in
systems of common legal tradition and philosophy. With regard to the relationship
between legal systems of the Western legal and political tradition, Ernest A. Young
noticed, that even when we looked to such systems which, with no doubt, shared
common heritage and reflected the same or significantly similar axiological funda-
ments, we saw ‘divergence rather than convergence on many aspects of values and
48I.e. the subject matter of the provisions of Title V TEU.
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political culture’.49 This not very encouraging conclusion is even more applicable to
the relationship between the Western legal and political traditions and its more
distant counterparts. The underlying prevalent local social circumstances, moral
attitudes and customs may determine a significant gap between the Western concept
of human rights and their popular/political acceptance beyond the Western world.
This gap may also serve as a political excuse for a national policy of not pursuing any
ambitious programme of human rights promotion. Moreover, the recent tensions
within the EU which urged the Commission to make recourse to the RLF with
respect to Poland were fundamentally caused by the fact that the present Polish
government emphasized its different stance to human rights—as it does not seem to
share the respect too common to most EU states legal tradition and philosophy
stemming strongly from the ideas of the European Enlightenment. Instead, it prefers
to derive its legitimacy from rather obscure and unclear ideas of social collectivism
and Catholic nationalism.
In order to be effective, international human rights (that is the rights adopted in a
context of an international agreement for the purpose of their more or less universal
application), must be suitable for their at least relatively equivalent intersemiotic
translation—that is their transformation into legal norms expressed in an interna-
tional statute into legal norms of a given national system.50 As a result, international
standards will only be ‘common’ either if the transformation system is apt to act
effectively and efficiently and/or if translated common standards represent a low
enough denominator (which could be detrimental to the international level of human
rights protection). Irrespective of the systemic capacity of intersemiotic translation or
structural complexity of norms being translated, a firm and welcoming constitutional
approach is required to make human rights enshrined in an international law
instrument subject to such a translation. The resulting divergence eliminates ‘an
axiological common ground’ to which respective EU Member States could refer in
their EU wide and global discourse on human rights. As a result, this discourse could
be deprived of important common reference framework which could have brought
these counterparties closer to each other and make legal measures reconciliation
more likely to achieve.
It is obvious that this problem is not only bilateral. In the globalized world,
bilateral reciprocity shortages become aggregated so that they are increasingly likely
to cause acute frictions between legal systems which tend to be more often exposed
in the area of consular protection and asylum granting. As a result, they may become
a source of a wide dispute over the general roles of the state needed to make the
international order an effective and efficient system in which various communities
and individuals can achieve levels of welfare not achievable under non-cooperative
conditions. In respective areas relevant for the formulation and implementation of
national and/or regional public policies, such a lack of reciprocity and the resulting
inter-systemic friction would reduce effectiveness of these policies, thus reducing an
49Young (2005), pp. 161–166 (referring to the Thompson judgment, 487, US 830).
50See, e.g. Tiefenbrun (2010), pp. 263–280.
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aggregate level of total global welfare which—under more concurrence and coop-
eration—might have reached higher levels.
5.2 International Law Interpretation of the RLF
In legal terms, the modern European human rights concept (including its procedural
frameworks such as RLF) represents a departure from a ‘traditional bottom line’
standard defining inter-relational aspects of international law set forth in the 1927
PCIJ Lotus judgment51 holding that international law (and thus, the human rights-
relevant international law) is essentially about relations among states. Today, inter-
national law, and especially human rights and the rule of law component of it is a law
about global governance which is a concept extending well beyond the relationships
amongst states. Global governance can be defined as ‘the sum of many ways
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs’.52
The practice follows this approach putting in the radar of both international law and
human rights (being its significant element) not only states but also non-state actors
(especially individuals and their more or less formalized groupings). It does so
through the application of international law norms conceived not only as a result
of state consent but also of general pressure resulting from a broad consent of all
legitimate international law and human rights stakeholders to pursue basic common
values of humankind. In modern times such a pressure has become a driving force
for shaping international normative agenda.53
Having said that, it is important to emphasize that states still play the most
important role as international law operators and human rights guarantors (through
their own substantive and procedural guarantees producing the rule of law). Thus, at
the end of the day, their consent to any conceived norms in these realms still plays
the dominant role in legitimating a broad enough and effective (judiciable) recourse
to those values in an international scale (in state-setting). To some extent, this
pronounced role of states represents an argument usually somehow less pronounced
but worth mentioning that only effective assets of international relations really count
in international law and human rights promotion.
The essential problem of today’s international relations, international law and
thus human rights defined in broad terms (i.e. also as a source of potential inspiration
for a global governance practice) is at what level of aggregation of their respective
standards should be conceived and, consequently, how universally, they can or
should be applied and enforced. In such a context, the EU effort to maintain some
uniformity in its human rights and the rule of law context can be interpreted as an
51[1927] PCIJ 10 Series A, 18.
52Commission on Global Governance (1995), Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance.
53See discussion presented in: Thirlway (2014), pp. 8–16.
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effort to achieve significant ‘weight’ able to attract other, non-EU states to follow the
European pattern or at least to become an important reference point for the interna-
tional discussion on the nature, scope of application and the mode of enforcement of
human rights.
6 Conclusions
1. The Rule of Law Framework (sensu largo) is vulnerable to unguaranteed,
discretionary influences of the Member States. This vulnerability arises from its
procedural format which requires high thresholds in decision making—with
unanimity applicable to the decision which could make it possible for the EU
institutions to effectively address any situation in a EU Member States where the
rule of law standards have been considered unsatisfactory. With such a mode of
the applicable decision-making, RLF procedures are prone to be terminated as a
result of collusions made by EUMember States likely to be scrutinized, if at least
two of them wish to cooperate with each other in order to abort the RLF procedure
brought against one of them.
2. Yet, any serious breaches of an EU Member State of human rights (in the context
of ineffective rule of law standards) could single it out within the Union. As a
result, in breaches of significant gravity, such a state would not be able to attract
cooperation needed for the collusive termination of the RLF. Thus the Frame-
work can have some positive impact on respective EU Member States’ behaviour
with regard to their respect to human rights.
3. This effect is even reinforced by an active stance of the European Commission
which is bound to pursue the RLF effectiveness for the sake of achieving relative
uniformity of application of EU law (at large), and making the European Union a
credible actor and co-creator of international legal order. The Commission is
determined to play an active role also because this allows it to make an important
statement on its own institutional powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions and the
EU Member States.
4. The RLF is an important tool for the maintenance of relative stability of human
rights and the rule of law in the EU despite natural divergence propensity
resulting from the procedural autonomy of the EU Member States. By achieving
this stability, the EU achieves significant political weight in international dialogue
concerning human right and the rule of law and preserves a high level of its global
credibility in this context. Thus, RLF increases the EU’s effectiveness in promot-
ing the European model of their identification and enforcement.
5. It is rather difficult to judge about the universal acceptability of the European
evolving concept of human rights. Admittedly, they may be considered attractive
because of the universality of their underlying axiology and their comprehen-
siveness as a legal concept reflexing the Western idea of broadly understood
individual and collective welfare. Such general elements can be considered
sufficient to serve as a low enough denominator which is widely acceptable to
The Rule of Law Framework in the European Union: Its Rationale, Origins, Role. . . 329
serve as an element of the ‘international order’ and to enforce other elements of
it. Moreover, high standards of protection of a vast catalogue of human rights in
the Western world have contributed to the effectiveness and efficacy of its
political and economic systems. They have done so by reinforcing largely
adequate mechanisms of public choice generally based on the determination of
prevailing preferences via political elections, protection of minority groups, and
on the well-functioning system of balance of powers. As soon as the prevailing
preferences are unveiled, they have to be translated into respective public policies
formulated and implemented at various stages of the organization of polity. This
has an important bearing on the content of public policies: in their goals,
objectives and instruments which—under such a system—take a proper account
of human rights.
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Abstract Investment treaty law and EU law began to develop in the same era and
share some important philosophical and axiological foundations. The pressure on the
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CEE countries to enter into numerous bilateral investment treaties in late 80s and
early 90s, in the context of the EU accession aspirations of the former communist
countries, was likely to result, eventually, in a conflict between EU law and
investment treaty law. The conflict could have been managed in three different
ways, yet the CJEU decided in Achmea to declare an undefined volume of intra-
EU arbitrations to be incompatible with EU law. This important judgment, which
delivered an outcome desired by the European Commission and a number of
Member States, is based on questionable legal reasoning that creates high uncer-
tainty in this area of law. The doubts include the scope of application of Achmea,
which is now a highly debatable issue. The CJEU itself saw it necessary to limit the
scope of Achmea by declaring in Opinion 1/17 (CETA) that the legal reasoning of
Achmea did not apply to investment protection treaties with third countries. The
Member States of the EU remain politically divided in their views as to whether
Achmea applies to the Energy Charter Treaty. And while the problems with the rule
of law and independence of the judiciary in certain Member States continue to grow,
Achmea has left an important gap for which there is no substitute in the current
architecture of the EU legal system.
1 Introduction
Yogi Berra, a baseball player and coach, once famously said it was difficult for him
to make predictions, especially about the future. His job should be easier in legal
studies, since law is supposed to be a set of rules intended to yield reasonably high
predictability of result. A frequent connotation of the rule of law is that legal matters
should unfold in an orderly and foreseeable fashion, instilling the sense of certainty
in legal subjects. When it comes, however, to the interactions between EU law and
investor-state arbitration, predictability of outcome has been rather low lately.
Politics clearly trumps technical legal reasoning in this field. This should probably
be of little wonder. International investment protection law has always been a highly
political issue. In the early 90s, investment protection treaties were used in Europe as
a way to foster economic expansion of Western European companies to the former
Soviet bloc, without much technical legal thought being given to the long-term
consequences of creating this new legal order in Europe and its relation to EU law.
The potential for conflict between EU law and investment treaty law was not
identified at that time, though it was eventually unavoidable. When these two worlds
finally came to a clash, their confrontation could have been managed in several
different ways. Advocate-General Wathelet made an ingenuous proposal in
Achmea,1 which could have established harmonious co-existence of both legal
systems, and at the same time, surrender intra-EU investment treaty tribunals to
1CJEU, Case C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699.
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the functional supremacy of the CJEU.2 The CJEU, however, chose a radically
different approach, declaring an undefined volume of intra-EU arbitrations to be
incompatible with the EU law.3 That decision elated certain European Governments,
but not necessarily those most adherent to the rule of law. The CJEU then purported
to clarify in Opinion 1/17 that only the investor-state dispute resolution clauses in
intra-EU treaties should be deemed incompatible with EU law, and not those in the
treaties with third countries.4 In the latter case, the outcome seems to depend on
whether a treaty in question complies with the threshold criteria defined by the CJEU
in Opinion 1/17. By declaring that the CETA5 complied with such criteria, the CJEU
cleared the path to the ratification and entry into force of that treaty. Opinion 1/17
reads as if the pendulum swang in the direction opposite to Achmea, since the
position the CJEU took in it contradicts in many important aspects the legal
reasoning underlying the Achmea judgment.6 Nonetheless, the CJEU confirmed in
Opinion 1/17 that Achmea applies broadly to intra-EU proceedings, but sought to
distinguish it from the case of treaties with third countries.7 As shall be shown
below, however, the distinction between the intra-EU and extra-EU investment
treaties is not sufficient to justify the contradictory conclusions reached by the
CJEU in these two decisions. A more plausible explanation is that in either case
the delivered outcome was conforming to the existing political expectations, which
in each case were different. In Achmea, the expectation was to do away with
investment treaty arbitration in Europe.8 In Opinion 1/17, to confirm the ability of
the EU to create a new system of international justice in investment matters,
featuring the Investment Court System.9
Because of these important decisions, the EU is now facing three important
challenges. Firstly, the elimination of intra-EU investment arbitrations has left an
important gap in the legal protection of individuals in Europe. There is no substitute
for it in the current architecture of the EU legal system.10 At the time when certain
illiberal governments pursue systemic actions intended to undermine the
2See Buczkowska et al. (2017).
3CJEU, Case C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.
4CJEU, Opinion 1/17 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada, on the one
part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, ECLI:EU:C:2019:341, see
dispositive part and paras. 126–129.
5See http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf. Last accessed on 17
July 2019.
6Koutrakos (2019), pp. 239–294.
7CJEU, Opinion 1/17, supra note 4, paras. 126–127.
8See Hartley (2019), p. 335: ‘It will be clear from the cases discussed that the law in this area is
almost entirely based on policy. The Treaty provisions are important, but they are regarded simply
as underpinning the wider policies inherent in the EU Treaties.[. . .] it would be futile to search for a
narrow formula which encapsulates the law.’
9See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-2334_en.htm. Last accessed on 17 July 2019.
10Which is admitted even by the enthusiastic supporters of the Achmea judgment, see e.g.
Hindelang (2019), p. 383.
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independence of the judiciary in certain EU countries, it is also riskier than ever to
assume that state courts in these countries can remain capable of providing effective
protection of EU rights to individuals.11 Secondly, Achmea has created significant
uncertainty as to its exact meaning and scope. Its reasoning is far from clear and the
judgment itself is based on seemingly mistaken assumptions.12 Even the EU Mem-
ber States differ among themselves in their official positions as to the impact of
Achmea on the Energy Charter Treaty.13 Achmea also creates a conflict between
international and EU law. In particular, it puts EU Member States in a delicate
situation, since they are obliged to comply with existing arbitral awards in accor-
dance with the investment protection treaties, but Achmea prevents them from
complying voluntarily. This may create real practical problems especially outside
the EU, where local courts seized with requests for enforcement against state assets
do not necessarily have to recognize the principles of primacy and autonomy of EU
law.14 Thirdly, Achmea creates lingering problems for the ambitious plans of the EU
to reform the investor-state dispute resolution system globally, in particular through
the creation of a multinational investment court.15 Opinion 1/17 resolves this
problem only partially and superficially. Future arbitrations under the CETA shall
likely lead to the situation in which the CJEU’s position taken in Opinion 1/17 may
have to be revisited in light of the views expressed in Achmea. Predictability in this
area of law has been reduced to a roll of the dice.
11See Sadowski (2018), pp. 1025–1060.
12As the Arbitral Tribunal in ICSID Case No. ARB/15/15, 9REN Holding S.À.R.L. v. Spain, award
of 31 May 2019, para. 150, put it: ‘The Tribunal has attempted, with the Parties’ assistance, to
understand the truncated reasoning in the CJEU’s decision in Achmea. There is much to
understand.’
13Compare the Declarations of the Member States of 15 and 16 January 2019 on the legal
consequences of the Achmea judgment and on investment protection, available at https://ec.
europa.eu/info/publications/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en, last accessed on 20 June
2019.
14The U.S. courts currently seem to be the principal extra-EU destination of EU investors who were
awarded damages by investment treaty tribunals against Spain. See, for example, NextEra Energy
Global Holdings B.V. and NextEra Energy Spain Holdings B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Petition to
Confirm International Arbitral Award Pursuant to the 1965 ICSID Convention of 3 June 2019, Case
no. 1:19-cv-01618, https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw10570.pdf,
last acceded on 17 July 2019.
15Lavranos and Singla (2018), p. 351 et seq.
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2 From Friends to Foes
2.1 Early Co-existence
Modern investment treaty law and European integration have contemporaneous
origins. The 1959 treaty between Germany and Pakistan,16 regarded as the first
bilateral investment treaty worldwide, was adopted just 2 years after the Treaty of
Rome was signed. The arbitration between a UK company AAPL and Sri Lanka in
the late 80s was the first dispute in which an arbitration agreement conferring
jurisdiction on an arbitral tribunal, was construed from a combination of a provision
in an international treaty and the express or implied will of an investor.17
When the CEE countries began the process of their association with the EEC
(later the EU) in the 90s, it was the European Commission which requested them, in
the so-called Europe Agreements, to enter into bilateral investment treaties with the
then Member States.18 This is the explanation of the high number of bilateral
investment treaties between Eastern and Western European countries. The European
Union and its Member States also adopted the Energy Charter Treaty, which pro-
vides for the settlement of a broad range of investor-state disputes through interna-
tional arbitration.19 There does not seem to be evidence that at the time these treaties
were signed, serious discussions were held as to whether international investment
law and investor-state arbitration were compatible with EU law, or whether candi-
date Member States from Central and Eastern Europe should renounce these treaties
once they are admitted to EU membership.
16Treaty for the Promotion and Protection of Investments (with Protocol and exchange of notes),
Germany and Pakistan, 25 November 1959, 457 U.N.T.S. 24 (entered into force 28 November
1962), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid¼0800000280132bef, last
accessed on 20 June 2019.
17Arbitral Tribunal, Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award of 27 June 1990.
18See, e.g., Article 72(2) of the Europe Agreement establishing an association between the
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Hungary,
of the other part, signed in Brussels on 16 December 1991, OJ 1993 L 347/2; see also: CJEU, Case
C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, footnote 41 for similar examples concerning Poland,
Romania, Slovakia or Croatia.
19The text of the Energy Charter Treaty is available at https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/
DocumentsMedia/Legal/ECTC-en.pdf, last accessed on 20 June 2019. The (non-exhaustive) list of
investment treaty arbitration initiated under the ECT is available here: https://energycharter.org/
what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-investment-dispute-settlement-cases/, last accessed on 20 June
2019.
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2.2 Rise in Intra-EU Arbitrations
The surge in investor-state arbitrations, which began worldwide in late 90s, did not
spare Central and Eastern Europe.20 In fact, the economic and legal transformation,
including massive privatization plans and the process of adaptation of the CEE legal
systems to the requirements of the European Union were fruitful grounds for
numerous treaty claims related to that part of the world.21 Following the accessions
of 2004 and 2007, newMember States were among the first ones to note the potential
conflict between EU law and investment protection treaties. Defending themselves
against treaty claims, they started to raise, in various shapes and forms, objections
related to the alleged incompatibility of the two legal regimes. The European
Commission also stepped in to support these contentions. Arbitral tribunals, often
composed of prominent international judges and scholars in public international law,
consistently rejected, however, jurisdictional objections based on EU law.22
The arguments in favour and against the ‘EU objection’ were rehearsed so many
times and from so many angles that the matter can now be said to have been
profoundly examined and discussed by arbitral tribunals. The case law which
emerged from those decisions could be regarded as jurisprudence constante in
investment treaty law. The unequivocal conclusion was that neither the accession
of the new Member States to the EU, nor the inherent features of the EU legal
system, deprived arbitral tribunals of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by
investment protection treaties.
2.3 Game-Changing Catalysts
Three catalysts then played a major role in undermining the position of investment
treaty arbitration in Europe. The first one was the emergence of cases, which, rightly
or wrongly, were considered to threaten the autonomy of the EU legal order. These
20See e.g. UNCTAD Fact Sheet on Investor–State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, available at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf, last accessed on 20 June 2019,
p. 1.
21See UNCTAD Fact Sheet on Investor–State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, p. 2. Czechia and
Poland have been among the most frequently sued countries, along Ukraine and Russia.
22Among many decisions preceding the CJEU judgment in Achmea, see e.g. Arbitral Tribunal, SCC
Case No. 088/2004, Eastern Sugar B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 27 March 2007; Jan
Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v. Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on Jurisdiction of
30 April 2010; PCA Case No. 2008-13, Achmea B.V. (formerly Eureko) v. Slovak Republic, Award
on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension of 26 October 2010; ICSID Case no. ARB/07/19,
Electrabel S.A. v. Republic of Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability of
30 November 2012; ICSID Case No. ARB/05/20, Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula, S.C. European Food
S.A, S.C. Starmill S.R.L. and S.C. Multipack S.R.L. v. Romania, Final Award of 11 December 2013
et al.
338 W. Sadowski
included Micula v. Romania, which was often presented as a clear example that
investment treaty arbitration could be used to circumvent the EU rules on state aid.23
Such statement was inaccurate with respect to Micula, since the facts of that case
concerned the consequences of the benefits, which were withdrawn before Romania
joined the EU and started to be bound by the acquis communautaire. By implication,
since the alleged internationally unlawful act occurred before the accession, the
alleged liability in damages of the respondent state also arose before that date. These
points were correctly identified by the General Court of the EU in its judgment of 18
June 2019, which annulled the decision of the European Commission (EU) 2015/
1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) implemented
by Romania—Arbitral awardMicula v. Romania of 11 December 2013.24 Indeed, it
should not be a controversial issue that benefits withdrawn 2 years before Romania’s
accession to the EU should not be regarded as state aid under EU law.25 However,
the perception impact of theMicula case had already taken its toll and influenced the
development of international investment law.26 Furthermore, it is not inconceivable
that in another case with a different set of facts, a conflict between EU state aid law
and an investment protection treaty could actually arise.
The second catalyst was the emergence of high profile disputes related to
politically or socially sensitive matters. This includes, for example, the Vattenfall
arbitration concerning the consequences of the uncompensated phasing out of
nuclear power plants in Germany.27 Along with a small number of other high profile
cases, including the Philip Morris arbitrations concerning the plain tobacco pack-
aging rules in Australia and Uruguay,28 Vattenfall attracted considerable interest
23Micula, supra note 22.
24GCEU, Cases T-624/15, T-694/15 and T-704/15, European Food SA and Others v. European
Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2019:423. See also Croisant (2019) and Bakos (2019).
25Interestingly, the Arbitral Tribunal in the Micula award calculated the amount of damages due to
the investors on the basis of hypothetical assumption that the benefits would remain in force also
beyond the date of the Romania’s accession to the EU. The Court noted that point, but ruled that
since the Commission did not draw a distinction, among the amounts to be recovered, between
those falling within the period predating accession and those falling within the period subsequent to
accession, the decision by which it classified the entirety of the compensation as aid is necessarily
unlawful (GCEU, European Food, supra note 24, para. 108).
26See e.g. Art. 8.9.4 of the CETA: ‘nothing in this Section shall be construed as preventing a Party
from discontinuing the granting of a subsidy or requesting its reimbursement where such measure is
necessary in order to comply with international obligations between the Parties or has been ordered
by a competent court, administrative tribunal or other competent authority, or requiring that Party to
compensate the investor therefor.’ A footnote to that provision explained that with respect to EU,
subsidies also embrace state aid. See also e.g. Article 2.2.4 of the Investment Protection Agreement
between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of
Viet Nam, of the other part.
27See the official explanation of Vattenfall for the reasons of its action: https://group.vattenfall.com/
press-and-media/news%2D%2Dpress-releases/newsroom/2016/why-vattenfall-is-taking-germany-
to-court, last accessed on 20 June 2019.
28Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products
S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay (formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip
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within the civic societies of Western European states. These cases spurred protests
against the then ongoing negotiations of the trade and investment agreements with
Canada (CETA) and the US (TTIP).29
Thirdly, the global financial crisis required some Member States to intervene on
its financial markets or to implement austerity measures, in particular with respect to
certain ill-conceived public support schemes for the renewable energy sector. That
led to more arbitrations where, for the first time, some of the Western European
states found themselves on the receiving end and began to reconsider the risks and
benefits of intra-EU investment treaty disputes.30 These cases, too, have had an
impact on the further erosion of the investors’ rights in the newest generation of
investment protection treaties.31
2.4 Achmea
Such was the landscape on 6 March 2018, when the CJEU rendered its judgment in
Achmea. The case concerned an action brought by Slovakia to German courts to set
aside a jurisdiction award of an arbitral tribunal, in a relatively low profile and low-
value dispute between a Dutch insurance company and Slovakia over regulatory
measures in the life insurance sector. The German Supreme Court, which referred
the preliminary questions to the CJEU, considered that it essentially had no major
doubts that the provisions of the Netherlands-Slovakia bilateral investment agree-
ment conferring jurisdiction on the arbitral tribunal were compatible with EU law,
but asked the CJEU to confirm that view. In the proceedings before the CJEU, the
intervening Member States formed two opposing camps. The polarization of views
Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay) and PCA Case No.
2012-12.Philip Morris Asia Limited v. The Commonwealth of Australia, UNCITRAL.
29The TTIP negotiations were launched in 2013 and ended without conclusion at the end of 2016,
see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/index_en.htm, last accessed on 20 June 2019.
This happened due to a wave of civil opposition in various EU countries, including massive street
protests. See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/17/ttip-protests-see-crowds-
take-to-streets-of-seven-german-cities, last accessed on 20 June 2019.
30Spain is by far the most-frequently sued EU Member State and the second most-often sued
country in the world with 49 known cases, closed or pending, by the end of 2018. Among other
‘old’ Member States, Italy follows with 11 cases, followed by Greece (4 cases) and Germany (3
cases), see UNCTAD Fact Sheet on Investor–State Dispute Settlement Cases in 2018, available at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcbinf2019d4_en.pdf, last accessed on 20 June 2019,
pp. 11–13.
31See note 23 above. The problem, from the investors’ perspective, is that the ability of the states to
freely withdraw subsidies incentives states to play the bait-and-switch, i.e. to first lure investors to
make heavy capital expenditures in order to create the required infrastructure in exchange for a
promise of long-term subsidy scheme, and then cancel the scheme shortly after the investment is
completed. This is particularly problematic in sectors such as renewable energy, or water and
sewage distribution and collection systems, which require very high initial capex, but then do not
generate high operating costs.
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in Europe was manifest, and the dividing lines were clearly marked between the
capital-exporting, and capital-importing states, the latter category supported by the
Member States with a high number of pending investment treaty claims.32
Arguably, the CJEU could have dealt with the alleged potential incompatibility
between EU law and investment treaty law in three different ways. Firstly, it could
have agreed with the Bundesgerichtshof and declare investment treaty arbitration to
be compatible with EU law. This may have left unresolved the problem of potential
future clashes between EU and investment treaty law in some borderline scenarios.
Secondly, the CJEU could have created a framework for dialogue between arbitral
tribunals and the CJEU on issues related to the application and interpretation of the
EU law. To that effect, the CJEU could have recognized investment treaty tribunals
as ‘courts or tribunals’ in the sense of Article 267 TFUE. This was exactly what
Advocate General Wathelet was suggesting to the CJEU in his opinion in the
Achmea case. The third option, and the one chosen by the CJEU, was to declare
investment treaty arbitration incompatible with the EU law. In its judgment, the
CJEU said it considered intra-EU investment treaty arbitration as threatening the
autonomy of the EU legal order. The CJEU considered arbitral tribunals sitting under
the intra-EU bilateral investment treaties to be trespassing on its own exclusive
jurisdiction and refused to enter into a dialogue with them under the auspices of
Article 267 TFUE. As a consequence, it ruled that the EU law ‘precludes’ the
investor-state arbitration provisions such as the one in the treaty between the
Netherlands and Slovakia.
2.5 Reception of Achmea by Arbitral Tribunals
Contrary perhaps to the CJEU’s expectations, its judgment has not brought invest-
ment treaty arbitration to a halt, although the number of new claims has dropped
considerably. However, arbitral tribunals have so far failed or refused to give broad
effects to the Achmea judgment.33 Not a single arbitral tribunal after the 6 March
2018 declined jurisdiction because of Achmea, although the Bundesgerichtshof
32This polarization was recorded in paras. 34 and 35 of the Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet
in Achmea, supra note 1.
33Among others, see: Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/31, Antin Infrastructure Services
Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, Award of 15 June
2018; PCA Case No. 2014-0, Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr. Michael Göde v. Czech Republic,
Award of 2 May 20181; ICSID Case No. ARB/14/1, Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief U.A. v
Kingdom of Spain, Award of 16 May 2018; ICSID Case No. ARB/13/35, UP and C.D. v Hungary,
Award of 9 October 2018; SCC Arbitration V 2015/150, Greentech Energy Systems A/S et al. v
Kingdom of Spain, Award of 23 December 2018; ICSID Case No. ARB/13/30, RREEF Infrastruc-
ture (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux SARL, Award of 30
November 2018; SCC Case No. 2015/063, Novenergia II—Energy & Environment (SCA) (Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg), SICAR v The Kingdom of Spain, Award of 15 February 2018; ICSID Case
No. ARB/15/15, 9REN Holding S.À.R.L. v. Spain, supra note 12.
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eventually annulled the Achmea award as a consequence of the CJEU decision.34
Arbitral tribunals recurred to various legal reasons in order not to give effect to
Achmea. Most notably, the arbitral tribunal in Vattenfall issued a lengthy and
thoroughly reasoned decision in which it declared that Achmea should not apply to
arbitrations based on the Energy Charter Treaty.35 Given that at least several dozen
cases brought under the Energy Charter Treaty are currently pending against various
EU Member States, the Vattenfall decision is of clear importance to the future of
investment-treaty arbitrations in Europe.
In reaction to the Vattenfall decision and the general pushback from arbitral
tribunals, on 15 and 16 January 2019, all EU Member States adopted three, partially
concurring declarations on the effects of the Achmea judgment.36 More than any-
thing else, these declarations are strong political statements against investment-treaty
arbitration in Europe. However, these declarations also include specific promises,
such as an undertaking to deposit their instruments of ratification, approval or
acceptance of a plurilateral treaty or of any bilateral treaty terminating bilateral
investment treaties between Member States, by 6 December 2019.37
In parallel to, and somehow in spite of, its quest against the intra-EU investment
protection treaties, the European Commission has launched an ambitious initiative to
reform the global investor-state dispute resolution system through the creation of a
multilateral investment court.38 Such court would be intended as a dispute resolution
forum, including between the EU or its Member States and investors of the other
contracting parties to the investment protection and trade agreements. There are
many problems how to conciliate the functioning of such system with Achmea. More
broadly, the reasons underlying Achmea should also be seen as the legal obstacles to
investment protection treaties with third countries. This is why Belgium (on behalf
of Wallonia) questioned the compatibility of the EU-Canada trade and protection
34Order of the Bundesgerichtshof of 31 October 2018, file no. I ZB 2/15, available at: http://juris.
bundesgerichtshof.de/cgi-bin/rechtsprechung/document.py?Gericht¼bgh&Art¼en&nr¼89393&
pos¼0&anz¼1, last accessed on 20 June 2019.
35Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12, Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of
Germany, Decision on the Achmea Issue of 31 August 2018; 9REN Holding S.À.R.L. v. Spain,
supra note 12.
36See: https://energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/all-investment-dispute-settlement-
cases/, last accessed on 20 June 2019. See also e.g. Power (2019).
37See https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/docu
ments/190117-bilateral-investment-treaties_en.pdf, last accessed on 20 June 2019. The Agreement
for the termination of Bilateral Investment Treaties between the Member States of the European
Union was signed on 5 May 2020 (OJ L 169, 29.5.2020, p. 1–41) by 23 Member States and enterd
into force for the first time on 29 August 2020.
38The European Commission proposed a new Investment Court System for TTIP and other EU
trade and investment negotiations already in September 2015, see: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-5651_en.htm. This model was initially included in the series of bilateral trade and
investment agreements which the EU was negotiating with Singapore, Canada and Vietnam.
Subsequently, on 20 March 2018, the Council authorised negotiations for a treaty establishing a
multilateral investment court (MIC).
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agreement with the TFEU. Notwithstanding, the CJEU followed the opinion of
Advocate-General Bot39 and ruled on 30 April 2019 that the CETA is compatible
with EU law.40 This is a good outcome for the future of investment treaty arbitration
in Europe, but it fails to provide legal certainty and bears an inherent risk of being
revisited once the actual cases under the CETA (or another similar treaty) are
decided one day.
3 Three Question Marks About Achmea
The root of all uncertainty is obviously Achmea. The judgment provoked diagonally
opposite emotions and reactions worldwide. It came as a blessing to the governments
of the EU Member States with large numbers of pending arbitrations or unenforced
awards, and as a curse to entrepreneurs who had made substantial long-terms
investment in Europe. It has already been addressed by multiple articles41 and
arbitral awards.42 However, even the supporters of Achmea recognize its ambigui-
ties, and there are many. This chapter purports to deal with only three of them.
3.1 Scope of Application
Firstly, it is unclear to which investment protection treaties Achmea applies. The
dispositive part of Achmea reads: ‘Articles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted as
precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member
States, such as Article 8 of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protec-
tion of investments between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Czech and
Slovak Federative Republic, under which an investor from one of those Member
States may, in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other Member
State, bring proceedings against the latter Member State before an arbitral tribunal
whose jurisdiction that Member State has undertaken to accept.’ Thus, the interpre-
tation rendered by the CJEU does not seem to be confined to the specific treaty in
question, but is likely to extend to other international treaties concluded between
Member States which include provisions ‘such as’ the provision analysed by the
CJEU in Achmea. Now, at the time of the judgment there were close to 300 bilateral
investment treaties between Member States, which significantly differed from each
other. Remarkably, the CJEU failed to notice these differences in Achmea, and it did
39CJEU, Opinion 1/17 Accord ECG UE-Canada, ECLI:EU:C:2019:72.
40Id.
41Among others, see Hess (2018); Lavranos and Singla (2018), pp. 348–357; Berger (2017), pp.
282–291; Hartley (2019), pp. 321–337.
42Supra note 33.
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not explain which criteria should be taken into account to determine whether a
dispute resolution clause in a given treaty was ‘such as’ Article 8 of the Netherlands-
Slovakia BIT.
This omission could create significant lack of legal certainty. However, EU
Member States have addressed this problem with the subtleness of Alexander the
Great approaching the Gordian knot. Their declarations of 15 and 16 January 2019
start from the assumption that Achmea applies to all bilateral investment treaties
between EU Member States, no matter how similar or different they could be from
the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT.43 Moreover, although the CJEU did not pronounce in
Achmea over the conformity of substantive provisions of the bilateral investment
treaties with EU law and confined its decision only to the jurisdictional aspects of the
Netherlands-Slovakia treaty, the Member States went further in their declarations.
They undertook to terminate all intra-EU investment protection treaties by way of a
treaty, they promised to adopt still in 2019. This step was clearly not required by the
Achmea judgment and should rather be considered a political decision, for which
Achmea provides a convenient supportive argument. It lead to the adoption of a
treaty which shall likely have the effect of immediate termination of all intra-EU
bilateral investment treaties, notwithstanding the existence of sunset clauses in many
of such treaties.44 Accordingly, the uncertainty concerning the scope of the Achmea
judgment in practice may be limited to intra-EU arbitrations, which were pending at
the time of its entry into force, and to enforcement of awards rendered to date under
intra-EU BITs.
3.2 Energy Charter Treaty
Secondly, it is unclear whether Achmea extends onto intra-EU disputes under the
Energy Charter Treaty. Here, the positions of EUMember States seem to be divided,
although a large majority of them (22 out of 27) thinks that Achmea has such effect.
Five other Member States, namely Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and
Sweden, noted however, that Achmea is silent on the Energy Charter Treaty. They
referred to the fact that while a number of international arbitration tribunals post the
Achmea judgment have concluded that the Energy Charter Treaty contains an
investor-State arbitration clause applicable between EU Member States, this inter-
pretation was contested before a national court in a Member State. Against this
background, those Member States considered that it would be inappropriate, in the
absence of a specific judgment on this matter, to express views as regards the




Treaty.45 One Member State, i.e. Hungary, went against the wind and declared that
in its view, the Achmea judgment concerns only the intra-EU bilateral investment
treaties and it ‘does not concern any pending or prospective arbitration proceedings
initiated under the ECT’. Hungary also stated that the ongoing and future applica-
bility of the ECT in intra-EU relations requires further discussion and individual
agreement amongst the Member States. Indeed, the revision process of the Energy
Charter Treaty has already started46 and it cannot be excluded that this treaty could
prospectively be changed so as to limit or exclude admissibility of intra-EU claims
based on its provisions. This, however, should not have an impact on the legal
ramifications of the claims brought before any such future change takes place. As of
the time present, arbitral tribunals accept ECT claims brought by EU investors
against EU Member States and EU national courts have not taken any firm position
on this point.
3.3 Commercial Arbitration
The third area of ambiguity resulting from Achmea concerns commercial arbitration.
Namely, although the CJEU made a very clear distinction between commercial and
investment state arbitration in Achmea, some of the reasons and arguments under-
lying the approach that the CJEU took with respect to investment treaty arbitration
also extend logically to commercial arbitration. Similar to investment treaty tri-
bunals, arbitral tribunals in commercial matters also cannot refer questions to the
CJEU pursuant to Article 267 TFEU. The position of the Court in this respect is well
settled.47 Similar to investment treaty arbitration, commercial arbitration also dero-
gates from jurisdiction of national courts of EU Member States, certain matters in
which EU law could be interpreted or applied. Awards of arbitral tribunals sitting in
commercial matters, and awards of arbitral tribunals sitting in non-ICSID investment
treaty matters are subject to the same scope and degree of review from EU national
courts in the context of actions for annulment or applications for enforcement.
Therefore, although it results from Achmea that the same standard of review is
45Declaration of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, of 16 January on the
Enforcement of the Judgment of the Court of Justice in Achmea and on Investment Protection in the
European Union, available at https://www.regeringen.se/48ee19/contentassets/
d759689c0c804a9ea7af6b2de7320128/achmea-declaration.pdf, last accessed on 24 June 2019.
46See Modernisation of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), TDM 2019(1), https://www.
transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-browse-issues-toc.asp?key¼83%20; see also
https://energycharter.org/fileadmin/DocumentsMedia/CCDECS/2018/CCDEC201818_-_STR_
Modernisation_of_the_Energy_Charter_Treaty.pdf and Negotiating directives for the European
Commission issued by Council on 2 July 2019, https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/
ST-10745-2019-ADD-1/en/pdf, last acceded on 17 July 2019.
47CJEU, Case C-102/81 Nordsee, ECLI:EU:C:1982:107 and CJEU, Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss,
ECLI:EU:C:1999:269.
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sufficient to ensure autonomy of EU law in commercial matters and insufficient in
investment treaty matters, it is completely unclear why. Some could argue this is
because of the reportedly sensitive nature of the matters, which are dealt with in
investment treaty matters. But if these matters are sensitive, they are typically
sensitive to particular national interests and national policies of EU Member States
and not of the EU. On the other hand, EU law expressly approves and endorses
commercial arbitration in matters involving EU competition law.48 There could be
hardly anything more sensitive in the entire body of EU law, yet the CJEU is satisfied
with the limited purview of national courts in these matters.
Another attempt to justify the distinction of investment treaty arbitration and
commercial arbitration under Achmea has been to show that in investment treaty
arbitration it is a treaty between the EU Member States that is the reported source of
the derogation of the jurisdiction of national courts. Accordingly, some authors
purported to claim that the existence of such treaty collides with Article 344
TFEU and thus creates the problem. This argument, however, does not justify the
distinction with commercial arbitration and is incorrect for a number of reasons.
Firstly, in order for jurisdiction of an investment treaty tribunal to arise (and thus to
derogate any existing competence of national state courts), also the investor needs to
give its consent. Accordingly, an investment treaty is not per se the autonomous and
enforceable basis for jurisdiction of investment treaty tribunals. Rather, the treaty is a
set of mutual undertakings of the contracting states that each of them should respect
and honour future decisions of eligible investors to refer disputes to international
arbitration (and not to state courts). However, an arbitration agreement is perfected
between the state and the investor.49 Secondly, in commercial arbitration, the
derogation of competence of state courts in favour of arbitral tribunals has dual
basis. On the one hand, such derogation is governed by national arbitration laws. On
the other, the derogation is rooted in Article 2 of the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,50 which obliges the
48See e.g. Eco Swiss, supra note 47, where the CJEU agreed that matters of EU competition law
were arbitrable and was satisfied that proper application of EU competition law could be ensured by
national courts reviewing arbitral awards as part of the action for enforcement or annulment of
award. It is simply illogical and inconsistent on the part of the CJEU, to accept in Eco Swiss that
annulment proceedings before national courts offer sufficient guarantees of proper application of
EU law by commercial arbitral tribunals, and to claim at the same time in Achmea that they do not.
Commercial arbitration is also widely used and promoted in the EU as legal remedy for parties
injured by anti-competitive behaviour of parties abusing dominant position. See e.g. Commission
Decision of 24.5.2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU) and Article 54 of the EEAAgreement Case AT.39816—Upstream Gas
Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe. See also e.g. recital (48) of the Directive 2014/104/EU of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the
Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, 1–19, which expressly admits
private enforcement of infringements of EU competition law through arbitration.
49See e.g. Wychera and Mimnagh (2019), pp. 395-419.
50https://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
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contracting parties to honour and give effect to the arbitration agreements in dero-
gation of national courts. The question following Achmea therefore is whether the
New York Convention, insofar as it was made between the EU Member States, also
should be reviewed in the light of Article 344 TFEU.51
In addition, the logic of Achmeamay likewise apply to the individual applications
to the European Court of Human Rights, which are based on a similar mechanism
that intra-EU bilateral investment treaties. Member States have agreed among
themselves to authorize individuals to refer issues which may involve the application
or interpretation of EU law, to an international court. Moreover, the CJEU has
already precluded the possibility of the EU’s accession to the European Convention
of Human Rights in Opinion 2/13. It also held there that inter-state applications
under Article 33 of the Convention would not be compatible with Article 344
TFEU.52 It may now be an open, but still unaddressed question whether and to
which extend Achmea takes the conclusions of Opinion 2/13 another step further, to
individual applications under Article 34.
4 Investor, Mind the Gap
4.1 How EU Law Purports to Replace Intra-EU BITs. . .
Assuming for a moment that Achmea could indeed achieve its political objective,
which is to eradicate investment treaty arbitration from within the EU, the judgment
would create a gap in the system of judicial protection in Europe.53 This would be its
natural consequence. For so long, investment treaty arbitration and EU law have co-
existed and provided complementary protection to the beneficiaries of the four
fundamental freedoms in Europe that there were no demands for an extension of
EU law onto guarantees similar to those offered under investment treaties. Then in
the aftermath of Achmea, a sudden realization came that the judgment of the CJEU
could deprive a large number of EU investors of important substantive rights they
required in order to maintain and develop their cross-border investments. The
pressure was such that within 4 months after Achmea, the European Commission
prepared and submitted to the European Parliament and Council, the Communica-
tion on Protection of intra-EU investment.54
The document opened with a bold statement that the ‘European Union’s single
market is a unique area of investment opportunities’. The European Commission
51See also further Paschalidis (2019), pp. 219–236.
52CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the EU to the ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, see para. 213.
53See e.g. Balthasar (2018), pp. 227–233.
54European Commission, Communication on Protection of intra-EU investment, 19.7.2018 COM
(2018) 547 final.
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then went to declare it ‘is committed to preserving and improving both a predictable,
stable and clear regulatory environment and the effective enforcement of investors’
rights.’ It failed to mention that at the time of the communication, EUMember States
were respondents in over 100 investment treaty disputes,55 the majority of which
related to allegations of unpredictability, instability or lack of clarity of the regula-
tory framework in the energy,56 financial57 or mining sectors.58
The European Commission was presumably mindful of those claims, but it
nonetheless declared in the Communication that ‘EU laws allows for markets to be
regulated to pursue legitimate public interests such as public security, public health,
social rights, consumer protection or the preservation of the environment, which may
have consequences also for investments. Public authorities of the EU and of the
Member States have a duty and a responsibility both to protect investment and to
regulate markets. Therefore, the EU and Member States may legitimately take
measures to protect those interests, which may have a negative impact on invest-
ments.’59 This statement, again, did not take into account that in many cases the EU
Member States were declared to be in breach of their international law obligations
and obliged to pay damages.
The European Commission went on to recognize that ‘In the aftermath of the
Achmea judgment, the unlawfulness of intra-EU investor-State arbitration may
result in the perception that EU law does not provide for adequate substantive and
procedural safeguards for intra-EU investors. However, the EU legal system protects
cross-border investors in the single market, while ensuring that other legitimate
interests are duly taken into account. When investors exercise one of the fundamen-
tal freedoms, they benefit from the protection granted by: (1) the Treaty rules
establishing those freedoms; (2) the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union (“Charter”); (3) the general principles of Union law; and iv) extensive sector-
specific legislation covering areas.’60
The Communication went on to demonstrate with examples that EU protects
intra-EU investors with respect to the acts of investing in, acquiring and setting up
companies; the right to acquire, use or dispose of immovable property; the
repurchase of shares and bonds dealt in and quoted on a stock exchange; the receipt
55According to UNCTAD, there are currently 105 known pending investment treaty arbitrations
against EU Member States (https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement/
advanced-search, acceded on 16 July 2019). This does not take into account unreported arbitrations.
56E.g. see cases The PV Investors v. Spain, Vattenfall v. Germany, CSP Equity Investment v. Spain,
Europa Nova v. The Czech Republic, EVN v. Bulgaria, I.C.W. v. The Czech Republic, MOL v.
Croatia, Natland and others v. Czech Republic, Photovoltaik Knopf Betriebs-GmbH v. The Czech
Republic, RREEF v. Spain, Voltaic Network v. The Czech Republic, InfraRed and others v. Spain or
NextEra v. Spain.
57E.g. cases Cyprus Popular Bank v. Greece, Adamakopoulos and others v. Cyprus, UniCredit
Bank and Zagrebačka Banka v. Croatia or Addiko Bank v. Croatia.
58E.g. case Gabriel Resources v. Romania, Lumina Copper v. Poland or Corcoesto v. Spain.
59European Commission, supra note 54, p. 1.
60European Commission, supra note 54, p. 3.
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of dividends and interest; the commercial grant of credits (including consumer
credits); the acquisition of units of an investment fund; mortgages, legacies and
loans, etc. and the acquisition of patents, trademarks and other intellectual property
rights.
4.2 . . . And Why It Fails
The point is, however, in what the Communication did not show. Notably, it did not
show that the EU protects investors against unfair or unfavourable treatment at the
hands of the Member State, that it protects them against breach of legitimate
expectations, instability, arbitrariness, or polititcally charged measures. That EU
procedural law offered a one-stop-court in the event of a concerted action of various
state organs targeting a single investor. It also failed to show that EU national courts
could effectively protect the investors’ rights including by way of award of damages
commessurate with the loss suffered.
The point is, EU law—including the specific instances featured by the European
Commission in the Communication—protects intra-EU investors from a different
angle and at a different level than bilateral investment treaties. To use an example
invoked in the Communication, the taxation which was found by the CJEU to be
incompatible with EU law in C-493/09 Commission v. Portugal61 would not need to
be declared incompatible with a bilateral protection treaty.62 On the other hand,
investment treaty law could protect an investor against an oppressive and harassing
tax enforcement proceedings or unjustified freezing of assets in the course of tax
proceedings related to the collection of that tax, while EU law would not.
The differences in the protection of investors between EU law and bilateral
investment agreements can also be shown on the example of the joined cases C-
52/16 and C-113/16 SEGRO and Horváth,63 which are being regarded by the
European Commission as a reportedly apposite example of the ability of EU law
instruments to protect investors in the EU.64 In that matter, amendments to the
relevant Hungarian law in 2013 extinguished all usufructuary rights on arable
land, unless it could be proven that they were created between members of the
same family. Consequently, the rights of the EU foreigners concerned were
61ECLI:EU:C:2011:635.
62In that matter, the CJEU dealt with discriminatory taxation which exempted Portuguese-based
pension funds from corporate income tax which was applied on dividends, when this tax was
applied to pension funds from other EU Member States. If that matter had been referred to an
investment treaty tribunal under a bilateral investment treaty, the questions for the tribunal to
consider would include e.g. whether the foreign-seated fund could demonstrate to have an invest-
ment in Portugal and whether the tribunal’s jurisdiction was not excluded or restricted in tax-related
matters.
63ECLI:EU:C:2018:157.
64European Commission, supra note 54, p. 14.
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cancelled from the property register. The CJEU, responding to the preliminary
question of Hungarian courts, declared that the legislation infringed the provisions
on the free movement of capital. In a subsequent judgment of 21 May 2019, the
CJEU also confirmed that by adopting the contested legislation, Hungary was in
breach of its obligations under the TFEU.65
The outcome of SEGRO can be, in many respects, more favourable for investors
than the outcome of a theoretical investment treaty claim in a parallel case. First of
all, the claimants could eventually receive restitution, i.e. its rights should be
returned to it. This would not be possible in investment treaty arbitration, where
damages would be the principal remedy.66 Proceedings before Hungarian courts,
even including the reference to the CJEU, would be cheaper, and not necessarily
longer than an investment treaty arbitration. On the other hand, claimants in the
SEGRO-type scenario depend on the willingness of national courts to refer matters
to the CJEU, and sometimes national courts can bend over backwards to arrive at an
interpretation that would deny the claimants their relief in spite of the CJEU
decision.67 Also, because of the sectoral and limited jurisdiction of national courts,
as well as the limited scope of application of EU law, the SEGRO-type scenario is
not apposite for complex factual patters, where claimant is affected by various
measures taken by different state organs. Thus, despite the attempts of the European
Commission to prove the contrary, the EU law cannot effectively make up for the
legal vacuum that shall be created when the system of intra-EU investment treaty
protection is terminated.
5 Triumph of Hope Over Experience
5.1 Risk of Conflicting Decisions
Another risk created by Achmea is that in the future, this judgment may undermine
the attempts of the EU to create a new mechanism of resolution of investor-state
disputed, involving a multilateral investment court and, more broadly, call into
question the trade and investment agreements which are now being negotiated by
the EU. This may be the situation e.g. when an arbitral tribunal established under one
of these treaties comes to conclusion that conflicts with the interpretation of EU law
65CJEU, Case C-235/17 Commission v. Hungary (Usufruct of agricultural land), ECLI:EU:
C:2019:432.
66But see Arbitral Tribunal, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/23, Mr. Franck Charles Arif v. Republic of
Moldova, Award of 8 April 2013.
67See e.g. CJEU, Cases C-213/11, C-214/11 and C-217/11 Forta, Fortuna and Grand, ECLI:EU:
C:2012:495 and the subsequent case law of the Polish courts, such as the judgment of the
Constitutional Court of 11 March 2015, file no P 4/14 (accessible at www.trybunal.gov.pl) and
resolution of the Supreme Administrative Court of 16 May 2016, II GPS 1/16 (accessible at http://
orzeczenia.nsa.gov.pl/doc/98C5206CE9).
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provided by the CJEU. So far, and for some unexplained reason, the European
Commission and the CJEU seem to believe that the EU or its Member States would
never lose a dispute under such treaties and that in any event, no friction between
such treaties and the TFEU could arise.68 In the light of Micula, Achmea and the
numerous cases confirming the breach of international law standards by EUMember
States, this optimism is difficult to understand.69
The core of the Achmea reasoning is that an arbitral tribunal could misinterpret or
misapply EU law and therefore affect its autonomy. Accordingly, it is—according to
Achmea—wrong to derogate investor-state disputes from national courts (who can
ask questions by virtue of Article 267 TFEU) and to refer these disputes to arbitral
tribunals (who cannot ask such questions). But if so, would not the same concerns
arise if a matter is referred to an arbitral tribunal (or a multilateral investment court)
established to resolve investment treaty dispute on the basis of a treaty between the
EU and a third country?
5.2 Application of EU Law As Facts?
An arbitral tribunal, or a multilateral investment court seized with a dispute under the
investment treaty between the EU and a third country shall likely have to apply or
interpret provisions of EU law just to the same extent as the arbitral tribunal would
under the Netherlands-Slovakia bilateral investment treaty. In Opinion 1/17, the
CJEU purported to distinguish the arbitral tribunal under the CETA from investment
tribunals sitting under intra-EU bilateral investment treaties by pointing to the
explicit provision of the CETA (Article 8.31.2) pursuant to which a CETA tribunal
would have to evaluate EU law merely as a fact. Whereas, in the view of the CJEU
expressed in Achmea, bilateral investment tribunals could apply EU law qua law and
not qua facts. The distinction is not persuasive for many reasons. Firstly, not all
bilateral investment treaties have had similar choice of law clauses, and in many
instances domestic and EU law of the EUMember States would be regarded as facts.
68See in particular CJEU, Opinion 1/17, supra note 4, paras. 152 and 153. The CJEU has focused on
the fact that according to its provisions, the CETA ‘cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent
a Party from adopting and applying measures necessary to protect public security or public morals
or to maintain public order or to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject only to the
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the Parties’. On that basis, the CJEU declares in
para. 153 of Opinion 1/17 that the CETA Tribunal ‘has no jurisdiction to declare incompatible with
the CETA the level of protection of a public interest established by the EU measures specified in
paragraph 152’. This conclusion not only confuses the question of jurisdiction with the decision on
merits, but more importantly it overlooks that it will be for the CETA tribunal to decide what was
necessary for the Member States to pursue a public interest and whether its actions were not
arbitrary, disproportionate or abusive.
69On Opinion 1/17 see e.g. Koutrakos (2019), p. 294 who refers to the approach of the CJEU in
Opinion 1/17 as to a leap of faith.
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Secondly, even if an arbitral tribunal under a BIT were to interpret EU law qua law,
it would not differ in such operation from an arbitral tribunal resolving a commercial
dispute under national law of an EU Member State. Thirdly, such interpretation
would not in any event be binding on the CJEU.
The point is, regardless of whether EU law is applied as law or as facts, it does
always require certain interpretation on the part of the arbitral tribunal, whether
under the CETA or not. It is not possible to assume that a future CETA tribunal
would not have to review the conduct of an investor, or state authorities, against the
yardstick defined in an act of EU law. Nor that in view of conflicting submissions of
the parties as to whether each side could reasonably rely on its own interpretation of
that act, assess that conduct. Such assessment could then be contrary to an anterior or
posterior interpretation given to that act by the CJEU. Alternatively, it could well
happen that a CETA tribunal would find that an interpretation given by the CJEU to a
particular provision of the EU law constitutes a breach (or part of a breach) of the
CETA provision.
Two other arguments have been used to distinguish between intra and extra EU
situations. They are the principle of mutual trust and involvement of the EU as the
contracting party to the treaty. Starting with the latter argument, it goes only as far as
Article 344 TFEU is concerned. However, the fact that the involvement of the EU as
a party may do away with the issue of an Article 344 violation is irrelevant for the
principal problem, which is the risk of incompatibility of the award with the principle
of autonomy of EU law. As far as the problem concerns the autonomy of EU law, it
is immaterial who the parties to the treaty are. The point is, even the EU cannot enter
into an international treaty that would be incompatible with the TFEU.
5.3 Role of Mutual Trust
Turning to mutual trust, this principle merely means that a court of a Member State
should assume that courts of another Member State can be trusted to comply with a
minimum (nota bene, vague and undefined) standard of due process. The argument
to be built on the principle of mutual trust is that in an intra-EU context, it is not
necessary to take a dispute out of the purview of the courts of a Member State
because it is supposed that those courts would ensure due process of law. But in
relation with third countries, the principle of mutual trust simply implies that courts
of all Member States seen as one, are deemed to offer the same type of due process
guarantees and be subject to the supervision of the CJEU. Accordingly, a provision
in an investment protection treaty with a third country conferring jurisdiction onto an
arbitral tribunal operating outside the judicial structures of the Member States,
logically implies that the EU would agree to waive these guarantees which are
presumed to exist (pursuant to the mutual trust principle) in the entire EU. Such
provision also implies the waiver of the power of the CJEU to ensure that an arbitral
tribunal properly applies and/or interprets EU law.
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The justification given in Opinion 1/17 for these concessions was that respect for
the rule of law could not be presumed in the third countries with whom such treaties
are made.70 Accordingly, it seems following Achmea and Opinion 1/17 that the
CJEU is prepared to sacrifice the autonomy of EU law and limit the jurisdiction of
national courts because certain third countries may have inadequate judicial systems,
but is not prepared to accept investment treaty arbitration in a purely intra-EU
context, where the risk of an actual conflict between a decision of an arbitral tribunal
with EU law would be much lower. The reasoning here is plainly incoherent and the
issue would have to be revisited by the CJEU at some point in the future.
In summary, the derogation of a dispute fromMember State courts in favour of an
international court or tribunal (one of the key reasons why the CJEU declared intra-
EU arbitration to be incompatible with EU law in Achmea), could create similar legal
issues in an intra-EU as in an extra-EU dispute.71 Moreover, an international
investment court could even declare that the CJEU acted in violation of the respec-
tive investment protection treaty through the adoption of a particular judgment on
the interpretation or application of EU law. All these points, adopting the logic of
Achmea, would strongly advocate against alleged conformity of extra-EU invest-
ment protection treaties with EU law. One would therefore think that following the
decided stance taken in Achmea, the CJEU should take the next logical path and
decide in Opinion 1/17 that investment treaty arbitration is likewise prone to
undermine the effectiveness of EU law in the non-intra EU context. As we have
seen, this did not happen. But this does not mean that the issue will not be revisited
one day.
6 Simply Bad Outcome for Europe
6.1 Imprudence of Trusting National Courts Only
Putting aside the technical legal flaws in the reasoning of Achmea, it is submitted that
the judgment was also imprudent from the perspective of protection of the rule of
law in Europe. At the time when independence of the judiciary is under attack from
illiberal governments, promoting judicial monopolism is not the best strategy. Thus,
while Achmea strengthens the position of the CJEU and national courts, a better
route to defend the rule of law precisely in those Member States where it most needs
to be protected would be to allow for a multiplicity of legal remedies at the choice of
70Expressed clearly in para. 82 of the opinion of AG Bot, supra 40, and implied in paras. 128–129 of
Opinion 1/17, supra note 4.
71Admittedly, the conferral of jurisdiction would take place pursuant to an agreement entered into
not by and between EU Member States, but pursuant to a treaty entered into by the EU and the
Member States with a third country. This, however, only addresses the concerns raised by the CJEU
in Achmea in relations to Article 344 TFEU, but not these related to Article 267 TFEU nor these
related to Article 19 TEU and the principle of autonomy of EU law.
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the aggrieved party. A useful analogy is the engineering concept of redundancy. In a
technical context, redundancy is understood as duplication of critical components or
functions of a system with the intention of increasing reliability of the system in the
event of a failure or break-down.72 Thanks to redundancy, for example, passenger
airplanes may safely continue a flight even in the case of the breakdown of one (or
more) engines. Similarly, multiple safeguards are routinely put in place to ensure
safety in air traffic. In law, redundancy is intuitively regarded as unwelcome as it
entails the risk of multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting judgments. As a result,
duplications in legal systems are eliminated. This, however, exposes the critical
components of the legal infrastructure designed to protect the rule of law to the risk
of a single successful attack from an illiberal or autocratic political power.
The existing system of investment treaty arbitration in Europe not only offered a
choice but was importantly different from proceedings before state courts and more
immune to current threats. International investment law enforces the rule of law
principally through non-state, apolitical quasi-judicial bodies, notably international
arbitral tribunals, which are constituted on an ad hoc basis for the limited purpose of
determining the outcome of a single case. The decentralized, dispersed system of
arbitration results more resilient to the potential attacks to which national courts may
be exposed from illiberal governments. Additionally, investment treaty arbitration
enables individuals to bypass national courts and assert their claims directly before
supra-national quasi-judicial bodies, which they cannot do under EU law.
6.2 Three Salient Advantages of Investment Treaty
Arbitration
Three specific features of international investment arbitration make it more attractive
for investors than any remedy available under EU law. Firstly, international arbitra-
tion under investment protection treaties typically allows creating a level playing
field for the individual and the government with respect to the composition of the
arbitral tribunal. From the perspective of an individual claimant, this is a remarkable
advantage, which is simply not available elsewhere. In national courts, judges are
appointed exclusively by the competent organs of the executive power.73 Individuals
72Adams (2017), p. 77.
73The perceived bias of domestic courts is typically indicated as one of the reasons that investors
prefer international arbitration to litigation before domestic courts, see e.g. Brower and Steven
(2001), p. 196. This phenomenon was also recognized by the European Commission in the 2013
Factsheet Investor-State Dispute Settlement, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/october/
tradoc_151791.pdf (last visited on 18 July 2019), in which it stated at p. 2: ‘Firstly, the investor may
not want to bring an action against the host country in that country’s courts because it might think
they are biased or lack independence. Secondly, investors might not be able to access the local
courts in the host country. There are examples of cases where countries have expropriated foreign
investors, not paid compensation and denied them access to local courts. In such situations,
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are similarly disadvantaged in proceedings before permanent international courts, to
which judicial candidates are often nominated by states. In international arbitration,
however, an individual and a state are on a par regardless of whether each party
appoints a co-arbitrator (and the president of the tribunal is appointed by those two or
by an arbitral institution) or the entire arbitral panel is chosen from among neutrals
by an arbitral institution.
Secondly, investment arbitral tribunal can be harsher to respondent states with
respect to damages. Domestic courts often feel constrained from ruling against states
with respect to the consequences of measures taken in pursuit of their sovereign
powers. Therefore, even in high value disputes, high damages are rare. In pro-
ceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, settled case law regarding a
taking in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 confirms that the compensation need
not be full.74 Confronted with such benchmarks, the prevailing approach in invest-
ment treaty arbitration favoring the full compensation model75 is attractive to
investors. It allows to assume that owners of a business project frustrated by
unlawful acts of a state could receive compensation calculated on the basis of
expected future streams of revenue that were missed because of the contested
measures.
Thirdly, enforcement of investment arbitral awards need not take place in the
territory of the Member State concerned. Arbitral awards are enforced either
pursuant to the Washington Convention76 or the New York Convention,77 which
implies that the grounds for refusal of enforcement on the leading international
financial markets is very limited. This poses an important risk to the states that
refuse to settle the awards voluntarily. The existence of a number of unsettled awards
may create problems for a state when seeking to gain access to international funding.
It can also increase the perceived political risk of doing business within that state,
thus affecting the inflow of foreign investments and augmenting the cost of service
of sovereign debt. Furthermore, the very prospect of being engaged in costly
arbitration proceedings is a nuisance to the states.78 In the end, the disadvantages
of investment treaty arbitration proved in the past to have a chilling effect on the
attempts of various states to take measures inconsistent with the rule of law.
investors have nowhere to bring a claim, unless there is an ISDS provision in the investment
agreement.’
74ECtHR, Lithgow and others v. United Kingdoms, Judgment of 8 July 198, Applications nos. no.
9006/80; 9262/81; 9263/81; 9265/81; 9266/81; 9313/81; 9405/81.
75PCIJ, the Chorzów Factory case (Germany v. Poland), Judgment of 13 September 1928, P.C.I.J.,
Series A, No. 17, p. 47.
76Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Washington D.C., 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS 159.
77Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June
1958, 330 UNTS 38.
78Pelc (2017), p. 567 estimates the average defence cost for a state per case at approximately USD
5.5 million.
The Rule of Law and the Roll of the Dice. The Uncertain Future of Investor-State. . . 355
For aforementioned reasons, investment treaty arbitrations played an important
role in the European Union as a tool of fostering and enforcing the rule of law.
Member States of the EU, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, felt there was
real risk of facing adverse financial consequences if they would adopt measures that
are incompatible with the rules laid down in the investment protection treaties.
Investors could assume that if they did not trust local courts in that part of the
world,79 they had recourse before an international forum. Following Achmea, the
accuracy of that assumption was undermined. Following Opinion 1/17, it has been
partially restored, as it seems that the CJEU shall tolerate—at least for some time—
recourse to arbitration by investors from Canada (and possibly also other jurisdic-
tions) or their EU subsidiaries,80 against EU Member States.
7 Conclusions
The decisions in Achmea and Opinion 1/17 have critical importance for the future of
cross-border investment protection in Europe. Their political manifesto is clear.
Protection of cross-border investments within the EU should not take place pursuant
to current investment protection treaties, and should not involve international arbi-
tration as it has been known to date. With respect to investments involving third
countries, the EU has green light to engage in trade and investment protection
treaties, provided that investor-state dispute resolution provisions in such treaties
comply with certain conditions believed to preserve the autonomy of EU law.
However, the technical legal analysis used by the CJEU to justify these conclusions
is wanting in many important aspects and it is internally incoherent. Therefore, it
undermines legal certainty and meets with considerable pushback from international
arbitral tribunals and international business community.
The source of these problems is clearly Achmea. The principal issue with this
judgment is that it purports to deliver a simplified political message that all investor-
state arbitrations based on intra-EU BITs are reportedly unlawful. By doing so,
Achmea overlooks not only the legal and factual niceties concerning almost 300
potentially affected international treaties which were formally in force at the time
when the judgment was issued, but also the potential collateral effect which the legal
reasoning employed in that judgment may have e.g. for commercial arbitration or the
European Convention of Human Rights.
79The situation in national judicial systems in many EU Member States if far from ideal, which is
being admitted even by the European Commission. See e.g. the 2018 EU Justice Scoreboard,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/justice_scoreboard_2019_en.pdf.
80See Article 8.23.1. (b) of the CETA.
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The timing of Achmea could not be worse as it coincided with the systemic
actions taken in countries such as Poland to undermine the independence and
efficiency of the national judicial system and to subjugate it to the political will of
the executive branch.81 It is of course most desirable that the CJEU intervenes to
protect the rule of law by supporting the independence of the judicial systems of the
Member States. However, the contested legislative acts in Poland, and earlier in
Hungary, were not a result of innocent errors of the national legislator. They were
undertaken in wilful disregard of due process of law and they were intentional. As of
today, the jury on the future of judiciary in Poland is still out. It also seems that the
procedure under Article 7 TEU has encountered serious difficulties and it is uncer-
tain whether it can be completed at all.82 Given the continuing rise of populism and
extremism in Europe is may be that also other political powers are watching the
space closely. In these circumstances, cutting the intra-EU investors off from an
alternative way of pursuing their legal claims and referring them before the manda-
tory jurisdiction of national courts was not a prudent move.
The same arguments which served to justify the decision in Achmea can also turn
in the future against the trade and investment agreements which have been entered
into, or are currently being negotiated by the EU. As long as these treaties provide for
access of investors to international arbitration, they will incentivize EU investors to
bypass Achmea by setting up subsidiaries in such third countries parties to these
treaties. Clearly, there is a tendency in the current international investment and tax
law to deprive post-box (or conduit) companies of the benefits of preferential tax
treatment83 and investment protection. This, however, makes it only harder—but not
impossible—to engage in jurisdiction shopping and treaty planning.
Finally, Achmea puts EU Member States into a position of conflicting obliga-
tions. On the one hand, the intra-EU treaties remain in force and create certain
obligations for these Member States under public international law, which may
benefit third parties (investors). On the other, under the interpretation of Achmea
as the Member States adopted on 15 and 16 January 2019, they are constrained from
complying with these obligations voluntarily. What results is an increasing mass of
81See e.g. CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (retirement of Supreme Court judges),
judgment of 24 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531; CJEU, Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland
(retirement rules for Polish judges), AG Opinion of 20 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:529; CIEU,
Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and Others, AG
Opinion of 27 June 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:551.
82The process was brought to a stall in 2018. Moreover, senior EU officials admit the procedure has
had limited impact on Poland’s behaviour, see https://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-katainen-
eu/eus-katainen-says-article-7-procedure-against-poland-has-had-little-impact-idUSKCN1S73C6;
last acceded on 17 July 2019.
83See e.g. CJEU, Joined Cases C-116/16 and C-117/16, Skatteministeriet v. T Danmark and Y
Denmark Aps, ECLI:EU:C:2019:135.
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unpaid awards rendered against EU Member States that one day shall reach the
gravitas required for the problem to be resolved at a political, and not legal level.
How and when can this may happen remains to be seen.
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1 Introduction
The Council of Europe was founded upon the Rule of Law as one of its three core
principles. This transpires from the preamble of the Council’s Statute and the
requirements for membership, as enshrined in Article 3 where “every member of
the Council of Europe must accept the principles of the Rule of Law [emphasis
added] and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights
*This submission was completed on 23 August 2019 and thereby only reflects upon the
developments up and until this date.
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and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate sincerely and effectively in the realisa-
tion of the aim of the Council.”1
Respect for the Rule of Law is a precondition for the accession of States to the
Organisation. The Rule of Law is of the upmost importance for the Council, so much
that if a member State were to consistently fail to uphold this principle, it may trigger
the application of Article 8 which would not only provide for the suspension of a
State’s right to representation, but also its eventual expulsion if the systematic
violations continued to persist. The relevant Committee of Minister’s decisions
require a mere two-thirds majority (as defined by Article 20 (d) of the Statute).2
The Parliamentary Assembly disposes of a range of measures in the context of its
own monitoring procedure. Based on the procedure to challenge the credentials of
national delegations, it may choose to suspend the voting and participatory rights of
a delegation.3 These powers have been subject to criticism on both political and legal
grounds.4 Following the adoption of the decision by the Committee of Ministers at
its 129th Session (Helsinki, 17 May 2019) on “A shared responsibility for demo-
cratic security in Europe – Ensuring respect for rights and obligations, principles,
standards and values”, the Assembly modified its sanctions regime. Henceforth, the
members’ right to vote, to speak and to be represented in the Assembly and its bodies
shall not be suspended or withdrawn in the context of a challenge to or reconsider-
ation of the credentials of these members.5 Should a member State continue to
persistently disrespect its commitments, the Assembly may address a recommenda-
tion to the Committee of Ministers requesting it to take action in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of the Statute. Both organs are currently in the process
of setting up, in addition to the existing procedures, a joint reactionary procedure to
serious violations of the Organisation’s fundamental principles and values, including
the Rule of Law, which could be triggered by the Parliamentary Assembly, the
Committee of Ministers or the Secretary General.
So far, no member State has ever been sanctioned for showing a blatant disregard
for the Rule of Law. Attempts to open ‘monitoring procedures’ in respect to
Hungary6 and Malta7 failed in April 2013 and June 2019. Yet, on 24 April 2017,
the Assembly chose to reopen a monitoring procedure regarding Turkey citing
1Statute of the Council of Europe, ETS No 001, London, 5 May 1949.
2Ibid.
3See Evans and Silk (2013).
4See ‘Role and responsibilities of the Council of Europe’s statutory organs with special emphasis on
the limitation of membership rights’ DLAPIL 18/2018 of 25 September 2018.
5Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 2287 (2019) of 25 June 2019.
6Parliamentary Assembly, PACE Committee Recommends Monitoring of Hungary, 25 April 2013.
7A motion presented in the context of ‘Daphne Caruana Galizia’s assassination and the rule of law
in Malta and beyond: ensuring that the whole truth emerges’ (Report by P Omtzigt, doc. 14906)
failed, but Resolution 2293 (2019) was adopted and states inter alia that “the rule of law in Malta is
seriously undermined by the extreme weakness of its system of checks and balances.”
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“serious concerns”8 over a number of human rights, democracy and Rule of Law
related issues.
This contribution addresses the Council of Europe’s various mechanisms
designed to strengthen the Rule of Law before examining our cooperation with the
European Union and in particular, the European Commission, who in light of the
serious breaches of the Rule of Law has initiated infringement proceedings against
Poland and referred two cases to the European Court of Justice9 in addition to asking
the Council of the European Union to adopt a decision under Article 7 of the Treaty
on European Union.10
2 The Venice Commission and its Rule of Law Checklist
The ‘European Commission for Democracy through Law’, otherwise known as the
Venice Commission is an independent consultative body established through an
enlarged Council agreement. The Commission has 61 members, the 47 Council of
Europe member States and 14 other countries including Algeria, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco,
Mexico, Peru, Tunisia and the US. The Commission has in the past been publicly
referred to as the “custodian of constitutional probity all over Europe.”11
For more than 20 years, the Venice Commission has supported and advised
individual countries on the Rule of Law in order to strengthen democratic institu-
tions and protect human rights. As one of its primary objectives, the Commission
promotes the Rule of Law as a basic feature of the European constitutional order
through recommendations and opinions on draft constitutions and legislation. The
Venice Commission can be seized by the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary
Assembly, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, the Secretary
General or by a participating State, international organisation or body to provide an
opinion.12 It may also carry out research on its own accord; prepare studies and draft
guidelines, laws and international agreements.13 Its flexible and ad-hoc character
allows the Venice Commission to react swiftly to threats posed to the Rule of Law
and ensures the Commission’s relevance, in the midst of unfolding crises as the most
8Parliamentary Assembly, PACE reopens monitoring procedure in respect of Turkey,
25 April 2017.
9CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531. CJEU, Case C-192/18
Commission v Poland ECLI:EU:C:2019:529.
10European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independent
in Poland, 20 December 2017.
11Gardner (6 April 2017).
12Council of Ministers, Resolution (2002) 3, Article 3(2).
13Ibid, Article 3 (1).
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recent events in Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukraine and Turkey, have
illustrated.
In 2007, the Parliamentary Assembly called upon the Venice Commission to
assist in the offering of further reflections on the Rule of Law in Europe. Following
thorough deliberations, the Venice Commission published a ‘Report on the Rule of
Law’ in 2011, in which it sought to identify a consensual definition of the Rule of
Law in order to assist “international organisations and both domestic and interna-
tional courts in interpreting and applying this fundamental value”14 and distinguish
the Rule of Law from a rule by law. The report concluded that, despite a variety of
opinions a consensus, regarding the core formal and substantive elements that
compromise the Rule of Law could, nonetheless, be found.
During its plenary session in March 2016, the Venice Commission adopted its
‘Rule of Law Checklist’ a practical, accessible and user-friendly instrument intended
to be used by a broad breadth of actors, including national authorities, international
and non-governmental organisations, academics and ordinary citizens. Designed as a
precise enough tool to allow for the application of the Rule of Law principles in an
objective, in-depth, and transparent manner, the Checklist is, when applied, meant to
benefit from the broad involvement of interested stakeholders.15
The Checklist is neither exhaustive nor final; rather, it aims to cover a series of
core elements of the Rule of Law whilst taking into account the diversity of Europe’s
legal systems and traditions.16 The Checklist translates five principles of the Rule of
Law (legality; legal certainty; prevention of abuse of power; equality before the law
and non-discrimination; and access to justice) into concrete questions with the
intention of applying these to evaluate and assess the country-specific circumstances
of its members. It also offers concrete examples of particular challenges with which
the Rule of Law is, at times confronted with, such as claims of corruption and
conflicts of interest17 or the collection of personal data and surveillance.18
In order to understand the practical value of the Rule of Law Checklist, one
should consider the following example: Access to Justice. Access to Justice is an
essential requirement to ensure that we do not find ourselves living in a world
dominated by lex imperfecta and yet, it remains a broad, perhaps even vague
principle and should thus be divided into two sub-principles: (a). independence
and impartiality and (b). fair trial. Both of these sub-principles are still quite general
in their nature and thus require further elaboration. The principle of independence
and impartiality for example, includes inter alia the independence of the judiciary
and of individual judges, the impartiality of the judiciary, the autonomy of the
prosecution service and the independence and impartiality of the Bar. Whilst the
14Venice Commission, Venice Commission Report on the Rule of Law, 4 April 2011, paragraph 3.
15Ibid, paragraph 24.
16For more information on the Rule of Law Checklist, see also Drzemczewski (2018), pp. 179–184.
17Venice Commission Report on the Rule of Law, supra (note 16), paragraph 114.
18Ibid, paragraph 117.
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abovementioned components are, at their core still ‘principles’ they are nonetheless
much more precise than the umbrella terms: independence and impartiality.
The Checklist includes a number of more detailed questions regarding the
independence of the judiciary:19 one general question and a number of specific
follow-up questions regarding the independence of individual judges:20
a) General: Are there sufficient constitutional and legal guarantees for the independence of
individual judges?21
b) Specific: Are judicial activities subject to the supervision of higher courts (outside the
appeal framework), court presidents, the executive or other public bodies? Does the
Constitution guarantee the right to a competent judge (“natural judge pre-established by
law”)? Does the law clearly determine which court is competent? Does it set rules to
solve any conflicts of competence? Does the allocation of cases follow an objective and
transparent criteria? Is the withdrawal of a judge from a case excluded (other than in
cases where a recusal by one of the parties or by the judge him/herself has been
declared)?
These questions aim to decipher the country-specific status of the Rule of Law,
once they are answered, it becomes easier to identify possible shortcomings and
subsequently, (hopefully!) remedy them.
With the adoption of the Rule of Law Checklist in March 2016, the Venice
Commission established “one of the few widely accepted conceptual frameworks for
the Rule of Law in Europe.”22 The Checklist has been formally endorsed by the
Committee of Ministers in September 2016 and a month later, by the Congress of
Local and Regional Authorities. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe also approved the Rule of Law Checklist during its plenary session in
October 2017.23 The resolution foresees a systematic use of the Checklist by the
Assembly, in particular in relation to the preparation of reports by the Committee on
Legal Affairs and Human Rights and the Committee on the Honouring of Obliga-
tions and Commitments by Member States of the Council of Europe (Monitoring
Committee).24 Furthermore, the Parliamentary Assembly invited national parlia-
ments, governmental bodies and ministries, regional and international organisations,
and civil actors to refer to the Checklist when contemplating legislative reform and
carrying out their respective activities.25
19Ibid, paragraph II. E.1.a.
20Ibid, paragraph II. E.1.b.
21Ibid, paragraph 85 b.
22Carrera et al. (2013), p. 17.
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According to the former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “the Rule of Law
is like the rule of gravity.”26 Gravity is, however a scientifically defined concept
which describes a universally applicable, naturally existing phenomenon. The Rule
of Law, by contrast, is a set of principles describing ideals that every society must
freely choose to adopt and adapt to their precise juridical, historical, political and
social contexts; thus the effective realisation of the Rule of Law very much depends
upon the commitment of civil society. Moreover, the diversity of Europe’s legal
systems and traditions, must be taken into account when discussing the application
of the Venice Commission’s Checklist.
Legal discourse at a European level rarely reaches the same breadth and depth as
at national level which, as Dieter Grimm observed, takes place in a much closer
context of participation and responsibility.27 International judges enjoy, in a certain
sense, a greater level of freedom than their national counterparts and thus try to
counterbalance this by respecting national judicial identities. This acknowledgment
is also reflected in the justifications for the ECtHR (The European Court of Human
Rights)’s recourse to the margin of appreciation and the principle of subsidiarity. A
good example of this is the ‘measuring’ of the ‘fairness’ of a procedure or system, a
task which can only be accomplished with reference to its particular context and
through the weighing of different factors which feed into this complex assessment.
In order to fully appreciate the significant role played by the national context for this
assessment, one may look towards the election procedure of judges in different
member States. Whilst the election of judges by citizens is a well-established
practice in Switzerland,28 the same approach would be unimaginable in a country
with a recent history of interethnic warfare, like Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Overview of the Council of Europe Rule of Law Related
Activities29*
According to the European Convention on Human Rights, the Rule of Law famously
forms part of “the common heritage”30 of its members, it is a principle inherent to the
very soul of the Convention.
The Court used the concept of “prééminence du droit” or “rule of law” for the first
time in Golder v. United Kingdom in February 1975,31 basing its interpretation of
26GA/11290, ‘World Leaders Adopt Deceleration Reaffirming Rule of Law as Foundation for
Building Equitable State Relations, Just Societies’, 24 September 2012.
27Grimm (2016), p. 171.
28Though not uncontested, see Lübbe-Wolff (2019), Available via https://verfassungsblog.de/
richterwahlen-in-der-schweiz-wo-liegt-das-problem/. Accessed 26 August 2019.
29For more information please see Polakiewicz and Sandvig (2016), pp. 115–134.
30Preamble of the European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 4 November 1950.
31ECtHR, Golder v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1975, Application no. 4451/70.
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Article 6 of the Convention (right to a fair trial) on the reference to the Rule of Law in
the Convention’s Preamble. It emphasised that this principle should not merely be
seen as a “more or less rhetorical reference”,32 devoid of relevance for those
interpreting the Convention. One of the reasons for why the signatory Governments
decided to “take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights
stated in the Universal Declaration”33 was their profound belief in the Rule of Law.
Since then, the Rule of Law has become a guiding principle for the Court which
“inspires the whole Convention”34 by being “inherent in all the Articles of the
Convention.”35 In this context, the Court has offered further clarification on a
number of key themes which underpin the Rule of Law, including: (1). the separa-
tion of powers, (2). the role of the judiciary, (3). impunity, (4). a tribunal established
by law, (5). sufficiently accessible and foreseeable law, (6). the scope of legal
discretion, (7). nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege, (8). legal
certainty, (9). the execution of final domestic judgments, (10). equality before the
law, (11). the judicial control of the executive, (12). positive obligations of the state
in the form of procedural requirements and safeguards, (13). the right of access to a
court, (14). the right to an effective remedy, and finally (15). the right to a fair trial.
The Court has emphasised that democracy is inseparably linked to the Rule of
Law, the concept implying the existence of a separation of powers, institutional
guarantees for an independent and impartial judiciary, as well as the judicial
oversight of the executive.36 Already in 2002, the Court itself noted that “the notion
of separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary has assumed
growing importance in the case-law of the Court.”37 This principle is also of
relevance with regard to the appointment and selection of judges, whilst the exec-
utive and legislative branches may be involved in the appointment, the procedure
must be free from undue pressure and interference.38
In the case of Baka v. Hungary, the Court recognised the growing importance
which international and more specifically, the Council of Europe’s legal instruments,
case law and bodies attach to procedural fairness in cases concerning the removal
and dismissal of judges.39 Regarding legal certainty, the Court in Brumărescu
v. Romania found that “one of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the
32Ibid, paragraph 30.
33Ibid, paragraph 34.
34ECtHR, Engel and Others v. the Netherlands, Judgement of 8 June 1976, Application no. 5100/
71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72, paragraph 69.
35ECtHR, Amuur v. France, Judgment of 25 June 1996, Application no. 19776/92, paragraph 50.
36Steiner (2016), p. 154.
37ECtHR, Stafford v. the United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 28 May 2002, Application
no. 46295/99, paragraph 78.
38See the overview over relevant case-law in the Background Document to the 2018 Judicial
Seminar at the Court entitled ‘The Authority of the Judiciary’, available at: https://www.echr.coe.
int/Documents/Seminar_background_paper_2018_ENG.pdf.
39ECtHR, Baka v. Hungary, Grand Chamber Judgment of 23 June 2016 Application no. 20261/12,
paragraph 172.
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principle of legal certainty, which requires, inter alia, that where the courts have
made a final determination of an issue, their ruling should not be called into
question.”40 More recently, the Court in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson addressed
at length the principle of the separation of powers and judicial independence and
impartiality, specifying that “the Court places emphasis on the importance in a
democratic society governed by the rule of law of securing the compliance with
the applicable rules of national law in the light of the principle of the separation of
powers.”41
The right of access to a court, fair trial and an effective remedy were similarly
further elaborated upon by the Court within its growing body of case law. The Court
established the basis for the principle of the right of access to a court in the
abovementioned case of Golder, when it held that in order to give effect to the
procedural guarantees contained within Article 6 of the Convention, the right of
access to a court must be provided for.42 In Sunday Times Strasbourg not only
underlined the fundamentality of public confidence in the judiciary and the impor-
tance of the Court’s role as a guarantor of justice for the Rule of Law, but also
emphasised that the principle implies the need for a fair trial.43 In relation to the
remedy required by Article 13, the Court perceived an effective remedy as “either
[to] prevent the alleged violation or its continuation or prove adequate redress for
any violation that had already occurred.”44 The Court has also elaborated upon what
it understands as the criteria for the phrase ‘prescribed by law’: “[f]irstly, the law
must be adequately accessible... Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a “law”
unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his
conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree
that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may
entail.”45
The ECtHR thus has, and continues to hold, a crucial function in safeguarding the
Rule of Law by fleshing out this principle through relevant case-law.
Furthermore the Committee of Ministers’ supervision of the execution of ECtHR
judgments constitutes as an invaluable source of information as to the efforts made
by member States to remedy both individual and systemic ECHR violations, includ-
ing those related to the Rule of Law. The Secretary General’s annual report on the
‘State of Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Europe’ similarly draws
upon the involvement of the Committee of Ministers. In 2017, the Committee was
40ECtHR, Brumărescu v. Romania, Grand Chamber Judgment of 28 October 1999, Application
no. 28342/95 Reports, paragraph 61.
41ECtHR, Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, Judgment of 12 March 2019, Application no. 26374/18,
paragraph 122.
42ECtHR, Amuur v. France, supra (note 37) paragraph 72.
43ECtHR, Sunday Times v. United Kingdom (No.1), Judgement of 26 April1979, Application
no. 6538/74, paragraph 55.
44ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, Judgment of 26 October 2000, Application no. 30210/96, paragraph
158.
45Ibid, paragraph 49.
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asked to examine a report entitled ‘Populism – How strong are Europe’s checks and
balances’which takes the Venice Commission’s Rule of Law Checklist into account.
Chapter 1, for instance, emphasised that efficient, impartial and independent judi-
ciaries “are the cornerstone of any functioning system of democratic checks and
balances. They are the means by which powerful interests are restrained, according
to the laws of the land. They guarantee that all individuals, irrespective of their
backgrounds, are treated equally before those laws.”46 As a follow-up to this second
report, which had identified the lack of judicial independence in several European
countries as being one of the most serious challenges to a democratic society, the
Committee of Ministers adopted the ‘Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial
Independence and Impartiality’ with the intention of implementing it within the
next 5 years (by April 2021).47
Apart from the Council of Europe’s statutory organs and the Venice Commission,
there are various other technical bodies dealing with, in one way or another Rule of
Law related issues. In particular, one must mention the Commission for the Effi-
ciency of Justice (CEPEJ), the Consultative Council of European Judges (CCJE) and
the Consultative Council of European Prosecutors (CCPE).48
The CEPEJ was established to improve the efficiency and functionality of justice
in the member States. Through its work, the CEPEJ strengthens the mutual confi-
dence between judicial professionals and promotes the public service of justice.
Furthermore, the CEPEJ’s evaluation of judicial systems, through the analysis and
collection of quantitative and qualitative data offers a reference point for the
execution of judicial reforms across Europe. The CEPEJ’s work provides a deeper
understanding of the day-to-day functioning of courts, the main trends evidenced by
the evolution of judicial systems with a view of improving the quality, fairness and
efficiency of the public service of justice. In a nutshell, the CEPEJ provides the
fertile soil necessary for the Rule of Law to flourish within the judicial and civil
fabric of member States.
The work undertaken by the CCJE and CCPE incorporates the perspectives of
serving judges and prosecutors throughout Europe. In 2016, the two bureaus drew a
comprehensive review of the challenges for judicial independence and impartiality,
in which they jointly recognised the public perception of corruption within the
justice system to be one of the most serious challenges for the maintenance of public
trust and confidence in the independence and impartiality of judges and
prosecutors.49
46Report of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, ‘State of Democracy, Human Rights
and the Rule of Law’ 2017, page 15.
47Committee of Ministers, Plan of Action on Strengthening Judicial Independence and Impartiality,
CM(2016)36 final.
48For more information on this topic, see Drzemczewski (2018), pp. 184–198.
49Consultative Council of European Judges, Challenges for judicial independence and impartiality
in the member States of the Council of Europe SG/Inf(2016)3, 15 January 2016, paragraphs 310 and
313.
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Let us not forget that the effective realisation of fundamental values, such as
democracy and the Rule of Law depend upon a number of institutional actors,
women and men, taking ownership and enforcing these at a national level. It is for
this reason, that the cooperative activities which assist member States in their efforts
to adapt legislation, practices and institutions to European standards are so vital for
the realisation of these values.
The Council of Europe’s judicial reform projects aim to assist governments in
putting into place laws and practices to address the outcomes and findings of
ECtHR’s judgments, Venice Commission opinions, CEPEJ reports, Committee of
Minister’s recommendations as well as the standards developed by the CCJE and the
CCPE. The Council of Europe is currently managing projects in the Eastern Part-
nership countries, the Western Balkans as well as in Turkey, Latvia, Slovakia,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan. These projects seek to address
judicial self-governance, time management, the role and status of the legal pro-
fessionals (judges, prosecutors and lawyers), access to justice and the delivery of
legal aid.
4 Case Studies: Poland and Romania
4.1 Poland
The Council of Europe has closely been following the events transpiring in Poland,
concerning the government’s plans to reform the Constitutional Tribunal and the
National Council of the Judiciary. Over the last few years, Poland has adopted more
than thirteen laws which aim to transform the judicial system and have had a
far-reaching impact upon the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court, the
ordinary courts, the National Council for the Judiciary, the prosecution service and
lastly the National School of Judiciary. In a recent public address, the First President
of the Supreme Court of Poland, described the reform package as a “coup d’état
against the structure of one of the most important State institutions . . . not with the
armed force or the paramilitary troops but ‘only’ by misusing legal institutions.”50
In March 2016, the Venice Commission issued an opinion at the request of the
Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which it underlined the crucial role assumed by
an effectively functioning Constitutional Court in order for a State to be governed by
the tenets of the Rule of Law. As regards to the amendments adopted on
22 December 2015, the Commission concluded that the different measures included
therein, especially in their combined effect, would slow down the work of the
Constitutional Tribunal and render it ineffective.
50Professor Dr. M. Gersdorf, Address by the Frist President of the Supreme Court on the reforms of
the judiciary in Poland, 22.12.2017.
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The Venice Commission was also severely critical of the new composition of the
Tribunal, as the Draft Act of the National Council of the Judiciary (NCJ) would alter
the election method of the judicial members to allow for the Sejm to elect a total of
15 members, thus skewing the balance of power and effectively politicising the
body.51 As for the Prime Minister’s refusal to publish the Constitutional Tribunal’s
judgement of 9 March 2016 on the constitutionality of the Act, the Commission held
that “a refusal to publish. . .would not only be contrary to the Rule of Law, such a
unprecedented move would further deepen the constitutional crisis triggered by the
election of judges . . . not only the Polish Constitution but also European and
international standards require that judgments of a Constitutional Court be
respected.”52
On 14 October 2016, the Venice Commission published a second Opinion in
relation to the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, in which it examined whether its
previous recommendations on the effective functioning and independence of the
Constitutional Tribunal had been respected by the Government when it adopted the
revised text of the Act. The Commission found that “individually and cumulatively,
these shortcomings show that instead of unblocking the precarious situation of the
Constitutional Tribunal, the Parliament and Government continue to challenge the
Tribunal’s position as the final arbiter of constitutional issues and attribute this
authority to themselves.”53
The Venice Commission also examined the new Act on the Constitutional
Tribunal which entered into force on the 16 August 2016, despite the judgment
given by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal which had annulled several provisions of
the Act. In its most recent opinion, published in December 2017, the Commission
chose to address the merging of the Office of the Public Prosecutor General with that
of the Minister of Justice, noting that “. . .the Minister has a vested interest in the
court proceedings, and, at the same time, has important powers vis-à-vis the courts
and individual judges.”54
Following a letter by the Chairman of the National Council of the Judiciary of
Poland in April 2017, the CCJE urgently adopted an opinion on the Draft Act on the
NCJ and certain other acts, underlining that the Draft Act was in a number of
respects, incompatible with the European standards on judicial independence.55
51Venice Commission Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, 14 October 2016,
paragraph 19.5.
52Ibid, paragraph 143.
53Venice Commission Opinion on the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, supra (note 53), para-
graph 128.
54Venice Commission Opinion on The Draft Act, Amending The Act On The National Council Of
The Judiciary, On The Draft Act Amending The Act On The Supreme Court, Proposed By The
President Of Poland And On The Act On The Organisation Of Ordinary Courts, 8–9 December
2017, paragraph 99.
55Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion of the CCJE Bureau following the request of
the Polish National Council of the Judiciary to provide an opinion with respect to the Draft Act of
23 January 2017, latest amended on 3 March 2017, amending the Act of 12 May 2011 on the Polish
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The CCJE Bureau issued a second statement in July 2017 stating that it “deeply
regretted the adoption by the Polish Parliament of the Act on the Polish National
Council of the Judiciary.”56 In September 2017, the President of Poland proposed a
revised version of the Draft Acts on the NCJ and the Supreme Court, for which a
second CCJE opinion was requested. Once more the CCJE concluded that the
amendments proposed “would jeopardize the independence of a body whose main
purpose is to guarantee judicial independence in Poland. The new draft does not in
any way change this.”57 In November 2017, the CCJE released a statement regarding
the “critical situation affecting the rule of law and independence of the judiciary in
Poland.”58
In May 2017, the Parliamentary Assembly’s Monitoring Committee issued an
information note on ‘The functioning of democratic institutions in Poland’ in which
it voiced its concerns regarding the “political and constitutional crisis”59 following
the 2015 parliamentary elections and the new government’s subsequent reform plans
for the Constitutional Tribunal and the judiciary. The Monitoring Committee asked
the Venice Commission to prepare an opinion on the amendments to the law
regarding the NCJ, the Act on the Supreme Court, and the Organisation of Ordinary
Courts and their compatibility with the relevant European standards on the Rule of
Law, democracy and best practices. The Venice Commission found that even the
new Proposal for the election of members of the judiciary to the NCJ by a three-fifths
majority was “still at odds with the European standards”60 as the “proposed reform
will lead to a NCJ dominated by political nominees.”61 With regard to the Draft Act
on the Supreme Court, which foresaw the creation of two new chambers for the
hearing of disciplinary cases against Supreme Court judges and other “extraordinary
appeals” and another chamber, for the hearing of electoral and other public law
disputes, the Venice Commission concluded that despite slight improvements the
National Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts, 7 April 2017, CCJE-BU(2017)5REV,
paragraph 26–30.
56Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion of the request of the Polish National Council
of the Judiciary to provide an opinion with respect to the Draft Act of September 2017 presented by
the President of Poland amending the Act on the Polish National Council of the Judiciary and
certain other acts, 12 October 2017, CCJE-BU(2017)9REV, paragraph 5.
57Ibid, paragraph 15.
58Consultative Council of European Judges, Statement of the CCJE as regards the situation on the
independence of the judiciary in Poland, 10 November 2017, CCJE(2017)9.
59Parliamentary Assembly, The functioning of democratic intuitions in Poland, 9 May 2017,
AS/Mon(2017)14, paragraph 3.
60Venice Commission Opinion on The Draft Act, Amending The Act On The National Council Of
The Judiciary, On The Draft Act Amending The Act On The Supreme Court, Proposed By The
President Of Poland And On The Act On The Organisation Of Ordinary Courts, supra (note 56),
paragraph 24.
61Ibid.
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draft still raised concerns in relation to its “compliance with . . . European
standards.”62
The Act also lowered the age of retirement for a significant number of currently
sitting judges and intends to involve parliamentarians in the proceedings of the
Extraordinary Chamber, which possesses the power to review the final and legally
binding judgements issued by the other chambers of the Court (even some five or—
during the transitional period—20 years after the judgment has been made!).63 The
Commission maintained that this restructuring would establish a hierarchical forma-
tion of “courts within the court,” a practice not foreseen for by the Polish Constitu-
tion. Moreover, according to the Draft the composition of these two new chambers
could, almost completely be determined by the President of the Republic thus
“making electoral judges particularly vulnerable to political influence”64 which
“creates a serious risk for the functioning of Polish democracy.”65 As to the Draft’s
proposal for the lowering of the retirement age of judges and the provisions which
enable the extension of tenure beyond the retirement age at the discretion of the
President of the Republic, the Commission questioned these practices, arguing that
they would undermine the “security of tenure and the independence of the SC
[Supreme Court] in general.”66
The Venice Commission criticized the introduction of an Extraordinary Chamber
which in effect may “reopen any case decided in the country . . . on virtually any
ground . . . it means that no judgment in the Polish system will ever be ‘final’
anymore.”67 It is difficult to reconcile the proposed mechanism with the fundamental
principles of the Rule of Law, including res judicata, legal certainty and
non-retroactivity. In relation to the powers of the President of the Republic vis-à-vis
the Supreme Court, the Commission concluded that the “proposed reform, if
implemented, will not only threaten the independence of the judges of the SC
[Supreme Court], but also create a serious risk for the legal certainty and enable
the President of the Republic to determine the composition of the chamber dealing
with the politically particularly sensitive electoral cases.”68 The Venice Commission
came to the conclusion that the combined effect of the draft acts and their respective
proposals allow the Polish legislative and executive authorities to severely and
capaciously intrude upon the administration of justice, thus threatening judicial
independence and the Rule of Law.69
In 2018, the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO)
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circumstances” and “serious violations” of anti-corruption standards.70 GRECO
stressed that “several basic principles of the judicial system had been affected in
such a critical way and to such an extent that the assessment made in GRECO’s
Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Poland in 2012 as far as it concerns corruption
prevention in respect of judges is no longer pertinent in crucial parts.”71
On 8 March 2018, the Polish government published a White Paper on the Reform
of the Polish Judiciary, in order to “explain that the criticism of the reforms is
unfounded, but primarily to clear any doubts our European partners may have about
the rule of law in Poland.”72 The Paper was sharply criticised by the First President
of the Supreme Court for including “distorted and even untrue information which
must be corrected.”73 Similarly, in its response to the Government’s White Paper, the
Polish Judges Association ‘Iustitia’ emphasised that the information the White Paper
relied upon was “presented in an extremely biased manner, and does not paint a
truthful image of the Polish judicial system in the European context.”74 In particular,
Iustitia denounced the practice of ‘cherry-picking’, that is the “drawing of compar-
isons with selected elements forming part of more complex mechanisms and legal
institutions, without regard for their normative environment.”75 The Association
concluded that the reforms stipulated in the White Paper “have led to a change in the
system of justice and the erosion of guarantees for the independence of the judi-
ciary”76 and furthermore, that this change was made “without changing the letter of
the Constitution.”77
70Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, ‘Poland: Judicial reforms violate anti-
corruption standards, say Council of Europe experts’ (Press Release, 29 March 2018) https://www.
coe.int/en/web/greco/-/poland-judicial-reforms-violate-anti-corruption-standards-say-council-of-
europe-experts last accessed 23 August 2019.
71Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, Ad hoc Report on Poland, 19–23 March
2018, Greco-AdHocRep(2018)1, paragraph 57.
72The Chancellery of the Prime Minister, White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary,
7 March 2018, 5.
73Professor Dr. M. Gersdorf, Opinion on the White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary,
16 March 2018, page 1.
74Iustitia Polish Judges Association, The Response of the Polish Judges Association ‘Iustitia’ To
The White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary Presented to the European Commission by
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4.2 Romania
The Venice Commission and GRECO have also adopted a number of opinions and
recommendations regarding the reforms initiated by the Romanian government.78
GRECO has expressed its criticism of a series of proposed amendments to the
Romanian justice system, including to the criminal justice system, which if viewed
alone but especially in the face of the current political climate are likely to undermine
the independence of the Romanian judiciary, weaken the public’s confidence, and
impair the effectiveness of the criminal justice system and the fight against corrup-
tion. Their opinions and recommendations79 pay tribute to the core concepts that
underpin the Rule of Law, including:
– the legislative process should be inclusive and transparent involving effective
consultations of all stakeholders and meaningful discussions (which are impos-
sible if the process is excessively fast and non-transparent);
– emergency ordinances and expedited procedures should be the exception, not the
rule;
– the principles of legal clarity and certainty and in particular the principle of res
judicata must be respected;
– not only judges, also the prosecution service and individual prosecutors should
enjoy some independence from interference by the government;
– judges and prosecutors are entitled to freedom of expression; a reasonable
balance needs to be struck between the degree to which judges may be involved
in society and the need for them to be and to be seen as independent and impartial
in the discharge of the duties;
– judges and prosecutors must not be prevented from engaging in debates about the
adequate functioning of the justice system; fear of sanctions may have a chilling
effect which is detrimental to society as a whole;
– corruption leads to arbitrariness and abuse of powers; it undermines the very
foundations of the Rule of Law;
– effectively preventing and sanctioning corruption-related acts are vital
anticorruption measures and obligations under Council of Europe conventions
against corruption to which Romania is a party.
While GRECO and the Venice Commission acknowledge the need to reform the
judiciary and prosecution services, in order to adapt it where necessary to new
challenges and realities, such important reforms should not be rushed through
Parliament, but be based on an inclusive, vetted procedure. In a state governed by
the Rule of Law, it is important to play by the rules, and not with the rules.
78Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption, Follow- up Report to the Ad hoc Report
on Romania, 17–21 June 2019, Greco-AdHocRep(2019)1.
79All opinions and recommendations can be found at the Venice Commission’s https://www.
venice.coe.int/webforms/events/ and GRECO’s https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco websites.
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The Council of Europe will continue to monitor developments in Poland and
Romania. The Secretary General and the Council’s various other bodies remain at
the disposal of the national authorities to provide further assistance if so requested.
5 Cooperation with the European Union
The 2007 Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the
European Union recognises the Rule of Law as a priority for matters of common
interest and encourages both institutions to commit to the development of common
standards to promote “a Europe without dividing lines.”80 In particular, it provides
that:
[t]he Council of Europe and the European Union will endeavour to establish common
standards thus promoting a Europe without dividing lines, without prejudice to the auton-
omy of decision. Bearing this in mind, legal co-operation should be further developed
between the Council of Europe and the European Union with a view to ensuring coherence
between Community and European Union law and the standards of Council of Europe
conventions. This does not prevent Community and European Union law from adopting
more far-reaching rules.81
The three pillars of our “strategic partnership” namely political dialogue, coop-
eration projects and legal cooperation have led to collaborations “of unprecedented
intensity.”82
It was against this background that the the ‘Council of the European Union’s
Conclusions on Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law’ emphasised the impor-
tance of “mak[ing] full use of existing mechanisms and cooperate with other relevant
EU and international bodies, particularly with the Council of Europe, in view of its
key role in relation to promotion and protection of human rights, democracy and the
Rule of Law, in order to avoid overlaps.”83
Referring specifically, to proposals which called for a EU Framework on the Rule
of Law to be established, the Committee of Ministers stressed in February 2014 that
it “fully supports the efforts deployed by the Secretary General, who has intensified
his political consultations with the EU institutions, emphasising in particular the
message that a possible future EU framework should take into account the instru-
ments and expertise of the Council of Europe and co-operate closely with it.”84
80Council of Europe and the European Union, Memorandum of Understanding between the Council
of Europe and the European Union, paragraph 23.
81Ibid, paragraph 23–24.
82Committee of Ministers, ‘Report on co-operation between the Council of Europe and the
European Union’ 12 May 2017, CM(2017)28-final.
83Council of the European Union, Conclusions on Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law,
June 2013.
84In its reply to Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 2027 (2013).
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The Council of Europe welcomed the European Commission’s understanding of
the Framework as a complementary component to “all the existing mechanisms
already in place at the level of the Council of Europe to protect the Rule of Law.”85
During the assessment phase of the Rule of Law Framework, the Commission may
refer to the expertise of different parties where necessary, including the Council of
Europe’s Venice Commission. The Communication from the Commission on the
Rule of Law Framework noted that the European Commission “will as a rule and in
appropriate cases seek the advice of the Council of Europe and/or its Venice
Commission.”86 The Commission reiterated and developed these ideas in two
further communications issued in April87 and July 2019.88 It notably committed to
the “strengthen[ing] cooperation with the Council of Europe, including the Venice
Commission and GRECO, and explore further support to it in relation to EU
priorities on the rule of law.”89
One might be tempted to argue that the more instruments and institutions there are
to protect and promote the Rule of Law, the better for the purpose of ensuring that
governments act in conformity with the Rule of Law. In October 2016, the European
Parliament endorsed the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affair’s
legislative initiative report calling for the establishment of a new binding mechanism
to monitor the Rule of Law, democracy and the fundamental rights’ situation in
Europe. The mechanism aims to ensure compliance with EU values through pre-
ventative, corrective and sanctioning measures. It is composed of four core elements:
an annual European report to identify possible breaches (the European DRF report)
which includes country-specific and general recommendations, an annual inter-
parliamentary debate on the abovementioned report, proposals to remedy possible
risks and violations as provided for by the relevant treaties, and lastly a monitoring
cycle (DRF policy cycle) within the main EU institutions. Whilst the Commission
expressed its support for the Parliament’s objective, particularly the fostering of an
inter-parliamentary dialogue on democracy, the Rule of Law and fundamental rights,
it was more sceptical of the need and feasibility of an annual independent expert
report on the Rule of Law.90
In addition to the Commission’s hesitant appraisal of the EP’s initiative, one must
not ignore the genuine risk of a duplication of standards and actors, which may lead
to serious inconsistencies and forum-shopping practices, an outcome that cannot be
seen to be in the interest of either citizens or governments. As a means of avoiding
85Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council a New EU
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM/2014/0158 final of 11 March 2014, page 6.
86Ibid, page 9.
87‘Further Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union - State of play and possible next steps’
COM(2019)163 final of 3 April 2019.
88‘Strengthening the rule of law within the Union - A blueprint for action’ COM(2019) 343 final of
17 July 2019.
89Ibid, page 8.
90Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council a New EU
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law supra (note 87) page 6.
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such overlaps, the Council and the relevant European institutions abide by a general
policy of cooperation such as exemplified by the European Commission and the
CEPEJ, where the EU justice scoreboard relies upon the information provided by the
CEPEJ, thereby avoiding any potential duplication and confirming the CEPEJ’s
status as a common reference point for justice evaluations. The DRF report similarly
refers to “cooperation envisaged with the Council of Europe and other bodies.”91 In
April 2019, the Parliamentary Assembly examined ‘the establishment of a European
Union mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights’. The
Assembly voiced concern “that, in the long run, the variety of the rule of law related
initiatives involving different European Union institutions may jeopardise both the
Memorandum of Understanding’s declared objective of ensuring the coherence of
the standard-setting system in Europe, and the complementarity and efficiency of
mechanisms in upholding the shared values of human rights, democracy and the rule
of law which exist within the two institutions with regard to States which are
members of both the Council of Europe and the European Union.”92 The Assembly
invited the European Union, in the framework of its existing procedures and its
initiatives to ensure compliance with the values guaranteed in Article 2 of the Treaty
on European Union, to:
– “support the effective application of benchmarks at European level, using the
Council of Europe’s ‘rule of law standards’, including the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights, relevant recommendations of the Committee
of Ministers, standards and opinions of the Venice Commission (including the
‘Rule of Law Checklist’) and recommendations, opinions and/or conclusions of
other relevant Council of Europe bodies;
– use the available reports, opinions or recommendations of the Council of
Europe’s advisory or monitoring bodies, not only citing them as references in
the documents produced by the European Union bodies, but taking into account
the conclusions of these bodies in the assessment by the institutions of the
European Union to determine whether a rule of law issue has arisen, as well as
to guide proposals for any action to be taken;
– when assessing whether a rule of law deficiency has been remedied or has ceased
to exist, liaise with the relevant Council of Europe bodies which issued the
opinion or the recommendation to ensure consistency of views and conclusions.
The initiative for political action in the event of alleged non-compliance with the
European Union legal framework would remain with the European Union, with
the Council of Europe offering legal and technical assessment in accordance with
its monitoring or advisory bodies’ competences;
– provide for safeguards in all mechanisms of the European Union to ensure that the
assessment or action of the European Union will not affect existing procedures
arising from Council of Europe advisory or monitoring mechanisms, along
91Ibid, page 7.
92Parliamentary Assembly, Establishment of a European Union Mechanism on Democracy, the
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, Recommendation 2151 (2019), paragraph 7.
378 J. Polakiewicz and J. K. Kirchmayr
similar lines to Article 53 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.”93
With the next Commission, headed by Ursula von der Leyen due to take office at
the end of 2019, Brussels has indicated that it intends to remain tough on the Rule of
Law. In turn, the joint Belgian-German proposal, to subject all EU countries to an
annual Rule of Law monitoring procedure has been favourably received by the
Commission94 and presents an excellent opportunity to establish new modes of
collaboration and mutual-reinforcement between the Council of Europe and the
European Union.
6 Concluding Remarks
The Council of Europe is neither rich nor particularly powerful. In 2019, the Council
of Europe’s budget totalled some € 437 million. If divided between every single
European citizen, this would amount to less than € 2 per person, as much as a cup of
coffee, which leads one to conclude that the Council is, on the balance of probabil-
ities, a worthwhile investment.
First and foremost, the Council does not embody one particular political or
governmental vision but draws upon the experiences, skills and knowhow of the
national experts from 47 member States. Somehow, almost paradoxically, its com-
parative weakness as a political actor provides legitimacy in relation to the formu-
lation of legal standards and recommendations and thus the Council is perceived as a
more neutral political actor than for example, the European Union.
These attributes allow the Council to engage in a dialogue with its member States
and to openly and constructively address emerging issues in order to avoid division.
The Council’s main working asset is its credibility and trust acquired through
70 years of successful cooperation. Indeed, it this deep cooperation between the
Council of Europe and the EU which is necessary for the promotion and
safeguarding of the Rule of Law. In order to properly function, both institutions
require that their respective members share a common understanding of the values
and principles which define the Rule of Law.
Various forms of successful cooperation on Rule of Law related issues are already
taking place, including most notably the Venice Commission, Group of States
against Corruption (GRECO), the CEPEJ and the work undertaken by the Human
Rights Commissioner. Thus, any initiative to set up new Rule of Law related
mechanisms within the EU should take into account the existing Council of Europe
93Parliamentary Assembly, Establishment of a European Union Mechanism on Democracy, the
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, Resolution 2273 (2019), paragraph 16.1–16.4.
94European Commission Press Release, “Strengthening the Rule of Law through increased aware-
ness, an annual monitoring cycle and more effective enforcement” (17 July 2019) https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4169.
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instruments, in particular the Rule of Law Checklist. The fact that the Council’s
mechanisms are not limited to the EU-28 but practically cover the entire continent
should not be regarded as a weakness but rather as a strength, as this provides for a
more consistent approach to the Rule of Law.
The existing cooperative relationship between the Council and the EU should be
strengthened by increasing the EU’s contribution in order to ensure that the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the Council’s Rule of Law mechanisms are
implemented by the EU’s Member States. Secondly, the EU could join a number
of selected mechanisms as a full member, such as GRECO95 or the Venice Com-
mission and thereby fully utilise the Council’s instruments with a view of better
safeguarding the Rule of Law within the EU, particularly in situations where the
EU’s competences are limited. Lastly, for the purpose of upholding the Rule of Law
within Europe, it is of the upmost importance that the EU finally makes good on its
promises and accedes to the ECHR.
The resilience of the Polish democracy must not be underestimated. Poland has
one of the oldest democratic traditions in Europe with a written constitution dating
back to the 3 May 1791, which is widely considered to be Europe’s first codified
constitution (and the world’s second). According to King Stanisław August
Poniatowski, it was “founded principally on those of England and the United States
of America, but avoiding the faults and errors of both, and adapted as much as
possible to the local and particular circumstances of the country.”96
Whereas the transition towards democracy was a peaceful one for most countries
behind the iron curtain, the price paid by civil society in Romania was a particularly
high one. It is perhaps for this reason that the Romanian people have taken to the
streets in their tens of thousands to protest against the Rule of Law backsliding of
their country. Prompted by the largest street protests since the fall of Communism,
President Klaus Iohannis decided to couple the recent European elections with a
referendum on the controversial justice reforms. Romanian’s were asked: “1). Do
you agree with banning amnesty and pardon for corruption offenses? 2). Do you
agree with banning the adoption by the Government of emergency ordinances in the
area of crimes, punishment and judiciary organizations, and with extending the right
to challenge ordinances directly at the Constitutional Court.”An overwhelming 84%
answered in the affirmative. If anything, the situation in Romania demonstrates the
importance of a strong, engaged and informed civil society for the protection of the
Rule of Law and democratic values.
Whatever constitution a country chooses to adopt, checks and balances between
State powers remain crucial for every democracy. A modern constitution has to
guarantee both effective democratic decision-making according to the majorities’
will and the protection of individuals and minorities against the dangers of a
95On 10 July 2019, the EU has been granted observer status with GRECO, see Committee of
Ministers’ decision CM/Del/Dec(2019)1351bis/11.1.
96Barentine (2015), p. 394.
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majoritarian rule.97 In that context, the role of an independent judiciary cannot be
overstated. Their work reinforces democracy and promotes the Rule of Law by
guaranteeing free elections, clearing the political space for the freedom of associa-
tion, expression and religion, combating discrimination, and enabling political
change. Therefore, whilst Poland and Romania are free to reform their judicial
systems, they should do so in a manner which is consistent with the Rule of Law
and does not threaten the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers, the
principle of res judicata or legal certainty.
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Abstract This contribution deals with the current European rule of law crisis. It
does so by analyzing the recent CJEU’s judgment in re LM and by considering its
possible ramifications for the future of the rule of law in the EU. In particular, it is
argued that, as a result of this judgment, the European rule of law as provided for by
Art. 2 TEU has become a legally enforceable value. The CJEU has indeed made
clear that this value features a set of minimum standards that the Member States
cannot bluntly disregard. In the present context, which is characterized by the
inaction of the supranational and national political institutions, a prominent role in
safeguarding a liberal understanding of the European rule of law is played by the
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entire European judiciary (the so-called ‘Gerichtsverbund’), including national
courts and tribunals.
1 What Is at Stake?
The Union’s ‘rule of law crisis’ is a multi-faceted phenomenon.1 Of particular
concern are Member States where ruling majorities wilfully uproot the separation
of powers. The current focus is very much on Poland. The Polish government has
taken extensive measures that have undermined the independence of the Constitu-
tional Tribunal. It has strengthened its influence on the National Council of the
Judiciary, which selects the judges. It has dismissed more than 150 (out of 700)
presidents and vice presidents of ordinary courts. It has forced almost 40% of
Supreme Court judges to retire.2 It has raised the overall number of Supreme
Court judges, thereby creating the need for up to 70 new nominations. It has
established a new disciplinary chamber as well as an extraordinary appeals proce-
dure before the Supreme Court, which has the potential to subdue independent-
minded judges.3 Yet other Member States should not be forgotten either, such as
Hungary. The latter is even said to have become a rather hopeless case—with some
involuntary help from Brussels, e.g., through its funds.4 Hopefully, the recent
adoption by the European Parliament of a reasoned proposal under Article 7
(1) TEU will help improve the situation in Hungary. But, should these authoritarian
measures remain unopposed, it will be hard to argue in the future that they are at
odds with the European values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU.5
European institutions have started to react far more determinedly than in the
Hungarian case. This is to be welcomed. At the same time, the European reactions
raise the stakes dramatically. We might even witness a ‘constitutional moment’. This
term indicates a situation that deeply impacts on the future path of a constitutional
1Editorial Comments (2015), pp. 619, 625–627; Editorial Comments (2016), p. 597; Editorial
Comments (2017), p. 1309; on the academic debate Bonelli (2017), p. 793.
2COM(2017) 835 final, ‘European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in accordance with Article 7
(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland: Proposal for a Council
Decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the
rule of law’, at p. 21, para. 116.
3Act on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, Journal of Laws (2018), item no. 5.
4For a dire picture, Charlemagne, The Economist, April 5, 2018. Halmai (2018), p. 85. See also
European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 25th June 2018
(Result of roll-call votes), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/votes-in-committee.
html.
5See for a comprehensive description Matczak (2018); ‘Opinion on the Draft Act amending the Act
on the National Council of the judiciary; on the Draft Act amending the Act on the Supreme Court,
proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the organisation of ordinary courts’, adopted
by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session (Venice, 8-9 December 2017), http://www.venice.
coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile¼CDL-AD(2017)031-e.
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order without formally amending it.6 At issue is whether illiberal democracies
become part of the European public order as laid out in Article 2 TEU, or are
opposed by it. In any event, the consequences could be truly far-reaching. In the
first case, the conventional self-understanding of Europe cannot be maintained any
longer, because the European rule of law would cover—and thus legitimize—what is
currently happening in Poland and Hungary. This would have tremendous implica-
tions, for example for the European stance towards critical developments in other
Member States or the Union’s external policy (Turkey!). In the second case, the
European rule of law would be supplemented by ‘red lines’. That would also amount
to a ‘constitutional moment’ because it would add substance and bite to the
European values.
To advance the second case, the European institutions are to be commended for
reacting fiercely. The Commission’s actions, in particular its Article 7 TEU proposal,
merit support, also for good legal reasons. At the same time, much will depend on the
judicial branch. It is indeed no coincidence that a first, important opportunity to draw
such red lines has arisen in the context of legal proceedings, more precisely in the
context of what is now known as the LM case.7 Initiated by the Irish High Court
through a request for a preliminary ruling, this case concerned the interpretation of
Article 1(3) of the European Arrest Warrant Framework Decision (hereinafter: EAW
Framework Decision). More specifically, the Irish judge asked whether that provi-
sion of the Framework Decision could be so construed as to exclude the execution of
a EAW in case of ‘cogent evidence that conditions in the issuing Member State are
incompatible with the fundamental right to a fair trial because the system of justice
itself in the issuing Member State is no longer operating under the rule of law’.
This case will be analysed in greater detail in what follows. It has to be said,
though, that no European political measure or judicial decision can, by or of itself,
restore the separation of powers in a Member State. They can only contribute to
Polish self-healing through its internal constitutional process. However, their impor-
tance is not limited to this, as they are crucial for upholding European liberal
constitutionalism in the rest of the Union. In fact, it is in this light that the LM
case must be read. But before examining the case, some introductory remarks are in
order.
6Ackerman (1991), Vol 1, 6. Note that the original articulation of this term by Ackerman has a more
specific meaning. For further analysis, Klarman (1992), pp. 759–797.
7Case C-216/18 PPU, Reference for a preliminary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on
27 March 2018 – Minister for Justice and Equality v LM, (pending), http://www.courts.ie/
Judgments.nsf/0/FD843302847F2E228025825D00457F19. This case is based on a referral from
the Irish High Court 2013 295 EXT;2014 8 EXT; 2017 291 EXT The Minister for Justice and
Equality v. Celmer , [2018] IEHC 119, http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/0/
578DD3A9A33247A38025824F0057E747. See also Case C-216/18 PPU, Reference for a prelim-
inary ruling from the High Court (Ireland) made on 27 March 2018 — Minister for Justice and
Equality v LM, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, ECLI:EU:C:2018:517. 28th June 2018.
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2 Operationalizing the Value of the Rule of Law
By now, much has happened to operationalize—i.e., interpret, apply and even
impose—the rule-of-law value. Confuting many who consider the rule-of-law
value of Article 2 TEU an all too vague political statement, the guardians of the
Treaties have developed it in a way that allows for a juridical assessment of Member
States’ activities. To be clear, the institutions have not set out to demarcate the value
by creating definitions that can be applied in a formalistic manner, but have rather
linked the value of the rule of law to well-established principles. Their application
requires much contextualization and circumspection and will inevitably contain
political, i.e., discretionary, evaluative and opportunistic, elements. But that is the
path of the law, in particular when it comes to ‘constitutional moments’.
A ground-breaking contribution to the operationalization of the rule-of-law value
can be found in the CJEU’s recent decision in the case of Associação Sindical dos
Juízes Portugueses (ASJP). Its interpretation of Article 19 TEU covers the institu-
tional dimension of domestic judicial independence.8 The European rule of law has
thus become justiciable vis-à-vis the Member States.9 The Commission contributes
to this development by compiling relevant principles into a sensible whole, in
particular in its Rule of Law Framework.10 It relies on many sources: the Court’s
rulings, but also decisions and opinions of other institutions, in particular the
European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission for Democracy
through Law (the Venice Commission). Such a broad spectrum contributes signif-
icantly to the legitimacy of its endeavour.
The Commission’s Rule of Law Framework is an important step with regard not
only for the interpretation but also, possibly, for the normativity of the rule of law.
Although it shows some weaknesses, for example by making it almost indistin-
guishable from the values of democracy and human rights, it seems a convincing
operationalization that is in tune with the acquis of European public law. The
Commission has reiterated the Framework’s interpretation in its Reasoned Proposal
under Article 7(1) TEU regarding the Rule of Law in Poland.11 Moreover, it referred
to the rule-of-law value in its 2018 Justice Scoreboard for ‘monitoring of justice
reforms at EU level’ as well as in its last Country Report on Poland under the
European Semester.12 The Commission’s recent regulation proposal on ‘the
8CJEU, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
9CJEU, Case C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861; Case C-452/16 PPU, Poltorak,
ECLI:EU:C:2016:858.
10COM(2014) 158 final/2, ‘European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the
European Parliament and the Council: A new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law’ p. 4, and
Annex I.
11Supra note 2, p. 1, para. 1.
12SWD(2018) 219 final, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Country Report Poland 2018
accompanying the document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Central Bank and the Eurogroup: 2018 European Semester: Assessment
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protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the
rule of law in the Member States’ even provides a definition for the threshold of
‘generalised deficiencies’ of the rule of law.13 Operationalization can also be helped
by a newly suggested ‘Justice, Rights and Values’ Fund with a total volume of
947 million euros.14 Already in force—albeit not yet enforced—is the Union’s
Regulation on European Political Parties, which permits reviewing whether a
European party complies with Article 2 TEU.15
Notwithstanding a number of doctrinal issues that remain open, at least the basis
for legally assessing Member States using the rule-of-law value is now fairly well-
established. From the Polish ‘White Paper on the Judiciary’, one can deduce that not
even the Polish government puts that into question, since it defends its measures on
the merits of the European rule of law.16 The impressive rebuttal of that ‘White
Paper’ by the Polish Judges Association as well as by the Polish Supreme Court also
shows a well-established juridical link between the vague rule-of-law value and
crucial features of the domestic judiciaries.17 The European rule of law has thus
become an operational principle in European political and legal controversies.
3 The Political Branch in Troubled Waters
Opposing the Polish measures is extremely sensitive because it implies going against
a democratically elected government that is transforming basic features of its
constitutional order. For that reason it is to be welcomed that the European political
of progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, and
results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011’, p. 3, 29.
13COM(2018) 324 final, ‘European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised
deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States’, at Art. 2(b).
14COM(2018) 321 final, ‘Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, A modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends:
The multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027’, p. 48.
15OJ 2011 L 317/1, ‘Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No. 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 22 October 2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and
European political foundations’, at Art. 3(1)c, Art. 6(1).
16Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland, ‘White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary’,
7 March 2018, https://www.premier.gov.pl/files/files/white_paper_en_full.pdf, para. 166.
17Iustitia (Polish Judges Association), ‘Response to the White Paper Compendium on the reforms
of the Polish justice system, presented by the Government of the Republic of Poland to the
European Commission’, 17 March 2018, https://twojsad.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/iustitia-
response-whitepaper.pdf; Gersdorf (First President of the Supreme Court), ‘Opinion on the White
Paper on the reform of the Polish judiciary, 16 March 2018, https://archiwumosiatynskiego.pl/
images/2018/04/Supreme-Court-Opinion-on-the-white-paper-on-the-Reform-of-the-Polish-Judi
ciary.pdf.
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branch has become active. Since the lessons have been learnt from the miserable
action national governments undertook against Austria in 2000, the institutional
activities are so far concentrated in the Council of Europe’s and the Union’s
institutions. The European Commission in particular tries to position itself as a
defender of European values, thereby responding to the harsh criticism levelled
against its earlier reluctance. In the Polish case, it has deployed two core instruments
for the first time. This is significant in and of itself, as the first usage of an instrument
often impacts on its further utilisation. Unfortunately, there is a clear and serious risk
of failure, with a possibly calamitous impact on the European rule of law.
One instrument is the Commission’s already mentioned ‘Rule of Law Frame-
work’ of 2014, which was designed as an instrument whose quick implementation
can avoid escalating the situation into Article 7 TEU territory. Read as an ‘a maiore
ad minus’ approach that is permissible under Article 7(1) TEU and Article
292 TFEU,18 it provides the Commission with a procedure for engaging—through
an opinion and later recommendations—in a dialogue with a Member State in case
of an observed ‘systemic threat to the rule of law’. To date, the use of the Framework
has not yielded tangible results, which casts much doubt on the instrument’s capacity
to impose results. Despite several Commission’s recommendations, the Polish
authorities have not undertaken any remedial action and have merely made some
minor concessions of an illusory nature and clearly no practical consequence.
The Commission then introduced the second instrument to show it ‘meant
business’. On 20 December 2017, it launched the procedure under Article 7
(1) TEU for the first time ever. It finds that there is a clear risk of a serious breach
of the rule of law in Poland, indicates rather precisely which steps need to be taken,
and asks that the Council recommend Poland take such steps.19 It hereby confutes a
statement by its former President Barroso, who depicted Article 7 TEU as the
‘nuclear option’,20 a statement that evidently delegitimizes the use of this instrument.
The legitimacy of its use is corroborated by the European Parliament21 as well as the
Committee of the Regions,22 which support the Commission and call upon the
Council to quickly follow up on the Commission’s action.
The Commission’s proposal merits close attention. It is detailed and extensive. It
integrates the findings of other institutions, such as the Council of Europe or the
18Giegerich (2015), pp. 499, 535–536. For the opposing view, 10296/14 Legal Service of the
Council, ‘Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to strengthen the rule of law: –
compatibility with the Treaties’, 27 May 2014, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-
10296-2014-INIT/en/pdf.
19Supra note 2.
20SPEECH/13/684, Barroso (President of the European Commission), ‘State of the Union address
2013’, 11 September 2013, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-684_en.htm.
21P8_TA-PROV(2018)0055, ‘European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commis-
sion’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland (2018/2541(RSP)’.
22RESOL-VI/30, 6391/18, ‘Determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of rule of
law – Resolution of the European Committee of the Regions of 22 February 2018’.
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United Nations as well as civil-society organizations.23 This fends off accusations
that the findings are partisan. By demonstrating that many institutions share its
findings, the Commission makes itself the voice of a broad institutional alliance.
At the same time, it underlines the legal dimension of the issue by making its
proposal resemble a reasoned opinion in infringement proceedings. The Commis-
sion’s proposal thus evidently aims to be two things at the same time: a convincing
political value judgment as well as a legally sound analysis. This is not paradoxical;
rather, it corresponds to how political institutions should decide.
The legal reasoning of the Commission as to why there is a clear risk of serious
breach might appear somewhat ‘thin’, as it does not really develop what the
threshold requires. However, one needs to consider that institutional developments
towards an authoritarian regime are regularly hard to grasp from a legal standpoint
because legal analysis focusses on individual acts. Taken individually, such mea-
sures lend themselves more easily to justification (although most of the Polish
measures against the Constitutional Tribunal seem rather clear cases).24 Indeed the
Polish government tries to defend its measures through legal comparison with
‘unsuspicious’ countries.25 Therefore, to convincingly determine a ‘clear risk of a
serious breach’ of an Article 2 TEU value, all Polish measures affecting the judiciary
must be considered together, with due regard to the overall political and social
conditions in the country. Such determination inevitably entails an important dis-
cretionary and evaluative dimension, which strictly doctrinal arguments cannot fully
guide.
It is now for the Council to act, which would require the approval of four fifths of
its members, i.e., 22 Member States. The Council has debated the matter in the
General Affairs Council on numerous occasions, most recently in April.26 But it is
distinctly possible that the Council will not decide on the matter, for instance in order
to keep the Union united in difficult times (just consider Brexit!). However, such an
omission could be used as an argument that the Council—and hence the Member
States—do not deem the policies of the Polish government, in particular the changes
to the Polish judiciary identified in the Commission’s Proposal, an infringement of
Article 2 TEU. Accordingly, such policies could more easily be presented as
conforming to the founding values of the European Union. They could possibly
even be considered an expression of the European rule of law. However, it should
not be forgotten that there are also the courts. As so often in European crises, much
will depend on the Court of Justice of the European Union as well as on the domestic
courts—in short, on the entire judiciary in the European legal space.
23Supra note 2, para. 183 and the respective footnotes.
24Iustitia, supra note 17, p. 92; Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on Amendments to the Act of
25 June 2015 on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland’, Opinion no. 833/2015, CDL-AD(2016)
001, paras. 126, 137, 138.
25‘White Paper on the Reform of the Polish Judiciary’, supra note 16. But see also the rebuttal supra
note 17.
26General Affairs Council, ‘Rule of law in Poland’, 9 April 2019: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/39196/st08130-en19.pdf.
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4 The Judicial Branch: ‘I Love You, Like I Love Ireland’
Contrary to the Council, courts cannot refrain from making a decision. What might
help the courts is the realisation that they will be heavily criticised regardless of how
they adjudicate the Polish situation.27 Still, the courts should seize any opportunity
to draw red lines for the European rule of law.28 Within the complex European
judicial system, it is for the CJEU to decide if Poland infringes a European value.
Domestic courts should decide this issue only if the CJEU does not do so.
The CJEU might be called upon either via infringement proceedings initiated by
the Commission or via preliminary-ruling requests referred to it by national courts,
i.e., in top-down or bottom-up proceedings. The traditional path for judicially
supervising the Member States is the infringement proceedings, the standard inter-
action between the two guardians of the Treaties. The infringement procedure should
hence also play a vital part in the rule-of-law crisis.29 The values in Article 2 TEU are
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction and thus to its mandate to ensure that ‘the law is
observed’ (Article 19(1) TEU), and the Court now seems ready to use this man-
date.30 Article 7 TEU does not preclude parallel infringement proceedings, as the
Van Gend en Loos precedent exemplifies.31 How to frame a possible case is more
problematic; after all, the Polish situation is triggered by a combination of measures
that are as diverse as they are numerous. However, the Court has already held that it
can use infringement proceedings to make a finding of general and continuous
deficiencies in a Member State,32 thereby overcoming its normal focus on an
individual and concrete setting.
If infringement proceedings are therefore legally viable, one should nevertheless
consider that it is a mighty burden for the CJEU to have to decide whether the Polish
measures violate the European rule of law. However, this burden can be shared
among several courts if the issue is handled via a preliminary-ruling procedure, as
27The new Vice President of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has already stated that he would
consider any CJEU decision against Poland illegitimate, Muszyński (2018).
28The Advocate General in the case indeed addresses the Polish situation. However, he does so only
in terms of human rights and thereby fails to fully meet the challenge, supra note 7, para. 39.
29The Commission initiated two successfull infringement procedures based on Article 19(1) TEU
and Article 47 CFR against Poland, see Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la
Cour suprême), ECLI:EU:C:2019:531 and Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance
des juridictions de droit commun), ECLI:EU:C:2019:924. A further infringement procedure is
currently pending before the Court, see Case C-791/19, Commission v. Poland. See also the
pending infringement proceedings against Hungary, Case C-66/18, Commission v. Hungary
(Enseignement supérieur) and Case C-78/18, Commission v. Hungary (Transparence associative).
30Supra note 8. In the infringement proceedings against Hungary concerning judicial independence,
(Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687) the Commission and the Court
were criticized for framing and deciding the case on the grounds of discrimination rather than
Article 2 TEU, Halmai (2017), p. 471.
31Case C-26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Administratie der Belastingen, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1. In detail,
Scheppele (2016), p. 105.
32Case C-494/01, Commission v. Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2005:250, para. 36.
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the CJEU then responds to the concerns of national courts. Deciding the issue in a
preliminary-ruling procedure would also continue the European tradition that most
decisions of deep constitutional impact are taken in the European Gerichtsverbund,
the European union of courts. Indeed, the LM33 case, which was referred to the CJEU
by the Irish High Court, is a first example. As the vivid Polish reactions to this
referral show,34 it has the potential to become a landmark decision on the issue.
The LM case originates from a negative appraisal made by the Irish judicial
authority as regards the rule of law in Poland. In other terms, it has its origins in a
country with which Poland has always had a special relationship. A big hit of Polish
rock music of the 1990s, with the title ‘I love you, like I love Ireland’, is a perfect
example of that relationship. As the main vocalist of the group ‘Kobranocka’
affirmed, ‘Ireland [. . .] had a similar history, just like us they fought for indepen-
dence. We loved them for that. I loved them and love them to this day.’35 In Polish,
to ‘love somebody like Ireland’ means to love someone deeply. Apart from this
curious note, the referral in the LM case demonstrates, in broader terms, that it is
inevitable that national courts become involved to vindicate the rule of law in the
European legal space.36
The concrete problem addressed in the preliminary reference was whether Ireland
may refuse to surrender a Polish citizen to Poland following a European arrest
warrant (EAW) because of a systemic deficiency in the rule of law in that Member
State. More specifically, through its referral, the Irish High Court asked the CJEU to
interpret Article 1(3) of the EAW Framework Decision, which lays down the
obligation to comply with fundamental rights when executing a European arrest
warrant.37 In formulating its questions, the referring court made clear that, in its
opinion, the recent reforms of the Polish judiciary jeopardize some fundamental
values, such as ‘the independence of the judiciary and respect for the Constitution’,
and amount to ‘systemic breaches of the rule of law’ as well as ‘fundamental defects
in the system of justice’,38 thereby prospecting a real risk for the protection of the
individual’s fundamental right to a fair trial. In the circumstances, instead of asking
the CJEU to assess the compatibility of the Polish reforms with the European rule of
33Supra note 8.
34See in this respect the statement of the Association of Judges of Ireland in defence of the referring
judge https://aji.ie/communications/press-release-2018-03-15/.
35Interview with the leader of ‘Kobranocka’, Andrzej Kraiński, http://gazetapraca.pl/gazetapraca/
1,68946,3425292.html (in Polish only).
36Canor (2013), p. 383.
37O.J. 2002, L 190/1 ‘Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the
European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States’ as amended by
O.J. 2009, L81/24, ‘Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA amending Framework Decisions
2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby
enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual
recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial’.
38Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198,
para. 140.
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law, the Irish court asked whether, in situations akin to those in the case pending
before it, judicial authorities can refrain from executing a EAW or whether, similarly
to how decided in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment, they need to carry out a
specific and precise assessment as to the exposure of the individual concerned to the
risk of unfair trial.
It is worth recalling that, in the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment, the CJEU had
been asked to decide on the possibility for national judges to derogate from the
principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust in case of alleged violations of
human rights in the Member State issuing a EAW. More specifically, the referring
judge had asked the Court whether, to the extent that national judicial authorities
possess ‘solid evidence’ that detention conditions in the issuing Member State are
incompatible with fundamental rights, they may or must refuse to execute a
European arrest warrant. According to the CJEU, an interpretation of the EAW
Framework Decision, which takes into account the absolute prohibition of inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment as set out in Article 4 CFR, implies the
obligation for the national judicial authorities not to execute a EAW. However,
such a decision can be taken only if ‘there are substantial grounds to believe that,
following the surrender of that person to the issuing Member State, he will run a real
risk of being subject in that Member State to inhuman or degrading treatment’.
In other words, national judicial authorities must run a two-phase test. For
starters, they need to assess whether there are systemic or generalised deficiencies
as regards the detention conditions in the prison system of the issuing Member State.
This appraisal must rely on ‘information that is objective, reliable, specific and
properly updated’, including—but not limited to—‘judgments of the ECtHR, judg-
ments of courts of the issuing Member State, and also decisions, reports and other
documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the
UN’. Then, national judicial authorities must ‘make a further assessment, specific
and precise, of whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual
concerned will be exposed to that risk because of the conditions for his detention
envisaged in the issuing Member State’. To carry out this assessment, the executing
judicial authority must ask the issuing Member State for all necessary supplementary
information, as provided for by Article 15(2) of the EAW Framework Decision.
Now, in the LM case, the Irish High Court submitted two questions to the CJEU.
First of all, it asked whether, in the presence of cogent evidence of systemic
violations of the rule of law in the issuing Member States, the executing judicial
authority is in fact obliged to carry out a two-phase test similar to that devised in the
Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment. If so, the second question was if the executing
judicial authority is to revert to the issuing judicial authority for any further neces-
sary information and, as a result, ‘what guarantees as to fair trial would be required’.
After summarising the facts underlying the request for a preliminary ruling and
the objectives and principles governing the EAW Framework Decision, the CJEU
affirmed that, according to settled case-law (i.e. Opinion 2/13 and Aranyosi and
Căldăraru), the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust among Member
States can be abridged only ‘in exceptional circumstances’. However, unlike the
Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment, which concerned an absolute prohibition
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(Article 4 CFR: prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), the
LM case concerned the right to a fair trial. Hence the question: does a systemic
violation of the right to a fair trial amount to an ‘exceptional circumstance’ that may
justify the abridgment of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust? The
CJEU replied in the affirmative, stating that the independence of the judiciary is part
of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial and that the defence of the
common value of the rule of law depends, in all respects, on the effective protection
of that right. Thus, in case of a real risk of violation of the right to a fair trial in the
issuing Member State, the executing judicial authorities must refrain, under Article 1
(3) of the EAW Framework Decision, from surrendering the requested person.
As is clear to see, the Court did not rely on the fundamental right to a fair trial, as
suggested by the Advocate General, but on the rule of law value itself. Or, to put it
better: the CJEU first linked the fundamental right to a fair trial to the value of the
European rule of law, and it then adopted such value as normative yardstick against
which to respond to the referring court. This emerges, for instance, in paragraph
50 of the judgment, where the Court referred to Article 19 TEU as ‘giv[ing] concrete
expression to the value of the rule of law affirmed in Article 2 TEU’ and cited the
precedent in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses. As a result, due to its
being a constitutional value common to the EU and its Member States, the European
rule of law must be interpreted, applied and safeguarded also by national judges.
Subsequently, the CJEU affirmed that the entire surrender procedure between
Member States must be carried out under judiciary supervision and that, for this to
happen, national judges must be fully independent. Thus, when the requested person
argues that there are systemic or generalised deficiencies which are liable to affect
the independence of the judiciary in the issuing Member State, the executing judicial
authority must run a two-phase test similar to that devised in the Aranyosi and
Căldăraru judgment.
It first has to ascertain whether, due to systemic or generalised deficiencies
connected to the independence of the judiciary in the issuing Member State, there
is indeed a ‘real risk’ that the requested person’s fundamental right to a fair trial be
violated. When carrying out this assessment, the executing judicial authority must
rely on ‘objective, reliable, specific and properly updated’material and consider both
the external and the internal dimensions of independence, notably the autonomy of
the judges (i.e., the absence of any hierarchical constraint and any form of subordi-
nation vis-à-vis other powers) and their impartiality (i.e., the equal distance from the
parties to the proceedings and their respective interests). Should it come to the
conclusion that there indeed exists a real risk, the executing judicial authority must
then assess ‘specifically and precisely’ whether there are ‘substantial grounds’ for
believing that the requested person will actually run that risk. The CJEU justified the
necessity of a two-phase test by referring to recital (10) of the EAW Framework
Decision. According to this recital, the mechanism of the European arrest warrant
can be suspended only when the Council determines, under Article 7(2) and
(3) TEU, the existence of a serious and persistent breach by one of the Member
States of the principles set out in Article 2 TEU. Thus, lacking such a determination
by the Council, national authorities may refrain from executing a EAW only after
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carrying out an individual and specific assessment of the concrete risks faced by the
person concerned.
5 From the Maastricht Urteil to the LM Case
Despite the generic nature of the preliminary questions put forth by the Irish judge,
the CJEU did not miss out on the opportunity to make some specific considerations
on the rule of law crisis in Poland and to draw some red lines. Different reasons
spoke in favour of an intervention of the Court. To begin with, it was important that
these red lines were drawn in a process that itself respected these European founding
values, including the right to a fair hearing. Therefore, Poland had to be granted a
formal role in the proceedings and be represented by its legitimate government. A
domestic court could have hardly provided for that. Second, given that the recent
reforms in Poland encroach significantly on the independence of judges and that—as
stated in paragraph 54 of the judgment—such independence is ‘essential to the
proper working of the judicial cooperation system embodied by the preliminary
ruling mechanism’, the dispute before the Irish High Court presented such a con-
nection with EU law as to justify the intervention of the Court. Third, and more
generally, a systemic rule of law problem with judicial independence impinges on
the effectiveness of the entire EU legal system; thus, an overall European assessment
of the matter was necessary.
That said, one could arguably maintain that the judgment in re LM is too abstract.
We disagree with this argument. For instance, when explaining the first stage of the
two-phase test, the Court specifies that, to assess the existence of a real risk for the
rule of law value in a Member State, the executing judicial authority can rely, among
other things, on the information laid down in a reasoned proposal by the Commis-
sion under Article 7(1) TEU. These acts are, according to the Court, of particular
relevance for the purposes of that assessment, especially if they refer to judgments or
opinions by other European and international institutions, like in the case of Poland
(e.g. the United Nations Human Rights Committee, the European Council, the
ECtHR, the Venice Commission etc.). This increases the soundness and legitimacy
of the Commission’s and, by extension, of the executing authority’s findings.
Moreover, as regards the disciplinary chamber mentioned in the introduction, the
CJEU takes a clear stance against its compatibility with the European value of the
rule of law. Finally, within the limits allowed by the specific case, the Court provides
national judges with a range of criteria to be followed when carrying out the second
stage of the two-phase test. The executing authorities must in fact consider the
personal situation, as well as the nature of the offence for which the requested
person is being prosecuted and the factual context that form the basis of the
European arrest warrant.
Now, from a broader perspective, the judgment in LM has (at least) two
distinguishing features. First, it involves overcoming the notion that the defence of
the European common values is an exclusive preserve of the European political
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institutions under Article 7 TEU. Second, it posits a pivotal role of the individuals in
the protection of the European rule of law value.
As for the first feature, the Court makes clear that the defence of the European
common values is also a task for the courts, especially national courts. Consistently
with its role in the preliminary ruling procedure, the CJEU does not express a
conclusive opinion on the Polish reforms of the judicial system. Rather, it lets the
referring court decide if—and to what extent—these reforms amount to a violation of
the European rule of law value. For any such decision requires much legitimacy and
is likely to be highly contested, it seems wise to share this burden among several
courts, national and supranational. In that respect, one might criticize the initial ‘if’
in paragraph 68 of the judgment for leaving that difficult task too much on the
shoulders of the national judge. After all, the formulation ‘systemic and generalised
deficiencies’ is, for all intents and purposes, a European concept, which calls for a
more incisive intervention of the CJEU.
As regards the second feature, an increased involvement of national courts
implies, by extension, the empowerment of individuals in the protection of the
European rule of law value. By linking this value to the essence of the fundamental
right to a fair trial, the Court makes a doctrinal move similar to the one the German
Federal Constitutional Court undertook in its Maastricht decision. It remains to be
seen if the CJEU thereby aims at a similar position as the German court in framing
the founding principles of the polity. What is clear, however, is that, from here on,
‘the vigilance of the individual’ is core not only for the ‘supervision’ of European
law, as famously stated by the Court in Van Gend en Loos, but also of the European
rule of law value. In addition, upon jointly reading the Court’s judgments in LM and
in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, it clearly emerges that the European
rule of law value can be used as a weapon by the very same judges whose
independence is at stake. The recent request for a preliminary ruling of the Polish
Supreme court bear witness to that.
At this point, the next question is what impact the LM judgment will have in the
overall context of the rule of law crisis management. We believe that the impact of
this judgment will be colossal and will by far exceed that of the N.S.39 or the
Aranyosi case.40 These two latter cases dealt with a particular violation of a certain
human right under specific circumstances. The LM case, by contrast, deals with a
comprehensive violation of the value of the rule of law. It is about a Member State
suffering from a systemic deficiency in upholding the rule of law, because the
independence of the judiciary has been undermined. That could have the broadest
implications and could possibly affect the fundamental principle of mutual trust on
which the entire judicial cooperation in the European legal space rests. Not only will
criminals not be surrendered on the basis of an EAW but asylum seekers will not be
transferred on the basis of the Dublin mechanism; moreover, civil judgments
39Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
40Supra note 38.
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originating from this state will possibly not be enforced by the national courts of all
the other States.
By significantly reducing horizontal judicial cooperation, the LM case could
therefore isolate Poland within the European legal space, although hopefully only
temporarily. This is a harsh consequence, but a number of reasons speak for it. The
respect of the rule of law value is a precondition for membership (Article 49 TEU),
for mutual trust,41 for all fundamental rights, for the entire European edifice.42 If that
is not enough: the future of the European rule of law, as Europe thought it knows it,
is at stake if no one opposes the developments in Poland. All this would justify
significantly reducing horizontal cooperation with Poland.
At the same time, this solution does not foreclose vertical cooperation, as it
allows national courts to continue using the preliminary-ruling procedure. This is
particularly important, because the CJEU and valiant Polish courts can thereby
continue to fight jointly for the European rule of law or the rights of Union citizens.43
In other words, the fact that the independence of the Polish judiciary as a system is
compromised does not exclude recognizing the independence of individual courts.
The different functional logic of the preliminary ruling procedure, on the one
hand, and horizontal judicial cooperation, on the other hand, allows for this distinc-
tion. In a preliminary ruling procedure, the CJEU can assess the referring court in
light of its case law on judicial independence, a review that is more difficult in the
case of horizontal cooperation. Moreover, the CJEU merely interprets EU law in a
preliminary ruling procedure, leaving the national court to apply it to the facts,
whereas horizontal judicial cooperation directly affects individuals: while horizontal
cooperation subjects an individual to the authority of another Member State, a
preliminary ruling procedure can in fact help an individual vis-à-vis the authority
to which he or she is already subjected.
This leads to the critical issue of the threshold for non-cooperation. In the LM
case, the Court decided to follow the approach devised in its Aranyosi case-law.44
Accordingly, non-cooperation requires ‘substantial grounds to believe’ that the
requested person’s right to a fair trial ‘will run a real risk’, for which there is no
evidence in the LM proceedings. This choice, however, appears inadequate to tackle
the rule of law crisis in Poland. Since the Polish government’s measures undermine
the independence of the entire judiciary, there is little or no point in conducting an
individual and specific assessment of the concrete risks the person concerned faces.
As things stand, there is always the danger that any case might at some point come
before a compromised judge. This circumstance should have prompted the Court to
41CJEU, Opinion 2/13, Opinion on the Draft Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:
C:2014:2454, para 168.
42Supra note 8, paras. 41 and 43.
43In detail, von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 489.
44Supra note 7, para. 5.
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follow the test developed in N.S.,45 according to which the abstract risk for the
individual concerned should suffice to refuse a surrender. From a systemic stand-
point, the refusal to surrender on the basis of a merely abstract risk is justified by the
urgent need for red lines. From a practical perspective, it is difficult to imagine how
the ‘dialogue’ on judicial independence between the executing authority, on the one
hand, and the issuing judicial authority and its government, on the other hand, can
meaningfully take place. At the same time, it is clear that once a systemic deficiency
has been established, the burden of proof shifts to the country issuing the EAW. In
dubio pro libertate.
6 Conclusion
For more than two decades, the constitutional developments in Central and Eastern
European countries were mainly considered a constitutional sideshow, that depicted
countries ‘catching up’ with their luckier neighbours who had never suffered Soviet
occupation. Now, these countries stand in the limelight: much of the future path of
European constitutionalism depends on how their peoples decide.
The rest of Europe cannot do a great deal for those countries’ constitutionalism.
One cannot expect from the deployment of the instruments analysed in this chapter a
‘solution’ to the crisis. None but the citizens of those countries themselves can
restore the separation of powers among their countries’ institutions. The decisions
taken by EU institutions can only contribute ‘to creating a situation where self-
healing through domestic processes is still possible’.46
However, one needs to look beyond those countries to understand the importance
of using these instruments now. European decisions confronting the Polish Govern-
ment are crucial to uphold a liberal and democratic self-understanding of European
constitutionalism throughout Europe. Otherwise, the current Polish undermining of
the independence of its judiciary is likely to count towards defining the European
rule of law, facilitating similar developments in other places and compromising large
parts of European foreign policy. Much is at stake. Yet, as the Polish anthem goes,
‘Poland Is Not Yet Lost’; and nor is the constitutional European project, if the
institutions act wisely.
References
Ackerman B (1991) We the people: foundations, vol 1, 6. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Bonelli M (2017) From a community of law to a Union of values. Eur Const Law Rev 13:793–816
45Supra note 39.
46Sonnevend (2017), pp. 123, 145.
A Potential Constitutional Moment for the European Rule of Law: The Importance. . . 399
Canor I (2013) My brother’s keeper? Horizontal Solange: ‘An ever closer distrust among the
peoples of Europe’. Common Mark Law Rev 50:383–421
Charlemagne (2018) The EU is tolerating – and enabling – authoritarian kleptocracy in Hungary.
The Economist, April 5
Editorial Comments (2015) Safeguarding EU values in the Member States – is something finally
happening? Common Mark Law Rev 52:619–628
Editorial Comments (2016) The rule of law in the Union, the rule of Union law and the rule of law
by the Union: three interrelated problems. Common Mark Law Rev 53:597–605
Editorial Comments (2017) About Brexit negotiations and enforcement action against Poland: the
EU’s own song of ice and fire. Common Mark Law Rev 54:1309–1317
Giegerich T (2015) Verfassungshomogenität, Verfassungsautonomie und Verfassungsaufsicht in
der EU: Zum ‘neuen Rechtsstaatsmechanismus’ der Europäischen Kommission. In: Calliess C
(ed) Herausforderungen an Staat und Verfassung: Liber Amicorum für Torsten Stein zum 70.
Geburtstag. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 499, 535–536
Halmai G (2017) The early retirement age of the Hungarian judges. In: Nicola F, Davies B (eds) EU
law stories. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 471–488
Halmai G (2018) Illiberal constitutionalism? The Hungarian constitution in a European perspective.
In: Kadelbach S (ed) Verfassungskrisen in der Europäischen Union. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp
85–104
KlarmanMJ (1992) Constitutional fact/constitutional fiction: a critique of Bruce Ackerman’s theory
of constitutional moments. Stanford Law Rev 44:759–797
Matczak M (2018) 10 Facts on Poland for the Consideration of the European Court of Justice.
VerfBlog, 13 May 2018. https://verfassungsblog.de/10-facts-on-poland-for-the-consideration-
of-the-european-court-of-justice/
Muszyński M (2018) Polski Trybunał w unijnej rzeczywistości. http://www.rp.pl/Opinie/
303229983-Polski-Trybunal-w-unijnej-rzeczywistosci%2D%2D-Mariusz-Muszynski-o-mocy-
wyrokow-TSUE-w-Polsce.html (in Polish only)
Scheppele KL (2016) Enforcing the basic principles of EU law through systemic infringement
actions. In: Closa C, Kochenov D (eds) Reinforcing rule of law oversight in the European
Union. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 105–132
Sonnevend P (2017) Preserving the acquis of transformative constitutionalism in times of consti-
tutional crisis: lessons from the Hungarian case. In: von Bogdandy A, Ferrer Mac-Gregor E,
Morales Antoniazzi M, Piovesan F (eds) Transformative constitutionalism in Latin America.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 123, 145
von Bogdandy A, Kottmann M, Antpöhler C, Dickschen J, Hentrei S, Smrkol M (2012) Reverse
Solange – protecting the essence of fundamental rights against EU Member States. Common
Mark Law Rev 49:489–519
Armin von Bogdandy is Director at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg.
Piotr Bogdanowicz is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Administration, Warsaw
University.
Iris Canor is Professor, School of Law, Zefat Academic College, Israel; School of Law, College
of Management, Israel.
Giacomo Rugge is Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg.
Matthias Schmidt is Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, Heidelberg.
400 A. von Bogdandy et al.
Maciej Taborowski is Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law and Administration, Warsaw
University.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
A Potential Constitutional Moment for the European Rule of Law: The Importance. . . 401
The Assessment of Judicial Independence
Following the CJEU Ruling in C-216/18 LM
Stanisław Biernat and Paweł Filipek
Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
2 The CJEU Concept of Judicial Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
2.1 Autonomy of Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
2.2 Objectivity and Impartiality of Judges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 409
3 The LM Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
4 Implementation of the LM Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
4.1 General Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415
4.2 Assessment of Particular Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
4.3 Individual Risk Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
5 Judicial Dialogue of National Courts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 420
6 Evaluation of the CJEU Mechanism for the Assessment of Judicial Independence . . . . . . . 423
6.1 Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
6.2 Who Shall Answer? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 424
6.3 Material Scope of Judicial Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425
7 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 428
Abstract In the LM ruling, the Court of Justice developed the Aranyosi and
Căldăraru test and indicated it as the one to be applied for the assessment of judicial
independence and fair trial guarantees in the context of executing European Arrest
Warrants. Although serious threats to the rule of law and judicial independence in
some EU countries, like Poland, have been documented over recent years, no
warrant has so far been definitely rejected as a consequence of the application of
the LM test, although there are cases in which the execution of warrants to Poland
has been suspended. This naturally raises questions as to whether the mechanism
proposed by the Court responds to the need of protecting the right to a fair trial and
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safeguarding judicial independence. In this contribution we evaluate the mechanism
devised by the Court, taking into account the available judicial practice after the LM
ruling. We point out that the almost automatic transfer of a mechanism proposed to
evaluate the functioning of a prison system to that evaluating a fair trial and judicial
independence has not been fully successful. The mechanism proposed by the Court
reveals a number of problematic issues and proves to be insufficient and not entirely
adequate to assess judicial independence and guarantees of a fair trial.
1 Introduction
Immediately after its publication, the judgment in Case C-216/18 LM1 generated
different reactions in Poland and abroad.2 Some commentators treated the judgment
as a general vote of no confidence in the Polish judiciary and especially with regard
to the changes made into it in the recent years. Others, including the Minister of
Justice, found it to be a defeat of the Irish court which referred the case to the CJEU,
as the latter did not share all the suggestions made by the referring court. The LM
case and the Court’s judgment have been used as an argument in the current political
debate. Because of the CJEU approach to certain significant issues, the judgment
received equivocal interpretation, and its full consequences may become apparent
only after a certain period of time and in the light of the post-LM judicial practice of
domestic courts.
The wish of some political actors for the Court of Justice to provide an explicit
negative assessment of the rule of law in Poland did not come true. Such anticipa-
tions did not take account of the specific nature of the preliminary ruling procedure.
The LM judgment essentially maintained the standard division of roles between the
CJEU and national courts. CJEU is to provide interpretation of EU law and give
guidance to national courts.3 In turn, the national courts are to pass judgments in the
domestic proceedings, yet having regard to this guidance. A separate question is,
whether the result of this division of roles and the actual instructions issued in the LM
ruling can prove satisfactory in practice.
There is no doubt that the judgment is of a certain significance for the develop-
ment of EU case law and the arguments set forth therein may potentially apply to
various situations and proceedings. Because of that, some of the findings of the
1CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of
justice), ECLI:EU:C:2018:586. The case is regularly referred to, in an abridged form, as the ‘LM
case’. The text builds on previous publications of the authors: Biernat (2018), Filipek (2018),
Filipek (2019).
2See. i.a. the debate on Verfassungsblog: https://verfassungsblog.de/category/debates/after-celmer/
(Accessed 20 Jul 2019); Bogdanowicz and Taborowski (2018a), Grabowska-Moroz (2018a).
3See e.g. CJEU, Recommendations to national courts and tribunals in relation to the initiation of
preliminary ruling proceedings (2019) C380/1, especially paras. 1, 5 and 11.
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CJEU were formulated in a more general manner, especially in respect of two major
perspectives. First, the Court developed and supplemented the arguments invoked in
the Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,4 concerning the
notion and meaning of independence of national courts in the light of EU law.
Secondly, the Court continued to set the limits of mutual trust and exceptions to the
principle of mutual recognition of court decisions on account of the denial of
fundamental rights in the context of executing a European Arrest Warrant.5 In
doing so, the CJEU developed its earlier ruling in cases C-404/15 and C-659/15
PPU Aranyosi and Căldăraru on a number of issues.6 In this chapter we focus on
some points of the LM judgment from the first of the aforementioned perspectives
taking account of the domestic judicial practice that has followed the CJEU ruling.
2 The CJEU Concept of Judicial Independence
A central notion in the LM ruling is the independence of the judiciary. In the Court’s
view, the requirement of judicial independence forms part of the essence of the
fundamental right to a fair trial. The right is of cardinal importance as a guarantee
that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and that the
values common to Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value of
the rule of law, will be safeguarded. (para. 48). It is clear, the independence of the
judiciary forms the essence of a fair trial and the right to effective judicial protection.
At the same time, it lies in the very heart of the rule of law.7 Without judicial
independence, the state legal system can only provide an illusion of the rule of law.
In recent years, however, in some EU Member States, we have been witnessing
the undermining of the role of independent judiciary. Without it, the protection of all
human rights is impaired, including the right to a fair trial. Yet, respect for the right
to effective judicial protection is a necessary and inalienable prerequisite for the
protection of all other fundamental rights.8 From the perspective of threats to the
protection of judicial independence and thus to the rule of law and to fundamental
rights, the LM ruling marks a further step towards building and consolidating the
defense of the EU legal order and Union values against states that seem to be
4CJEU, Case C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, ECLI:
EU:C:2018:117.
5In this regard, see i.a. Grzelak (2018), especially pp. 51–54, 57–63; Xanthopoulou (2018),
Lenaerts (2017), Anagnostaras (2016).
6CJEU, Case C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru
v. Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Bremen, ECLI: EU:C:2016:198.
7‘The very existence of effective judicial review designed to ensure compliance with EU law is of the
essence of the rule of law.’, CJEU, Associação Sindical, supra note 4, para. 36.
8See e.g. Górski (2016), p. 37; Safjan (2018), pp. 559–560; Safjan (2019), pp. 5 and 10.
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abandoning them and threaten the entire European project.9 A new, specific point
which was made by the CJEU is the following: if the national court executing the
European Arrest Warrant finds that there are substantial grounds for believing that
the person in respect of whom that warrant has been issued, will—following his
surrender to the issuing judicial authority—run a real risk of breach of his funda-
mental right to an independent tribunal and, therefore, of the essence of his funda-
mental right to a fair trial, it may ultimately refrain to give effect to the warrant
(para. 73).
In developing the understanding of judicial independence, the CJEU relied on the
concept worked out in its previous case law and voiced i.a. in the Associação
Sindical judgment. In the LM ruling, the Court broadened its view on the elements
that make up and substantiate judicial independence (para. 63–67). This is one of the
most important aspects of the judgment whose relevance goes beyond the specific
case brought by the Irish High Court.
The notion of ‘court’ was elaborated in CJEU jurisprudence in the context of the
preliminary reference procedure.10 The CJEU enjoys the power to verify whether a
request for a ruling comes from an authorised body, i.e. a ‘court or tribunal’. It is
empowered to do so both on party’s request or of its own motion, when deciding the
admissibility of the preliminary ruling request. The Treaty does not determine which
body is to be considered a court, yet the Court of Justice has consistently pointed to a
number of criteria which it takes into account when assessing if a body is in fact a
‘court or tribunal’. The traditional Court’s formula reads as follows:
the factors to be taken into account in assessing whether a body is a ‘court or tribunal’
include, inter alia, whether the body is established by law, whether it is permanent, whether
its jurisdiction is compulsory, whether its procedure is inter partes, whether it applies rules
of law and whether it is independent.11
It is thus not the formal denomination as a ‘court’ that is decisive for the actual
classification of the body admitted under Article 267 TFEU. What matters most of
all is whether it carries out the function of adjudicating; if it acts as a judicial body.
This entails a number of elements. The court proceedings are initiated by action of a
party that wants to have a dispute settled. Bringing the case to the court results in the
lis pendens, and precludes autonomous action in another ordinary court.12 In most
9‘The collapse of the rule of law in any member state is tantamount to the rupture of a legal space in
the entire European Union.’, Safjan (2019), p. 7.
10See e.g. Lenaerts et al. (2014), p. 52 et seq.; Dashwood et al. (2011), pp. 214–216; Schütze
(2018), pp. 389–391; Schwarze (2012), pp. 2234–2235. On the legitimacy of a uniform under-
standing of the term ‘court’ both in Article 267 TFEU and Article 47 Charter, see i.a.: Pech (2014),
p. 1251; Górski (2016), p. 39; Bogdanowicz and Taborowski (2018a), p. 9. For an in-depth
discussion of the differences in the concept of a ‘court’ under both articles see Grzeszczak and
Krajewski (2014), pp. 5–11.
11CJEU, Associação Sindical, supra note 4, para. 38; almost identical with the original formula
CJEU, Case C-54/96 Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH, ECLI:EU:C:1997:413, para. 23.
12CJEU, Case C-503/15 Ramón Margarit Panicello v. Pilar Hernández Martínez, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:126, para. 34.
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cases, judicial proceedings are by nature adversarial, and are characterised by
opposing positions of the parties. The proceedings eventually lead to a binding
ruling.13 Furthermore, the court cannot refrain from taking a position on the case;
it is entitled and, at the same time, called upon to consider and decide the case.14 The
final ruling of the court has the effect of res judicata.15
It is clear that the independence of the body belongs to the constitutive elements
of a ‘court’ and is intrinsic to the very basic idea of adjudication. This is why it forms
an essential requirement of the right to an effective remedy provided for by Article
19 TEU and Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. As such it must be
guaranteed both at the EU level, within the CJEU, but equally by the Member States
at the national level with respect to domestic courts.16 The Court of Justice in the
Associação Sindical case proclaimed a general obligation of EU members to guar-
antee and respect independence of their judiciaries.17 Domestic courts once they are
qualified as a ‘court or tribunal’ under EU law and are empowered to rule on EU
legal issues, have become ‘European courts’ (‘Union courts’) whose independence is
now protected by the Union, its institutions and the Union’s legal system.18
The guarantees of judicial independence are intended to protect both the courts
and judges as well as those whose cases they handle. Firstly, they create an
environment for the judge that enables him19 to carry out the judicial function
being confident about professional and personal safety. The judge must not fear
that another public authority will not appreciate the court’s decision and that he may
suffer some negative consequences for that reason. Secondly, the guarantees of
judicial independence provide the parties with a sense of confidence and certitude
that the court will keep equal distance from the parties.20 The facts of the case and the
13See also Lenaerts et al. (2014), p. 53.
14‘It is called upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of a judicial
nature’, CJEU, Panicello, supra note 12, para. 28.
15Id., at 34; see also Górski (2016), pp. 39–40; Wachowiec (2019), pp. 568–571; for a critical
review of these criteria see Grzeszczak and Krajewski (2014), pp. 7–9.
16See CJEU, Associação Sindical, supra note 4, para 42.
17See Pech and Platon (2018), p. 1828.
18See also Lenaerts (2018), p. 8.
19We use the pronoun ‘he’ throughout the text, and not the longer formula ‘he or she’, only for the
reasons of readability.
20‘Guarantees of independence and impartiality require rules (. . .) in order to dismiss any
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the imperviousness of that body to external
factors and its neutrality with respect to the interests before it’, CJEU, Case C-506/04 Graham
J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, ECLI:EU:C:2006:587, para. 53; see
also recent CJEU rulings related to Polish courts: CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland
(Independence of the Supreme Court), ECLI: EU:C:2019:531, paras. 74, 111; CJEU, Case C-92/18
Commission v. Poland (Independence of ordinary courts), ECLI:EU:C:2019:924, paras. 111, 124;
CJEU, Case C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.K. and Others v. National Council of Judiciary
and Supreme Court (Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court), ECLI:EU:
C:2019:982, paras. 128, 153.
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applicable law are of sole relevance to the court, and it shall not take into account
other considerations. When, in the end, the court delivers a judgment, it is indeed the
very law that speaks.21
2.1 Autonomy of Courts
Unquestionably, there is a need to assess the independence of the national judiciary
on the basis of a common EU standard. In its case law, the Court of Justice identified
external (objective) and internal (subjective) aspects of independence, that to a large
extent remain in line with the set of criteria indicated by the European Court of
Human Rights.22 They consist in guaranteeing, on the one hand—the autonomy of
the court and, on the other—the objectivity and impartiality of the judge. In a similar
way, judicial independence is understood in the jurisprudence of the Polish Consti-
tutional Tribunal.23
Judicial independence sets the limits of political influence on the judiciary.24
When considering a case, the court must remain autonomous. It must be free from
outside influence, is protected ‘against external intervention or pressure liable to
jeopardise the independent judgment of its members as regards proceedings before
them’.25 It is presumed that ‘the court exercises its functions wholly autonomously,
without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or subordinated to any other
body and without taking orders or instructions from any source whatsoever’.26
These preconditions are ensured by the principle of separation of powers, orga-
nizational and functional autonomy of courts which are entrusted with the task of
21Only in exceptional cases accepted the Court of Justice as a ‘court or tribunal’ a body that was not
fully independent. It occurred in some cases of administrative bodies which were also acting in a
judicial capacity. In such situations the Court required the separation of functions between the
departments responsible for administrative tasks and the departments vested with judicial functions.
The judicial activities by the latter should be carried out without receiving any instruction from the
former. See e.g. CJEU, Case C-110/98 Gabalfrisa SL and Others v. Agencia Estatal de
Administración Tributaria (AEAT), ECLI:EU:C:2000:145, para. 39.
22For an in-depth analysis of ECHR case law on judicial independence, see i.a. Hofmański and
Wróbel (2010), pp. 314–325; Lawson (2018), Sillen (2019).
23‘Legislative and executive powers cannot exercise judicial power or interfere in areas in which
judges are independent’, Constitutional Tribunal (Judgment), Case Kp 1/15, Law on the Organi-
zation of Ordinary Courts, OTK ZU 147/9A/2015, para. III.2.4; ‘Independence comprises many
elements, namely: (1) impartiality vis-à-vis the parties to the proceedings; (2) independence from
non-judicial bodies (institutions); (3) autonomy of the judge in relation to the authorities and other
judicial organs; (4) independence from political factors; (5) internal independence of the judge.
The independence of a judge is not only the right of a judge but also his constitutional duty, as is the
constitutional duty of the legislature and judicial administration bodies to protect the independence
of a judge’, id., para. III.2.5; see also Constitutional Tribunal (Judgment), Case K 47/15 Noveliza-
tion of the Act on the Constitutional Tribunal, OTK ZU 31/A/2018, para. III.6.1.7.
24See Lenaerts (2018), p. 5.
25CJEU, Wilson, supra note 20, para. 51; CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 63.
26CEU, Panicello, supra note 12, para. 37; CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 63.
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administering justice. Other public bodies should be deprived of instruments by
which they could exert pressure on courts to comply with their instructions or
expectations.
In Commission v. Hungary the Court of Justice addressed the issue of political
influence. It held that the mere risk that political influence could be exercised is
enough to hinder the body in the independent performance of its tasks.27 It continued
by indicating a particular example of such influence: a threat of a premature
termination of the body’s term of office. This could lead to ‘prior compliance’ that
would be incompatible with the requirement of independence.28 In this case, the
Court of Justice was not referring to a national court, but to a supervisory authority
for the protection of personal data, which in accordance with Directive 95/4629 was
required to exercise its functions ‘with complete independence’. There is no good
reason why the protection of the independence of judicial bodies should deserve
anything less.30
The current lack of effective separation of powers and the undermining of judicial
independence, especially in the absence of guarantees of constitutional review,
jeopardises the protection of human rights and disrupts the balance of powers. The
consequences of the above deficiencies may be severe and far-reaching, beginning
with a de facto change of a state’s political and legal system. As the conduct of the
parliamentary majority over the last few years in Poland demonstrates, the Consti-
tution may be ignored or interpreted in a hostile manner.31
2.2 Objectivity and Impartiality of Judges
The second aspect of judicial independence embraces the impartiality and objectivity
of the members of the court. As the CJEU pointed out, it ‘seeks to ensure a level
playing field for the parties to the proceedings and their respective interests with
regard to the subject-matter of those proceedings. (. . .) [it] requires (. . .) the
absence of any interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from the strict
application of the rule of law.’32
In its previous case law the Court recognised a number of personal and institu-
tional guarantees of independence and impartiality, in particular with respect to:
court composition; appointment of judges; length of their service; grounds for
27CJEU, Case C-288/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2014:237, para. 53.
28Id., para. 54.
29Directive (EC) 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and on the free movement of such data (1995) OJ L281/31.
30Likewise, Bogdanowicz and Taborowski (2018a), pp. 9–10.
31See also i.a. Łętowska (2018), p. 614 et seq.; Wyrzykowski (2017), p. 831 et seq.; Sadurski (2018,
2019).
32CJEU, Wilson, supra note 20, para. 52.
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abstention, rejection and dismissal; protection against removal from office33
(in particular, the dismissals of members of that body should be determined by
express legislative provisions);34 or remuneration of judges which should corre-
spond to their function.35
A new accent in the LM judgment that expands the Court’s perception of
guarantees of judicial independence is the incorporation of some qualitative features
of disciplinary proceedings against judges. It can be presumed that this is related to
the Polish context. The Court pointed out that the system of disciplinary measures
should be regulated in such a way that it cannot be used for political control of the
content of court rulings. In this context, the Court stressed the need for a normative
definition of: the conduct constituting disciplinary offences; the disciplinary penal-
ties; the defendant’s right to defence; and the right to appeal against a disciplinary
ruling. This point of the LM judgment can be seen as a response to the reasoned
proposal made by the European Commission under Article 7(1) TEU.36 It is worth
noting that, in addition to the legislative dimension, the actual application of the
disciplinary regime to individual judges should equally be taken into account. Even
if the disciplinary system met the criteria provided in the LM ruling at a normative
level, its application in individual cases should be also taken into consideration. It is
apparent that the situations, the manner and the context in which disciplinary pro-
ceedings against judges are instituted, or even the very incidents where judges are
threatened with disciplinary responsibility, may intentionally lead to an oppressive
effect and interfere with judicial independence. It is expected that the standards of
disciplinary regime for judges will be further developed in the course of the
infringement action brought in October 2019 by the European Commission against
Poland under Article 258 TFEU. The Commission made an evaluation of disciplin-
ary investigations in Poland and concluded that they may be triggered by the content
of judicial decisions. This clearly undermines judicial independence and puts judges
at risk of political control. The Commission claimed breach of Article 19 (1) TEU—
effective judicial protection, and Article 267 TFEU—the right of a domestic court to
refer questions for a preliminary ruling, because of the possibility of the initiation of
a disciplinary proceeding if the court exercises that right.37
A further contribution to the development of the European concept of judicial
independence was made by the CJEU in two recent infringement cases on the
independence of the Polish Supreme Court38 and the independence of ordinary
courts39 initiated by the European Commission on the basis of Art. 258 TFEU. In
33Id., paras. 51 and 53.
34CJEU (order), Case C-109/07 Jonathan Pilato v. Jean-Claude Bourgault, ECLI:EU:C:2008:274,
para. 24.
35CJEU, Associação Sindical, supra note 4, para. 45.
36Taborowski (2019), p. 397.
37CJEU, Case C-791/19 Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2020:277.
38CJEU, Independence of the Supreme Court, supra note 20.
39CJEU, Independence of ordinary courts, supra note 20.
410 S. Biernat and P. Filipek
both of them the Court of Justice found that Poland failed to fulfil its obligations to
ensure effective judicial protection. In the course of time, there will be more and
more CJEU rulings concerning the effects of changes in the Polish judiciary, as a
number of Polish courts have referred questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling.
The Court has recently responded to first of these questions (the case A.K. and
Others).40
In both infringements rulings the CJEU underlined the protection of the judges
against removal from office, and analysed the mechanism to extend judge’s mandate
after reaching the retirement age. The Court of Justice emphasised that the principle
of irremovability requires that judges may remain in post provided that they have not
reached the obligatory retirement age or until the expiry of their mandate, where that
mandate is for a fixed term.41 Though the CJEU admitted that the protection against
the removal is not absolute, it nonetheless stressed that the interference with the
principle can only be justified on ‘legitimate and compelling grounds’ and must
satisfy the proportionality test.42 Whether these substantive and formal conditions
are met may now clearly be subject to European scrutiny.
The Court examined in detail the mechanism for extending the active service of a
judge. The mechanism is acceptable and it is the exclusive competence of the
Member State to decide whether to make use of it in the domestic system. However,
EU members are not free to impose arbitrary conditions and rules of such pro-
longations; their competence is limited by the requirement to ensure that the
procedure does not undermine judicial independence. Indeed, neither the rule of
law nor the principle of judicial independence prohibits the use of such a procedure,
even if the non-judicial (e.g. executive) bodies are involved in its application. Yet, it
is prohibited to shape the procedure in such a way that it may interfere with the
independence of a judge by tempting him or her, even potentially, to give in to
external intervention or pressure.43 A judge who considers himself to be fit to
continue in active service may be inclined to rule in conformity with the expectations
of those who will examine the request and/or decide on the prolongation.
Recognising the deficiencies of the procedures to extend the mandate of the Supreme
Court judges by the President of the Republic and the judicial activity of ordinary
courts judges by the Minister of Justice, the CJEU pointed to the discretionary nature
of the President’s and Ministerial powers, the lack of objective and verifiable criteria
for their decisions, no obligation to state reasons for the decision and the lack of a
judicial remedy against a possible refusal.44
40CJEU, A.K. and Others, supra note 20.
41Id., para. 76; CJEU, Independence of ordinary courts, supra note 20, para. 113.
42Id.
43See CJEU, Independence of the Supreme Court, supra note 20, paras. 110–112; CJEU, Indepen-
dence of ordinary courts, supra note 20, paras. 118–120.
44CJEU, Independence of the Supreme Court, supra note 20, para. 114; CJEU, Independence of
ordinary courts, supra note 20, para. 122. It was a paradox that a judge could have appealed from a
preparatory, non-binding opinion of the National Council of the Judiciary which was to advise the
President on whether to prolong the judge’s mandate; while he could not have appealed against a
final negative decision.
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Another aspect of the Independence of the Supreme Court ruling which deserves
special emphasis is that the examination whether judicial independence is preserved
in a Member State, may also include checking what were the true aims of judicial
reforms.45 This is the case when serious doubts arise as to whether the aims declared
by the government (e.g. standardizing the retirement age; improving the age balance
of judges) justify the implementation of the specific measures, e.g. lowering the
retirement age of judges, or granting a discretionary power to the political body to
extend the active service of a judge. After all, a premature dismissal of judges
appears not to be a very subtle means by the government to fill the ‘vacated’ judicial
posts with their own appointees.46 The examination of the actual aims focuses on the
justification and the proportionality of the measures adopted. It covers not only the
grounds for their application and the degree of discretion conferred on state bodies,
but equally, other modalities of their implementation, e.g. compulsory nature,
discriminatory effect, or retro-active application, as well as the results they may
lead to (i.e. the removal of judges from the office).
In the most recent judgment A.K. and Others, delivered in the preliminary ruling
procedure, the CJEU developed a method for assessing the independence of a
judicial body.47 Referring to the functioning of the newly established Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court, but also to the National Council of the Judiciary,
which participated in its staffing, the CJEU indicated the criteria for assessing,
whether the body preserves its independence, ergo, whether it is in fact a court in
the meaning of EU law.48 In keeping with the terms of the judicial dialogue based on
Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU left it up to the national court to carry out the
assessment and draw conclusions.49 The consequences of the CJEU ruling and the
subsequent domestic judgments will be of major importance for both national and
European administration of justice.
45CJEU, Independence of the Supreme Court, supra note 20 paras. 82 et seq. Twenty years ago, in
Köllensperger and Atzwanger, the CJEU declared a request for a preliminary ruling from the
Tiroler Landesvergabeamt admissible despite the fact that the provisions on the removal of its
members were vague; the Court applied a general presumption that public authorities act in
compliance with the national constitution and the rule of law; Case C-103/97 Josef Köllensperger
GmbH & Co. KG and Atzwanger AG v. Gemeindeverband Bezirkskrankenhaus Schwaz, ECLI:EU:
C:1999:52, para. 21 and 24.
46See also Kuijer (2018), pp. 532–533.
47CJEU, A.K. and Others, supra note 20.
48These criteria include the circumstances in which the body was set up, its characteristics and
nature, the manner in which it operates and the public perception of its work; see CJEU, A.K. and
Others, supra note 20, paras. 143–153.
49The domestic court made such an assessment in a judgment of 5 December 2019. The three-
person panel of the Polish Supreme Court (Chamber of Labour and Social Security) ruled that the
National Council of the Judiciary is not an impartial and independent body, and the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court is not a court within the meaning of EU law (case ref. no. III PO
7/18).
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3 The LM Test
The general views of the CJEU on judicial independence set out above have been
concretised in the LM case with regard to the EAW mechanism. The concretisation
concerns the extent of obligations incumbent on judicial authorities which decide to
execute the EAW at the request of judicial authorities of Member States with regard
to which allegations of breach of the rule of law have been made, including
interference with judicial independence. These obligations then consist in carrying
out an independence test and ensuring that the fundamental right of the requested
person to a fair trial is not at risk.
In the LM ruling the Court of Justice confirmed, in a different context, the
essential application of the Aranyosi and Căldăraru mechanism to assess the risk
of a breach of a fundamental right.50 Ergo, the test applies also when the doubts are
raised with respect to judicial independence and the fairness of a court trial.
In the operative part of the LM judgment, the Court reiterated the two tests
introduced in Aranyosi and Căldăraru: the general test and the individual one
(paras. 68, 79, and the conclusion). It is a prima facie conclusion when reading
literally the wording of the judgment itself. This is also how most of the literature
commented on this ruling. Yet, a more profound analysis brings us to the point that
we may distinguish indeed, not a two- but a three-step test, which more accurately
reflects the process of verifying the conditions for the execution of the EAW. The
CJEU adapted the original test, by introducing an intermediate stage between a
general and the individual risk assessment (para. 74). That stage comprises the
assessment of judicial independence of the very courts which are competent to
hear the individual case of the requested person. The Court thus indicated that the
fair trial guarantees should be considered at three levels: general, intermediate and
individual, accordingly making a distinction of: (1) a general risk assessment; (2) the
assessment of particular courts competent to deal with proceedings concerning the
person covered by the EAW; and (3) the individual risk assessment.
(1) The general test of Aranyosi and Căldăraru was left unchanged. It is used to
determine whether there is a real risk that the fundamental right to a fair trial may
be breached on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the
judiciary, such as to compromise judicial independence in the Member State that
issued the arrest warrant (para. 68).
(2) The next is the test of particular courts, i.e. the courts which have jurisdiction
over the proceedings for which the individual person was requested by the
warrant. At this stage, the executing court should determine to what extent
systemic or generalised deficiencies in judicial independence (that were identi-
fied under the general test) may affect these courts (para. 74). The introduction of
50See also Taborowski (2019), p. 394 et seq.; Taborowski (2018), p. 73 et seq.; Bogdanowicz and
Taborowski (2018b), Lewandowski (2019), p. 10; Frąckowiak-Adamska (2018b), p. 98 et seq.;
Krajewski (2018), p. 796; Grabowska-Moroz (2018b), p. 21; Nita-Światłowska (2018), p. 8.
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the intermediate stage is justified by the subject-matter of the assessment which
is different from the other tests and, consequently, by the nature of questions that
the executing court needs to consider. Only if the existence of such an impact is
confirmed, the judicial authority can take the final test.
(3) The third test in the CJEU mechanism is the individualised test in relations to the
specific case and the individual person being prosecuted. It aims to answer the
ultimate question, whether there is a real risk of a breach of the fundamental right
to a fair trial of the person subject to the arrest warrant. In making this assess-
ment, the executing court should take into account the specific concerns of the
person prosecuted and his personal situation, the nature of the offence, the
circumstances in which it was committed and the context in which the EAW
was issued (para. 75).
The evolution of the two-step Aranyosi and Căldăraru test into the three-step LM
test has already been explicitly reflected in national court decisions taking into
account the LM judgment. Indeed, the Irish High Court followed the three-stage
pattern in its ruling to surrender the suspect.51 Then, the Supreme Court of Ireland
which considered the appeal from the High Court’s ruling applied the three-step
approach as well and concluded that ‘although there was clear evidence of breach of
Poland’s Charter and Treaty obligations (. . .) and further evidence leading the trial
judge to conclude that a breach of the principle of independence did operate at the
level of the courts involved, the available evidence did not, on its own, satisfy the
third stage of the test set out by the C.J.E.U. (. . .)’.52
The consecutive steps of the LM test require further analysis and more detailed
commentary, which will be made in the following section.
4 Implementation of the LM Test
Judicial independence is an undisputed legal standard of the European Union.
Member States have the primary responsibility for ensuring it.53 The verification
of whether Member States fulfil this responsibility can be centralised, i.e. carried out
by the EU institutions in the framework of political procedures (e.g. the protection of
the rule of law, Art. 7 TEU) or judicial proceedings (e.g. an infringement action, Art.
258 TFEU).
Since the LM ruling, it has become apparent that the courts in other Member
States also have the right and the duty to play an active role in safeguarding the
51High Court (Judgment of 19 November 2018), The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur
Celmer (No. 5), [2018] IEHC 639, paras. 92-98 and 117.
52Supreme Court (Judgment of 12 November 2019, The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur
Celmer, S:AP:IE:2018:000181, para. 85.
53See CJEU, LM, supra note 1, paras. 52–57; CJEU, Independence of the Supreme Court, supra
note 20, para. 71.
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proper standard of judicial independence in the European legal area. The compe-
tence of domestic courts in this area is deemed to be a ‘safety valve’54 and a means to
protect the EU legal order against the destructive influence of action of certain
Member States which are not compliant with the rule of law.55 The Court of Justice
has therefore recognised that this responsibility is also decentralised and lies with all
‘Union’ courts, including national judiciaries.
4.1 General Risk Assessment
Concerns can be raised in relation to each of the steps of the above test. The
mechanism established by the Court of Justice is complex and multilevel. It also
appears to be difficult to implement in practice and the degree of difficulty increases
with passing to the subsequent levels. From a methodological perspective, the easiest
stage to carry out seems the first level: the general test. It may require a considerable
amount of work on the part of the executing authority, as it consists in gathering and
assessing the information on the general situation in the judiciary of the issuing state.
In this context, the question may be asked: what is the significance of the
reasoned proposal of the European Commission opening the proceedings pursuant
to Article 7 (1) TEU?56 Would a similar document, if prepared by the European
Parliament, e.g. a resolution on Hungary,57 or filed by Member States, have a role to
play? The Court held in the LM ruling that the information provided by the
Commission in the proposal is ‘particularly relevant’ for the purposes of the general
risk assessment (para. 61). Thus, the national court is to take account of the
information contained in the Commission document.58
Nonetheless, it is to be noted that such a document will not be issued in future in
each case of suspicion of the risks discussed. After all, in the history of the Union to
date, it has only happened once (or twice, if the EP resolution on Hungary is to be
counted). In the specific situation in which the Irish High Court was to take the
decision, there were no obstacles to relying on the findings and conclusions of the
Commission. In particular, no obstacle stemmed from the fact that the Commission
proposal was adopted under a different procedure of a political rather than judicial
nature; or from the fact that the decision of the Council under Article 7 (1) TEU had
54Taborowski (2019), p. 49, 375 et seq.
55See Barcz (2019), pp. 4, 12–13.
56European Commission, Reasoned proposal in accordance with Article 7 (1) of the Treaty on
European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, 20 December 2017, COM(2017) 835 final.
57European Parliament, Resolution on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to
Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by
Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, 12 Sep 2018, P8_TA(2018)0340.
58See also Taborowski (2019), p. 399.
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not been taken before the national court reached its decision on the execution of the
warrant.
However, may the national court fully rely on the information presented in the
Commission’s proposal or perhaps it should verify or supplement it? The CJEU
judgment is vague in this regard (cf. para. 61, 69, 73, 79). Yet, it seems justified that
the national court may rely on the proposal of the Commission bearing in mind its
detailed nature and extensive documentation. It should not, however, be confined to
the Commission’s document only. It should verify whether this document is up to
date and, if necessary, gather further material.
The reference by the Court to the Commission’s reasoned proposal should be
seen as a recognition of the document as a source of information ensuring a high
standard of reliability. Nonetheless, it is left to the executing authority to choose and
evaluate the sources of information. The CJEU indicated the qualitative criteria of
the information on which the executing authority should base its evaluation: the
information should be objective, reliable, specific and properly updated (para. 61). In
principle, any sources which provide information helpful for the general risk assess-
ment can be used by the national court. The executing court should examine them, so
that its determination is based on accurate, complete and exhaustive information that
gives a true representation of the situation.
4.2 Assessment of Particular Courts
Further doubts arise in relation to the next levels of the assessment procedure,
i.e. the determination whether there are serious and proven grounds to conclude, in
the circumstances of the given case, that the prosecuted person will be exposed to the
risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial as a result of being surrendered to the issuing
state. The doubts concern both the procedural and the substantive aspects of the
mechanism devised by the CJEU.
The executing judicial authority is required to assess whether the general or
systemic deficiencies in judicial independence indeed affect the courts which have
jurisdiction in criminal cases against the persons requested by the EAW. In the first
place, it needs to identify the courts in the issuing state which have jurisdiction to
rule on the matters in question. This will require to apply the rules of criminal
procedure of that state, either by the executing court itself or with the assistance of
other authorities, including the issuing court, e.g. through the judicial dialogue (Art.
15 (2) EAW Framework Decision). In principle, the courts’ jurisdiction can be
established before the person is transferred to the issuing state. In situations specified
by the law in force, it may nevertheless be subject to change after the person’s
transfer. The risk of the potential change of jurisdiction after the surrender of the
person prosecuted creates the danger that the assessment made by the executing
authority will not be correct. It is equally difficult for the executing authority to
predict later developments in the case. Assessment of the independence of the
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specific courts competent to carry out proceedings against the person wanted, is
therefore only of limited usefulness to safeguard the fair trial guarantees to the
individual person.
The example of the manner in which the Oberlandesgericht in Karlsruhe dealt
with a EAW case (Ausl 301 AR 95/18), provide an interesting illustration of the
difficulties that the executing courts may encounter when assessing the guarantee of
the independence of judges by whom the requested persons would supposedly be
tried after the transfer. Initially, the German court held a dialogue with the Polish
court to clarify the doubts that had arisen and to gather additional information with
regard to judicial independence in Poland. In doing so, it followed the formula
indicated by the CJEU (see infra). The correspondence with the Polish counterpart
did not allow to clarify all doubts of the German court. In the course of the dialogue,
the Oberlandesgericht asked specifically for a binding assurance under international
law that no disciplinary proceedings will be instituted against judges with regard to
the content of their decisions taken during the trial of the requested person.59 After
having received a reply that such an assurance is not possible, the court then decided
to make the consent for the surrender of the requested Latvian citizen subject to the
assurances that the German ambassador or a person authorised by him will be
entitled to be present at the trial conducted with respect to that person and, in the
event of a conviction, to visit him in custody.60 By proceeding in that way, the
Oberlandesgericht apparently went beyond the formula outlined by the Court of
Justice.
4.3 Individual Risk Assessment
The Court of Justice’s test as proposed in the LM ruling, raises the most serious
concerns as regards the final test: the examination of the individual risk. At this
stage, the executing judicial authority is to make a final determination as to whether
the requested person’s fundamental right to a fair trial is at risk. The executing
judicial authority ought to take into consideration: the specific concerns expressed by
the person prosecuted as well as his personal situation, e.g. the political pressure to
prosecute or punish him; possible negative statements by state officials about the
person wanted; his possible membership of political opposition, social or ethnic
minority; or media activities critical of political power, etc. In addition, the judicial
authority should take account of the nature of the offence, the circumstances in
which it was committed as well as the context in which the arrest warrant was issued,
59Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Decision of 31 October 2018), Ausl 301 AR 95/18, para. 33.
60Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Decision of 7 January 2019), Ausl 301 AR 95/18, para. 70.
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e.g. the political nature of the act; or the fact that the act was committed in connection
with the exercise of the freedom of expression or the freedom of assembly, etc.61
Taking the individual test means that the foreign national court has already
carried out the two previous stages. It must have then established that judicial
independence is endangered in the Member State which requested the surrender of
the person, and it must have further recognised that this danger exists also in relation
to the particular courts that are to try the person requested. At this stage, there should
be therefore no doubt that the Member State whose judicial system is subject to such
an examination does not respect the values of the Union, in particular the principle of
the rule of law and its fundamental element: judicial independence. Some legal
scholars suggested that refusal to execute EAWs should take place after general or
systemic deficiencies in judicial independence in the given Member State had been
identified.62 However, this was not enough for the CJEU to complete the test. This is
where the Court of Justice came to the rescue of the principle of mutual trust and the
mutual recognition of judicial decisions. By protecting the EAW cooperation mech-
anism by requiring all three levels of the LM test to be carried out, the CJEU de facto
accepted that judicial independence was threatened in the Member State which
issued the warrant. This is perhaps the most controversial outcome of the LM
ruling.63
The Court of Justice assumed that the actual realisation of the standard of judicial
independence in a given Member State may vary. Moreover, this variation may occur
at different levels, corresponding to the levels of the LM test. The existence of systemic
or generalised deficiencies in the judiciary (the general test) may affect national courts
to a differing degree: some courts may be affected, while some others not (the
intermediate test). Furthermore, the determination that these deficiencies do have an
impact on a particular court still does not preclude, in the Court’s view, that in such a
court a certain person in a specific criminal proceedings may be tried in accordance
with the European standard of judicial independence (the individual test).64 Therefore,
61CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 75. See also written observations in the LM case of the European
Commission of 30 April 2018, paras. 23-24; CJEU, Case C-216/18, LM, Opinion of Advocate
General E. Tanchev, ECLI:EU:C:2018:517, para. 103.
62E.g. Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018a) Judicial Independence; von Bogdandy (2018), Krajewski
(2018), p. 805; Pech and Wachowiec (2019).
63See also i.a. von Bogdandy (2018), Frąckowiak-Adamska (2018a), Scheppele (2018),
Grabowska-Moroz (2019), p. 427; Pech and Wachowiec (2019). It is suggested that in addition
to preserving the mutual recognition mechanism, the CJEU intended to distinguish its responsibility
(to protect the right to a fair trial in individual cases, based on Art. 19 (1) TEU and Art. 47 Charter),
from that of the Council and the European Council (to oversee the systemic compliance of domestic
judicial systems with the rule of law, stemming from Art. 7 TEU); see CJEU, LM, supra note
1, paras. 70–72; CJEU (opinion), LM, supra note 63, paras. 40, 42 and 44; Frąckowiak-Adamska
(2018a), Krajewski (2018), p. 797.
64The Court clearly followed the line suggested by the European Commission and supported by the
Advocate General; see European Commission (Written observations of 30 April 2018), para. 19;
CJEU (opinion), LM, supra note 63, para. 108. See also Bárd and van Ballegooij (2018b) The AG
Opinion, para. 2.2; Taborowski (2019), pp. 400–401.
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the third stage of the LM test is indeed decisive. It makes the test highly rigorous and
extreme, to the point that it becomes rather challenging to justify a refusal to execute a
European Arrest Warrant.
The Court will soon re-examine the methodology indicated in the LM ruling
following two new preliminary references brought by the Amsterdam Court (C-354
and 412/20). The Court in Amsterdam has asked how to deal with Polish warrants,
once it has concluded that the independence of every court in Poland is at risk due to
systemic deficiencies caused by changes introduced in recent years, including the
possibility of initiating disciplinary proceedings for the content of judicial decisions.
There is another crucial aspect of the LM ruling that will definitely have
far-reaching consequences for the EAW mechanism. It is the obligation of the
executing court to request the issuing authority to provide additional information
that it considers necessary for assessing whether there is a risk to a fair trial (the
Q&A mechanism). The CJEU stated so in both Aranyosi and Căldăraru (para. 95),
and LM (para. 76) cases. The Court of Justice applied the modal verb ‘must’ in the
context of requesting additional information, which suggests that this horizontal
judicial dialogue is of a compulsory nature and national courts cannot derogate from
this duty. Such interpretation has been expressly accepted by some executing
authorities.65 Indeed, especially the second and third stages of the procedure devel-
oped by the CJEU will generally require launching of a Q&A mechanism. The
detailed information that would be needed to carry out the assessment of particular
courts as well as the specific case and individual situation of the suspect, usually, will
not be fully known to the executing court. However, it should be left to the discretion
of the executing authority to decide whether the information in its possession is
sufficient for taking a decision about the execution of a EAW, or whether any
supplementary information is needed.
The horizontal judicial dialogue is based on Article 15 (2) of the EAW Frame-
work Decision66 and is intended to allow the collection of ‘necessary supplementary
information’, in particular as regards the grounds for non-execution of the warrant,
the guarantees to be provided for its execution or the warrant’s content or form. The
issuing judicial authority may provide the executing court with any objective
material in relation to any changes concerning the conditions for protecting the
guarantee of judicial independence in the issuing Member State, which may rule out
the existence of that risk for the individual concerned (para. 77). The issuing body
may as well seek assistance, if need be, from the central authority or one of the
central authorities of the issuing Member State (para. 78). Yet, both the CJEU
approach to the formula of judicial dialogue and a relatively short practice of its
use reveal a number of issues concerning the way in which it is actually carried out.
65See e.g. Rechtbank Amsterdam (Decision of 16 April 2019), ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:2721,
section 4.4.
66Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States, OJ L190/1.
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5 Judicial Dialogue of National Courts
This part of the contribution presents the experience gained so far in the dialogue
between the executing judicial authorities of different Member States and the issuing
judicial authorities in Poland. It covers the dialogue not only of the particular courts
which were competent in the case which led to the LM judgment, but also of other
courts which applied the mechanism prescribed by the Court of Justice in other
EAW cases. Most of the documents were obtained via the access to public informa-
tion mechanism;67 occasionally, some answers of Polish courts to the questions
asked by the executing authorities were also made available on the respective courts’
websites. The information obtained can be regarded as representative of other cases
of judicial dialogue inspired by the LM judgment. They follow a similar pattern and
show fairly common deficiencies. It should be noted, however, that this mechanism
is still at its debut and may be subject to further evolution.
Following the CJEU ruling in the LM case, the Irish High Court complied with
the requirements set out by the Court of Justice. It twice requested the supplementary
information from Polish courts that issued the arrest warrants. In the end, the court in
Dublin decided to execute all three warrants and ordered the surrender of the person
wanted to Poland.68 The Irish court confirmed its earlier assessment of the existence
of a general risk of breach of the right to a fair trial due to systemic or general
deficiencies in judicial independence in Poland.69 It also concluded that these
deficiencies will affect the courts before which the person wanted will be tried.70
Ergo, it did determine that two out of the three tests of the LM ruling were met.
Nonetheless, with respect to the last one: the final assessment of the existence of an
individualised risk for the prosecuted person, the Court held that this risk was not
proven.71 The prosecuted person filed an appeal from the High Court’s judgment
which was examined by the Supreme Court of Ireland. The Supreme Court shared
the assessment of the lower instance and eventually ruled in November 2019 to
dismiss the appeal.72
The dialogue carried out in the LM case illustrated some problems of the Q&A
mechanism established by the CJEU, which will be addressed below. The analogous
judicial dialogue initiated in other EAW cases, e.g. by the courts of Madrid,
67The courts were asked for information twice: in November 2018 and in June/July 2019. While in
the first round only about half of the courts replied, in the second round the success rate of the
requests increased to some 80%. Perhaps this should be linked to the paper, which was the result of
the first series of inquiries and was published in a legal periodical regularly consulted by judges; see
Filipek (2019).




72Supreme Court, supra note 54, para. 88.
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Amsterdam or Karlsruhe, also shows that the mechanism is deficient and the ‘Union
courts’ are not fully capable to make use of it.
The questions posed by different courts varied greatly in terms of the content and
the level of detail: from the most general questions from the Spanish court to
inquisitive, detailed sets of questions from the Dutch and German courts. The
most frequent questions concerned systemic, structural issues of the Polish judiciary,
including the autonomy of courts in performing their tasks, the irremovability of
judges, the composition of adjudicating panels, the available legal remedies, the
dismissal of presidents and vice-presidents of courts, disciplinary proceedings, etc.73
Questions referring directly to particular courts that have jurisdiction to hear the case
of the person wanted were less frequent. Questions of this kind were raised primarily
by the courts of Amsterdam and Karlsruhe (including: indication of competent
bodies, changes in court’s staff, recent retirement or transfer of judges in the
competent courts, allocation of cases, rules on case resolution, disciplinary pro-
ceedings, or measures to protect the right to an independent court).74 Some of the
questions on particular courts were indeed of a general nature. In fact, there were
only occasional questions related to the last stage of the LM test: the personal
situation and concerns of the person prosecuted, or the nature of the offence and
the circumstances in which it was committed. The latter category included questions
about statements made by the deputy minister of justice referring to the person
prosecuted as a dangerous offender, which the Irish court interpreted as likely to
undermine the presumption of innocence of the person prosecuted.75
The analysis of the responses of Polish courts indicates that they may assist the
executing authority in taking a decision to surrender a person prosecuted only to a
limited extent. Many replies consisted mainly in a brief presentation of general legal
rules concerning the judiciary: provisions of the Constitution/statutes and the sub-
mission of some basic data requested by the foreign court. In fact, this kind of replies
prevailed. Occasionally, they were supplemented with some superficial conclusions,
e.g.: ‘In Poland, legal norms exclude threats to the independence of judges’.76 Only
a few answers of the courts (judges) were explicitly critical, and negatively assessed
the existing situation and expressed doubts about the independence of judges. In
this context, in particular, disciplinary proceedings against judges were mentioned
regularly. Other issues raised by the responding courts included: the non-transparent
allocation of cases by a classified algorithm, the excessive influence of the Minister
of Justice on the functioning of courts through administrative supervision, as well as
73Celmer No. 5, supra note 53, para. 3; High Court (letter of 8 August 2018); Juzgado Central de
Instrucción (letter of 24 September 2018).
74Rechtbank Amsterdam (Decision of 4 October 2018), ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:7032, para. 4.4.3;
Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe (Decision of 31 October 2018), Ausl 301 AR 95/18, paras. 21–33.
75High Court (Judgment of 1 August 2018), The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur Celmer
(No. 4), [2018] IEHC 484, paras. 37, 40–41, 47.
76Regional Court in Warsaw (Letter of 26 September 2018). http://bip.warszawa.so.gov.pl/
attachments/download/7511. Accessed 20 July 2019, p. 9.
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the premature, arbitrary dismissal and appointment of (vice-)presidents of courts or
the politicised composition of the National Council of the Judiciary. In turn, some
replies were limited to expressing views in line with the official stance of the
government (e.g. ‘the National Council of the Judiciary is the independent body
responsible for guaranteeing [judge’s] rights’).77 or individual, hopeful opinions of
the responding judge (‘I would like to express my conviction that the majority of
judges in the Republic of Poland stand up for their independence’).78
Some of the answers were laconic or evasive and, in the opinion of the requesting
court, contributed very little to the understanding of the general situation in Poland.79
Some courts invoked the lack of a formal competence to provide answers in the
required material scope (e.g. concerning the general situation of the rule of law in
Poland, disciplinary proceedings against judges, the dismissal of presidents and
vice-presidents of ordinary courts, the use of the extraordinary appeal, the evaluation
of politicians’ statements, the position of the Minister of Justice towards statements
of his deputy etc.) or the lack of knowledge (e.g. about the disciplinary proceedings,
the employment of assessors or judges’ assistants, the extraordinary appeal, the
statements of the deputy minister etc.). Sometimes both the lack of competence
and the lack of knowledge were invoked simultaneously. In situations where the
court is not capable of responding to some questions raised by the executing
authority, it should perhaps approach the authority (or person) that has such knowl-
edge or competence rather than ignore the questions or leave them unanswered.
Excessive brevity or the lack of answer may make the requesting authority repeat or
reformulate the questions, which will generate unnecessary additional communica-
tion and negatively affect the length of the proceedings. In ten very similar decisions
of early 2019, the court in Amsterdam held that the answers of the Polish courts were
insufficient to decide on the surrender of the persons wanted, and resolved to
continue the dialogue.80 This mainly consisted in urging the requested court to
provide or supplement the answers to the previously transmitted questions.81
Over time, the judicial dialogue began to involve other bodies in Poland, apart
from the regional courts (sądy okręgowe), as the ones entitled to issue European
arrest warrants. The communication also included district courts (sądy rejonowe,
e.g. in questions about assessors), courts of appeal, the Supreme Court (e.g. with
77Regional Court in Świdnica (Letter of 8 October 2010), p. 2.
78Regional Court in Rzeszów (Letter of 8 October 2010), p. 5.
79Celmer No. 5, supra note 53, para. 90.
80Rechtbank Amsterdam (Decisions of 4 January 2019), ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:33,
2019:42–2019:44, 2019:46–2019:51.
81In some cases, the second round of Polish courts’ replies also left the EAW executing court
unsatisfied; in a series of decisions it requested once again that the replies be supplemented; see
Rechtbank Amsterdam (Decisions of 16 April 2019), ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:2750, 2019:2760,
2019:2792, 2019:2793, 2019:2801.
422 S. Biernat and P. Filipek
regard to extraordinary appeals) and the disciplinary bodies (e.g. the scope of
disciplinary proceedings with regard to individual judges).82
In April 2019, in some cases, after a second round of dialogue, the court of
Amsterdam decided to surrender the persons requested. Similarly to the Irish court,
the Rechtbank Amsterdam acknowledged the general concerns in respect of the
impact of the changes in Poland on the rule of law as well as the concerns with regard
to the right to a fair trial before the courts in which the transferred person will be
tried.83 That means that, again, two out of three tests were met. It considered,
however, that the risk of breaching the right of the individual person to a fair trial
was not demonstrated. It held that neither the personal circumstances of the suspect
nor the nature of the offences for which he would be tried justifies a negative
decision. The court concluded that the charges related to common criminal offences,
so the suspect as well as the type of offences were not in any way in the special
attention of the ruling politicians in Poland so as to give rise to inappropriate
influence on the judges.84
6 Evaluation of the CJEU Mechanism for the Assessment
of Judicial Independence
6.1 Nemo Iudex in Causa Sua
In the Aranyosi and Căldăraru cases, the answers to be given by national courts
within the judicial dialogue mechanism were intended to refer to the conditions
under which a custodial sentence was to be served. Thus they related to the area for
which a separate branch of public administration was responsible: the prison author-
ities that remain outside the judiciary. In contrast, in the LM case while it concerned a
fair trial and judicial independence, national courts were requested to comment on
themselves. A domestic judicial authority may be asked to assess particular courts of
its own country (the ones having jurisdiction to try the case of the person being
prosecuted) or the judiciary in general. Ergo, the court is being asked about a branch
of the state structure of which it forms a part, within which it is established. This
82The survey of correspondence between courts shows that, occasionally, the understanding
(translation) of the correspondence between courts could be a problem. Misunderstandings
concerned some issues of importance, e.g.: which court will have jurisdiction to rule on the
transferred person’s case? Which court is actually giving the answer? (district or regional); Were
the individual courts’ presidents dismissed or they left due to the expiry of their term of office? Does
the question relate to assessors or court assistants?
83See e.g. Rechtbank Amsterdam (Judgments of 16 April 2019), ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:2722,
para. 5.4.1; 2019:2751, para. 5.4.1; 2019:2794, para. 6.4.2; 2019:2795, para. 4.4.1; 2019:2799,
para. 4.4.1.
84ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2019:2722, supra note 85, para. 5.4.2; 2019:2751, para. 5.4.2; 2019:2794,
para. 6.4.3; 2019:2795, para. 4.4.2; 2019:2799, para. 4.4.2.
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gives rise to potential conflicts unknown to the previously examined cases relating to
prison conditions.85 In this context some difficult questions arise. Will such infor-
mation meet the standard set by the Court of Justice? Will such information be
objective and adequate? Will the assessment be fully reliable? Does a judge (court)
who does not recognise any threats to the independence of the judiciary, contrary to
the widely expressed and well-documented concerns, remain fully independent?
How about a judge whose answers comply with to the expectations of political
decision-makers, bearing in mind that their voice could have an impact on the
judge’s career? Would a judge admit receiving explicit or implicit instructions,
suggestions or perhaps ‘friendly advice’ from the executive or other political actors?
Answers to these questions can be challenging. On the other hand, how about a judge
who provides critical comments on fair trial guarantees? Could he be afraid of
condemnation, intimidation, legal harassment or threats of disciplinary proceedings
on account of the answers he has given? These are legitimate concerns.
6.2 Who Shall Answer?
It is not clear who should answer the questions raised by the executing authority: the
judge issuing the arrest warrant, the head of the court’s department or the president
of the court. The LM ruling indicates, in general, that the issuing judicial authority
should be addressed. The EAW Framework Decision only in general specifies as the
addressee of the questions: the court issuing the EAW. It may seem a minor issue,
yet in practice, the actual respondent may be of crucial significance to the content of
the answers. It actually did happen that competing answers were provided to
the same questions by different judges of the same court: the court’s president and
the judge who issued the warrant.86 An additional issue in the specific perspective of
the LM case was that the warrants to surrender the person were issued by three
different Polish courts. The cooperation of the executing court with several issuing
authorities, with regard to a single wanted person, may lead the former court to
ambiguous conclusions.
In practice, questions from a foreign court are generally answered either by court
presidents or heads of court departments or sometimes individual judges indicated
by them. Occasionally, questions from the foreign court have been answered by the
individual judges who actually issued the arrest warrant; this happened when
expressly requested by the court executing the EAW. A review of the current
practice of judicial dialogue suggests that when answers are given by court presi-
dents or heads of departments, they are more often abbreviated and kept to a
minimum. Their actual usefulness for the executing authority may therefore be
limited. On the other hand, in the rare cases where answers are given by the
85See also i.a. Pech and Wachowiec (2019).
86For details see Filipek (2019), p. 29.
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individual judge who issued the warrant, these are usually more comprehensive,
straightforward, and critical. It should be kept in mind that a number of courts’
presidents were appointed by the Minister of Justice during a six-month period,
when he enjoyed a fully discretionary power to replace presidents and vice-
presidents of courts, or who were appointed by him following the expiry of their
predecessor’s term of office. The Minister, who is responsible for the changes in the
Polish judiciary, is inclined to appoint persons who share his point of view.
6.3 Material Scope of Judicial Dialogue
Further concerns arise with regard to the scope of the questions asked by the judicial
authorities executing arrest warrants and the stage at which the Q&A mechanism
should be employed.87 Could these be general questions, which concern systemic
issues and therefore serve to perform a general assessment, the first stage of the tests
pointed to by the Court of Justice? Or should these questions relate to the
individualised courts which are competent to deal with the case of the person
prosecuted after his transfer to the requesting country? Or, should they perhaps be
limited mostly to the specific case and the person being prosecuted, and therefore
serve the purpose of the ultimate individualised risk assessment?
The executing authority may indeed like to obtain information from the issuing
court concerning a general or systemic situation in the Member State. This may be
the case in particular with regard to the updating of existing information and cover
recent legislative amendments, the development of case law or the administrative
practice or any incidents that may be relevant to the assessment of threats to judicial
independence. However, this possibility should be considered an exception. The
executing authority should not make an initial effort to find and verify information
simply by addressing, in the first place, the issuing judicial authority. The assessment
of the fair trial guarantees and judicial independence by the executing court is also
intended to apply to the responding court. The responding body is therefore in a
difficult situation, as it speaks pro domo suo.
The judicial dialogue indicated by the Court of Justice should primarily serve the
purpose of an individualised test carried out by the court executing the warrant, in
which it assesses whether the particular person to whom the warrant refers, will be at
risk of a breach of the right to a fair trial. A review of the existing practice indicates,
however, that the executing courts do not refrain from asking general questions.88 In
87Doubts about the absence of a more precise indication by the CJEU of what the supplementary
information should concern were already raised after the Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgment, see i.a.
Kamiński (2019), p. 59.
88It would be advisable for judicial authorities from other Member States to use for the first and
second stage of the LM test, the available, general and up-to-date information from reliable sources,
instead of referring to the Polish courts in the first place. Such sources include reports, analyses,
opinions or recommendations from the international expert bodies: the Venice Commission, the UN
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fact, they are much more frequent than questions about the person prosecuted and his
individual case. Nonetheless, there are also such courts, e.g. the London Court,
according to which the requests for further information are appropriate only in
relation to particular circumstances affecting the person requested by the EAW.89
7 Final Remarks
The mechanism of horizontal judicial dialogue between executing and issuing
authorities has some potential to permit the gathering and verification of information
on the Member State which issued the EAW, and to clarify doubts related to fair trial
guarantees in that State. However, it is a deficient instrument which is not fully
capable of examining judicial independence and threats to the rule of law. Its
functioning so far raises a number of issues: is it mandatory or optional? What
should be its material scope? Who should respond to the questions of the foreign
court? Is it appropriate and credible to ask the judge to evaluate his own indepen-
dence and the attitude of fellow judges?
The above considerations illustrate inherent limitations and substantial inade-
quacy of the model of supplementary questions to assess judicial independence and
decide on the execution of the EAW in relation to fair trial standards. This mecha-
nism assumes that judicial authorities will carry out a self-assessment of their
independence and share it with foreign authorities. The adequacy and credibility
of such an exercise may be disputed. Despite detailed guidance from the Court
(or perhaps: due to them), such a procedure does not seem to be able to lead to a
satisfactory result in many or perhaps in most cases.
In view of emerging difficulties, a question may arise whether it would not be a
better idea to stick exclusively to the general test: i.e. the examination of the systemic
risk of breach of independence of the courts following the formula set in the context
of asylum law in the judgment in Case C-411/10 and C-493/10 N.S.90 This could
lead to a quasi-automatic refusal to execute arrest warrants issued by Polish courts,
and de facto result in the full exclusion of Poland’s participation in the EAW
mechanism. Such a solution would be questionable though. Its consequences
could prove too far-reaching and hard to accept as it would not allow a more nuanced
response to different specific circumstances of EAW cases.
In Poland’s current situation, a general exclusion of all courts from judicial
cooperation within the EU would result in a vote of no confidence against the
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers; the judges’ associations: ‘Iustitita’,
‘Themis’; or the civil society organisations: the Helsinki Foundation, the Batory Foundation, etc.
89London High Court of Justice (Judgment of 31 October 2018), Pawel Lis and others, [2018]
EWHC 2848, postscript.
90CJEU, Case C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and
M. E. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. See also i.a. von Bogdandy (2018), Frąckowiak-Adamska
(2018a), Pech and Wachowiec (2019).
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entirety of the Polish judiciary. However, a prevailing majority of the total of more
than 10,000 judges maintain their independence in difficult conditions, both legal
and psychological, which they face in their daily work.
Another observation comes to mind relating to the extensive reach of the Court’s
arguments going beyond the framework of the case presented by the Irish Court, but
being of relevance for the scope of judicial cooperation. The independence of
national courts is also required when they refer questions for a preliminary ruling.
Such a position was emphasized by the CJEU in its judgment in the Associação
Sindical case,91 and repeated in the LM judgment discussed here (para. 54). It means
that in the case of each reference for a preliminary ruling from Poland (or from
another Member State in which there are corresponding doubts as to the respect of
the fundamental right to a fair trial) it will be necessary for the Court of Justice to
begin with a full test of independence of the referring court in the manner specified in
the LM case. Did the Court in Luxembourg realise that its judgment might have such
consequences?
In the context of a new category of questions referred for a preliminary ruling to
the Court of Justice, in which national courts ask for an evaluation of their own
independence, we may be soon witnessing new developments. Such questions have
recently been referred to the CJEU by the courts in Germany (Verwaltungsgericht
Wiesbaden)92 and Hungary (Central District Court in Pest).93 A new element is that
the CJEU’s reply and its appraisal is to apply to the very courts submitting the
questions on judicial independence. This situation poses new challenges. First, if the
Court of Justice were to answer the questions in the negative, i.e. if it considered that
there is, indeed, a lack of a proper standard of judicial independence in the cases
referred, the national court would then in fact not be entitled to ask a question for a
preliminary ruling at all. In such cases, the answer on the substance of the question
simultaneously becomes the answer on its admissibility. Would the Court of Justice
therefore make an exception and admit the question on judicial independence from a
non-independent court?, or would it rather declare the question inadmissible, yet
pointing to the lack of independence of the requesting court?
Secondly, would the CJEU evaluate the independence of those courts by adapting
the LM test? Not likely. In both cases of the German and Hungarian courts, the
questions were asked in the context of individual cases pending before the national
court. However, the questions referred to Luxembourg did not directly concern the
private party’s right to a fair trial, that is, the individual fundamental right. Instead,
they dealt with a more general, constitutional issue: the independence of the court.
The latter does not have to be linked to the specific case of a particular person. In
91CJEU, Associação Sindical, supra note 4, para. 43.
92CJEU, Case C-272/19, Land Hessen. The Wiesbaden Court’s self-evaluation of its independence
from the viewpoint of EU standards was negative: ‘Nach alledem dürfte das vorlegende Gericht die
europarechtlichen Vorgaben nach Art. 47 Abs. 2 GrCH eines unabhängigen und unparteiischen
Gerichts nicht in diesem Sinne erfüllen.’, Verwaltungsgericht Wiesbaden (Decision of 28 March
2019), 6 K 1016/15. https://openjur.de/u/2169849.html. Accessed 20 July 2019.
93Biró (2019) and Szabó (2019).
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principle, therefore, there would be no need for a final (third) LM test: the individual
assessment of the specific case and the risks related to the party of the national
proceeding. The Court of Justice could make a ruling after carrying out: (1) the
general assessment of the existence of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the
Member State’s judiciary, and (2) the impact of these deficiencies on the particular
courts, namely those which submitted the questions.
If such a scenario were to materialise, it could also be followed by the courts of
the Member States deciding on the execution of the EAW. They could start asking
questions not just about the protection of the individual’s right of the requested
person to a fair trial, but at a more general level about the independence of the court
that is supposed to hear the case, after the person were transferred. Such an approach
would safeguard the individual right to a fair trial while guaranteeing the indepen-
dence of national courts and protecting the rule of law more effectively than in the
LM ruling.
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Abstract The 2018 CJEU ruling in LM highlighted the importance of judicial
independence for the rule of law and protection of the right to fair trial. In so
doing, the judgment raised problematic questions about the relationship between
Article 2 values and the EU Charter rights, and their connection with mutual trust.
This chapter considers these issues through the lens of human dignity, which is both
the first foundational value under Article 2 and the first right in the EU Charter. By
discussing how the LM judgment raises the constitutional status of the right to a fair
trial, this chapter argues that a focus on human dignity could effectively link Article
2 values with EU Charter rights and facilitate assessment of their respective breach.
1 Introduction
The design faults of Article 7 TEU proceedings and the delayed responses of EU
institutions to the rapid deterioration of democratic standards in Hungary and Poland
have triggered renewed interest in the mainstream EU judicial procedures as possible
This is a reworked version of ‘Individuals and Judges in Defense of the Rule of Law’,
Verfassungsblog (28 July 2018).
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channels to address some of these concerns. The European Court of Justice (CJEU)
Grand Chamber judgment of 25 July 2018 in LM1 was promptly dissected by
commentators across Europe.2 In many ways, this case illustrates EU constitution-
alism at its best: despite not being obliged to do so, the Irish judge made a request
under Article 267 TFEU, bringing together concerns raised by the pending Article
7 TEU procedure against Poland and the more technical and narrow issue of fair trial
under Article 47 EU Charter. The CJEU addressed these following the urgent
procedure. Seizing the first opportunity to intervene on an issue directly relevant
to the ongoing Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland,3 the CJEU stayed on the
path opened by Aranyosi4 as a way of seeking to address the problematic issue of
judicial independence at the core both of the preliminary ruling reference and of the
Article 7 TEU procedure against Poland.
At first glance, in LM the CJEU appeared to make decisive strides with regard to
the rule of law, stepping up as a prominent participant in the discussion triggered by
reforms to the judiciary in Poland and Hungary. Notably the CJEU did not wait for
Article 7 TEU proceedings to come to an end5 in order to devise its own tests and
assessment mechanisms, inviting Member States’ courts to apply them. The LM case
can certainly therefore be understood as promoting the role of Member States’ courts
in assessing what are generally referred to as the rule of law crises and related attacks
on judicial independence in fellow Member States. The message of the CJEU is
clear. When there is a ‘real risk of systemic or generalised deficiencies’ affecting the
principle of judicial independence constructed by the Court as the ‘essence’ of the
right to a fair trial under Article 47 EU Charter, the presumption of mutual trust that
underpins the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system can be rebutted by the
executing authorities (i.e. the domestic courts) unless they are satisfied that the
essence of the applicant’s right under Article 47 will be protected in the issuing
Member State. In carrying out the LM abstract test, the Irish High Court predictably
found that there was a ‘real risk connected with a lack of independence of the courts
in Poland on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies’.6 Predictably too, the
Irish High Court did not find that in the concrete situation faced by the applicant
upon his being surrendered to Poland he would be exposed to a breach of his right to
a fair trial under Article 47.2 EU Charter and to a flagrant denial of justice.7 This
anti-climactic outcome of the Irish High Court judgment brings into sharp relief
1CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
2von Bogdandy et al. (2018) and Peers (2018).
3Kochenov et al. (2017).
4CJEU, Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Caldararu, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198.
5At the time of delivery only a reasoned proposal had been issued by the EU Commission in
December 2017.
6Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur Celmer (No. 5) [2018] IEHC
639, para. 93.
7Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur Celmer (No. 5) [2018] IEHC
639, paras. 105 and 117.
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some of the shortcomings of the CJEU’s judgment in LM and points to the ruling’s
potentially wider significance in relation to safeguarding the EU foundational values
under Article 2 TEU.
2 Article 7 TEU and LM: Questionable Overlaps
In its LM judgment the CJEU managed to connect Article 7 TEU and preliminary
proceedings while keeping the two avenues on parallel tracks (paragraphs 70–72).
First, the CJEU noted the ‘particular relevance’ of a reasoned proposal of the
Commission against Poland adopted under Article 7(1) TEU (paragraph 61). The
reasoned proposal is one of the materials that have to be ‘objective, reliable, specific
and properly updated concerning the operation of the system of justice in the issuing
Member State’ that may be considered in this process by the executing authority
(paragraph 61). On its own, however, it is not sufficient to establish the ‘real risk’
and the executing court is required to make a wider investigation, with the assess-
ment having to be carried out on the basis of the right to a fair trial (Article 47 EU
Charter), and not of the EU value under Article 2 (paragraph 62). The second
element shared by the Article 7 TEU procedure and the LM tests is the principle of
judicial independence, a phrase not used by the Irish High Court in its preliminary
reference, which focussed on the fundamental right to a fair trial and on a ‘real risk of
flagrant denial of justice’ (paragraph 25). The two are easily related, but the CJEU’s
switch to judicial independence is arguably strategic as it makes it possible to
establish a hermeneutic continuum between Article 2 TEU, which mentions the
rule of law, and Art. 47 EU Charter, which protects the right to a fair trial:
In that regard, it must be pointed out that the requirement of judicial independence forms part
of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial, a right which is of cardinal importance
as a guarantee that all the rights which individuals derive from EU law will be protected and
that the values common to the Member States set out in Article 2 TEU, in particular the value
of the rule of law, will be safeguarded. (paragraph 48)
In the above, the CJEU noted that the right to a fair trial under Article 47 EU
Charter is included under the scope of Article 2 TEU, referred to in Council
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002, about which the Irish High
Court sought clarification. In so doing the CJEU justified its entry into the territory of
Article 2 TEU, from which it is excluded by Article 7 TEU, which promotes an
exclusively political approach to breaches of Article 2 TEU values. The CJEU
language however keeps clear boundaries between the two territories: rule of law
issues fall under Article 7 TEU, and fair trial can—and should—be addressed by
courts. Having established the principle of judicial independence as a bridge
between the two, the CJEU provided guidance to domestic courts for determining
the quality of judicial independence. In this respect, the CJEU arguably came very
close to encouraging domestic courts to substitute Article 7 TEU, with the two
procedures being at the very least mutually complementary. The reasoned proposal
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produced under Article 7.1 TEU will certainly be useful for domestic courts’
determination of a ‘real risk of systemic or generalised deficiencies’. Repeated
positive findings by domestic courts against Poland under the second test of LM
could potentially provide further evidence to feed into the Article 7 TEU procedure,
thus possibly encouraging speedier action through this channel.
If it is certainly well-intentioned, i.e. encouraging action in a situation of a real
risk of deficiencies in judicial independence, this promotion of judicial involvement
in Articles 2 and 7 TEU territory is not unproblematic. Firstly, the complex pluralism
in relation to judicial independence across the EU has been highlighted as rendering
any assessment of its ‘systemic’ quality in a given Member State (abstract test) an
arduous task to say the least.8 As will be recalled from the early stages of pre-Article
7 proceedings, identifying and gathering appropriate documentation on the quality
of the rule of law in Poland and Hungary have not been easy tasks, and that is for
institutions that are much better equipped than any domestic court being invited to
perform that test. Therefore, in this respect LM does not provide much clarification,
as the reasoned proposal is considered as just one of the possible materials at the
disposal of domestic courts. In addition, the abstract test arguably creates a wide
power gap between a single court (and a single judge in many cases) and the issuing
Member State, subject to the early stage of Article 7 TEU proceedings. Secondly, the
executing Member State court’s task of checking the quality of judicial indepen-
dence in the issuing Member State with regards to the pending EAW before them
(concrete test) amounts to what was evocatively compared to ‘herculean hurdles’.9
In particular, while the CJEU in LM appeared keen to promote a ‘dialogue between
the executing judicial authority and issuing judicial authority’ (paragraph 77),
scepticism has been expressed about this, with scholars noting that such a dialogue
might not go so smoothly in practice.10 If a court-to-court exchange of information
can be workable, the Irish High Court’s effort to engage in this arguably confirmed
the difficulty in obtaining unequivocal answers from the issuing authorities in a
situation of real risk of systemic or generalised deficiencies.11 Thirdly, domestic
courts having to determine single-handedly the quality of judicial independence and
of the right to a fair trial in the issuing Member State is likely going to delay the
procedure of EAW and generate extra costs, which would somehow have to be
absorbed by the executing judicial authority. Paradoxically, this might trigger a
knock-on effect for fair trial in the executing Member State, depending on the
volume of EAW with Poland (or Hungary) going through its court system. In this
situation, one possible silver lining might come from recent CJEU case law
according to which the host state has to cover the cost for granting asylum seekers
8Kosar (2016).
9Bard and Ballegooij (2018), pp. 8–9.
10Bracken (2018) and Biernat (2018).
11Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur Celmer (No. 5) [2018] IEHC
639, paras. 85–91.
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‘the minimum conditions for reception’ pending their application.12 In relation to the
EAW, the extra cost for the executing Member State might, so it could be hoped,
alert the Member States’ authorities to the seriousness of the situation and encourage
them to be more pro-active at the EU level, including through Article 7 TEU.
Fourthly and finally, in its endeavour to bring Article 47 EU Charter closer to Article
2 TEU, the CJEU forgot to draw on Article 6 European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR). This apparent forgetfulness is odd considering the EU Charter’s
requirements under Article 52 paragraph 3 and Article 53 that the CJEU refer to
ECHR case law when there is a correspondence between the EU Charter and ECHR
rights. It becomes odder considering that the Irish High Court had phrased its Article
267 TFEU question with explicit reference to the ‘flagrant denial of justice’ test
developed by the European Court of Human Rights under Article 6 ECHR (para-
graph 25). As a result of this omission, the CJEU’s focus on the ‘essence of the right
to a fair trial’ arguably made a complicated situation even more complicated, leading
to the Member State’s court having to work out the questionable distinctions
between the CJEU and the ECHR thresholds for an acceptable quality of fair trial.
3 Sowing the Seeds of Constitutional Distrust?
In LM the CJEU widened the possibility of rebutting the mutual trust presumption,
while emphasising its ‘fundamental importance’ (paragraph 36) and defining it as the
‘cornerstone’ of judicial cooperation in criminal matters (paragraph 41). The CJEU
had recognised this possibility in previous case law,13 however, in LM it did so for
the first time in relation to a non-absolute right, namely the right to a fair trial. The
CJEU was cautious to ring-fence this exceptional approach by requiring that both
steps of the Aranyosi test be taken in this context too. The pending Article 7 TEU
proceeding against Poland was no doubt one of the reasons for extending the
Aranyosi and NS tests involving absolute rights (human dignity, and the prohibition
of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment). Nevertheless, as mentioned above, on
its own, the existence of a reasoned proposal under Article 7 is not a sufficient
criterion for finding a clear risk of systemic or generalised deficiencies, it only forms
part of the material that the executing authority can consider in its assessment. This
arguably makes mutual distrust a possibility for other situations of systemic defi-
ciencies affecting other non-absolute EU Charter rights. This is all the more possible
as mutual trust is a core principle in numerous other EU procedures,14 therefore
likely to concern a range of fundamental rights. In addition, the mutual trust standard
12CJEU, Case C-179/11 Cimade and GISTI v Ministre de l’Intérieur, de l’Outre-Mer, des
Collectivités Territoriales et de l’Immigration, ECLI:EU:C:2012:594.
13CJEU, Case C-411/10 N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865 and CJEU, Cases C-404/15 and
C-659/15 PPU Aranyosi and Caldararu, supra note 4. Korenica and Coli (2016), p. 542.
14Frackowiak-Adamska (2018).
The Rule of Law, Fair Trial and Human Dignity: The Protection of EU Values. . . 435
in LM (i.e. a real risk of systemic or generalised deficiencies in the protection of
Article 47 paragraph 2) appears to be lower than under the EAW Framework
Decision 2002/584 which stays within the Article 7 TEU perimeter, requiring a
‘serious and persistent breach’ of one of the foundational values under Article 2 TEU
(paragraph 10).
This has further ramifications as mutual trust (and mutual recognition which
derives from it) lies at the core of the whole EU constitutional framework and is
anchored in the principle of sincere cooperation of Article 4 paragraph 3 TEU. This
therefore arguably raises the question whether LM is planting the seeds of constitu-
tional distrust, fighting fire with fire, and undermining ultimately the constitutional
principle of mutual trust, without which the EU cannot operate effectively. The
CJEU seems to be well aware of this risk, as evidenced by its focus on an essentialist
definition of the right to a fair trial, and its connection to Article 2 TEU values. Even
so, the scope for mutual distrust remains wide as non-absolute rights represent the
vast majority of the EU Charter rights, and Article 2 TEU foundational values are
numerous, creating the possibility for an even greater number of combinations
between the two. Moreover, this risk of encouraging mutual distrust has to be seen
in the current political context of a series of unprecedented crises, which have in
common a radical questioning of, and distrust in, the EU’s ability to fulfil its own
mission and/or to fulfil a mission that Member States would like it to fulfil. In
addition, and in relation to the rule of law crises, pre-Article 7 proceedings and
Article 7 have created a general climate of deep distrust between the EU on the one
hand, and Poland15 and Hungary16 on the other. This sentiment flourishes on a wide-
spread resentment and sense of deep social injustice among Central Europeans many
of whom feel they have been treated as second class citizens by the EU since joining
it. Finally, it must be borne in mind that the CJEU itself might not be viewed by
Poland nor Hungary with the greatest level of trust. The few rulings it delivered on
the issue of judicial independence had little effect on remedying the problem,
especially in the early stages of the Hungarian situation,17 but they were given great
publicity as the first unequivocal condemnation of the judicial reforms by an EU
institution. Concerns about the possible germination of this seed of constitutional
distrust are therefore not unrealistic, especially as the tension between the EU and
Central and Eastern European Member States increases.18 As the rebuttability of
15‘Poland Cries Foul as EU Triggers ‘Nuclear Option’ over Judicial Independence’, The Guardian
20 December 2017: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/20/eu-process-poland-voting-
rights.
16Interview with Hungarian Foreign Affairs Minister, Péter Szijjarto, with Le Monde: ‘La procé-
dure de sanction est une revanche contre la Hongrie’, 14 December 2018.
17E.g. CJEU, Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
18See e.g. European Parliament Resolution of 12 September 2018 calling for Art. 7 proceeding,
P8-TA-PROV (2018) 0340; CJEU, Case C-619/18 European Commission v Poland, ECLI:EU:
C:2018:910. The EU’s relationships with Romania are also marked by a ‘climate of defiance’: ‘La
Roumanie en pleine dérive illibérale: Bucarest assure au 1 Janvier sa première présidence de l’UE,
dans un climat de défiance inédit avec Bruxelles’, Le Monde, 1–2 January 2019.
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mutual distrust ultimately rests on the right to a fair trial, the constitutional status of
this right therefore requires closer attention.
4 Abstract Versus Concrete Test: In Dubio pro Dignitate
It is suggested here that one way of resolving the mutual trust conundrum is to seek
to ensure that its rebuttal promote a constitutional good of higher importance or
status than mutual trust. This is perhaps what the CJEU has sought to achieve, albeit
incompletely, in its LM judgment by emphasising the definition of the right to a fair
trial as the essence of judicial independence and its connection to Article 2 TEU.
Therefore an alternative, or perhaps complementary, approach might arguably be to
take the lesson of NS and Aranyosi a step further. This could involve joining the dots
between the right to a fair trial and human dignity which is codified both under
Article 1 EU Charter19 and Article 2 TEU. This would give the right to a fair trial an
elevated constitutional status, i.e. close if not identical to that of ‘inviolable human
dignity’. As such it would arguably be robust enough to provide a suitable ground
for rebutting the presumption of mutual trust, considered both in its specific
(e.g. EAW) embodiment and in its constitutional dimension under Article 4 para-
graph 3 TEU. This would therefore legitimise constitutional distrust in situations of
systemic or generalised deficiencies.
This suggestion needs unpacking. Firstly, this follows NS and Aranyosi in which
the mutual trust presumption gave way to the protection of human dignity in the form
of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, considered under
Article 1 and Article 4 EU Charter (NS), and under Article 4 EU Charter (Aranyosi).
This makes both practical and theoretical sense. Practically, the treatments involved
under Article 4 EU Charter are the most violent and brutal ones falling short of
killing a human being; and this therefore arguably legitimises an executing judicial
authority’s decision to suspend the surrendering of a person to another Member State
if that person faces a real risk of being subjected to Article 4 EU Charter types of
treatment. Theoretically, the Article 4 EU Charter absolute prohibition is the stron-
gest prohibition of the EU human rights system, and this status is further strength-
ened by Article 15 ECHR according to which Article 3 ECHR (Article 4 EU Charter
counterpart) may never be curtailed even in emergency situations. As a result, it is
argued that there may not, and should not, be any mutual trust towards Member
States where people face a real risk of being tortured or subjected to inhuman and
degrading treatment or punishment, due to systemic or generalised deficiencies.
Finally and importantly, breaches of Article 4 EU Charter do not only result in
violations of this person’s human dignity under the EU Charter, they also attack
human dignity as the first foundational value of the EU under Article 2 TEU and the
principle of inviolability of human dignity codified under Article 1 EU Charter. As
19Dupré (2014), pp. 3–24.
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such, the commitment to human dignity holds together the EU’s first foundational
value under Article 2 TEU and the most important fundamental right of the EU
Charter (from which all the other rights flow), therefore bringing together the realms
of values and rights. It is suggested that the presumption of mutual trust can therefore
be rebutted not only because of the real risk of treatments contrary to Article 4 EU
Charter in situations of systemic and generalised deficiencies, but also because the
considered Member State might be breaking the EU foundational promise never
again to destroy humanity as codified both under Article 2 TEU and the EU
Charter.20
The connection between the commitment to protect human dignity and the right
to a fair trial is not made explicit in LM, but it arguably lies very close to the surface
of the judgment. Drawing it out would therefore strengthen the legitimacy of
extending the rebuttability of the mutual trust presumption in the specific case of
the non-absolute right to a fair trial. Many, if not all, non-absolute EU Charter rights
can be related in one way or another to human dignity which is, as the 2017 Report
on the Application of the EU Charter reminds us, ‘the basis of all fundamental rights’
and ‘part of the essence of all other rights’.21 It has to be noted, however, that the
right to a fair trial stands out as a sine qua non condition for the respect of human
dignity, as only if it exists can human dignity (and rights) victims be heard,
effectively seek justice and ultimately start healing the violation. Moreover, it is
argued that the right to a fair trial plays a crucial (if not exclusive) role in making it
possible for a democracy to learn from its mistakes, and to seek to prevent further
breaches of human dignity and of human rights from occurring again. Above all,
grounding the rebuttability of the mutual trust presumption in human dignity con-
sidered in its inviolable (Article 1 EU Charter) and foundational (Article 2 TEU)
natures has another benefit, as this explicitly limits the situations in which the
presumption can be rebutted, therefore addressing the concern of constitutional
distrust discussed above. Namely, it might be rebutted only when the four rights
codified under the dignity title of the EU Charter face a real risk of being breached.
This, it is suggested, limits the problematically wide scope of pluralist definitions
and practices of judicial independence, which could easily lead to double standards
in addition to problems of identification in a given situation of alleged breach of this
principle. Moreover and crucially, this draws attention to other situations in which
20Dupré (2015), pp. 66–74.
21‘Human dignity, as protected under Art. 1 of the Charter, is the basis of all fundamental rights. It
guarantees the protection of human beings from being treated as mere objects by the state or by their
fellow citizens. It is a right, but also part of the essence of all other rights. Therefore it must be
respected when any other rights are restricted. All subsequent rights and freedoms on dignity, such
as the right to life and the prohibition of torture and slavery, add specific protection against
violations of dignity. They must be equally upheld in order to protect other rights and freedoms
in the Charter, for example the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. None of the
rights laid down in the Charter may be used to harm the dignity of another person.’ 2017 Report on
the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, SWD (2018) 304 final, p. 12. Emphasis
added.
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the presumption of mutual trust may be legitimately rebutted, such as those of
servitude, slavery, forced labour and human trafficking which are absolutely banned
under Article 5 EU Charter (the last right of the dignity title).
As a result, the LM judgment can be read in two ways. One, as the judgment
through which the CJEU opened the gates to mutual distrust in instances of a real
risk of breach of (potentially all) non-absolute EU Charter rights. Alternatively, LM
can be read as elevating the constitutional status of the right to a fair trial to a level
close (if not totally similar) to the absolute protection of human dignity. In this
reading, it is suggested that the CJEU builds on the EU commitment to making
human dignity inviolable by securing the strongest possible constitutional basis for
a key procedural mechanism required for its effective protection. Exploring this
interpretation might give the CJEU the opportunity to shed light on what is at stake
with a breach of Article 2 TEU values, which arguably goes far beyond the
significance of the rule of law and judicial independence, to include the constitu-
tional ontology and raison d’être of a democratic European Union anchored in the
dignity promise.
Finally, drawing out the connection between the foundational commitment to
protect human dignity and the right to a fair trial makes it possible to address the
shortcomings of the LM two-stage test. This can arguably be achieved, by reverting
to the approach put forward in NS.22 Namely, the presumption that in situations of
systemic deficiencies in conditions of reception for asylum seekers (NS), and, by
extension, of judicial independence (LM) in fellow Member States, issuing Member
States ‘cannot be unaware’ of the risk of breaches to Article 4 TEU (NS) and by
extension to Article 47 TEU (LM). This double negative presumption has three main
advantages over the two-stage test advocated in LM. First, by rendering the LM
two-stage test unnecessary, it prevents the constitutionally awkward positioning of
the executing Member State courts (a single judge in most cases), both vis-à-vis the
issuing Member State and vis-à-vis Article 7 TEU (abstract test). In an Article 7 TEU
context, the existence of a reasoned proposal would be sufficient for confirming the
double negative presumption, while keeping Member State courts outside the
boundaries of Article 7 TEU. Second, adopting the NS approach would contribute
to addressing the nonsensical second and concrete stage of the LM test, whereby the
executing Member State court is expected to trust the information provided by the
issuing Member State court, about which it has just established that the mutual trust
presumption may not apply. Third, considering the foundational nature of human
dignity (Article 2 TEU) and its paradigmatic function in shaping human rights in the
EU (Article 1 EU Charter), it would be wise not to dilute human dignity in chance
concretisations depending in part on the judges’ subjectivity, but to retain it as a
whole in its abstraction and as the foundational promise on which the EU project
rests.
22CJEU, Case C-411/10 NS and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, para. 91.
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5 Conclusion
Disappointing for some, exciting for others, the ultimate significance of the LM
judgment might not mainly lie in its connections with Article 7 TEU, and in its
ability to offer new tools or new channels for Member States’ courts to address the
systemic deterioration of the rule of law in fellow Member States. Rather, this
judgment’s principal merit might prove to be the connections it established between
the set of foundational values under Article 2 TEU and rights contained in the EU
Charter, therefore bringing the Charter and its rights to the political core of the EU.
At least two questions remain at this stage. One is whether the hermeneutic route
taken by LM from Article 2 EU to EU Charter rights can be reversed, namely
whether the judicial finding of systemic and generalised deficiencies of the NS and
Aranyosi type in relation to the right to a fair trial, and in relation to one or all of the
dignity rights under Title 1 EU Charter might be one of the factors for triggering
pre-Article 7 or Article 7 proceedings. The other question is about which institution
is best placed to safeguard the foundations of a constitutional order such as the
EU. In the framework of European constitutionalism developed on the basis of a
collaboration between the EU, the Council of Europe and their common Member
States, safeguarding the foundational values in any of these orders has not been left
to that order alone. Rather, protection of their foundational values has been entrusted
to a dynamic equilibrium of sovereignty.23 In this respect, the EU still has a way to
go. As LM shows, despite its visible endeavour to draw red lines, the judicial
collaboration between the CJEU and Member States’ courts at the heart of the
preliminary reference process cannot effectively address the shortcomings of Article
7 TEU mechanisms for the protection of the EU foundational values. Even in the
event of a negative finding by the issuing court, implementing LM does not contrib-
ute to advancing Article 7 TEU. If anything, the Irish High Court ruling arguably
weakens Article 7 TEU by demonstrating that when there is a proven ‘real risk of
systemic or generalised deficiencies’ in relation to the right to a fair trial, it can still
be appropriate to surrender applicants in individual instances. An appropriate cus-
todian for the EU foundational values, together with procedural avenues to access it
effectively by those who need it most, remain therefore to be imagined and designed.
Failing an institutional reform, hermeneutic connections with the ECHR case law
is a necessary and simple step for the CJEU to take towards protecting its founda-
tional values and safeguarding democracy in the EU. The ECHR is not just a
convenient—and illusory—safety net for the protection of fair trial when the EU
mechanisms fail, as pointed out by the Irish High Court.24 As will be recalled, the
ECHR case law is a valuable source of inspiration for interpreting EU Charter rights
and ensuring that standards of protection are consistent across the EU and the
Council of Europe. Arguably, it is also a keystone for European constitutionalism,
23Dupré (2015), p. 5.
24Irish High Court, Minister for Justice and Equality v. Artur Celmer (No. 5) [2018] IEHC
639, para. 124.
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which brings together the constitutional orders and the EU and its Member States
through their respective commitment to it.25 Ultimately, the ECtHR provides the
overarching narrative as to why it is important to protect these rights and these values
in a democratic society. By omitting to refer to ECHR case law under Article
6 ECHR, the CJEU might have missed a golden opportunity to take part in this
powerful narrative and to give meaning to the EU democratic project at a time where
it faces its greatest challenges.
Acknowledgments I am grateful to Gabor Halmai and Stephen Skinner for their comments on
earlier versions of this chapter.
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Abstract This contribution argues that an obligation for an executing court to
conduct an individual assessment in case of systemic deficiencies of the judiciary
in other Member States is not an adequate tool for ensuring the respect for the rule of
law. Infringements of the independence of the judiciary require other legal mecha-
nisms of protection than fundamental rights. Moreover, individual test is often not
feasible in the European judicial area as some other acts providing for recognition of
judgments in the EU do not contain the mechanisms of refusal of recognition or
execution. A breach of the obligation to ensure independence of the courts should
logically result in suspending the participation of a given Member State in the EU
policy area at stake.
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The judgment in the LM1 case was much expected as the first opportunity for the
Court of Justice of the EU to assess the consequences of the systemic changes
restricting judicial independence in Poland. The sequence of laws adopted in
2015–20182 in this State has been assessed commonly by various external and
internal institutions as ‘[enabling] the legislative and executive powers to interfere
in a severe and extensive manner in the administration of justice and thereby
[posing] a grave threat to the judicial independence as a key element of the rule of
law’.3 These reforms are problematic for the EU as the national courts shall ensure an
‘effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law’.4 But they also pose a
problem for other Member States because of mechanisms of judicial cooperation
established by the EU in last 19 years as a part of area of freedom, security and
justice.
The open questions are whether these reforms should have consequences for the
position of Poland in the EU and if yes, who should draw them and how. To protect
the rule of law in Europe, the European Commission submitted for the first time in its
history a reasoned proposal activating the Article 7 TEU mechanism.5 The pro-
ceedings against Poland based on Article 258 TFEU are also ongoing.6 The LM case
hinges on the horizontal aspect of the changes—verifying the state of the rule of law
1CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality (LM), ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
2Described in Report of the Stefan Batory Foundation Legal Expert Group on the impact of the
judiciary reform in Poland in 2015–2018.
3CDL-AD(2017)031-e Poland—Opinion of the European Commission For Democracy Through
Law on the Draft Act amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary; on the Draft Act
amending the Act on the Supreme Court, proposed by the President of Poland, and on the Act on the
Organisation of Ordinary Courts, adopted by the Commission at its 113th Plenary Session (Venice,
8–9 December 2017). Similar opinions were expressed i.a. by the European Commission, the
Executive Board of the European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ), www.encj.eu/
articles/96, Polish Supreme Court, Polish faculties of law, independent nongovernmental
organisations.
4Article 19 (1) TEU. See also CJEU, Opinion 1/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, para. 68: ‘it is for the
national courts and tribunals and for the Court of Justice to ensure the full application of European
Union law in all Member States and to ensure judicial protection of an individual’s rights under that
law’ and para. 69: ‘The national court, in collaboration with the Court of Justice, fulfils a duty
entrusted to them both of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is
observed’.
5European Commission, Reasoned proposal of 20 December 2018 in accordance with Article 7
(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding the rule of law in Poland, COM(2017) 835 final.
6At the time of deciding the LM case, the case C-192/18 on the law on the ordinary courts
organisation was already pending before the CJEU (action brought on 15 March 2018). And
infringement procedure regarding the Polish law on the Supreme Court was launched by the
Commission only on 2 July 2018. At the time of deciding the LM case it was thus at the pre-trial
stage and it was not evident at all that the Commission will decide to bring an action to the court.
Finally, the action was brought on 2 October 2018 and registered as Case C-619/18 Commission
v. Poland.
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by courts of the other Member States. In the case, in which the European Arrest
Warrant (EAW) was issued by a Polish judicial authority against a person prosecuted
for a drug-related crime, the defendant argued before an Irish court that due to the
reforms of the Polish judiciary there is a risk of denial of justice if he is transferred to
Poland.
Has the Court of Justice (hereinafter CJEU), in deciding the LM case, drawn red
lines for Member States in the context of the rule of law? It could be admitted that it
set ‘a limit beyond which someone’s [Member State’s] behavior is no longer
acceptable’7 but it could also be argued that it did not establish adequate conse-
quences of crossing it. The Luxemburg court focused on the protection of individ-
uals, leaving the issue of systemic consequences to the Council acting on the basis of
Article 7 TEU. This contribution argues that an individual test required by the LM
judgment is not an adequate tool for ensuring the respect for the rule of law.
2 Potential Solutions in the LM Case
The Irish question was based on the CJEU’s case law relating to the protection of
fundamental rights in the context of mutual recognition of judgments in criminal
matters (Aranyosi8). According to the latter case, if a court taking the decision on
extradition on the basis of an EAW possesses evidence of systemic or generalised
deficiencies in the protection of fundamental right in the issuing Member State, it
should postpone the execution and assess whether the individual concerned will be
exposed to a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment because of the conditions
during detention. The CJEU in the LM case had three main options: (1) to refrain
from assessing the impact of the restriction of judicial independence on the EAW
mechanism (following Poland’s argument that it is possible only by the Council on
the basis of Article 7 TEU), (2) to follow the Aranyosi pattern or (3) to introduce a
new mechanism if the independence of the courts is doubtful in the Member State
issuing the judicial decision (building on its recent decision in the case Associação
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,9 in which it stated that Member States are obliged
to ensure independence of the courts).
The LM judgment treated an issue of judicial independence as a part of a right to a
fair trial protected by Article 47 of the Charter. It allowed the CJEU to follow the
Aranyosi path and base its answer on a similar pattern: if the court executing an
EAW from another Member State possesses the information that there is a real risk
of a breach of the fundamental right to fair trial due to systemic or generalised
7See Cambridge Dictionary, see dictionary.cambridge.org/pl/dictionary/english/red-line.
8CJEU, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:
C:2016:198.
9CJEU, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117,
para. 37.
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deficiencies concerning the independence of the issuing Member State’s judiciary, it
shall assess whether the person incurs such a risk if he is surrendered to that State
(individual or specific assessment).10 The CJEU indicated that the suspending of the
mechanism of recognition is possible only if the decision is taken on the basis of
Article 7(2) TEU.11 Until this moment even if a Member State is the subject of a
reasoned proposal as referred to in Article 7(1) TEU, the ‘executing judicial author-
ity must refrain from giving effect to the European arrest warrant’ only if there are
substantial grounds for believing that that person will run a real risk of breach of the
fundamental right to a fair trial.12
3 Individual Test
An executing judicial authority conducting an individual test should verify firstly ‘to
what extent the systemic or generalised deficiencies are liable to have an impact at
the level of that State’s courts with jurisdiction over the proceedings to which the
requested person will be subject’. Then it should verify whether there is a real risk of
breach of his fundamental right to an independent tribunal having regard to his
personal situation, the nature of the offence for which he is being prosecuted and the
factual context that forms the basis of the European arrest warrant. The sources of
knowledge are: (1) specific concerns expressed by the individual concerned and any
information provided by him, (2) any supplementary information obtained from
the issuing judicial authority in the answer to the (mandatory) request made by the
executing authority, (3) (optional) assistance from the central authority or one of the
central authorities of the issuing Member State.13 If the information obtained in such
a way by the executing judicial authority ‘does not lead the latter to discount the
existence of a real risk [for the individual concerned] (. . .) the executing judicial
authority must refrain from giving effect to the European arrest warrant’.14
4 Critical Assessment of an Individual Test
It can be argued that an obligation for an executing court to conduct an individual
assessment in case of systemic deficiencies of the judiciary in other Member States
reverses the logic of the mutual trust developed by the CJEU (Sect. 4.1). Further-
more it is not the proper test to protect the rule of law due to two reasons. Firstly
10CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 79.
11Id., paras. 71–73.




(Sect. 4.2), there is a substantial difference between fundamental rights and the
independence of the judiciary. Infringements of the latter require other legal mech-
anisms of protection deterring a Member State from restricting judicial indepen-
dence. Secondly (Sect. 4.3), the individual test is often not feasible in the European
judicial area as some other acts providing for recognition of judgments in the EU do
not contain the mechanisms of refusal of recognition or execution. A broader
perspective should be taken as Polish institutional changes affecting judicial inde-
pendence may influence all twenty-six EU acts providing for mutual recognition of
judgments.
4.1 Regular Mutual Control Contrary to the Spirit
of Mutual Trust
According to the CJEU the principle of mutual trust has a fundamental importance
and ‘requires (. . .) each of those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to
consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly
with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law’.15 But according to para. 69 of
the LM judgment, when the issuing Member State has been the subject of a (well)
reasoned proposal adopted by the Commission pursuant to Article 7(1) TEU,16 the
executing court is obliged to pursue a regular control. The fact of starting the Article
7 TEU procedure thus rebuts the presumption of mutual trust as the individual
assessment is required in every case in which the person subject to EAW pleads it.17
Perhaps the CJEU treated this obligation as a tool of pressure on the Member
State restricting the independence of the judiciary contrary to the recommendations
of the Commission—applied until the decision on the basis of Article 7(2) TEU is
taken. But a regular control of judicial decisions from other Member States reverses
the logic of mutual trust and can impair it in the long term (as taking a decision on the
basis of Article 7(2) TEU which requires unanimity is not very probable). From the
perspective of mutual trust a better solution would be if a decision of a Member State
to restrict the independence of the courts (assessed as systemic deficiencies) implied
a temporary suspension of its participation in all legal acts based on mutual trust in
the administration of justice.
15CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the EU to the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 191.
16Based on actions impairing the independence of national courts.
17CJEU, LM, supra note 1, paras. 60 and 68–69.
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4.2 Substantial Difference Between Fundamental Rights
and the Independence of the Judiciary
The answer in the LM judgment was based on the interpretation of Article 1 (3) of the
EAW framework decision which states that this act shall not modify ‘the obligation
to respect fundamental rights and fundamental legal principles as enshrined in
Article 6 [TEU]’.18 But there is a substantial difference between fundamental rights
and the independence of the judiciary. Both values are certainly interconnected: the
independence of the judiciary is in particular a part of the right to effective judicial
protection. But it is not limited to this aspect. Fundamental rights are entitlements of
individuals and it is therefore possible to verify whether they are ensured in
individual situations. The independence of the judiciary is important in an individual
case, but it also remains a key element of the State’s system, indispensable to
ensuring the right balance between public and private interests. In the EU, it also
guarantees securing effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. It is
important especially if the executive power in a Member State openly declares the
protection of its own nationals and ignores the European citizenship context. For
example, in the case of a child abduction to another State the principle is that the
authority shall order the return of the child forthwith save for exceptional cases.19
But the Polish government treats children who have a Polish parent as Polish
children (ignoring the parent of other nationality) and does not hide the wish that
they stay in Poland. A law on the central authority in family matters20 was recently
adopted to enable the Ministry of Justice to supervise judicial proceedings in child
abduction cases.21 It provides, amongst others, for the right of the Ministry to inquire
courts about pending cases and for the obligation of the courts to answer immedi-
ately.22 The purpose of such supervision is clear from the title of a Ministry leaflet—
‘Stop transferring Polish children abroad’.23 The influence of the executive on the
judiciary can diminish the protection of rights stemming from EU law including the
right to equal treatment.
18It is interesting to note that the CJEU did see in this provision also the reference to Article 2 TEU
(CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 45) while Article 1(3) mentions only Article 6 TEU.
19Art. 12(2), 13 and 20 Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction, complemented by Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental
responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, (2003) OJ L338/1.
20Ustawa z dnia 26 stycznia 2018 r. o wykonywaniu niektórych czynności organu centralnego
w sprawach rodzinnych z zakresu obrotu prawnego na podstawie prawa Unii Europejskiej i umów
międzynarodowych, Dz.U. 2018 poz. 416 (law on the central authority in family matters).
21Information from the Polish Ministry of Justice website explains that ‘Under current law Ministry
of Justice has not had possibilities of efficient supervision on such cases. (. . .) It is time to finish
with it. State must protect Polish children’, see www.ms.gov.pl/pl/informacje/news,8926,
chronimy-prawa-dzieci-w-postepowaniach.html.
22Law of 26 January 2018 on the central authority in family matters, supra note 20, Art. 15.
23See www.ms.gov.pl/Data/Files/_public/aktual/2018/2_years_eng_ms.pdf.
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In LM the CJEU could have stated that the European area of justice is based on a
high level of mutual trust in the administration of justice, but at the same time on the
responsibility of Member States to ensure independence of the courts. Such an
obligation was recently confirmed by the CJEU in the case Associação Sindical
dos Juízes Portugueses (ASJP).24 In this case the judicial independence was derived
mainly from Articles 2, 4(3) and 19 TEU, while Article 47 of the Charter was treated
only as a subsidiary source. The LM judgment takes Article 2 TEU as a starting
point,25 repeats the statements of the ASJP judgment26 and confirms the importance
of judicial independence in the context of the EAW.27 But these general statements
do not find expression in the conclusions of the LM case. In the answer given to the
Irish court, judicial independence is reduced to the right of an individual to an
independent court as a part of a right to a fair trial.28 It is a step back in comparison
to the ASJP judgment.
Fortunately, a broader perspective on the independence of the judiciary is taken
by the CJEU in a subsequent case relating to the rule of law deficiencies in Poland. A
judgment in the Commission v. Poland29 case confirms the importance of Article 19
(1) TEU as a main source of obligation of maintaining independent courts by
Member States. The most important consequence is a broader scope of application.
While fundamental rights (including Article 47 of the Charter) are applied only when
Member States are implementing Union law,30 Article 19(1) TEU ‘refers to ‘the
fields covered by Union law’, irrespective of whether the Member States are
implementing Union law within the meaning of Article 51(1) of the Charter’.31
The CJEU explained explicitly that the national body falls within the fields covered
by EU law if it may be called upon to rule, as a court or tribunal, on questions
concerning the application or interpretation of EU law.32 As almost any court in
Member States can nowadays rule on questions of EU law, each Member State is
obliged to ensure that its judiciary as a whole must meet the requirements of effective
judicial protection. The CJEU underlined the interdependence between the require-
ment of independence of the courts stemming from Article 19(1) TEU and the right
to effective judicial protection33 but the Commission v. Poland judgment shows
clearly that the former is something more than the fundamental right of an individual.
24CJEU, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, supra note 9, para. 37.




29CJEU, Case C-619/18, Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531.
30Article 51 of the Charter.
31CJEU, Commission v. Poland, supra note 29, para. 50.
32Id., paras. 51 and 56.
33Id., para. 58.
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4.3 Individual Assessment Often Not Feasible in the
European Judicial Area
The Irish question relates only to the EAW, but a broader perspective shall be taken
as the restriction of independence of the judiciary has a potential impact on at least
25 acts providing for mutual recognition of judgments. Mutual trust in the admin-
istration of justice is the guiding principle of nine framework decisions, two direc-
tives related to mutual recognition in criminal matters, and 14 regulations governing
mutual recognition in civil matters. In criminal matters there are in chronological
order: Directives on European Investigation Order34 and European protection
order35 and framework decisions on: mutual recognition of decisions on supervision
measures,36 decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial,37
recognition of judgments imposing custodial sentences,38 supervision of probation
measures and alternative sanctions,39 taking account of convictions in the course of
new criminal proceedings,40 confiscation orders,41 mutual recognition to financial
penalties,42 orders freezing property or evidence,43 European arrest warrant.44 In
34Directive (EU) 2014/41 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European
Investigation Order in criminal matters (2014) OJ L130/1.
35Directive (EU) 2011/99 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European
protection order (2011) OJ L338/2.
36Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2009/829 on the application, between Member States of the
European Union, of the principle of mutual recognition to decisions on supervision measures as an
alternative to provisional detention (2009) OJ L294/20.
37Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2009/299 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA,
2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the proce-
dural rights of persons and fostering the application of the principle of mutual recognition to
decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial (2009) OJ L81/24.
38Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2008/909 on the application of the principle of mutual
recognition to judgments in criminal matters imposing custodial sentences or measures involving
deprivation of liberty for the purpose of their enforcement in the European Union (2008) OJ L327/
27.
39Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2008/947 on the application of the principle of mutual
recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation
measures and alternative sanctions (2008) OJ L337/102.
40Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2008/675 on taking account of convictions in the Member
States of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings (2008) OJ L220/32.
41Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2006/783 on the application of the principle of mutual
recognition to confiscation orders (2006) OJ L328/59.
42Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2005/214 on the application of the principle of mutual
recognition to financial penalties (2005) OJ L76/16.
43Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2003/577 on the execution in the European Union of orders
freezing property or evidence (2003) OJ L196/45.
44Council Framework Decision (JHA) 2002/584 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender
procedures between Member States—Statements made by certain Member States on the adoption of
the Framework Decision (2002) OJ L190/1.
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civil matters there are regulations on: insolvency proceedings,45 general civil matters
(the so-called Brussels I46), parental responsibility and divorce (Brussels II bis),47
the European Enforcement Order (EEO),48 the European Order for Payment
(EOP),49 small claims,50 maintenance obligations,51 the Brussels I bis Regulation,52
the succession,53 the European protection order,54 European Account Preservation
Order,55 new regulation on insolvency proceedings,56 matrimonial property
regimes,57 property consequences of registered partnerships.58
All acts introducing mutual recognition of judgments relate to judgments of
courts/tribunals59 or judicial authority.60 This notion was considered by the CJEU
45Council Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings (2000) OJ L160/1.
46Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments in civil and commercial matters (2001) OJ L12/1.
47Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation
(EC) No 1347/2000, (2009) OJ L347/32.
48Regulation (EC) 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council creating a European
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (2004) OJ L143/15.
49Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council creating a European
order for payment procedure (2006) OJ L399/1.
50Regulation (EC) 861/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European
Small Claims Procedure (2007) OJ L199/1.
51Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations (2009) OJ L7/1.
52Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (2012) OJ L351/
1.
53Regulation (EU) 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction,
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of
authentic instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of
Succession (2012) OJ L201/107.
54Regulation (EU) 606/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on mutual recognition
of protection measures in civil matters (2013) L181/4.
55Regulation (EE) 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European
Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and com-
mercial matters (2014) OJ L189/59.
56Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) 2015/848 on insolvency pro-
ceedings (2015) OJ L141/19.
57Council Regulation (EU) 2016/1103 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of jurisdic-
tion, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters concerning
matrimonial property regimes (2016) OJ L183/1.
58Council Regulation (EU) No. 2016/1104 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matters
concerning the property consequences of registered partnerships (2016) OJ L183/30.
59According to Article 2(a) Brussels I bis: “judgment’ means any judgment given by a court or
tribunal of a Member State, whatever the judgment may be called’.
60Article 1(1) of Framework Decision 2002/584: ‘The European arrest warrant is a judicial decision
issued by a Member State (. . .)’. Article 6 of the same act: ‘1. The issuing judicial authority shall be
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as an autonomous notion of EU law and interpreted several times in both civil and
criminal cases. In the cases Ibrica Zulfikarpašić61 and Pula Parking,62 the Luxem-
bourg Court stated that, due to mutual trust, EU regulations require ‘that judgments
the enforcement of which is sought in another Member State [be] delivered in court
proceedings offering guarantees of independence and impartiality’. In two cases
relating to criminal matters—Kovalkovas63 and Poltorak64—the CJEU stated that
the term ‘judiciary’ ‘must (. . .) be distinguished, in accordance with the principle of
the separation of powers which characterises the operation of the rule of law, from
the executive’. These requirements are difficult to reconcile with the statement of the
Venice Commission quoted at the beginning of this chapter that Polish reforms
‘enable the legislative and executive powers to interfere in a severe and extensive
manner in the administration of justice’.
The most important issue is that a level of integration in the field of judicial
cooperation is so high that the judgments issued in one Member State have full
effects in other Member States. In civil cases the majority of judgments are auto-
matically recognised and enforceable in the other Member States. In all EU acts on
mutual recognition, the review of jurisdiction of another Member State or of the
content of the judgment to be recognized is prohibited. In some legal instruments,
there are even no legal mechanisms allowing recognition/execution to be refused
(for example in the case of maintenance or Article 42 of 2201/2003 regulation
relating to child return decisions). The courts in Member States are thus often
defenceless to judgments coming from other Member States as there is no proceed-
ing in which they could conduct an individual assessment. An obligation of indi-
vidual assessment is not suitable to protect other Member States which are obliged to
recognise judgments originating from a Member State restricting judicial
independence.
5 Conclusions
A breach of the obligation to ensure independence of the courts should logically
result in suspending the participation of a given Member State in the EU policy area
at stake, not (only) because the individual right can be impaired but because the EU
should deter a Member State from restricting independence of the judiciary and
protect other Member States which are obliged by EU law to recognise and enforce
judgments from a Member State breaching the rule of law. It is probable that in the
the judicial authority of the issuing Member State which is competent to issue a European arrest
warrant by virtue of the law of that State.’
61CJEU, Case C-484/15 Ibrica Zulfikarpašić, ECLI:EU:C:2017:199, para. 43.
62CJEU, Case C-551/15 Pula Parking, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, para. 54.
63CJEU, Case C-477/16 PPU Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, para. 36.
64CJEU, Case C-452/16 PPU Poltorak, ECLI:EU:C:2016:784, para. 35.
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majority of cases Polish judges will resist the political influence. But the courts in
other Member States will never know whether this actually is the case. They would
have to make difficult65 investigations about the substantial issues of the cases and of
the division of powers in Poland. The regular individual assessment can contravene
the spirit of mutual trust between the courts and often will be impossible in practice.
Moreover, the non-execution of EAWs can save some individuals but is not
capable of resolving the essence of the problem. Firstly, the Aranyosi test can protect
one’s fundamental rights only partly. This became apparent in the judgment in the
ML66 case, which limits an obligation to assess detention conditions in the issuing
Member State to the first prisons in which it is intended that the person concerned
will be held just after the surrender. The CJEU admitted that ‘a person who is the
subject of a European arrest warrant can, as a general rule, be detained in any prison
in the territory of that State. It is generally not possible at the stage of executing a
European arrest warrant to identify all the prisons in which such a person will
actually be detained’.67 It means that in reality the individual is not wholly protected
against inhuman treatment.
The ideal tool to protect judicial independence would be the one which could
solve the source of the problem. And there is a clear difference between prison
conditions and the independence of the judiciary. In the Aranyosi judgment, the
reason lying at the heart of the breach was a serious, structural incapacity of some
Member States to ensure the proper standard of protection in prison. Improvement of
the situation is a long, costly and complicated process which the EU could stimulate
and support. Differently, in the LM case, the source of the problem has been the will
of the governing party. The problem could be very easily and quickly resolved by
amending the laws on courts according to the recommendations of the Venice
Commission and the European Commission. The only thing that the EU can (and
should) do is to set clear limits and the consequences in the case of violations. If the
EU had addressed the Hungarian case more promptly, the Polish government would
probably not have dared to follow the Hungarian path.
In the LM case the CJEU acted like a human rights court. This circumstance is
always very welcome. Perhaps, future cases—especially those based on Article
258 TFEU and on the preliminary reference request from the Polish Supreme
Court—will present the Luxembourg court with the opportunity to look at the
judicial deficiencies from a broader constitutional perspective and stand up against
the destruction of the rule of law in Europe.
65Rizcallah (2018).
66CJEU, Case C-220/18 PPU, ML, ECLI:EU:C:2018:589, para. 87.
67Id., para. 81.
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Abstract In the LM case, the CJEU was called to decide on whether systemic rule
of law deficiencies in Poland could lead to the suspension of EU cooperation based
on mutual trust, in particular under the European Arrest Warrant system. Building on
its earlier decision in Aranyosi, the Court concluded that EAWs may be suspended
only after the executing authority conducts a general analysis of the situation in the
country concerned and an individual assessment of the specific situation of the
applicant. For some, the decision was a disappointing one, as the Court failed to
take a clear stance on the Polish constitutional crisis. This chapter argues, on the
other hand, that the Court reached a balanced decision: while it is true that it
confirmed the strict Aranyosi test, it also sent some key messages on the crucial
importance of the rule of law and judicial independence for the EU and underlined
the red lines of European constitutionalism. Furthermore, a different line of cases
that originated from the groundbreaking decision of the Court in the ‘Portuguese
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judges’ case seems much more promising for the protection of EU values. Thus,
rather than a constitutional moment for the Union, LM was ultimately an intermezzo
between the two main acts of the rule of law play before the Court of Justice.
1 Introduction
The decision of the Court of Justice in the LM case was one of the most eagerly
anticipated of 2018.1 The preliminary reference of the Irish High Court brought to
the attention of the CJEU two of the thorniest issues of European constitutional law:
the EU’s reaction to Polish constitutional backsliding2 and the operation of the
principle of mutual trust, in particular the European Arrest Warrant system
(EAW). Many wished the Luxembourg court would take a strong stance on the
Polish situation, even suspending the operation of the EAW and possibly other
instruments based on mutual trust in Poland.3 In any event, the Court of Justice was
called to strike an undoubtedly difficult compromise, one bound to be controversial.
Unsurprisingly, the ruling delivered on July 25 was welcomed with mixed reac-
tions.4 Although generally perceived as a step forward compared to the Opinion of
Advocate General Tanchev,5 some authors considered the decision of the Court
ultimately too timid and insufficient to address the fundamental challenges posed by
the Polish judicial reforms.6
This contribution takes a different line. First, it argues that, despite some loose
ends in its reasoning, the Court’s approach and the compromise it reached were
ultimately quite solid;7 secondly and more broadly, the way in which the LM case
was framed was simply not suitable for a bold intervention of the Court in the Polish
crisis.8 The attempt of Justice Donnelly of the referring Irish High Court to bring to
the attention of the Court of Justice her concerns for the Polish rule of law situation
was certainly respectable and even courageous. Yet, the line of cases based on
Article 19 TEU that initiated with the ruling in the ‘Portuguese judges’ (or ASJP)
case9 seems much more promising for the protection of the rule of law and judicial
1CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU LM, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586.
2See Sadurski (2019) and Pech and Scheppele (2017).
3See e.g. von Bogdandy et al. (2018).
4For an overview of the first reactions, see the contributions to the Verfassungsblog debate ‘The
CJEU’s Deficiencies Judgment’, available at www.verfassungsblog.de/category/themen/after-
celmer/.
5CJEU, Case C-216/18 PPU LM, Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev, ECLI:EU:C:2018:517.
6See e.g. Bard and van Ballegooij (2018), Krajewski (2018) and Scheppele (2018).
7On the ‘elegant compromise’ reached by the Court, see also Sonnevend (2018).
8For a similar argument, see Kosar (2018), who argued that ‘neither the preliminary reference
procedure nor the fundamental right to the fair trial are good ‘vehicles’ for addressing the Polish
structural judicial reforms’.
9CJEU, Case C-64/14 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117.
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independence in Poland and across the Union. The landmark ruling of the Court of
Justice in the infringement action on the reform of the Polish Supreme Court10 very
well demonstrates the potential of this new approach to Article 19 TEU and offered a
perfect moment for the Court of Justice to finally enforce the red lines of European
constitutionalism.11 Further opportunities to advance this line of cases will come in
the next months: a second infringement action,12 as well as a series of preliminary
references coming from Polish courts,13 are now pending in Luxembourg.
All considered, rather than a decisive moment of the Court of Justice’s rule of law
play,14 the LM case could be best seen as an intermezzo between the two key acts: the
‘Portuguese judges’ decision, in which the Court, offering an extensive interpreta-
tion of Article 19 TEU, set the scene for its intervention; and then the infringement
procedure on the Supreme Court, as well as the other forthcoming rulings on the
Polish judiciary, in which the Court took the next step and began enforcing the EU
judicial independence standards. At the same time, it should not be forgotten that it is
unlikely that legal mechanisms alone could address crises such as the Polish or the
Hungarian ones. The procedures under Article 7 TEU against both Member States
might prove equally, if not more, important than the Court’s decisions, and the Court
itself seems to be aware of the importance of political mechanisms.
The chapter develops these points in the following paragraphs, starting from a
brief analysis of the LM case (Sect. 2), then taking a step back to the ‘Portuguese
judges’ case (Sect. 3) and one forward to the Article 19 cases on the Polish judiciary
and in particular the infringement action on the Supreme Court (Sect. 4). Having
done so, the contribution explains why LM can therefore be best seen as an
intermezzo in the Court’s play (Sect. 5): the framing of the case did not offer to
the Court the best opportunity for a strong intervention in the Polish constitutional
crisis. Nonetheless, the Court still sent some clear messages to Polish authorities and
the European public, making it clear that European constitutionalism contains red
lines against threats to democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the Court
10CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland (Supreme Court), ECLI:EU:C:2019:53. See also
the two previous interim orders: CJEU, Case C-619/18 Commission v. Poland, Order of 19/10/
2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:852 and Order of 17/12/2018, ECLI:EU:C:2018:1021.
11On red lines, von Bogdandy et al. (2018).
12See CJEU, Case C-192/18 Commission v. Poland (Law on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts)
(pending), and the Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev in the same case. In July 2019, the
Commission has also opened another infringement action regarding the new disciplinary regime for
Polish judges: see European Commission, Press Release—Rule of Law: European Commission
takes new step to protect judges in Poland against political control, Brussels, 17 July 2019. The case
was decided in November 2019, after the submission of this contribution.
13See Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev in Joined Cases C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 A.
K. (C-585/18) v Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa and CP (C-624/18) DO (C-625/18) v Sąd Najwyższy
(C-624/18 and C-625/18), ECLI:EU:C:2019:551. These joined cases were also decided in Novem-
ber 2019, after the submission of this contribution.
14Even more drastically, Avbelj (2018) concluded that the Celmer case was not ‘a landmark ruling’
and that its impact will not be ‘of seismic constitutional proportions’.
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restated the need for parallel political procedures that can give further bite to the red
lines.
2 The Court of Justice’s Ruling in LM
As described in other contributions to this volume, the LM case originated in Ireland,
where the High Court was called to give execution to a EAW issued by Poland
against Mr. Artur Celmer, accused of drug-related offences. The Irish Court doubted
whether, in view of the systemic deficiencies with the rule of law in Poland, the
execution of the EAW could lead to the violation of the applicant’s fundamental
right to a fair trial, protected by the Irish Constitution, the ECHR and the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights. It is worth underlining a few key elements of the Irish High
Court’s referral, in order to illustrate how the latter framed the case and how this
influenced the proceedings before the Court of Justice.
Generally and most importantly, the Irish Court built its questions on the basis of
the previous Aranyosi decision of the Court of Justice.15 In this landmark case, the
CJEU acknowledged for the first time that the execution of EAWs could be
suspended in case of systemic deficiencies in the issuing Member State. Following
the Aranyosi approach, the Irish Court in the first place directly assumed the
existence of systemic rule of law problems in Poland and did not call the CJEU to
reflect on that matter.16 In Aranyosi, in fact, the CJEU left to the referring court to
determine whether the deficits of prisons facilities in Hungary and Romania
amounted to a systemic problem.17 Second, the Irish Court brought to the attention
of the Court the position of the specific individual concerned by the surrender
request and his fundamental right to a fair trial. This is to say that the referring
court wanted to understand what would be the effects of the assumed breach of the
common values on the specific situation of the applicant, and in particular whether
they could amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ for the individual.18 Third, the Irish
15CJEU, Case C-404/15 Aranyosi and Câldâraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198.
16Irish High Court, The Minister for Justice and Equality and Artur Celmer, Record no. 2013 EXT
295, 12 March 2018, para. 123: the Commission reasoned that a proposal under Art. 7 is considered
a ‘shocking indictment of the status of the rule of law’, illustrating ‘what appears to be the
deliberated, calculated and provocative legislative dismantling by Poland of the independence of
the judiciary. In the next paragraph, the Irish High Court then ‘concludes . . . that the rule of law in
Poland has been systematically damaged’ and further adds (para. 135) that ‘the common value of
the rule of law in Poland has been breached’.
17See also the Opinion AG Tanchev in Celmer, supra note 5, para. 35: ‘it is not for the Court to rule
on whether there is a real risk of breach of the right to a fair trial on account on deficiencies in the
Polish system of justice . . . It is for the executing judicial authority to rule on the existence of such a
risk’.
18Irish High Court, The Minister for Justice and Equality and Artur Celmer, supra note 16, para.
137. On flagrant denial of justice, see para. 107: it constitutes the standard for extradition cases both
under Irish law and under the ECHR.
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Court asked a very specific question to the Court of Justice, all imprinted on the
applicability of the Aranyosi test and in particular of its second prong, namely the
individual part of the test.19 While the Irish judge considered conducting an indi-
vidual test ‘unrealistic’ and ‘difficult’ in the situation she was confronted with,20 it
was precisely on this matter—the necessity to conduct an individual test even after
establishing the existence of a systemic problem—that the Court of Justice was
called to intervene and clarify the landscape. The answers given by the Advocate
General and the Court of Justice were thus necessarily informed by the referring
courts’ questions and analysis, as it is true for any preliminary reference to the CJEU
under Article 267 TFEU.
In substance, Advocate General Tanchev and the Court of Justice reached similar
conclusions, confirming the applicability of both prongs of the Aranyosi test: an
individual assessment of the specific situation of the applicant is required after
establishing that the situation amounts to a systemic threat to the rule of law,
which has negative repercussions on Article 47 of the Charter protecting the
fundamental right to a fair trial.21 Yet, the overall approach and tone of the Advocate
General and the Court were not identical. The Advocate General’s Opinion consid-
ered the possibility of refusing to execute the EAW absolutely exceptional. More
precisely, Advocate General Tanchev argued that not any breach of Article 47 of the
Charter could lead to postpone the execution of an EAW. Postponement, in his view,
would only be possible when ‘there is a real risk that [the individual] will be exposed
in the issuing Member State to a flagrant denial of justice’;22 in turn, problems with
the independence and impartiality of a court could only amount to a flagrant denial of
justice when they ‘[destroyed] the fairness of the trial’.23 While the Opinion argued
that it should be left to the referring court to determine whether the Polish situation
reached that level, it established an extremely high threshold already for the first,
general part of the Aranyosi test.
The ruling of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice, while fairly similar in
the operative part—confirming in particular the need for the individualized assess-
ment, the second prong of the Aranyosi test—showed more explicitly the judges’
concerns with the Polish situation. Overall, the Court’s reasoning and the underlying
tone are more convincing. Both in the specific response to the referring court and in
the message sent to the European public eagerly waiting for the decision, the Court
tried to find a balance between, on the one hand, emphasizing the importance of the
19Irish High Court, The Minister for Justice and Equality and Artur Celmer, supra note 16, see para.
145. The second question is on a more specific aspect of the individual prong, namely whether the
referring court has to contact the issuing judicial authority in order to obtain further necessary
information.
20Irish High Court, The Minister for Justice and Equality and Artur Celmer, supra note 16, paras.
141 and 142.
21This was also the view expressed by the Commission in the case: see Opinion AG Tanchev in
Celmer, supra note 5, para. 103.
22Opinion AG Tanchev in Celmer, supra note 5, para. 69.
23Opinion AG Tanchev in Celmer, supra note 5, para. 93.
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common values of the rule of law and fundamental rights for the Union as a whole
and, on the other, protecting the smooth operation of mutual trust instruments. The
Court reached that balance using different languages and techniques.
On the one hand, the Court reinstated some of its traditional mutual trust
arguments.24 By making a textbook reference to Opinion 2/13,25 the Court repeated
that mutual trust is a principle of fundamental importance for the Union’s legal order
that can only cease to operate in ‘exceptional cases’.26 As a rule, judicial authorities
are thus ‘require[d] to execute any European arrest warrant on the basis of the
principle of mutual recognition’; refusals are, on the other hand, exceptions ‘which
must be interpreted strictly’.27 The crucial importance of the principles of mutual
trust and mutual recognition led the Court to confirm the need for the individual
assessment of the specific situation of the applicant, which remains necessary even
after establishing the existence of a systemic problem. At the same time, in LM, for
the first time, the Court extended the Aranyosi approach to a non-absolute right such
as the right to a fair trial. Furthermore, it lowered the strict requirements posited by
the Advocate General,28 and generally granted a broad discretion to the executing
authorities in conducting both parts of the assessment. In particular, the Court left to
the executing authority the task to evaluate whether the possible systemic deficien-
cies generated a real risk to the fundamental right to a fair trial29 and only made
general references to the facts to be considered in conducting the second part of the
assessment, which include the personal situation of the applicant, the ‘nature of the
offence’, and the ‘factual context’ in which the EAW was issued.30 National
authorities are thus granted a wide margin of action in taking their final decision
on the execution of the warrant and they could easily play with the Court’s criteria in
order to justify a possible suspension of cooperation.31
The Court then went even a step further. Several paragraphs of the rulings can be
read as implicit messages that the Court considers the Polish situation deeply
problematic. The first message is the importance given to the concept of judicial
independence, a point on which the Court departs from the approach of the Advocate
General. The Opinion had indeed considered that problems with judicial indepen-
dence could amount to a ‘flagrant denial of justice’ only when they radically
destroyed the fairness on the trial. The Court thinks differently. It held that judicial
24CJEU, LM, supra note 1, see paras. 35–37.
25CJEU, Opinion 2/13 Accession of the EU to the ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, in particular
para. 192.
26CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 37.
27CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 41.
28See also Konstadinides (2019), p. 745.
29CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 61.
30CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 75.
31It is not be noted, however, that the Irish High Court ultimately did not suspend the transfer: Irish
High Court The Minister for Justice and Equality v. Celmer No. 5, Record no. 2018 IEHC 639, 19
November 2018. The decision has been appealed in the meantime.
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independence ‘forms part of the essence of the fundamental rights to a fair trial’,32
which seems to mean that any breach of that requirement should be considered a
breach of the essence of Article 47 of the Charter, thus in principle able to lead to the
suspension of a EAW transfer, following the two steps of the assessment. Moreover,
with references in particular to the cases ASJP, Wilson,33 and TDC,34 the Court
summarized its case law setting the EU law requirements of judicial independence
and generally pointed at the crucial relevance of judicial independence for the Union
constitutional order.35 Crucially, independence is one of the conditions for partici-
pation to the preliminary reference system, the ‘keystone’36 of the EU judicial
system: the Court of Justice has since long maintained that only ‘independent’
bodies can send preliminary questions to the Court of Justice under Article 267
TFEU.
The Court sent a second signal in paragraph 61 of the ruling, where it gave
instructions to the referring court on the materials to be evaluated in determining the
existence of systemic deficiencies (the first part of the Aranyosi test).37 The Court
affirmed that the Commission’s reasoned proposal under Article 7(1) TEU ‘is
particularly relevant’ for that assessment. When taking also into account the long
summary of the Commission’s document in the first part of the ruling,38 it becomes
evident that the Court wanted to underline the importance of the document adopted
by the Commission, suggesting that the concerns expressed by the Commission are
at least well founded. All in all, the Court’s analysis strived to find a delicate balance:
protecting the smooth functioning of mutual trust and thus of the European legal
order, while remarking that the rule of law and judicial independence are of the
outmost importance for the EU. In doing so, the Court further bolstered the expec-
tations for its following rulings on the Polish judiciary, discussed later in this
contribution.39
Nonetheless, as already mentioned above, the decision was not universally
praised. There are two main strands of criticism. The first concentrates on the
feasibility of conducting an individual assessment in cases where judicial indepen-
dence is at stake.40 The task of the executing judicial authority, it is said, is
excessively complex, especially because it cannot truly rely on the authorities of
the issuing Member State, as they are the direct targets of the reforms in question and
may thus have a stake in the process. The second strand of criticism, on the other
hand, looks at LM and at the Court’s approach mostly as a missed opportunity in the
32CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 48.
33CJEU, Case C-506/04 Wilson, ECLI:EU:C:2006:587.
34CJEU, Case C-22/13 TDC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2265.
35CJEU, LM, supra note 1, paras. 63–67.
36CJEU, Case C-284/16 Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158.
37CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 61.
38CJEU, LM, supra note 1, paras. 18–21.
39See Sect. 4.
40See e.g. Bard and van Ballegooij (2018).
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rule of law play.41 It is said, for example, that by sticking to the question referred and
thus focusing on the individual fundamental right to a fair trial, rather than on the
rule of law in general, the Court failed to take a clearer stance against Polish
constitutional backsliding.
There is certainly some truth in both assertions. The individual assessment
national courts are called to do is much more complex than the already difficult
analysis they were asked to pursue in the Aranyosi situation.42 While evaluating the
fundamental rights’ conditions of specific detention centers is, although not easy,
still feasible—and the Court of Justice has further helped to clarify the proce-
dure 43—assessing whether a trial could be fair, despite the structural changes to a
rule of law regime, is a much more difficult and speculative exercise. It demands that
judges try to grasp and assess the functioning of other legal orders they are not
necessarily familiar with.44 There is also a higher risk of receiving conflicting
information and that the authorities to which clarifications are asked are already
compromised, i.e. not independent. The Court perhaps downplayed the difficulties in
applying the Aranyosi test to a different context. Offering more guidance to national
courts could have been an option to pursue—for example further clarifying the
factors to be taken into account for the individual assessment—but the Court
preferred to follow the opposite approach, namely granting them a wide margin of
discretion, which may also be used for refusing surrenders when issuing authorities
do not give sufficient assurances on the individual trial.
As for the ‘missed opportunity’ critique, the Court of Justice could certainly have
been more explicit in pointing out the systemic threats to the rule of law in Poland, as
it did for example in N.S. on the systemic problems of the Greek asylum system.45
Furthermore, there is no doubt that a more centralized system of assessment at least
of the ‘systemic’ part of the test would certainly have significant benefits.46 How-
ever, that was not the issue the Irish Court referred to Luxembourg: the questions
concentrated on the applicability of the second part of the Aranyosi test. More
generally, the task of the Court in preliminary references, according to Article 267
TFEU, is to rule on the interpretation and validity of EU law, not to assess the factual
situation in a Member State. While the Court has always interpreted its powers under
Article 267 TFEU in a fairly broad manner,47 it remains that there are limits to what
it can do in the context of a preliminary reference.
41See Krajewski (2018), Pech and Wachowiec (2018), Scheppele (2018) and Wendel (2019).
42On the complexity of the test, see Lazowski (2018), p. 14.
43See CJEU, Case C-220/18 PPU Conditions de détention en Hongrie, ECLI:EU:C:2018:589.
44On this difficulty, see Krajewski (2018) and Konstadinides (2019).
45CJEU, Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. In N.S. the
Court found that systemic problems in the asylum system of a Member State, creating a real risk of
inhuman or degrading treatment, prevent asylum transfers under the Dublin regulation. An indi-
vidual assessment of the specific situation of the applicant is not necessary in those circumstances.
46See Wendel (2019).
47In general, see Broberg and Fenger (2014).
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Hence, the framing of the case did not offer the best opportunity for the Court to
take a clear stance on the Polish crisis. Rather than a sign of a timid approach of
Luxembourg towards cases of constitutional backsliding, the decision can be best
seen as an intermezzo in the Court’s rule of law play, which took place between the
two main acts: the ruling in the ‘Portuguese judges’ and then a set of more precise
and targeted decisions on the Polish situation, which has started with the key ruling
in the Supreme Court case. To better understand LM, thus, it seems necessary to,
first, take a step back and look at the decision in Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses, and then a step forward, analyzing the ‘Supreme Court’ ruling and then
the other forthcoming decisions on the Polish judiciary, mapping out the different
contexts in which these other decisions have been and will be taken.
3 First Act: The Portuguese Judges’ Case48
In contrast to LM, the ‘Portuguese judges’ case was far less anticipated and much
more surprising. Rather than a rule of law case, it seemed to fall in the Court’s line of
‘austerity cases’:49 a group of Portuguese judges complained that austerity measures
reducing their salaries, adopted in order to comply with the demands of the Mem-
oranda of Understanding signed in the context of ESM financial assistance
programmes, violated the principle of judicial independence guaranteed by Article
19 TEU and 47 of the Charter. It is only from this austerity perspective that interest in
the case was growing,50 especially after the Opinion of the Advocate General, who
argued for the applicability of the Charter to ESM-related measures.51
The Court followed however a different path. It remained silent on the applica-
bility of the Charter to ESM-related austerity measures and transformed the austerity
case into a ‘constitutional backsliding’ or rule of law one. It did so by relying on
Article 19 TEU, significantly bolstering both its scope of application and its sub-
stantive content. First, the Court read in a broad manner the expression ‘the fields
covered by Union law’ that is used in Article 19 TEU (second sentence: ‘Member
48This section draws on Bonelli and Claes (2018).
49See for example the other Portuguese cases CJEU, Order in Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos
Bancários do Norte and Others v. BPN—Banco Português de Negócios SA, ECLI:EU:
C:2013:149; Order in Case C-264/12 Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v.
Fidelidade Mundial—Companhia de Seguros SA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2036; Order in Case C-665/13
Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v. Via Directa—Companhia de Seguros
SA, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2327.
50After a long period in which the Court showed reluctance to engage in judicial review of national
austerity measures, the orientation of the Court partially shifted in the Ledra (CJEU, C-8/15 P Ledra
Advertising, ECLI:EU:C:2016:701) and Florescu (CJEU, C-258/14 Florescu, ECLI:EU:
C:2017:448), and some expected Luxembourg to extend the Florescu reasoning on the applicability
of the Charter to national austerity measures implementing EU-related Memoranda of Understand-
ing to the ESM context: see Markakis and Dermine (2018).
51See CJEU, Opinion of Advocate General Øe in C-64/16 ASJP, ECLI:EU:C:2017:395.
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States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the
fields covered by Union law’) and created a new ‘sphere’ of Union law. According to
the Luxembourg Court, Article 19 TEU has a broader scope of application than the
rest of Union law including the Charter. It brings under the purview of the Court
situations that would otherwise fall outside the scope of Union law, because they are
not linked to any EU substantive competence.52 Second, the Court read Article 19
TEU as containing an obligation to ensure the judicial independence of national
courts acting in the fields covered by EU law, despite the absence of any textual
reference to the concept of judicial independence in the provision. By doing so, the
Court de facto aligned the substantive content of Article 19 TEU with that of Article
47 of the Charter, which includes the right to an independent court. This broad
reasoning allows the Court of Justice to assess against EU standards any national
measure that affects the judicial independence of courts or tribunals acting in the
fields covered by Union law, that is, the vast majority of the national judiciary.
While formally being about Portuguese judges and austerity measures, much in
the ruling suggests that the Court had actually in mind the Polish situation. The Court
wanted to get a say in the judiciary reforms pushed forward by Law and Justice. Yet,
on a traditional reading, these reforms could be considered as falling outside the
scope of EU law. In order to bring the reforms under its purview, the Court needed
therefore to significantly stretch the reach of EU law and of the principle of judicial
independence, and did so by reading Article 19 TEU in the expansive manner just
described.
The setting of ASJP was thus the following: a preliminary reference challenging
the compatibility with EU law, and more precisely with the principle of judicial
independence guaranteed by Article 19 TEU, of specific domestic measures, namely
the salary cuts adopted to implement the Memorandum of Understanding between
the EU and Portugal. The Court was not truly concerned with the Portuguese
measures under discussion, though, and quickly dismissed the arguments brought
by the group of Portuguese judges.53 Rather, the Court took the opportunity to
prepare the ground for a more direct intervention in the Polish crisis. The ‘Portu-
guese judges’ case, delivered in February 2018, served as an invitation for the
Commission to pursue infringement actions based on Article 19 TEU on controver-
sial aspects of the Polish judicial reforms. The Commission accepted the invitation a
few months later, in July, opening an action against the Supreme Court reform54 and
quickly bringing it to Luxembourg. On the other hand, there was no clear connection
between ASJP and the LM situation, which originated in a completely different
context (mutual trust obligations), focused on the interpretation of provisions other
than Article 19 TEU, and ultimately asked the Court of Justice to conduct another
52See Bonelli and Claes (2018), p. 631. The new sphere is thus a ‘functional’ one: the key factor for
falling under the jurisdiction of the Court is not whether the circumstances of the case touch upon
matters regulated by Union law, but the function of national courts as part of the European judiciary.
53CJEU, ASJP, supra note 9, paras. 46–51.
54European Commission, Press Release: Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement proce-
dure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, Brussels, 2 July 2018, Doc. IP/18/
4341.
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type of assessment. The true next step in the rule of law line of cases, thus, was not
LM, but the infringement action on the Polish Supreme Court’s reform, as will be
pointed out in the next section.
4 Second Act(s): The Infringement Action on the Polish
Supreme Court and the Other Cases on the Polish
Judiciary
As noted in the previous section, the Commission almost immediately followed the
‘invitation’ of the Court to tackle the controversial Polish reforms through Article 19
TEU and opened an infringement procedure on the Law on the Supreme Court. After
two crucial interim orders delivered in the last months of 2018, the Court of Justice
decided the case in June 2019, ultimately finding a violation of the second
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU. Before explaining how the Court approached
the case, it seems however appropriate to briefly recall how the Commission had
been tackling the Polish crisis up until the ASJP decision.
At first, the Commission reacted to the controversies surrounding the composition
and functioning of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal by activating the ‘Rule of Law
Framework’. The instrument, which is a base for political dialogue between the
Commission and Polish authorities, did not produce adequate results; on the con-
trary, after completing the capture of the Constitutional Tribunal, the ‘Law and
Justice’ majority began to reform the other institutions of the judiciary: ordinary
courts, the Supreme Court, and the National Council of the Judiciary. After three
unsuccessful Rule of Law Recommendations issued under the Framework, the
Commission finally decided to move to the next step in December 2017, activating
for the first time in EU history Article 7(1) TEU.55
Furthermore, already in July 2017, the Commission had launched a first infringe-
ment action on the Law on Ordinary Courts, questioning the compatibility with EU
law of the reform under two profiles in particular. First, the Commission alleged that
the new norms on the judges’ retirement age were not compatible with EU gender
equality law, as they provided different retirement ages for male and female judges.
This first point of contention bore clear similarities with an earlier infringement
action on the Hungarian judiciary reforms, which, despite the Commission’s victory
in Luxembourg,56 had however not prevented Fidesz’s takeover of the judiciary.57
The Commission, aware that a purely technical, ‘indirect’58 infringement action
55European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on
European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, Brussels, 20 December 2017, Doc. COM
(2017) 835 final.
56See CJEU, Case C-286/12 Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
57See e.g. Belavusau (2013) and Halmai (2017).
58Dawson and Muir (2013).
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could not work, raised also a second point: it argued that the discretionary powers
assigned to the Ministry of Justice on the prolongation of the judges’ mandates and
on the appointment and dismissal of courts’ presidents undermined the indepen-
dence of the Polish judiciary under Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter.
This second argument added thus an important layer to the Commission’s action
under Article 258 TFEU and it was one of the first times in which Article 19(1) TEU
was mentioned as a possible source of rule of law obligations. The infringement
action was then referred to the Court in December 2017 and was still pending at the
time of writing.
This is the context in which the ‘Portuguese judges’ decision arrived.
The decision supported the Commission’s reliance, in the infringement action on
the Ordinary Courts, on Article 19 TEU as a tool to protect judicial independence.
The Court agreed that Article 19 TEU is a ‘concrete expression’59 of the value of the
rule of law and contains a principle of judicial independence. But in ASJP the Court
of Justice went even a step further, extending the scope of Article 19 to all national
courts acting in the fields covered by Union law. If the infringement action on the
ordinary court could still be re-conducted to the ordinary scope of EU law, as the
reform was allegedly in conflict with EU anti-discrimination law, the broad reading
of Article 19 TEU in ASJP liberated the Commission from the need of finding a hook
in an infringement of EU substantive law, which could bring with it the application
of the Charter and of its Article 47. In plain words, after the ASJP decision, the
Commission may start a new infringement action for an alleged violation of the
principle of judicial independence purely on the basis of Article 19 TEU.
This is precisely what the Commission did in July 2018, starting an Article 258
procedure on the reform of the Supreme Court, after the entry into force of the Polish
law imposing the anticipated retirement of the Supreme Court’s judges and follow-
ing the growing controversies on the mandate of the President of the Court.60 In this
new procedure, the Commission did not refer to any alleged breach of substantive
EU law. It only relied on Article 19 TEU and, more surprisingly, on Article 47 of the
Charter, which however did not seem applicable to the situation at stake as it did not
constitute an implementation of EU law.61 The Commission then referred the case to
the Court in September 2018, asking for interim measures and the application of the
urgent procedure.62
59CJEU, ASJP, supra note 9, para. 32.
60European Commission, Press Release: Rule of Law: Commission launches infringement proce-
dure to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, Brussels, 2 July 2018, Doc. IP/18/
4341.
61As will be explained in the next paragraphs, the Court of Justice—as also suggested by Advocate
General Tanchev—ultimately assessed the contested norms only on the basis of Article 19 TEU,
though it did not explicitly state that Art. 47 of the Charter was not applicable in the case.
62European Commission, Press Release—European Commission refers Poland to the European
Court of Justice to protect the independence of the Polish Supreme Court, Brussels, 24 September
2018, IP/18/5830.
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The infringement actions launched by the Commission—both the Supreme Court
one and the earlier action on the Law on Ordinary Courts—follow the Court’s
approach in ASJP much more evidently than LM. First, the key provision in both
actions is Article 19 TEU, as it was in ASJP. Second, while of course the concrete
situations are radically different—austerity measures reducing judges’ salaries, in
ASJP, and a full-scale reform of the judiciary in the Polish cases—the Court is asked
to conduct a similar exercise, namely to assess whether the national laws in question
conflict with the EU principle of judicial independence. In the infringement actions,
the Court can do so explicitly and can reach a final decision on whether or not Poland
has failed to fulfill its obligations under the Treaties; in the ASJP case, a preliminary
reference, the Luxembourg Court did not have the competence to assess the mea-
sures directly, but still it made clear that EU law does not preclude measures such as
those at issue in the proceedings. The similarities between the two settings suggest
that what the Court had in mind when it delivered the ASJP decision was precisely an
action framed like the Supreme Court’s infringement procedure.
The Court of Justice’s willingness to forcefully intervene in the Polish crisis was
confirmed in its two interim orders as well as in the final ruling.63 In the first order,
delivered by the Vice President of the Court inaudita altera parte on the basis of
Article 160(7) of the Court of Justice Rules of Procedure, the Commission’s requests
were all satisfied. The Vice President asked Polish authorities to suspend the
application of judges’ retirement measures, allow the judges to carry out their duties
in the same position, and refrain from nominating new judges to the Supreme Court.
Remarkably, the interim order was meant to be retroactive and self-implementing:
the request to Polish authorities was not to reinstate the judges, but to suspend the
application of the law ex tunc and thus to consider that the retirement measures had
never applied to them. In the second interim order, the Court confirmed, after hearing
the Polish authorities, the same requests. Polish authorities were asked to restore the
situation as it stood before the approval of the reform and to refrain from adopting
any measure that could have interfered with the final decision of the Court of Justice.
As was to be expected after the interim orders, the final decision of June 2019
found a violation of EU law obligations by Poland. In its ruling, the Court of Justice
first reaffirmed its jurisdiction to assess the national measures in question, stating
that, while the organisation of justice is a competence of the Member States, ‘when
exercising that competence, the Member States are required to comply with their
obligations deriving from EU law’,64 and thus crucially with the obligation to
guarantee judicial independence under Article 19 TEU.65 In substance, the Court
accepted both complaints presented by the Commission, the first related to the
principle of irremovability of the judges, which was violated by the measures
lowering retirement age;66 and the second concerning the ‘external’ independence
63See supra.
64Para. 52.
65Paras. 55 and 57.
66See paras. 71–97.
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of the judges of the Supreme Court, breached by the decision to assign to the
President of the Republic the power to decide on the extension of the judges’
mandate.67
Compared to the earlier infringement action against Hungary mentioned earlier,
the action of the Commission and the ruling of the Court have sharper effects. In the
Hungarian case, national authorities were simply asked to offer to the judges
concerned an alternative between compensation and reinstatement, with no guaran-
tee that they could return to the same position. Fidesz was thus still able to remove
the undesired judges and replace them with more loyal personnel.68 In the Polish
action, on the other hand, the Court of Justice put more far-reaching obligations on
national authorities, already in the two interim orders. In simple words, the reform of
the Supreme Court had to be reversed, and the judges of the Supreme Court allowed
to continue their mandates. The Polish authorities well understood that they had little
alternatives, if they wanted to avoid a full-scale confrontation with the Court of
Justice and the EU institutions, as well as a possible penalty payment under Article
260 TFEU, had they refused to implement the orders69 and the final judgement. Even
before the final judgment of the Court, the Polish Parliament passed a new law in
November 2018, repealing the previous reforms, and the law was then promulgated
by the President of the Republic in December, just after the second order of the Court
of Justice.
Infringement procedures based on a violation of Article 19 TEU seem therefore to
be an excellent framework for the Court’s intervention in rule of law crises. Both in
its order and in the final ruling, the Court of Justice has demonstrated a certain
readiness and willingness to intervene forcefully and to read its powers in a broad
manner: in substance, the extensive reading of the scope of Article 19 TEU has been
confirmed; procedurally, the Court delivered a rather exceptional order, even before
the formal hearing, and requested far-reaching interim measures. What is more, the
Supreme Court infringement action is not an isolated decision, and the Court of
Justice will have other chances to continue developing its jurisprudence on Article
19 TEU and judicial independence. One opportunity was the other infringement
action pursued by the Commission on the Law on Ordinary Courts, although Polish
authorities had already modified the regime of appointment and dismissal of courts’
presidents. Then, there are the several preliminary references sent by Polish courts
themselves questioning the compatibility of parts of the Polish reforms with EU
law.70 But of course the new approach to Article 19 TEU can become relevant also
67See paras. 108–124.
68The action was considered an instance of ‘symbolic’ compliance: see Batory (2016).
69The possibility to impose penalty payments in case of non-compliance with an order of the Court
was affirmed in another case concerning Poland, but unrelated to the judiciary reforms: CJEU, C-
441/17 Commission v. Poland, ECLI:EU:C:2018:255.
70For an analysis, see Biernat and Kawczyńska (2018).
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for other cases including the new Hungarian reform of administrative justice71 and
possibly the Romanian reforms of the judiciary.72
5 The LM Decision As an Intermezzo in the Court’s Rule of
Law Play
The next paragraphs return to LM and explain why it should be considered as an
intermezzo in the Court’s rule of law play, rather than a key constitutional moment
for the Union. Most importantly, the framing of the case was ultimately not a suitable
platform for a strong intervention in the Polish crisis by the Court. Nonetheless, the
intermezzo was not unrelated to the previous and following acts: the Court still sent a
few important messages, showing its concerns with the rule of law situation in
Poland and in the continent at large. Finally, the LM’s intermezzo served also to
restate the need for parallel political procedures that can give further bite to the red
lines of European constitutionalism.
5.1 The Different Frame of LM
In the first place, it is crucial to recall the perspective through which the LM case
reached the Court. The gist of the case was the protection of a specific fundamental
right (Article 47 of the Charter) of a specific individual (Artur Celmer) and the
interpretation of the EAW Framework Decision. On the other hand, the case did not
concern—at least directly—the legislative changes operated by the Polish Parlia-
ment and generally the rule of law situation in Poland.73 Of course, there were
crucial connections between these two facets, but the fact remains that the applicant
and the referring court asked to the Court of Justice precisely to reflect on how
the general rule of law situation in Poland reflected on the individual position of the
applicant and on his right to a fair trial. The Irish Court was only interested in the
question of Mr. Celmer’s possible surrender. Thus, the substantive situation, i.e. the
reforms undertook by the Polish government, while certainly crucial as context and
background of the decision, were not the core concern of the Court of Justice. On the
other hand, in the infringement procedure on the Supreme Court and the other cases
71See Uitz (2019).
72See e.g. the preliminary reference sent by a Romanian Court in January 2019 on the obligations
deriving from the Commission’s Recommendations under the Cooperation and Verification Mech-
anism and from Art. 19 TEU: www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-22941400-decizia-fara-precedent-
unei-instante-din-romania-curtea-justitie-uniunii-europene-solicitata-spuna-daca-autoritatile-bucu
resti-sunt-obligate-respecte-recomandarile-din-mcv.htm.
73See also Konstadinides (2019), p. 751.
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mentioned above, the key concern of the Court is whether the Polish legislation
complies with Article 19 TEU and the requirement of judicial independence. In other
words, the Court in these cases concentrates on the value of the rule of law as
‘specified’ by Article 19 TEU. Furthermore, in this second set of cases there are no
conflicting interests to be safeguarded, such as protecting mutual trust, the smooth
functioning of the EAW and generally the effectiveness of EU law.
The differences between the two settings can also be outlined with reference to
the consequences and effects of the rulings. A good exercise is imagining what
would have happened, if the Court had reached a bolder conclusion in LM, perhaps
generally suspending the application of the EAW system vis-à-vis Poland. First, the
decision would have created a high risk of impunity in the Union’s Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice: individuals accused or even convicted by a Polish court could
have simply crossed the border between Poland and another EU Member State in
order to avoid prosecution or detention, as other Member States would have been
forced to refuse judicial cooperation with Poland.
The EAWworks indeed in a fundamentally different way compared to the Dublin
asylum system. In the latter context, the Court of Justice concluded in the N.S. case
that it is possible to suspend Dublin transfers once systemic problems in a Member
State are identified.74 There is no need for an additional individual assessment of the
specific situation of the applicant, i.e. the second prong of the Aranyosi test. The
reason for this is that, under the Dublin system, the Member State that does not
transfer an asylum seeker in view of systemic deficiencies in the other Member State
simply takes direct responsibility for the assessment of the asylum claim. Under the
EAW, on the other hand, Member States in most cases will not be competent to
prosecute or detain the individual subject to the warrant: extraterritorial application
of substantive national criminal laws remains confined to exceptional cases. EU
criminal cooperation based on mutual trust has not changed the dogma of territori-
ality of criminal law.75 This difference between the Dublin and EAW systems was
outlined by Advocate General Bot in the Opinion in Aranyosi76 and explains why the
individual test was added in the context of the EAW: it plays an important role in
preventing cases of impunity in the AFSJ.
Furthermore, taking a strict stance in LM would have meant for the Court to
assess in abstract the independence of all Polish courts, with the possible result of
excluding the Member State and its courts from the European legal space.77 Yet, it is
evident that some domestic courts, including the Supreme Court itself, are still
playing on the side of the Court of Justice and of the rule of law, by challenging
domestic laws on the basis of EU law and sending preliminary references to the
74CJEU, N.S., supra note 45.
75Rizcallah (2019).
76CJEU, Case C-404/15 Aranyosi, Opinion of Advocate General Bot, ECLI:EU:C:2016:140, in
particular paras. 59 and 60.
77Biernat (2018), arguing that such a result would be a ‘vote of no confidence’ against all Polish
courts, despite the fact that many are still fighting for the rule of law and judicial independence.
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CJEU.78 Excluding them from the European judiciary tout court would have thus
prevented this ‘bottom up’ resistance.79 Furthermore, it is at least not so clear that all
Polish courts will not be independent in all cases even after the reforms.80 There is
no doubt that the Polish reforms undermine, threaten, reduce judicial independence;
but is it so evident that, after the reforms, all Polish civil and criminal proceedings
would not comply with EU or ECHR standards? Finally, the reaction at the political
level to a strong intervention of the Court expelling Poland from the European
judiciary would have most likely been extremely harsh. Further attacks to the
Court of Justice’s legitimacy and authority could have been easily expected.
On the other hand, the ruling in Commission v. Poland was much more targeted
and precise. The assessment concerned a specific piece of adopted legislation and its
negative effects on judicial independence, and not the abstract independence of all
domestic courts.81 Despite the finding of a breach of Article 19 TEU, there has been
no exclusion of Polish courts, including the Supreme Court, from the ‘European
judiciary’ and quite on the contrary, domestic courts—again including the Supreme
Court—can still play on the side of the Court of Justice, as they are already trying to
do with the preliminary references on the judiciary reforms.
5.2 The Messages of the Intermezzo
The LM case was therefore not the most suitable platform for a strong intervention of
the Court in the Polish crisis. Yet, the Court still sent a few important messages on
the rule of law developments in the country and generally on the EU values’
oversight scheme. The first message, as already noted in the previous pages, is the
space that is dedicated, and the role that is given, to the Commission’s reasoned
proposal under Article 7(1) TEU. In the opening paragraphs of the ruling, the Court
offered a fairly long summary of the document. The CJEU was not in a position to
explicitly endorse those findings, but later it made clear that the reasoned proposal is
‘particularly relevant’ for the first, ‘systemic’ prong of the assessment to be
78See also Spieker (2018), p. 22 on the advantages of keeping Polish courts in the EU legal order
and EU law as the ‘relevant standard’ for cooperation between Member States.
79On the role of national courts in fighting ‘bottom up’ systemic rule of law and fundamental rights
deficiencies, see also von Bogdandy et al. (2012).
80See also Kosar (2018).
81This still has challenges: while it is true that the Court has often been called to adjudicate on the
‘independence’ of national courts, it did so in a very different context, namely that of Article 267
TFEU, where the Court examines the independence of specific bodies that sent a preliminary
reference to Luxembourg. The Court is therefore called upon to develop clearer and perhaps more
stringent criteria, something that is not easy to do in view of the differences between Member States
in understanding and realizing judicial independence: see Kosar (2018).
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conducted by domestic courts.82 In doing so, it gave some legal bite to what would
otherwise be only a political document.
Secondly, the Court underlined the relevance of the principle of judicial inde-
pendence for the Union’s legal order. It held that judicial independence is ‘part of the
essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial’, a fundamental right that is in turn of
‘cardinal importance’ as it contributes to guaranteeing all other rights deriving from
EU law as well as safeguarding the values of Article 2 TEU.83 Having summarized
its approach to judicial independence as having an internal and external aspect, the
Court developed in particular a few aspects relating to rules on dismissal of mem-
bers84 and on disciplinary regimes, where the Court held that rules must ‘display the
necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of its being used as a system of
political control of the content of judicial decisions’.85 By doing so, the Court
clarified its standards for the following cases, and then punctually applied them in
the following ruling on the Supreme Court.86
There is then a final aspect of the LM decision worth highlighting, namely the
Court’s attention to the political mechanisms available to safeguard EU values. The
Court seems to well understand that ensuring democracy or the rule of law is not a
task of judicial actors only.87 In the first place, as already noted several times, the
Court gave crucial relevance to the Commission’s reasoned proposal under Article 7
TEU. Second, in confirming the second prong of the Aranyosi test, the Court held
that the competence to generally suspend the application of the EAW in a Member
State belongs only to the Council and the European Council. The Court reached this
conclusion on the basis of recital 10 of the EAW Framework Decision, which affirms
that the implementation of the EAW system ‘may be suspended only in the event of a
serious and persistent breach by one of the Member States of the principles set out in
Article 6(1) EU, determined by the Council pursuant to Article 7(1) EU with the
consequences set out in Article 7(2) thereof’. The recital was adopted before the
Nice Treaty amendments to the Article 7 system and has never been modified since
then, thus it does not mention the preventive mechanism now contained in Article 7
(1) and still refers to ‘Article 6’ (now Article 2) and to the ‘Council’ (now the
‘European Council’). In LM, the Court decided to judicially update the references
contained in the recital and read it as requiring first a determination of the European
Council under what is now Article 7(2) TEU, and then a decision of the Council on
the suspension of the EAW.88 Once this second decision is taken, judicial authorities
‘would be required to refuse automatically to execute any European arrest warrant
82See CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 61.
83See CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 48.
84CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 66.
85CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 67.
86CJEU, Commission v. Poland, supra note 69, paras. 73–77, which include several references to
the LM case.
87See also Avbelj (2018).
88CJEU, LM, supra note 1, paras. 70–71.
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issued by the Member State concerned, without the need to conduct an individual
assessment’.89
The Court is thus respectful of the political procedures created by the Treaties and
of the Council’s decision to make a general suspension of the EAW possible only
after a decision of the European Council. The system, as it stands, might be
disappointing: it is now evident how difficult it is to reach a decision under Article
7(1) TEU, let alone a unanimous decision under Article 7(2) TEU. But the Court
could have hardly reconciled a different reading with the explicit text of recital 10 of
the EAW Framework Decision.90 It would rather be for the legislator to modify the
preamble of the EAW and more broadly for the political institutions to rethink and
reform EU oversight mechanisms. A centralized monitoring scheme seems in fact
needed to prevent fragmentation,91 i.e. the risk that different courts of different
Member States reach conflicting decisions on the very existence of systemic threats,
and consequently on EAW or Dublin transfers.92 Yet, it is not the task of the Court to
create such a scheme.
Ultimately, the Court’s approach to the political mechanisms is not only textually,
but also systematically convincing. First, the solution to the constitutional crises of
Poland and Hungary is not in the hands of the Court of Justice alone. Problems
originating in the political sphere simply cannot be addressed only with legal
decisions and ruling;93 they require a political reaction.94 Second, it should not be
forgotten that the EU Treaties themselves leave space for the ‘political game’when it
comes to the protection of EU values. Most importantly, they do so when they
exclude the Court from substantive deliberations under Article 7 TEU.95 Hence,
while it is true that the Court cannot simply leave all responsibilities to political
authorities, it should not completely replace them, nor the procedures created by the
Treaties.
89CJEU, LM, supra note 1, para. 72.
90For a different view, see Bard and van Ballegooij (2018), arguing that the Court should have re-
interpreted the preamble of EAW and concluded that the system could be suspended even after a
decision under Article 7(1) or perhaps the mere activation of it.
91See Lazowski (2018) on how the Aranyosi approach might threaten the uniform application of EU
law.
92On the need for a more centralized assessment, see Wendel (2019) and Bard and van Ballegooij
(2018).
93And the same is true if we conceive the rule of law crisis as a crisis of trust, see von Bogdandy
(2018), pp. 689–690: ‘It is inconsistent to diagnose a crisis in trust, but to expect the relevant legal
instruments to overcome it, as do some legal analyses of the Commission’s “rule of law framework”
. . . A crisis in trust cannot be “resolved” by legal instruments, it can only be hedged and gradually
allowed to subside over time.’
94See e.g. Besselink (2017); see also Kosar (2018), pointing out that ultimately the Polish elections
might be more important than any Court of Justice’s intervention for safeguarding judicial inde-
pendence in the country.
95See Article 269 TFEU.
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6 Conclusion
When read in the broader context described in this chapter, the LM case can hardly
be understood as a general signal of the Court’s reluctance to engage with the Polish
rule of law crisis. On the contrary, the Court has shown a proactive approach by re-
directing the ASJP case from austerity to the rule of law, interpreting Article 19 TEU
in an exceptionally broad manner, and thus creating a new tool to enforce judicial
independence across the Union. The Commission and the Court immediately
exploited the new tool in the infringement action on the Supreme Court. These
were the two key acts of the Court’s rule of law play and, measured against them, the
LM decision loses the centrality it was expected to have.
Although there are some not entirely convincing steps in the Court’s reasoning
and outcome,96 the approach of the Court was ultimately a balanced one: it
maintained the need for the individual prong of the Aranyosi test, but left the national
court a fairly wide opportunity to refuse referral were it to consider that, in the
specific case, the individual suffered a real risk of unfair trial;97 furthermore, in
reaching its decision, the Court also signaled its broad concerns with the rule of law
in Poland. The framing of the case, however, did not offer the best opportunity to
take a strong stance on the Polish crisis and a broad reformulation of the questions
referred could have easily led to accusations of judicial activism, especially after the
already creative and groundbreaking decision of ASJP.98 The lesson LM seems to
teach is that infringement procedures seem to be better suited than ‘horizontal’
attempts to protect EU values,99 also considering that mutual trust creates complex
problems of a federal and constitutional nature that the Court always needs to take
into account.100 Questions of judicial independence and rule of law are in fact to be
addressed in a systemic manner, as it can be done in Commission’s infringement
actions against violations of Article 19 TEU; on the other hand, it is harder for
horizontal preliminary references, based on the protection of individual fundamental
rights, to frame the case in the most appropriate manner.101 The positive impact that
well-conducted infringement procedures may have has been further shown by the
decisions of the Court in the first Commission v. Poland case on the reform of the
Supreme Court. This was arguably the first true victory of the EU institutions after
several unsuccessful attempts to fight against Polish constitutional backsliding. The
forthcoming decisions on the second infringement actions, as well as on the prelim-
inary references raised by Polish courts, offer now further opportunities to safeguard
96See Sect. 2 above.
97As noted above, however, the national court ultimately rejected the appeal of Mr. Celmer: see
Irish High Court, supra note 31.
98For a different view, see Krajewski (2018) and Wendel (2019).




judicial independence. After the LM intermezzo, we are therefore in the truly
decisive act of the rule of law play between the EU and Poland.
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